Between the 18^th and the 22^nd of May 2021, 39 countries will take part in the Eurovision Song Contest in Rotterdam. The national juries and the public will decide which song is the best – or at least, which song they prefer.

What is Eurovision Exactly?

At the risk of causing confusion, there are two different meanings for Eurovision. What we are talking about here is the Eurovision Song Contest. The annual competition is organised by a TV network also called Eurovision, which is part of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), an alliance of public service media organisations around Europe and beyond.

Any member of the EBU can participate in the Eurovision Song Contest. This explains why Israel, Morocco and Turkey have participated at least once. It also means that countries like Egypt or Tunisia are eligible to participate if they want to as they are full members of the EBU, but Liechtenstein cannot. The case of Australia is more special, as in theory they only have “EBU Associated Member” status, but in practice they have participated to Eurovision assiduously since 2015. The explanation is simple: they had an enormous audience, asked politely to join, and were accepted as guests that have come back every year since then.

With almost 200 million people watching it every year, Eurovision is a formidable stage for artists to reach a bigger audience both at home and internationally. This is the very same show that made Abba and Céline Dion famous worldwide, fuelling the dreams of renown to the participants.

Eurovision’s Identity

For many people that don’t really follow the song contest, Eurovision is merely a show of bad pop songs where only Eastern European countries win. This statement is partly true. Yes, there are a lot of pop songs, and yes, some Eastern European countries such as Moldova have a habit of sending entries that fit the Eurovision stereotype to a tee (see for references when they created the Epic Sax Guy meme).

The show is known, in fact, for making fun of itself in this regard. Think, for example, of the unforgettable Verka Serduchka, the Ukrainian comedian who makes regular appearances to entertain the audience with his iconic star-shaped disco hat. Or again, when presenters themselves described the recipe for a perfect Eurovision performance (which should include love, peace, memorable costumes and some strange old folkloristic instrument) when introducing the song “Love Love Peace Peace” in Stockholm back in 2016.

But the audience also loves powerful songs that do not necessarily have this ironic taint to them. 2016, 2017 and 2019 winners were far from being silly pop songs. Both moods go hand in hand, and this makes the beauty – and the identity – of the show. The stage can display a silly pop, a heart-breaking ballad, and a headbanging hard rock piece – that’s part of the fan appeal!

The Confusion over its Political Dimension

Technically, the contest is supposed to be neutral in terms of politics, and political statements are forbidden. Georgia was refused participation in 2009 with the title “We Don’t Wanna Put In” which was a barely hidden criticism of the President of Russia. Belarus was disqualified from this year’s edition for sending a pro-Lukashenko song allegedly mocking the protests and named “Ya nauchu tebya (I’ll teach you)”.

On the other hand, the stage is often used for societal messages, to favour equality, LGBTQ+ friendly messages, etc. The 2018 winning song, by Netta, had a strong anti-patriarchy message, for example. Austria won in 2014 with Conchita Wurst’s song, “Rise Like a Phoenix”, promoting acceptance for and giving a voice to the LGBTQ+ community. Since its first openly gay contestant in 1997, Páll Óskar Hjálmtýsson from Iceland, the show has made a sort of “coming out” by itself by defending values of tolerance, giving the spotlight and a chance to shine to these messages.

The Power of Music

Like clockwork, Eurovision always brings up arguments about how these societal messages are political after all, and that they shouldn’t have any space within a song contest. But has music ever been neutral? Music has been used to fight oppressive regimes, like “E depois do adeus” by Paulo de Carvalho, which was the secret sign to the military to start the Carnation Revolution against the Salazar regime in Portugal. Music is also used to express a feeling in society; things we love or things we hate.

If a song like “Rise like a Phoenix” won, it means that it resonated in people’s hearts and that it deserved to win. It is a mere reflection of society and if songs about love or dancing are popular, they are certainly not the only ones to exist. A song speaks to the heart, to the emotions.

By allowing the public to vote, it opens the door to societal messages that vibrate within the crowd. If we only wanted to have the best song in purely technical terms, the jury would be the sole judge. The current system is a good balance between technical skills and popular votes, which are based only on the heart. Without that, the show would be significantly less entertaining.

The European Soul of Eurovision

The Eurovision Song Contest is also a stage for European identity. People from across the continent gather on stage, in the stadiums, in bars (during normal times), and celebrate music. Europeans come together on a stage, perform and cheer on each other. Many of them choose to proudly display their culture and their language and everyone applauds.

This is a place where being chauvinistic is not a thing, because music is such an emotional and subjective feeling. It often leads to mitigated feelings or disappointment over one’s own country when the music does not fit his or her personal taste. Eurovision is about picking the country with the song you like the most and rooting for them, regardless of the country itself.

The show focuses on having fun and there are no borders. Cultures, languages, and accents cohabitate, and this does not seem to be a problem. We are united in diversity.

The show took a deeper European turn when the Berlin Wall fell. The countries recently freed from the USSR’s yoke had a strong desire to be recognised as European. Estonia openly stated that their path to the European Communities went through Eurovision as well. This cultural aspect seems to be taken seriously by most Eastern European countries, which often have strong contenders to the show. It may also explain why Ukraine never lost a semi-final since its first participation in 2003, and even won twice, the first time being only one year after their entry in the contest.

Of course, while the show has a very European identity, there is no direct correlation between it and European cooperation on a political level. After all, it did not prevent Brexit, and Switzerland, where the first edition took place, never had a sudden urge to join the European institutions family.

However, the show does create the possibility to be a part of Europe without the politics, without having to debate on rules, on trade, and all the nitty-gritty that comes with politics. It allows to be a part of Europe, as diverse and vast as it is, and to have fun with friends from all over the continent. If this does not convince you, then nothing will.

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The links between Morocco and the European Communities traces back to 1987, when King Hassan II sent an official demand to integrate his country in all three institutions: the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community. His demand was rejected stating that the country was not European, a criterion written on the paper only 6 years later with the approval of the Copenhagen criteria.

Despite the rejection, Hassan II knew that his country had little chances of being considered as a potential candidate after sending representatives to test the waters in Brussels. However, this did not stop the two parties from collaborating. Many treaties were signed, especially on subjects such as fisheries, free trade, agriculture, and many others. These bilateral treaties, combined with the country’s membership of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, give Morocco today almost all the benefits of being a Member State of the European Union without having decisional power.

The European Union is Morocco’s main trade partner, with about 60% exports and around 57% imports, while Morocco does not make it in the top 20 biggest partners of the EU. Then why is the country so close to the European Union? In three words: strategy, oil, and fish.

Morocco today

Despite Spain’s apparent contentions with Morocco about its exclaves, both countries share a lot of information in terms of security, antiterrorism, border control, etc. France as well has multiple strategic interests in collaborating with the Kingdom. The country is a stable ally in the Maghreb and offers a door to the Saharan countries. It is also on the path of migration flows from Africa to Europe and acts as a gatekeeper on behalf of Europe, in exchange of financial compensation. The second aspect consists in the fisheries. The scenario here is simple: Europe sends money to Morocco and European fishermen are allowed to fish in Moroccan waters.

The final major aspect is oil. Western Sahara, or Sahrawi, is located in southern Morocco and it is believed that there might be major oil resources there. The first problem is that Western Sahara is a disputed land that is classified as a “non-self-governing territory to be decolonised”. The second problem is that there might not be any oil in that region. But an oil-endowed ally is in the interest of Europe, hence why the French company Total helped prospecting on behalf of Morocco, and why the National Norwegian Oil Fund invested in the venture. However, both companies pulled out due to international pressure from the UN.

Despite the help and the collaboration, there is contention over the three exclaves owned by Spain on the Moroccan coast: Ceuta, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Melilla. The European country refuses to address the issue while Morocco repeatedly tried to get control of the exclaves in the past. However, it became a comfortable issue recently for both countries.

With the increase in migration to Europe, Spain decided to build large walls at the borders to keep the waves of migrants out as much as possible. Europe is also paying Morocco to police the border on behalf of Europe, comfortably outsourcing the responsibility to the Kingdom. This heavy, external border control led to several deaths and caused NGOs such as Amnesty International to ask Spain to take responsibility for such events. Meanwhile, nothing is being done, with Morocco and Europe silently shaking hands.

Finally, the biggest and most embarrassing problem for both parties is the aforementioned Western Sahara. Morocco’s central power claims the land as its own, while the United Nations designated this land as an occupied country. The UN’s and the EU’s law forbid the latter to have a trade agreement including products from a territory whose status is the same as Sahrawi’s.

It is based on this law that the Front Polisario, a rebel liberation movement, sued the European Union at the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016. The Court found the EU guilty and forced to annul the trade agreement.

The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the time, Federica Mogherini, dismissed the issue, and another trade agreement was found excluding specifically products (and fish) made on the Western Saharan land. Morocco briefly protested by cutting ties with the EU, but they were quickly restoed.

As of today, the status quo remains intact. The presence of a stable, cooperating ally in the region is a too good opportunity to pass for the EU. Especially when it gives the opportunity for Member States to relocate its migratory problems outside of its borders, just by closing their eyes on the spiky issue of Western Sahara.

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UK’s historical involvement

After the Russo-Turkish war, the Ottoman Empire agreed to let the British Empire set an outpost in the Mediterranean by leasing them the island of Cyprus. The island was of key importance for the UK, which needed the location to monitor the Suez Canal and all the colonial routes going through. Once the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in WW1, the UK formally annexed Cyprus, as well as many other Ottoman territories such as Egypt.

The UK officially made Cyprus a British crown colony in 1925, after the Turkish Republic had given up on Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the Greek population of the island believed that the British rule would lead them to Enosis, the reunification with Greece, as part of a “Greater Greece” (Megali Idea) plan. As the UK did not seem to move towards this, a guerrilla organisation was born in 1955: the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which had Enosis as its goal. Turkish nationals wanted at first a full annexation by Turkey, but then preferred a partition after realising that Turkish Cypriots made up only 20% of the total population. As a response to EOKA, the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) appeared and aimed for Taksim, the partition of the island.

Independence, the Greek coup, and the Turkish invasion

After many riots provoked by EOKA and supported by the majority of the population, Cyprus got its independence in 1960. The first president elected is Makarios III, an archbishop that aimed for Enosis. By trying to keep the Turkish out of government and out of decision loops, violence only escalated. The UN had to intervene with UN peacekeepers and impose a cease-fire in 1964 to maintain peace.

In July 1974, the Greek Military Junta orchestrated a successful coup in Cyprus. The new government formed, a junta led by Nikos Sampson, was aiming at reuniting Cyprus with Greece. In response, Turkey tried to gather international support for an invasion through the UN but failed. Under the Guarantee Treaty of 1960 signed by Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, each one of these signatories could orchestrate a unilateral military invasion of Cyprus to restore democracy. The situation remained frozen since then.

Reunification and the Annan plan

After such an escalation of violence, how can a nation ever reunite? Both regions would need devolution of powers, as neither side would accept the other having more power. The most sustainable solution appears to be the federal model. It would allow more flexibility and less state centralisation, taking more into account the needs of local communities. Such a plan has been already thought by the United Nations: the Annan plan. It suggested a restructuration and reunification of the Republic of Cyprus into a “United Republic of Cyprus” that would be a federation of two states, more or less based on the Swiss model.

A reconciliation committee was proposed along with the federation plan, with the aim to bring the two communities back together. It also allowed Greece and Turkey to keep permanent military bases on the island, with a strong limit on the military size.

Different versions of the plan were made, up to the Annan plan V. The resolution was put to a referendum in 2004 in both communities. Northern Cypriots voted in favour of the reunification plan with almost 65% in favour, while Greek Cypriots voted the referendum down with a vast 75% against. On exit polls, most Greek Cypriots were concerned about security, which was the main reason for the rejection.

Towards a two-state solution?

In response to the Greek Cypriot’s rejection of the referendum, the UN called for a lift on unnecessary trade barriers and restrictions. Their hope is, if a reunification federation plan is not accepted, that the two entities can at least cooperate on basic inter-state matters. This means implementing a de-facto two-state solution until the Republic of Cyprus eventually officially recognises Northern Cyprus.

The conflict evolved from aggressiveness, threats or even annihilatory conflict at times, to disagreements, or questioning. As shown in the behaviour graph below, the general trend over the years shows that the conflict is slowly settling. Many elected Cypriots, both Turkish and Greek, concede that both populations grew apart by several generations, acknowledging that they share little except the name.

The only way left to move forward is thus a two-state solution. It would allow Northern Cyprus to vary its trade and avoid being dependent on Turkey. Normalisation would also mean further diplomatic relations between the two parts of the island and to aim eventual agreements at common growth. It will also resolve a century-long dispute for Cyprus and could ease tensions between the European Union and Turkey.

But Turkey does not seem willing to ease these tensions. Many aspects show that the country will not finalise its accession process to the EU, and President Erdoğan understood it. The Cyprus question is a point of pressure they have on the Union, a powerful lever just like the migrants and their diaspora. A United Cyprus would mean giving away their military control over the North of the island, being even more contained in the Mediterranean Sea, which has been the source of many tensions in 2020.

The need to reunify is also less present in the Northern part. They used to be much poorer than Cyprus which was a pro-unity argument for long. They are however rapidly closing the gap, showing that they do not need the unification to develop properly. Cyprus’ nominal GDP per capita is estimated at $26,240, while Northern Cyprus’ is almost equal to $15,000. It might be almost two times lower, but it is almost equal to Poland’s and Hungary’s nominal GDP per capita. It also is higher than the ones of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria.

While not ideal, it clearly shows that this part of the island can develop on its own. And with the recent discovery of increasingly more natural gas in Northern Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, the space for development increases with it.

With Turkey having little incentives to let go of its influence over the island and Northern Cyprus developing well, the pressure other than political will to reunite the two parts will remain low for a very long time. The situation is certainly not pushing for a United Cyprus. Citizens of both areas report more and more their doubts about a possible reunification and become more and more used to the situation. This is normalisation in process.

Finally, this conflict is a “comfortable” conflict for Cyprus, as it gives its leaders great political leverage. Not only it fosters patriotism within its population, but it also allows Cyprus to have a real say in the European Council by threatening to veto unless Cyprus receives concessions whenever they may use it.

Whatever the future negotiations will lead to, the European Union is pushing for a normalisation of the situation as part of its long-term plan of Development and Cooperation. Whether it is under the form of a United Republic of Cyprus, or as the recognition and trade agreements with Northern Cyprus (and eventually welcome them as Member State in the future), the best thing that can happen is the end of this century-long conflict.

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Whether one side has a more legitimate reason for aggression or a stronger claim over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is not, however, the point of this article. Instead, it will analyse the trust mechanism in the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, how this trust has been broken, and how it may eventually be repaired.

Where it all started

Tensions surrounding the region of Nagorno-Karabakh have existed for a long time. The modern development of the conflict can be traced back to the early 1920s, when the USSR took control of the Caucasus. Particularly, it can be pinpointed to 1921, when the Soviet Union placed the ethnically Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic in an attempt to divide and rule the South Caucasus.

The territory, more commonly known as Artsakh in Armenian, has repeatedly attempted to reunite with Soviet Armenia. Despite its attempts, it has remained de iure Azerbaijani land, although de facto it has declared itself independent since 1992 and self-governs accordingly. The dissolution of the USSR led to an open war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for six years, in what became known as the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). Since then, the situation has remained one of frozen conflict, with no outright war but significant clashes occurring occasionally alongside the border.  

The most significant of these skirmishes happened in 2016, taking the name of the Four-Day War, and now again in 2020 as we are witnessing a significant and worrying escalation of belligerence.

The role of trust in the conflict-process

At the basis of the tensions is a structural incompatibility: the conflict is based on the belief that Armenia and Azerbaijan’s interests are incompatible. Not only has the dispute lasted 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, but it has deep roots that date back centuries. Today, the two countries are very well aware of the reasons that push them to fight and are willing to continue as such. The conflict cannot be resolved in the current context, leading to frustration, anger, and hostilities.

Behaviour from both sides denotes little cooperation and a lot of aggressive assertiveness. The current goal set is the “annihilation” of the other party to get a better position during peace talks. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan might come to an end eventually, but it will not be the end of the conflict per se. The countries will go to war endlessly unless they find a compromise that is accepted by both parties.

Where does trust fit into all this? According to Cambridge, trust is “to believe that someone is good and honest and will not harm you, or that something is safe and reliable”. It is not difficult in this context to realise that trust is far from being set. The issue is that with a lack of trust, agreements will be breached by fear of what the other might do. By way of example, this is what we have been seeing repeatedly with breached ceasefire agreements in recent days.

Trust has lots of benefits during a conflict. The first one is simply information exchange: it’s easier and more transparent in good conditions, which leads to more sustainable agreements. It also leads to cooperative behaviour, which is absolutely crucial, unlike today’s focus on “annihilation”. A minimum of trust also allows negotiators to employ strategies of “positive influence”, which pushes the entire negotiation to go in a positive way for both parties. These strategies are more desirable than the coercive strategies that are in place today: for example, Azerbaijan claiming that they will not accept anything until they get the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh back.

One of the main barriers to trust is the group effect. When people that do not know each other are randomly put into two groups, they tend to believe people from their group rather than the other. In moments of tension, the information given to someone in one’s group will be considered as the truth and the information of the other group as fake. That is why fake news in periods of war are spread so easily. Add in the mix a feeling of nationalism and pro-war state propaganda and trust cannot survive a day. A minimum of trust may offer the other group the benefit of the doubt, which is totally absent in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Another barrier is the accountability of the negotiators. When two negotiators sit at the table, alone and without public opinion to take into consideration, they usually show more concessions and more flexibility. Trust tends to grow more easily as the interpersonal relationship slowly builds up. However, when one is held accountable by the citizens of one’s country, concessions are rarely offered. Negotiations in this setting tend to be less successful. This is exactly what happens when Azerbaijan’s president announces that Azerbaijan’s citizens do not agree with the ceasefire, which gives him a perfect reason to refuse to stop the fighting.

How to create trust when tension is rocket high

While the fighting continues and soldiers and civilians lose their lives over this conflict, what could be done to achieve peace? What could be done to restore trust? There are many examples of countries that went from full-scale war to trusting alliances, such as the entirety of Europe, the USA or Japan. But how to achieve that level of trust?

First, before any strategies are discussed, some trust dynamics starters need to be set. Announcing an action, and doing it exactly as announced, shows the other party that they are reliable. Secondly, to ensure a lasting negotiation, conciliatory measures must be irrevocable.

Usually, a first gesture of goodwill will be answered by another positive gesture, which can lead to a virtuous cycle of collaboration and trust. Breaking a tense status quo is easier after one party makes the first concession, hoping that the other party responds in a similar fashion. Of course, such a move is extremely risky, as the other party might simply take advantage of the situation.

In the scenario of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, let us imagine that Armenia makes the first move and offers some occupied regions back to Azerbaijan, as a sign of goodwill towards peace. Azerbaijan could make the effort to offer concessions to Armenia back, or it could simply take the regions and continue the fighting to further its position of power and recover what it perceived to be its legitimate territory.

Another option is to make a huge first gesture of goodwill. A big offer will only make the opposing party look illegitimate to its population and to the international community by refusing to negotiate. It is, again, a highly risky but effective way of forcing trust into the relationship. This technique was used during the war between Israel and Egypt, when Egypt’s president Anwar el-Sadat decided to go to Israel to discuss peace terms directly. In war times, this is a huge sign that led to lasting peace. However, he had spent a lot, both politically and personally, as he got assassinated for this act once back in Egypt.

Finally, the safest option is to modify the structure of the problem itself. Instead of tackling the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in its entirety, it would be more sustainable to break the problem into smaller issues and tackle each of them one by one. It is much easier to make a first move concession on a small, lest costly issue than on the entire problem.

But as the conflict in the Caucasus endures and no efforts are being made to establish lasting trust, a real solution to the problem might not come any time soon, despite the best attempts of State mediators, the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group.

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In 2005, the European Commission stated that the EU could be open to enlargement talks with these three countries in the future. But just how European is Transcaucasia? While making definite statements on the blurry concept of European identity can be complicated, this article explores the existing cultural links between European countries and these three countries.

Languages of Transcaucasia: the horsemen of distinctness

Despite their proximity, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan share nothing in terms of language. All three derived from three different primary languages. Georgian, the literary and common language of the Kartvelian languages, is not known to be linked to any other language. It is one of the world’s primary languages by itself and has evolved within the same region since then. It is the direct descendant of proto-Kartvelian, which show some similar patterns to Indo-European, which might indicate an early interaction. However, the language remained very closed to foreign influence, despite the various occupations of the region. Georgians even have their own alphabet, only used by them.

Armenian is an independent and distant branch of the Indo-European languages. It is, however, closer to Iranian than any other European language. They also possess their very own alphabet.

Azerbaijan, the only country of the region using the Latin script, speaks a language part of the Turkic family. Despite the proximity to Turkey, Azerbaijani is closer to the Turkmen language than to Turkish.

Being an Indo-European language is not a prerequisite to be European. Hindi or Iranian languages do not make their country any more European. In the same way, Estonia, Finland, or Hungary speak Uralic languages, yet the countries are indisputably European. So, in terms of language, Transcaucasia’s linguistic culture has little to no links to Europe, having their very own cultural heritage.

The religious bond

While Christianity is not a European religion per se, European culture and heritage are highly influenced by Christianity. Georgia’s main religion is under the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church, which shares close links with Eastern Europe and most of the Balkans. It also brought Georgia closer to Europe during History, when Christian powers allied to fight the common Islamic “enemy”. Today’s Apostolic Autocephalous Church of Georgia is in entire agreement with the rest of the Eastern Orthodox world. But Christianity is not the only religious link Georgia shares with Europe. The Georgian mythology, which preceded Christianity, had important influences from Greek mythology.

While Armenia is part of the Eastern Orthodoxy as well, it follows a different orientation, being the Oriental Orthodoxy. Unlike the Georgian Patriarchy, the Armenian Apostolic Church is not in full agreement with the Orthodox world and developed specific customs. A similar church would be Coptic Orthodox Church.

Finally, Azerbaijan has an overwhelming part of the population following Islam, with 85% of the population being Shi’a. While European culture is strongly influenced by Christianity, it is not limited by it, as shown by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania or Kosovo which are Muslim in the majority.

Traditions and culture based on religious practices are overall very similar to Europe within the region. The only exception being Azerbaijan which does not have strong historical ties or cultural and religious exchanges with the rest of Europe.

Transcaucasia and its art

Another manifestation of culture, perhaps the most visible, is art. Religious buildings are, of course, influenced by Christianity in both Armenia and Georgia. Other building styles are distinctively Georgian or Armenian, but both are influenced in a way by Byzantine architecture, linking them to European culture. The Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi is distinctive for its Haussmann building style, showing that the country is turned towards Europe more than Asia or the Middle East.

The traditional music in Georgia is a unique mix of local polyphonic music inherited from Christianity, of middle eastern monophony and late European languages.

Persian culture, however, has greatly influenced the region as well. Not only it is the omnipresent influence in Azerbaijan, but it also influenced Georgia from the 12^th to the 19^th century. The ruling class was often raised in today’s Iran, and Jean Chardin noted in 1672 surprising similarities with the Persian world.

European heritage is visible in Transcaucasia and had an undeniable influence over the region. Despite how strong it may be in Georgia, or faint to non-existent in Azerbaijan, it remains a surprisingly unique region where local peculiarities mix with both European and Persian influences.

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Napoleon III’s creation

Napoleon I introduced the gold franc standard in 1803, which had the precise measurements and metal composition needed to have a stable currency. Half a century later, in 1865, Napoleon III used this same standard to model the Latin Monetary Union on. The LMU had both gold and silver coins, set at an exchangeable ratio of 1:1.15, effectively making the currency function on bimetallism.

The idea was to have national currencies follow the LMU standard, so all member states could use each other’s currency and know for certain that the value of the coins was the same. On the 23^rd of December 1865, the LMU treaty was signed by France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. All four countries could issue coins under the Latin Monetary Union standard mentioned in the treaty, which would then be accepted in any of the other partner countries. This meant that, for example, French merchants accepted Lire and Italian merchants accepted Francs. The goal was to promote commerce and exchanges between the signatory countries.

The Expansion of the Latin Monetary Union

The idea had a stunning success and attracted other nations to join the Union. Greece joined in 1867 and started minting its Drachma under LMU standard. Then Spain and Romania started the talks to join the Union, but the negotiations failed. Nevertheless, both decided to unilaterally mint their currencies to respect the LMU standard.

Negotiations happened with Austria-Hungary, but they ended rejecting the change, refusing to adapt to the concept of bimetallism as currency. They did, however, sign a separate treaty with France on gold coins and minted some gold Gulden (Forint) in LMU standard.

Other states joined the Union without signing the treaty: all French colonies had to transition to the LMU standard (including Algeria) in 1865, Peru joined in 1863, Colombia and Venezuela in 1871, Finland in 1877, Serbia in 1878 and Bulgaria in 1880. At that point, the LMU already expanded much further than simply a European currency. Finally, when Albania gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912, it used coins from all over the LMU instead of keeping the Ottoman Lira, before it adopted its own currency in 1925.

Why it failed

Despite its apparent success, the LMU was deeply flawed and several critical mistakes were made in its set up and development. Key downfalls were the abuse and the breaches of the treaty. In 1866, the administrator of the Papal Treasury, Giacomo Antonelli, decided to increase the Vatican’s silver coinage by the equivalent of Belgium’s total. To mint this enormous amount of money, he changed the amount of prescribed metal in the coins, in direct violation of the treaty. The Papal coins flowed in the Union and debased the currency, proving very profitable for the Vatican. But the French and Swiss Banks rejected the Papal coins (despite Napoleon III’s tacit agreement with Giacomo Antonelli). The Papal States were ejected from the Union in 1870, owing 20 million Lire (the equivalent of almost 83 million Euro today).

Greece did the same thing as the Vatican in the beginning of the 20^th century, lowering the amount of gold to save its economy and hence debasing the value. They were expelled in 1908, but eventually readmitted in 1910. France and Italy, too, abused the LMU by printing paper money based on the bimetallic currency, which was technically outlawed. The two countries printed an extensive amount of money to finance their projects, while other Union members had to bear the costs.

Another critical problem, perhaps the main one, was that bimetallism is subject to fluctuation in the value of the two metals used, gold and silver. New silver extraction and refining techniques, huge increase in silver imports by France and Belgium, and a natural decrease in silver value led to huge stress on the Union’s economy. The exchange rate of 1:1.15 was no longer the reflection of the real value.

The Germans used this to their advantage, exchanging overvalued silver coins for gold coins that they would insert in their own monetary union, the Zollverein. In response to this, the mintage of silver coins was entirely suspended in 1878. From this date to the end, the LMU became de facto gold standard only. Payment in silver was still allowed, but customs were only in gold.

The previous failures completely destabilise the Union, with World War I giving the final blow to the project and ending all monetary collaboration. While the LMU was only officially dissolved in 1927, in practice its use really disappeared at the beginning of the war.

The Impact of the Latin Monetary Union

The primary goal of the Union was to nurture international trade and to bring the countries closer. While Napoleon I tried to unite Europe by force, Napoleon III tried to unite Europe through its currency. However, looking back, most economists agree that it only had a limited impact on trade. The period between 1865 and 1874 was the only moment where real increase in international trade with positive effects on the economy was visible.

Unlike the Zollverein, which was one of the key factors of Germany’s unification, the LMU failed to bring the countries closer. Its numerous flaws were fatal for anything to happen. It however inspired the creation of the similar Scandinavian Monetary Union, a union formed by Denmark and the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. It also served as a model on which to take lessons from to avoid the mistakes made in the past to make the Euro a more sustainable currency.

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Transnistria is a breakaway state located de jure within Moldova’s borders, on the banks of the Dniester river close to the Ukrainian border. The de-facto state of 500,000 citizens possesses everything to be considered as a country, except for international recognition. It is only recognised by three other unrecognised territories: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Arstakh.

History

Under the USSR, 40% of Moldova’s GDP came from Transnistria, with a standard of living twice as high as that of Bessarabia.

Moldova declared its independence during the dissolution of the USSR. The leaders of the country re-introduced the Latin alphabet and acknowledged the country’s cultural ties with Romania. Russian was banished as an official language, and this decision was sparked a conflict beginning in March 1992. In July of the same year, a ceasefire was signed, and remains in place until today. Russia has kept about 1,000 troops along the demilitarised zone as a peacekeeping force. However many Moldovans see this as a foreign aggression on their land.

In 2006, further normalisation talks between Moldova and Transnistria began, without successful results. The same would occur in 2011; despite the implication of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in the talks, and with the US and the EU as external observers. In 2014, after the Crimean annexation from Russia, the president of the Transnistrian parliament, Mikhail Burla, officially asked Russia to annex Transnistria. The demand was never met.

Politics

Despite being called the Soviet Supreme, the national parliament has nothing to do with communism. Although clearly far from perfect with important voting fraud, the election system is considered to be democratic, and allows multiple parties from across the political spectrum to run, unlike communist states.

The Soviet (Council in English) is composed of 43 seats. 35 of these seats belong to the Renewal party, a nationalistic centrist party, for only 1 seat owned by the Pridnestrovie Communist Party (Marxism-Leninism). The communist party has not been in power for over a generation, and the only communist deputy is, as of today, in jail for violence against police officers during a protest. In an ironic comparison, the communist party of Moldova was part of the majority in the parliament from 2001 to 2009, which is has now been replaced by the Party of the Socialists (far-left) as the largest party in the 2019 elections.

The Economy

The economy is much closer to free-market socialism than to anything communist. While the state offers free healthcare, education and a subsidised transport system, they also have a flat tax rate of 10%. Some citizens call it “Wild West capitalism”, as business is unrestricted and everything is for sale. There are so few regulations that crypto mining has bloomed in the region. In a place where it is impossible to get the national currency from an ATM due to its international inexistence, where it is impossible to pay by card and where cryptocurrency is thriving, where corruption is rooted everywhere, it is without surprise that it has fostered the creation of a black market. Not only that this black market eases the lives of everyday citizens, but it also plays a huge role in arms trafficking and money laundering, for which the Transnistrian government is directly accused of.

Sheriff, the biggest Transnistrian company, is suspected of mass money laundering on behalf of the Transnistrian government, which makes most of its profits through arms manufacturing with its high-security plants. The company owns almost everything in the region: petrol stations, supermarkets, a television channel, construction company, etc. The best football team in the country is funded by the company. It was originally on behalf of the first president of the country, Igor Smirnov, and now controls all the region’s political and economic life. The current president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, was backed by Sheriff during the electoral campaign, effectively securing him the seat of president.

All the indicators shift towards an oligarchy rather than a communist regime.

Nationalism and Transnistria

Using communist symbols is far from being considered hypocrisy. It is an essential part of Transnistrian identity. The hammer and sickle became a nationalistic symbol to glorify the past and to differentiate it from the rest of Moldova. Stores sell busts of Stalin and Putin simultaneously and colonels such as Igor Nebeygolova proudly display the USSR flag alongside the flag of Imperial Russia. What seems to be schizophrenic, is in fact that the symptom of a nationalistic identity is that it misses its glorious past.

During the war, the Transnistrian mass media portrayed the conflict as a “sacred war against the genocide by nationalistic Moldovans”. The collective memory is the one of “a war for truth, justice and independence”. The techniques are the same as those used by media in ex-Yugoslavia during the Yugoslavia wars. Politicisation of education played a crucial role in the creation of the Transnistrian identity. This was evident for the leaders who forcibly closed all Romanian-speaking schools in the region; effectively increasing the gap between the region and Moldova. The EU and the OSCE denounced this act as a linguistic cleansing, leading to economic restrictions on Transnistria and a travel ban for all the leading elite.

The Transnistrian Identity Crisis

Historically however, the arguments supporting the independence of Transnistria are not wrong. Bessarabian Moldova has always been under the sphere of influence of Romania, while the Transnistrian Moldova has had strong Russian influence. Moldova had always been a very heterogeneous region, and Russian acted as a common language for a long time. When the USSR fell, the elites wanted to stay in power and effectively used identity and culture to foster this nationalism. The big difference between Moldova and Transnistria is that Transnistria defines its identity very clearly, unlike Moldova. The breakaway state feels part of the Russian sphere of influence and there is no doubt there. Moldova remains today split about its own identity. Are they Romanians or Moldovans? Are they closer to Europe or closer to Russia? These questions remain unanswered and split the political landscape.

However, “identity doesn’t fill your stomach” according to a Transnistrian citizen with the question of identity slowly losing its grip. Even though the region survived on its own with Russia’s economical help, it becomes harder to be ostracised as such by the rest of the continent. Goodwill has emerged from the north side of the Dniester. The current president is pleading for closer ties with Moldova and has suggested the option of federalising the country. The hope for the Sheriff Republic is to be able to export its goods without all the current limitations of being unrecognised.

The post Beyond the Communist Appearance: Transnistria appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Anguilla is a small 91km² island of the Leeward Islands, situated east of Puerto Rico and North of the shared island of Sint-Maarten/Saint-Martin. It is home to about 14,000 Anguillians, all British and EU citizens under Council Decision 2013/755/EU. Anguilla was previously part of the associated states of Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, but seceded from the country to become a British Crown colony (now British Overseas Territory) again in 1971. The Anguillians are proud to say they fought to remain British, and it is part of who they are nowadays. However, Brexit is perceived as treason from the UK, especially considering that Anguilla did not have a say in the referendum.

A symbiotic relationship strengthened by the EU

The islands of Anguilla and Saint-Martin have an intertwined history that goes all the way back to the first inhabitants of the islands, the Arawak people. When the Europeans colonised this corner of the globe, both islands have often been alternatively under Dutch, French, or British rule.

Many families, even today, live and travel freely between the two islands. The best personification of this is Victor F. Banks, the Chief Minister of Anguilla, being the cousin of Daniel Gibbs, the President of the Collectivité of Saint-Martin. With the UK previously a Member State, the rules of free movement applied to these islands as well. The European single market deepened the links between the two islands, fostering prosperity.

It also allowed a symbiotic development. Sint-Maarten possesses an international airport acting as a regional hub, transiting up to 95% of all the traffic to Anguilla. Unlike the Anguillan airport, the Dutch hub Princess Juliana is long enough to welcome large aircrafts. The French side of Saint-Martin benefits from the provision of excellent healthcare services by metropolitan France, including an MRI scanner, dentistry, and a well-equipped hospital. It is no surprise that many Anguillians and Sint-Maarteners commute to the French side to have access to quality treatments. Anguilla, due to its flat geography, has a lot of space to produce food as well as alcoholic beverages. It is their main export and Saint-Martin is the main destination for these products.

But even more than Saint-Martin, Anguilla also strongly depends on Sint-Eustatius (Netherlands) for over 90% of the island’s fuel. It is not only essential for the production of most of their electricity, but also crucial for the desalinisation process needed to provide drinking water.

Most of the Leeward Islands, 11 of them, make up what is nicknamed the “Caribbean European Union”, soon to be weakened in a similar way as mainland Europe.

Is the EU more attractive than the UK?

As much as the Anguillians are proud to be British, the population feels disrespected by the UK’s attitude of imposing rules without ever asking their opinion. Brexit is the decision that threatens the very own survival of the island. The local government fears that being forced out of the EU will have  a much harsher impact than the strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic, Irma, which severely hit the island in 2017.

The UK’s attitude to the island offers many solutions maintaining an on-going culture of dependency. Whether or not it is intentional or simply a political error, it does not offer many development options to Anguilla. On the other side, the EU’s politic is to create stability and prosperity in the territories part of the Overseas Territories and Countries. The policy applied for the neighbouring countries of the Union is exactly the same. According to Victor F. Banks, the Chief Minister of Anguilla, this behaviour is much more profitable to the island. Hence the general feeling that it is more in their interest to collaborate with the EU than the UK.

Anguilla also depends a lot on international funding. The UK’s Department For international Development (DFID) does not classify Anguilla as eligible to receive financial help. The EU, however, represents 36% of Anguilla’s overall budget for a total of 14 million euros. The subsidy has stopped this year as the first direct consequence of Brexit.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank already expressed its concern about the economical effects of all (EU) citizens scattered across the Leeward islands, not only in Anguilla. The EU also contributed much more than the UK to the development of the island thanks to decisions such as trade policies, fisheries, maritime policies, blue growth, cohesion policies, environment and energy. The EU’s policies contributed to strengthen the historical relationship between the islands – now the UK’s decision threatens this special relationship.

Finally, as previously displayed, Anguilla relies heavily on trade and risks seeing a strong deceleration of its economy after losing access to the free movement of goods, putting at risk even their ability to provide enough fresh water.

The benefits for the 27

It is crystal clear that the EU plays a crucial role for Anguilla, but what does Anguilla have to offer to the EU? Much more than one would expect, and more than the UK even acknowledges.

Firstly, there’s the Anegada passage, also nicknamed the Oh-my-god-passage, where all European exports transiting through the Panama Canal must navigate through. It also represents 10% of all US maritime exports. This means that 20% of the world’s marine traffic goes through Anguillan waters. There is a clear strategic importance in controlling this passage that the UK fails to recognise according to Anguilla.

Free movement allows French and Dutch territories to benefit from the high-end tourism that Anguilla attracts. Businesses on the island of Saint-Martin, on both sides, would suffer important setbacks from losing access to the Anguillan market, jeopardising the economical stability of the island.

Finally, the airport Princess Juliana in Sint-Maarten aims to be a regional hub. It generates important wealth to the island and ensures direct links with European cities such as Paris or Amsterdam. Closing borders would redirect the traffic to Puerto Rico or Antigua, weakening the position of EU’s airport.

The available solutions

Now that Brexit is inevitable, the solutions available to Anguilla and the EU are narrowing. Anguillian officials have called on the UK to negotiate for a customs union specific to the Leeward EU islands. Free trade is an essential part of Anguilla’s sustainability. However, London remains deaf to the demands and simply replies that “every measure will be taken”. Hard to believe for the Anguillians

France and Netherlands have also been vague about it, failing to acknowledge the importance of the impact on their territories. Finally, there is one ultimate solution, independence. As much as Anguilla would rather not have to do this, the control over who they can trade with seems today more important than their relationship with the UK.

As much as this is a very specific problem posed by Brexit, it goes to show the UK’s poor handling of its overseas territories after Brexit, and highlights the importance of the EU for its citizens across the oceans. Just like Anguilla, 250 000 EU citizens living in the British Overseas did not have the right to vote for their divorce with the European Union.

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