In mid-September, X was crawling with stories about these. Dozens, then hundreds, thousands of accounts reposted alarming claims about the “spread” across towns and cities. Every major news outlet picked it up, and the local press came in support.

And yet. The figures showed no surge compared to previous years. Reported cases remained in line with the usual yearly numbers. True, call-outs did increase but mostly because people panicked and demanded inspections they didn’t really need, messing with the actual numbers. Six schools were shut down nationwide, closures later deemed unnecessary. France typically sees about a million interventions a year, and 2023 only just nudged above that, notably due to the increase of intervention demands by worried people.

This could have been funny (without mocking the people that genuinely experienced a bedbug infestation, which is a miserable thing to live through) were it not so clearly part of the Kremlin’s playbook: disinformation and disruption, deliberately seeded in “unfriendly” countries. France’s Minister for European Affairs at the time, Jean-Noël Barrot, said as much in early 2024 that the bedbug hysteria was a textbook Russian operation.

Storm-1516 is the name French authorities gave to the massive disinformation campaign conducted by Russia in France, which has apparently been active in this form since August 2023. Unable to infest the beds of the French, the bedbugs had invaded their internet, a trial run of for what was to come, just as counter-interference services were beginning to track the operation.

But not all the attacks were virtual. That same autumn, dozens of Stars of David were sprayed on buildings in the Paris suburbs, home to Jewish families, in the tense weeks following Hamas’s terror attack and Israel’s assault on Gaza. Once again, these actions were amplified by countless bots on social networks, spreading the acts of individuals paid, directly or indirectly, by the Russian regime to socially destabilise the country. It would be dishonest to claim that it did not work: tensions flared, at least for a while, before the revelation that this was, yet again, foreign interference. A very similar action happened in May of 2024, where red hands were spotted on the Shoah memorial in Paris. The suspects were later found by the police to be Bulgarian and had just arrived in Paris.

On the 9th of September of this year, pig heads were dumped outside several mosques around Paris, sparking outrage and more online clashes.

The investigation, thankfully, moved quickly, helped by CCTV and witness accounts, allowed investigators to indentify that a Serbian-registered car had entered France, bought the heads from a farmer, dropped them at the mosques, then fled the country via Belgium.

Taken individually, these incidents were already worrying, but placed in the broader context of the Kremlin’s strategy, they take on a far more sinister dimension, that is undermining French citizens’ trust in their institutions and media, playing on identity fractures, and pouring oil on the dumpster fire that is the French political crisis.

General Thierry Burkhard, then Chief of the Defence Staff, said on the 11th of July that Moscow saw France as its “main enemy in Europe” and quoted Vladimir Putin himself to that effect.

Abroad, some shrugged this off as the French giving themselves too much importance yet again. But the point was well made. For years, Paris has been regarded by Kremlin-linked outlets and the Kremlin proper as a pivotal supporter of Ukraine.

The turning point was of course February 2022, when Russia invaded. Until days before, France was still trying to play the diplomacy card, in its long tradition as a “distant friend of Russia.”

In truth, French-Russian interests haven’t been aligned since 1917. Some would argue that they haven’t been since the Crimean War of 1853 considering the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892 was more about France’s will of revenge on Germany and Russia’s need to balance German power in occupied Poland than outspoken friendship. The Second World War, of course, is another story.

Moscow’s diplomats were fond of cultivating the illusion of a “special relationship,” as it shaped French hesitation and inconsistency about Russia for decades. France still maintained its ground and had parts of its military and diplomatic establishment deeply sceptical of Russia, seeing it as a growing threat, as opposed to the more conservative, older generation that could see them as a “partner” for the future.

For a while though, France’s elites thought they had the hear of the Kremlin. Notably in 2008 when Nicolas Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy with Putin, following the invasion of Georgia, effectively froze the conflict, much to Russia’s advantage, cementing the separatist “republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which served as general rehearsals for the future puppet states of Donetsk and Luhansk. This came at a time when Nicolas Sarkozy had actually been bullied by Putin in 2007, with him threatening him and France during their first meeting. Sarkozy famously looked distraught in the press conference shortly after.

The real break came only in 2022, after the assault on Ukraine, even though Putin had been received at Brégançon as recently as 2019, to the not-so-concealed irritation of France’s allies.

By April 2022, France expelled 35 Russian diplomats, suspected of running an espionage network from the Russian embassies and consulates.

France’s intentions not to humiliate Russia after the Soviet collapse came from good intentions and geopolitical goodwill. However, the oligarchs, who had pushed Yeltsin to hand power to Putin after the latter’s clever political manoeuvring, turned that goodwill into a tool for Moscow. The “special relationship” was, in truth, only going one way. Still, one could say, the French national bird is a rooster. And a rooster has claws. Paris’s sudden shift of tone caught Moscow off guard, and hybrid attacks escalated in response.

Now deprived of official diplomatic channels in France, Moscow has changed tactics, moving to the everyday and societal level. Imaginary bedbugs, hateful graffiti, decapitated pigs, bots, and fake media, even replicating sites like Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Le Parisien in 2024, now weave a web of not-so-subtle and pervasive attacks across the country. Networks of fake news online, often linked to far-right groups covertly directed by Russian services, exist globally, according to VIGINUM (the French vigilance and protection service against foreign digital interference).

Opinion manipulation is now one of the most serious threats to the French Republic, attacking its constitutional foundations and order. The very intensity of these attacks, online and offline alike, also betrays something else: Russia is hurting. Sanctions are biting.

France, being one of the keystones of European defence, is thus an enemy Russia seeks to destabilise. There is no need to defeat a country militarily when one can divide its society sufficiently and ensure that its agents thrive within the fractures it created.

The post Bedbugs, Pig Heads, and Chaos: France Under Russian Siege appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The 2023 shutdown of the last nuclear power plants in Germany, under Olaf Scholz’s chancellorship made a lot of noise on the continent. Some wondered if other countries were going to follow suit. But it seems that it will not be the case, and leaders of the nuclear sector in Europe, notably France and Finland, made it very clear that nuclear was gonna be the way forward and that Berlin would pay the price of what experts would call an incoherent energy policy. On the one side, Germany is indeed one of the global leaders of renewable energy, succeeding in the increase of wind and solar power where pessimists predicted failure, while on the other, they phased out their nuclear first, rather than their coal industry, which still accounts for nearly 25% of total electricity in Germany.

The Shift: The Nuclear Alliance and EDF’s victory

Indeed, since the closure of Isar 2, Emsland and Neckarwestheim 2 in April 2023 during the SPD-Grünen-FDP coalition, Germany’s reliance on imports has become a necessity to fulfil its needs. 8.66 TWh were imported that same year, ad well as a total of 25.19 TWh in 2024, with France filling the gap via EDF (Électricité De France, the state-owned and biggest French energy company), at the worst time of the energy crisis that hit Europe back then.

Notwithstanding the rejoicing of some of the European Greens that cheered for the dismantlement of the last German nuclear power plants, rather than more efforts focusing on shutting down the coal plants that make Germany’s electricity one of the least sustainable today in Europe, it seems the situation has evolved positively for the Nuclear industry in Europe. France has spearheaded that change and is now looking forward to strengthening its place in Europe, as the de facto head of the Nuclear Alliance, a group of 12 countries (France, Finland, Poland, Croatia, the Netherlands amongst others) founded in 2024, pushing forward for the development of nuclear energy as a key factor in decarbonization and energy independence efforts, something that has been in line with the french energy policy since the 70s.

In fact, it was only recently, after years of tensions with Berlin, that the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz  clearly stated in May 2025 during a visit to France that Germany wouldn’t further block the development of nuclear power in Europe.

This warmed up relations between the two countries, as France and Germany underwent a relatively cool phase of their relations in the previous years, notably because of energy and defence policies that saw Berlin and Paris clash on multiple occasions. The lowest point of the relations was probably 2023 after it was revealed that two German foundations on the Bundestag payroll (The Heinrich Böll and Rosa Luxemburg foundations) were directly conducting efforts to hinder the development of the French nuclear industry, which sparked a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

This comes as a double victory for the French nuclear industry, as the ARENH (Meaning regulated access to historic nuclear energy) scheme, which forced EDF to sell 100TW per year at the low cost €42/MWh is due to end by December 2025. The scheme, which had been implemented in 2011 during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, followed the European decision to break energy monopolies in Europe, had been widely criticised in the country, a lot of experts and people alike saying that neighbouring countries were using the scheme to provide themselves with cheap, carbon-free energy rather than accelerating their own transition. Germany was especially pointed, as the phasing out of their own nuclear industry was seen as highly hypocritical, as it was believed that they would need to import French power the moment their last reactor was turned off.

France did not defend its industry properly back then and has, it seems, learnt its lesson as EDF will quite literally regain a monopoly post 2025 with a much more favourable scheme.

Indeed, EDF will be free to sell its electricity at market prices, but if its volume of sales exceeds a certain threshold (based on historical “normal” profits or production costs), it will have to pay a tax going from 50 to 90% of that excess revenue to the French state.  If the ARENH provided French consumers with relatively low prices, EDF will now likely prioritise selling more abroad than raising prices domestically. This is seen as a great victory for the industry and the country as a whole as the feeling of the industry being “profited from” is eased, and hopes that neighbouring countries will invest more or rethink their phase out of nuclear rise.

This comes at a time when EDF is spearheading the replacement of existing reactors and the building of the new generation of EPR2.

Uranium back in fashion: The NZIA and its subsequent help to extending nuclear power in Europe.

All of this came after intense lobbying efforts on the part of pro-nuclear forces in Europe, which resulted in nuclear being included as one of the beneficiaries of the Net Zero Industry Act of June 2024, a crucial European text that recognises decarbonization and energy security as the utmost priorities, rather than competition. This would allow key industries in the sector to flourish and work in a monopolistic manner if needs be, towards these goals, as forced competition would only jeopardise them.

The NZIA was massively pushed by France and most of its nuclear industry firms (EDF and Framatome come to mind) as well as Finland. They all lobbied for the recognition of nuclear as a strategic tool that must be used to combat climate change alongside renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. The war in Ukraine only helped their line of argument.

This was accompanied by Belgium and the Netherlands announcing in May 2024 new investments for nuclear at the same period. If Belgium “just” plans to extend the life of its existing reactor with Prime Minister Alexander de Croo saying at the time that it was “unrealistic” to hope to phase out nuclear if the country wanted to reach its decarbonization goals, the Netherlands clearly announced their intent to build new power plants in the 2030s as well as extend the life of the Borssele plant. This marks a serious turn in their nuclear policies, considering the fact that both countries planned for a phase-out in the early 2000s. Two new EPRs in the Netherlands would provide something on the order of 5 GW of low-carbon electricity

Germany dropping its opposition to nuclear in Europe altogether may also unblock the long-lasting crisis between them and Poland, considering the former repeatedly stalled Polish plans to invest in nuclear and open its first power plant with regulatory (Via the EU), diplomatic and economical measures, a bewildering move considering Polish energy is today the most carbon heavy (Averaging 653g of Co²/kWh in the last 12 months. France or Finland on the same period were only 25 and 45g, respectively) on the continent.

France and Poland signed a deal in May 2025 on this specific matter, with EDF hoping to secure its share of the future Polish nuclear market, directly competing with the US company Westinghouse, which also expressed interest in the matter. The German blockade of Polish nuclear developments has soured relations between the two countries, though the change of government in Poland in 2023 has seemingly helped re-establish a form of dialogue, made even more possible with Germany backing off its anti-nuclear stance on a European level.

The future?

The recent international situation, as well as the climate emergency, has helped change the narrative regarding nuclear in Europe, now being seen as an essential tool if Europe wants to achieve energy sovereignty, as well as the ambitious climate goals it is aiming for. France’s role on the matter has not only been one of pure benevolence, as it aimed to preserve its industry and one of its greatest champions. But France’s energy policy has itself been a victim of a lack of coherence, with nuclear being both championed and attacked since the 70s, which has slowed down its rollout and its efficiency at times. It has now benefited of a coherent support for a solid twenty years, with governments throughout the period attempting to defend the “Filière” (Industry)  and defending France’s role on the European level. The end of ARENH is awaited by EDF and companies of this industrial sector, as it’s expected to boost the sector’s revenue.

As Europe recalibrates its energy strategy, nuclear seems to be no longer a question of ideology and has, for now, it seems, defeated dogmatism. For the Nuclear Alliance, it is a needed cornerstone alongside renewable for both decarbonization and strategic independence.

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To date, the only evidence that Pratasevich is even alive is a video broadcast on the dictatorship’s State television. Here, the journalist bears clear marks of torture and declares – rather unconvincingly – that he has been treated well. This is followed by a “confession” regarding the “crimes” the regime alleges he committed against them. If Lukashenka feels he can get away with it, Pratasevich will be executed by firing squad. It’s a rarely used method even in Belarus, but one the regime has been preparing the ground for by labelling the journalist a “terrorist“, which enables the harshest punishments under what passes for “law” in Belarus.

The fact that a country in Europe is waging such a campaign of terror and despicable brutality against its own people is simply beyond the pale. But Lukashenka isn’t stopping there, as he fights tooth and claw to retain a position of power the rest of the world recognises is not his to have.

To get at Pratasevich and Sapega, Lukashenka has committed an act of State terrorism, directed against an EU-registered plane on an internal EU flight, which was “escorted” by a jet fighter – an act of military aggression that implicitly threatened EU civilians and the plane’s crew with death if they refused to comply. As part of this terror attack, EU citizens were left stranded at Minsk airport until the plane was released. Two passengers who were exercising their right to freedom of movement inside the Union’s borders were brazenly kidnapped.

The gravity of this act would warrant extraordinary measures, but the EU lacks the legal and political mandate required to meet force with force. It does have other tools at its disposal to strike back at Belarus, but is not utilising them too effectively yet.

A Toothless Great Power

The action carried out by Lukashenka against Ryanair would have been unthinkable against an internal Russian or USA flight packed with Russian or American citizens. The jet fighter involved in the act of aggression would have surely been downed, and possibly the airbase responsible for the operation would have been put out of action as well.

Unfortunately, the EU is a peculiar type of Great Power, one endlessly hampered by weakness and internal disunity, and most critically by the pathological shortsightedness of its Member States. The timidity, opportunism, and domestic constraints of national leaders mean that the EU lacks the competencies to respond to the hijacking the way it should – with a military response to protect the lives of EU citizens, force Belarus to respect its own citizens, and punish the perpetrators. But the chronic political anaemia that has taken root in every European capital prevents this. The internal disunity is even worse when considering the issue of Russian involvement, which is even more divisive to Member States.

But if the EU can’t react the way a Great Power should, what can it do? Luckily, it can do a few things, and to some degree it already is. However, a different approach will be needed to exploit the EU’s leverage to the fullest.

The Response So Far

Following an emergency session, the European Council has pushed through a sanctions package that goes some way to inflicting pain on Lukashenka’s regime without overturning the apple cart. The essence of the move is to lock Belarus out of international aviation by banning Belarusian overflight in the EU’s air space, as well as access to EU airports.

The Council has also called “on all EU-based carriers to avoid overflight of Belarus,” and while this measure has largely been heeded, at the time of writing both Ryanair and Alitalia have failed to respect it. Overflight is an important – if secondary – source of precious income for Belarus, particularly on flights bound eastward into Asia. All told, the measure will cost Lukashenka’s regime anywhere between 50-70 million USD.

A carrot has been put forward with the stick: should Belarus embark on a path of democratisation, the EU has a 3 billion EUR aid package waiting in the wings. This message is of course intended primarily for Belarus’ political opposition, but it’s not realistic to expect them to be in a position to take the EU up on its offer anytime soon.

The sanctions also target individuals close to the regime, blacklisting them from various activities. More countermeasures are expected to be announced in the coming days. While effective in their own right, these sanctions are a sign that the EU still hasn’t given up on its wait-and-see strategy towards Belarus. This approach is understandable, since it’s driven by forces outside of the EU’s control, but it’s also misguided. Lukashenka is essentially walking away with impunity and will continue to stir trouble – unless we stop him.

The Russian Problem

Russia benefits from this situation more than anyone else involved. The more Lukashenka loses face in the West, the narrower his political room for manoeuvre becomes. Left with only Russia as a bridge to the rest of the outside world, as well as a patron in economic and military terms, Lukashenka has no choice but to hang on to Putin even tighter. This in turn puts him on an even more confrontational path with the West, in a positive feedback loop.

The EU has tackled this through, primarily, ambivalence. It has sought to punish Lukashenka, but not too harshly, always dangling the hope of a Euro-Belarusian rapprochement should Minsk change its tune.

Some Member States recognise this strategy has failed. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are spearheading a political effort to extend sanctions on Russia as well. This effort isn’t based on the analysis that Putin is the primary beneficiary of the current crisis, although that certainly plays a part. Rather, it rests on the (most probably correct) assumption that the Belarusian KGB lacks the operational capabilities to carry out the espionage operation required to keep tabs of Pratasevich’s trip to Athens without direct Russian assistance. France is also leaning towards this position, as President Macron has become manifestly frustrated with the timidity of European sanctions against its eastward opponents.

But the rest of the Union is a lot more ambivalent. Countries like Italy have a long history of opposition to new rounds of sanctions against Russia, primarily based on (largely imaginary) commercial grounds. Orban’s Hungary is of course always ready to cozy up with the Kremlin, a strategy Budapest calls the “eastern pivot”. Germany, torn by ambivalent political inclinations and its own commercial ties with Russia, is also a source of frustration for those wishing for a tougher EU response.

We Have Nothing to Gain by Waiting

That, however, doesn’t mean the situation is hopeless. Even ignoring Russia’s involvement and sticking with current sanctions against the Kremlin, and even within the current mandate of the EU, there is considerable room to manoeuvre and develop a better foreign policy towards Belarus, one much more effective at pursuing Brussels’ objectives and interests.

For a start, the loss of overflight fees will not bankrupt Lukashenka’s regime, but other countermeasures might. Large State-owned companies are the primary pillar on which Lukashenka’s regime lays its foundations. These oligarchs form the elite in the country, provide precious connections to Russia and the rest of the world, and bankroll the heavy militarisation of society required to maintain Lukashenka’s illegal hold on power. Hitting these companies would mean striking at Lukashenka where it actually hurts.

One such example is Belarusian mining and extraction company Belaruskali, whose employees are deprived of the right to strike – among others. Belaruskali enjoys strong connections with a Norwegian energy giant, Yara, which acts as a gateway into the European Economic Area – of which Norway is a member. Why should this situation continue, in a context where Belarus has clearly decided to douse its bridge with Europe in gasoline, and burn it?

The Americans, untroubled by the internal division and uncertainty that hampers the EU’s every move, have been following precisely this strategy, heaping so many economic sanctions on Belarusian refineries that Russia has been forced to cut its oil exports to Minsk. These oil exports, which are subsidised by the Kremlin, are the economic lifeline of the regime. Cutting it would do more to restrain Lukashenka’s bloodthirst than a thousand overflight restrictions.

Another low-hanging fruit that would make sure sanctions are not a half-measure would be to restrict the sale and holding of Belarusian treasury bonds. No financial institution inside Europe should help bankroll the regime that is going to put that cash flow into even more repression of its own citizens. Other key Belarusian economic interests, such as the illegal smuggling of cigarettes from and into the EU (which has reached truly dazzling proportions), would make for easy targets for any concerted response. It would also very quickly exert financial pressure on Lukashenka.

The only carrot Europe should offer to Lukashenka is to ease some of the restrictions if Minsk releases its political prisoners. This doesn’t mean Pratasevich and Sapega alone. There are now hundreds of political prisoners lost inside the depths of the Belarusian security apparatus, a number that keeps growing ever since the parody of national elections held last year. Only by de-escalating his war against his own people should Lukashenka be able to win some breathing room. And even then, the ultimate objective should always be his removal from power, by any means necessary.

Belarus has turned into a black hole of repression and State-sanctioned violence right at the border with the EU. The poison pouring out of Minsk is beginning to cross the border, threatening the lives and safety of European citizens as well as the opposition figures that, at this critical juncture, should enjoy our protection. It is clear that the strategy of half-measures has failed. Lukashenka will keep stirring up trouble unless he’s unable to, and it is up to us to make him stop. That will, unfortunately, require European national leaders to take their heads out of the sand. One wonders how bad things will have to get before they are forced to do so.

The post With Belarus, the EU Has Nothing to Gain by Waiting appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The links between Morocco and the European Communities traces back to 1987, when King Hassan II sent an official demand to integrate his country in all three institutions: the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community. His demand was rejected stating that the country was not European, a criterion written on the paper only 6 years later with the approval of the Copenhagen criteria.

Despite the rejection, Hassan II knew that his country had little chances of being considered as a potential candidate after sending representatives to test the waters in Brussels. However, this did not stop the two parties from collaborating. Many treaties were signed, especially on subjects such as fisheries, free trade, agriculture, and many others. These bilateral treaties, combined with the country’s membership of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, give Morocco today almost all the benefits of being a Member State of the European Union without having decisional power.

The European Union is Morocco’s main trade partner, with about 60% exports and around 57% imports, while Morocco does not make it in the top 20 biggest partners of the EU. Then why is the country so close to the European Union? In three words: strategy, oil, and fish.

Morocco today

Despite Spain’s apparent contentions with Morocco about its exclaves, both countries share a lot of information in terms of security, antiterrorism, border control, etc. France as well has multiple strategic interests in collaborating with the Kingdom. The country is a stable ally in the Maghreb and offers a door to the Saharan countries. It is also on the path of migration flows from Africa to Europe and acts as a gatekeeper on behalf of Europe, in exchange of financial compensation. The second aspect consists in the fisheries. The scenario here is simple: Europe sends money to Morocco and European fishermen are allowed to fish in Moroccan waters.

The final major aspect is oil. Western Sahara, or Sahrawi, is located in southern Morocco and it is believed that there might be major oil resources there. The first problem is that Western Sahara is a disputed land that is classified as a “non-self-governing territory to be decolonised”. The second problem is that there might not be any oil in that region. But an oil-endowed ally is in the interest of Europe, hence why the French company Total helped prospecting on behalf of Morocco, and why the National Norwegian Oil Fund invested in the venture. However, both companies pulled out due to international pressure from the UN.

Despite the help and the collaboration, there is contention over the three exclaves owned by Spain on the Moroccan coast: Ceuta, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Melilla. The European country refuses to address the issue while Morocco repeatedly tried to get control of the exclaves in the past. However, it became a comfortable issue recently for both countries.

With the increase in migration to Europe, Spain decided to build large walls at the borders to keep the waves of migrants out as much as possible. Europe is also paying Morocco to police the border on behalf of Europe, comfortably outsourcing the responsibility to the Kingdom. This heavy, external border control led to several deaths and caused NGOs such as Amnesty International to ask Spain to take responsibility for such events. Meanwhile, nothing is being done, with Morocco and Europe silently shaking hands.

Finally, the biggest and most embarrassing problem for both parties is the aforementioned Western Sahara. Morocco’s central power claims the land as its own, while the United Nations designated this land as an occupied country. The UN’s and the EU’s law forbid the latter to have a trade agreement including products from a territory whose status is the same as Sahrawi’s.

It is based on this law that the Front Polisario, a rebel liberation movement, sued the European Union at the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016. The Court found the EU guilty and forced to annul the trade agreement.

The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the time, Federica Mogherini, dismissed the issue, and another trade agreement was found excluding specifically products (and fish) made on the Western Saharan land. Morocco briefly protested by cutting ties with the EU, but they were quickly restoed.

As of today, the status quo remains intact. The presence of a stable, cooperating ally in the region is a too good opportunity to pass for the EU. Especially when it gives the opportunity for Member States to relocate its migratory problems outside of its borders, just by closing their eyes on the spiky issue of Western Sahara.

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Vaccine Nationalism And Political Myopia

Let’s start with the fundamentals. The EU’s negotiating wasn’t slow, nor was it inefficient. In fact, the EU – AstraZeneca purchasing agreement precedes the company’s similar deal with the United Kingdom. The “British first” clause did not stem out of a commercial contract. It was the result of public funds made available to Oxford, which AstraZeneca gained access to once the two teamed up to develop a vaccine.

Deploying early funding to support a vaccine for the new coronavirus is undoubtedly a sensible move. Vaccine nationalism, conversely, was extremely myopic. The funding being made conditional on Britain receiving doses before anybody else might seem like a nation-state ruthlessly pursuing its interests while leaving the rest of the world out to dry, and to a degree this is true. But even if one handwaves this selfishness as acceptable, the fundamental point is missing: this logic makes it harder, not easier, to fight the pandemic.

Every new generation of the virus increases the likelihood that it will mutate. The more people are infected all over the world, the likelier it is that the virus will change. The more the virus changes, the less effective vaccines will be. Should the UK manage to vaccinate its entire population, and open up to the rest of the world, it would be confronted with a situation in which contagions still surge in the majority of the planet, leading to more and more variants, and presenting the spectre of a new wave in the UK itself, endangering all the work done so far. Only a global rollout of vaccines can properly stem the tide of the pandemic.

The World “First”, Europe “Second”

This is not fringe epidemiology. This fact was well understood as far back as January 2020. For all the uncertainty surrounding the new coronavirus, it was still a coronavirus – many in this clade are already known to science, and while there could be no certainty as to how fast the virus would mutate, it was fair to assume it would eventually produce variants, especially if confronted with piecemeal vaccinations. This is why, when Germany funded BioNTech like the UK did Oxford, the government in Berlin did not include a “Europe first” clause. Nor did the European Commission see it fit to intervene and request one. This attitude remained consistent when BioNTech partnered with American pharmaceutical company Pfizer. Meanwhile, the UK vetoed a partnership between Oxford and American company Merck, forcing a partnership with British AstraZeneca instead.

And yet, while the EU was making sound medical R&D decisions, and trusting its long-standing partners to do the same, worrying signs started coming out of the Atlantic. Then-president Trump tried to steal BioNTech from Germany to gain exclusive American access to the vaccine. The move failed, and even so, back then it caused an uproar. Why the same indignation is not on display now, with countries monopolising vaccine doses, is a great mystery of public opinion.

Export Bans And The Global Vaccine Supply Chain

Trump didn’t seem overly concerned with his failure to steal the BioNTech vaccine. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to sign Pfizer supply contracts. This is because he knew that most of the new partnership’s production capacity was in the United States; he only needed a legal excuse to seize doses present on American soil, or block them with an export ban, and he would get all the jabs his country would need. The absurdity of this beggar-thy-neighbour policy is that European vaccines are being used, not only in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but also Mexico and Canada – the two countries bordering the Continental United States, who have no other option given their neighbour’s export ban on vaccines.

The legal cover for this – which the Biden administration is still using at time of writing – is twofold: one is Trump’s December 2020 executive order, giving Americans first priority to vaccines produced on American soil. The other, more substantial basis is the Defense Production Act.

We’re not discussing a trickle here, either: millions of EU doses have been used in the aforementioned countries, as well as in developing countries, while the United States and the United Kingdom simply seize EU doses produced on their soil and regularly purchased well in advance. This unilateral seizing is nothing short of vaccine piracy, and as mentioned, it’s making it all the harder to have a meaningful global impact on the pandemic. Should dangerous variants proliferate, it might even backfire, causing untold damage to the economy, as well as – and more seriously – additional loss of life. The United States alone has got its hands on over five million EU vaccine doses.

EU-UK Relations Take Centre-Stage

On the other side of the coin is the UK’s own vaccine piracy – primarily fueled by what the EU deems AstraZeneca’s breach of contract. Already on 29th January, AstraZeneca informed the EU that it would be unable to meet promised shipments due to “production problems” in its two European plants. This was because doses slated for the EU had been delivered to the UK instead. Brussels demanded AstraZeneca uphold its contract, which obliged it to make use of all four of its production facilities (two in the UK, two in the EU) to meet its obligations on deliveries. Shielded by the “British first” clause, AstraZeneca refused to bridge the gap with exports from the UK. The stage was set for a cross-channel battle of wills that is not yet concluded at time of writing.

Up to January 2021, the EU had included the UK in all of its anti-pandemic industrial coordination plans, making sure Britain was not isolated from the world economy on critical items such as ventilators and medical equipment during the first and second surges of covid cases. This has included as many as ten million vaccine doses exported from the EU to the UK. Britain’s current manipulation of vaccine exports has ended that cooperation. The Commission has retaliated and is moving ahead with its own export ban, and it is likely that additional countermeasures will be forthcoming. As more vaccines enter the market, AstraZeneca’s leverage will diminish. Legally, the battle might well last for years to come. Politically, the tide has already turned against them.

The Strategic And Political Bankruptcy Of European Member States

A final consideration should be made to close out this much-needed reframing of the vaccine narrative. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that the EU was naive to trust in its international partners to put collective long-term interests ahead of their own short-term benefit. This misses the fundamental point on two levels. First is the already explored medical argument: a piecemeal rollout of vaccines in select countries is an own goal, as the virus rages everywhere and the number of mutations increase. The failure to coordinate vaccine distribution on an international scale ultimately represents the failure of humanity to address this crisis effectively; it will lengthen it, not shorten it.

A narrower but equally important point is that the EU did not act naively – rather, it acted as it has always been intended to act, by design. It is completely unreasonable to expect the EU to act and think like a hard power, neorealist security institution, when Member States still jealously guard their monopoly on security and national defence. As we have emphatically argued before, Member States are in the driver seat when it comes to running the Union through the pandemic, and they’re making a terrible job of it.

The Catch 22 Vaccine Scenario

Healthcare is also a competence lying primarily with the Member States. Their refusal to equip the EU with the proper tools to handle security responsibilities has left this flank open to Anglo-American vaccine piracy. It is their political timidity which leads them to preserve this institutional status quo even in the face of a world-changing crisis. In addition, their pathological concerns with short-term gains over long-term strategy is what motivates them to use the EU as a scapegoat for everything they fail to accomplish.

Unfortunately, this is the “Catch 22” European institutions are constantly exposed to. Had the European Commission truly tried to force BioNTech to end its partnership with Pfizer and find a European partner instead, Member States today might be playing the blame game the other way, pointing to the failed partnership as the reason for the delayed availability and rollout of anti-covid jabs. This crisis has made it obvious that 19th-Century European nation states are not fit to govern themselves in a crisis.

If you want evidence of the need for true European integration, look no further than the vaccine rollout crisis. This is more than recrimination about the past – it contains a concern about the future. The end of the pandemic is not yet in sight. Even as immunisations mount, the process to make the virus both endemic and harmless will be long and arduous. Will Europe get through to the end of this great challenge still in one piece? How exactly do European Member States plan to survive climate change when the coronavirus has so thoroughly outmatched them? These remain, at the moment, tragically open questions.

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UK’s historical involvement

After the Russo-Turkish war, the Ottoman Empire agreed to let the British Empire set an outpost in the Mediterranean by leasing them the island of Cyprus. The island was of key importance for the UK, which needed the location to monitor the Suez Canal and all the colonial routes going through. Once the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in WW1, the UK formally annexed Cyprus, as well as many other Ottoman territories such as Egypt.

The UK officially made Cyprus a British crown colony in 1925, after the Turkish Republic had given up on Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the Greek population of the island believed that the British rule would lead them to Enosis, the reunification with Greece, as part of a “Greater Greece” (Megali Idea) plan. As the UK did not seem to move towards this, a guerrilla organisation was born in 1955: the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which had Enosis as its goal. Turkish nationals wanted at first a full annexation by Turkey, but then preferred a partition after realising that Turkish Cypriots made up only 20% of the total population. As a response to EOKA, the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) appeared and aimed for Taksim, the partition of the island.

Independence, the Greek coup, and the Turkish invasion

After many riots provoked by EOKA and supported by the majority of the population, Cyprus got its independence in 1960. The first president elected is Makarios III, an archbishop that aimed for Enosis. By trying to keep the Turkish out of government and out of decision loops, violence only escalated. The UN had to intervene with UN peacekeepers and impose a cease-fire in 1964 to maintain peace.

In July 1974, the Greek Military Junta orchestrated a successful coup in Cyprus. The new government formed, a junta led by Nikos Sampson, was aiming at reuniting Cyprus with Greece. In response, Turkey tried to gather international support for an invasion through the UN but failed. Under the Guarantee Treaty of 1960 signed by Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, each one of these signatories could orchestrate a unilateral military invasion of Cyprus to restore democracy. The situation remained frozen since then.

Reunification and the Annan plan

After such an escalation of violence, how can a nation ever reunite? Both regions would need devolution of powers, as neither side would accept the other having more power. The most sustainable solution appears to be the federal model. It would allow more flexibility and less state centralisation, taking more into account the needs of local communities. Such a plan has been already thought by the United Nations: the Annan plan. It suggested a restructuration and reunification of the Republic of Cyprus into a “United Republic of Cyprus” that would be a federation of two states, more or less based on the Swiss model.

A reconciliation committee was proposed along with the federation plan, with the aim to bring the two communities back together. It also allowed Greece and Turkey to keep permanent military bases on the island, with a strong limit on the military size.

Different versions of the plan were made, up to the Annan plan V. The resolution was put to a referendum in 2004 in both communities. Northern Cypriots voted in favour of the reunification plan with almost 65% in favour, while Greek Cypriots voted the referendum down with a vast 75% against. On exit polls, most Greek Cypriots were concerned about security, which was the main reason for the rejection.

Towards a two-state solution?

In response to the Greek Cypriot’s rejection of the referendum, the UN called for a lift on unnecessary trade barriers and restrictions. Their hope is, if a reunification federation plan is not accepted, that the two entities can at least cooperate on basic inter-state matters. This means implementing a de-facto two-state solution until the Republic of Cyprus eventually officially recognises Northern Cyprus.

The conflict evolved from aggressiveness, threats or even annihilatory conflict at times, to disagreements, or questioning. As shown in the behaviour graph below, the general trend over the years shows that the conflict is slowly settling. Many elected Cypriots, both Turkish and Greek, concede that both populations grew apart by several generations, acknowledging that they share little except the name.

The only way left to move forward is thus a two-state solution. It would allow Northern Cyprus to vary its trade and avoid being dependent on Turkey. Normalisation would also mean further diplomatic relations between the two parts of the island and to aim eventual agreements at common growth. It will also resolve a century-long dispute for Cyprus and could ease tensions between the European Union and Turkey.

But Turkey does not seem willing to ease these tensions. Many aspects show that the country will not finalise its accession process to the EU, and President Erdoğan understood it. The Cyprus question is a point of pressure they have on the Union, a powerful lever just like the migrants and their diaspora. A United Cyprus would mean giving away their military control over the North of the island, being even more contained in the Mediterranean Sea, which has been the source of many tensions in 2020.

The need to reunify is also less present in the Northern part. They used to be much poorer than Cyprus which was a pro-unity argument for long. They are however rapidly closing the gap, showing that they do not need the unification to develop properly. Cyprus’ nominal GDP per capita is estimated at $26,240, while Northern Cyprus’ is almost equal to $15,000. It might be almost two times lower, but it is almost equal to Poland’s and Hungary’s nominal GDP per capita. It also is higher than the ones of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria.

While not ideal, it clearly shows that this part of the island can develop on its own. And with the recent discovery of increasingly more natural gas in Northern Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, the space for development increases with it.

With Turkey having little incentives to let go of its influence over the island and Northern Cyprus developing well, the pressure other than political will to reunite the two parts will remain low for a very long time. The situation is certainly not pushing for a United Cyprus. Citizens of both areas report more and more their doubts about a possible reunification and become more and more used to the situation. This is normalisation in process.

Finally, this conflict is a “comfortable” conflict for Cyprus, as it gives its leaders great political leverage. Not only it fosters patriotism within its population, but it also allows Cyprus to have a real say in the European Council by threatening to veto unless Cyprus receives concessions whenever they may use it.

Whatever the future negotiations will lead to, the European Union is pushing for a normalisation of the situation as part of its long-term plan of Development and Cooperation. Whether it is under the form of a United Republic of Cyprus, or as the recognition and trade agreements with Northern Cyprus (and eventually welcome them as Member State in the future), the best thing that can happen is the end of this century-long conflict.

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The agreement is still subject to review and cancellation by both parties and needs approval by the British and European parliaments, as well as by the Council of the EU. All EU Member States will also have to ratify it before it takes effect. There isn’t enough time left to get it done before the expiration of trading rights – which were supposed to lapse in January 2020 but were extended by one year to the dawn of 2021. EU Ambassadors have already stated that trading rights will be extended again, until the Council and Parliament vote to ratify the agreement.

What’s Been Agreed To?

As of December 13th, well past the initial deadlines for an agreement supposed to take effect at the end of the year, agreement on what was to be done in the case of abrogation of the accord and fishing rights in UK waters were still outstanding. Brussels and London eventually resolved this, even though it was by then impossible to have a new regime in place by the end of the year. The question of fishing remains perhaps one of the most perplexing aspects of the entire negotiations, with bizarre prominence both during the talks and in the text itself.

A free trade agreement with zero tariffs and quotas for all goods had already been agreed to by both parties. This is something the UK has already touted as the ‘largest’ free trade agreement ever and more than a justification for Brexit which would leave it in a privileged place along with Canada and Australia in regards to the community. This privileged trading position is, nevertheless, one which inhibits the prior free trade in services that the UK enjoyed as an EU member. All services account for over 80% of GDP. These include: financial, retailing, computer, medical, legal, realty, transport, hospitality and entertainment, to name only the most prominent,

The true body blow to the British economy, however, is the exclusion of financial services from the agreement. One of the mainstays of British power since the long-gone days of empire, its far reach kept London in competition with New York and Hong Kong on the short, gilded list of global financial hubs. Now, British finance will no longer have a privileged position in the EU. Paris and Frankfurt are likely to gain further ground, perhaps replacing the City altogether as the centre of European finance.

Though perhaps not as dire, the competitive position of British insurance companies – like the much-vaunted Lloyd’s of London – will also be in jeopardy. Other services too will no longer enjoy privileged status. Their professionals will need to apply for certification to practice in the EU. The services themselves may be taxed or subject to limitations.

These aspects of the new relationship are not new. Both parties entered into the final round of talks knowing, and accepting, that the UK would have to live with these limitations. The major point of contention was the continued acceptance of EU rules governing the quality and safety of traded goods, and what to do if they were no longer adhered to. The UK would agree to accept EU rules, not in perpetuity. They wanted to be able to change them and still have access. The EU stated that in such cases the playing field might no longer be level for its producers. They proposed arbitration before the European Court of Justice with the imposition of tariffs and quotas anew as a possible outcome.

Intervention by the European Court in adjudicating disputes was anathema to Brexiteers of all stripes. The talks were at an impasse. The break came when – after almost a year of discussions – the UK put forth a last-minute proposal to set up independent arbitration. In this context, London also accepted the imposition of tariffs and quotas as a possible remedy. The way was paved for an agreement on fishing rights and a final accord. Unfortunately, the clamour of contentious issues on the allotment of the fishing catch drowned out the critical question of its sustainability. One can only hope at this point that the green, or in the case of fish blue, aspects of future sustainability were taken into account.

British citizens will no longer have free access to the EU. There was no agreement on further cooperation in defence and intelligence. The popular Erasmus programme also will no longer accept British students – though there is an exception for Northern Ireland students, thanks to Ireland’s generous volunteering of funding for their northern neighbours.

Northern Ireland will also remain within the EU’s trade zone, with a special agreement allowing the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to remain open. Some commentators have quipped that London has managed the rather unremarkable feat of creating a free trade area that is actually smaller than the UK’s national borders. A further review of the Brexit agreement is scheduled for 2024, at which time the clauses may see further changes by mutual agreement.

The Future of Brexit

Lorries are already queued up for miles around Dover and throughout Kent – but this is now largely due to Covid restrictions, imposed recently because of new strains found in the UK. French President Macron has promised to lift restrictions for lorries tied to Covid. The often predicted queues from a no-deal Brexit will even under this agreement be likely to replace the Covid tie-ups with new ones, even before they are dissipated. This is because the late hour will leave no time to sort out loose ends.

Even if the EU ambassadors have their wish and the current status of the movement of goods is extended until the agreement can be ratified, the absence of detailed implementation regulations, which still need to be drawn up, will create impediments and slow border crossings. Such simple things as new tariff codes, lorry drivers’ passports, proper paperwork and compliance documents, will need to be worked out. It will be well into spring before trade is flowing smoothly again and until summer to return to normal.

Financial markets have already factored in the much greater effect Brexit will have on the UK. This does not pre-empt further deterioration. Absent other agreements with the United States, and some key markets in Asia, the UK will be stuck with diminished trade. Overall economic conditions will follow, though it is difficult to sort out precisely the effects of trade from those of COVID-19 and other geopolitical developments.

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Whether one side has a more legitimate reason for aggression or a stronger claim over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is not, however, the point of this article. Instead, it will analyse the trust mechanism in the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, how this trust has been broken, and how it may eventually be repaired.

Where it all started

Tensions surrounding the region of Nagorno-Karabakh have existed for a long time. The modern development of the conflict can be traced back to the early 1920s, when the USSR took control of the Caucasus. Particularly, it can be pinpointed to 1921, when the Soviet Union placed the ethnically Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic in an attempt to divide and rule the South Caucasus.

The territory, more commonly known as Artsakh in Armenian, has repeatedly attempted to reunite with Soviet Armenia. Despite its attempts, it has remained de iure Azerbaijani land, although de facto it has declared itself independent since 1992 and self-governs accordingly. The dissolution of the USSR led to an open war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for six years, in what became known as the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). Since then, the situation has remained one of frozen conflict, with no outright war but significant clashes occurring occasionally alongside the border.  

The most significant of these skirmishes happened in 2016, taking the name of the Four-Day War, and now again in 2020 as we are witnessing a significant and worrying escalation of belligerence.

The role of trust in the conflict-process

At the basis of the tensions is a structural incompatibility: the conflict is based on the belief that Armenia and Azerbaijan’s interests are incompatible. Not only has the dispute lasted 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, but it has deep roots that date back centuries. Today, the two countries are very well aware of the reasons that push them to fight and are willing to continue as such. The conflict cannot be resolved in the current context, leading to frustration, anger, and hostilities.

Behaviour from both sides denotes little cooperation and a lot of aggressive assertiveness. The current goal set is the “annihilation” of the other party to get a better position during peace talks. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan might come to an end eventually, but it will not be the end of the conflict per se. The countries will go to war endlessly unless they find a compromise that is accepted by both parties.

Where does trust fit into all this? According to Cambridge, trust is “to believe that someone is good and honest and will not harm you, or that something is safe and reliable”. It is not difficult in this context to realise that trust is far from being set. The issue is that with a lack of trust, agreements will be breached by fear of what the other might do. By way of example, this is what we have been seeing repeatedly with breached ceasefire agreements in recent days.

Trust has lots of benefits during a conflict. The first one is simply information exchange: it’s easier and more transparent in good conditions, which leads to more sustainable agreements. It also leads to cooperative behaviour, which is absolutely crucial, unlike today’s focus on “annihilation”. A minimum of trust also allows negotiators to employ strategies of “positive influence”, which pushes the entire negotiation to go in a positive way for both parties. These strategies are more desirable than the coercive strategies that are in place today: for example, Azerbaijan claiming that they will not accept anything until they get the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh back.

One of the main barriers to trust is the group effect. When people that do not know each other are randomly put into two groups, they tend to believe people from their group rather than the other. In moments of tension, the information given to someone in one’s group will be considered as the truth and the information of the other group as fake. That is why fake news in periods of war are spread so easily. Add in the mix a feeling of nationalism and pro-war state propaganda and trust cannot survive a day. A minimum of trust may offer the other group the benefit of the doubt, which is totally absent in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Another barrier is the accountability of the negotiators. When two negotiators sit at the table, alone and without public opinion to take into consideration, they usually show more concessions and more flexibility. Trust tends to grow more easily as the interpersonal relationship slowly builds up. However, when one is held accountable by the citizens of one’s country, concessions are rarely offered. Negotiations in this setting tend to be less successful. This is exactly what happens when Azerbaijan’s president announces that Azerbaijan’s citizens do not agree with the ceasefire, which gives him a perfect reason to refuse to stop the fighting.

How to create trust when tension is rocket high

While the fighting continues and soldiers and civilians lose their lives over this conflict, what could be done to achieve peace? What could be done to restore trust? There are many examples of countries that went from full-scale war to trusting alliances, such as the entirety of Europe, the USA or Japan. But how to achieve that level of trust?

First, before any strategies are discussed, some trust dynamics starters need to be set. Announcing an action, and doing it exactly as announced, shows the other party that they are reliable. Secondly, to ensure a lasting negotiation, conciliatory measures must be irrevocable.

Usually, a first gesture of goodwill will be answered by another positive gesture, which can lead to a virtuous cycle of collaboration and trust. Breaking a tense status quo is easier after one party makes the first concession, hoping that the other party responds in a similar fashion. Of course, such a move is extremely risky, as the other party might simply take advantage of the situation.

In the scenario of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, let us imagine that Armenia makes the first move and offers some occupied regions back to Azerbaijan, as a sign of goodwill towards peace. Azerbaijan could make the effort to offer concessions to Armenia back, or it could simply take the regions and continue the fighting to further its position of power and recover what it perceived to be its legitimate territory.

Another option is to make a huge first gesture of goodwill. A big offer will only make the opposing party look illegitimate to its population and to the international community by refusing to negotiate. It is, again, a highly risky but effective way of forcing trust into the relationship. This technique was used during the war between Israel and Egypt, when Egypt’s president Anwar el-Sadat decided to go to Israel to discuss peace terms directly. In war times, this is a huge sign that led to lasting peace. However, he had spent a lot, both politically and personally, as he got assassinated for this act once back in Egypt.

Finally, the safest option is to modify the structure of the problem itself. Instead of tackling the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in its entirety, it would be more sustainable to break the problem into smaller issues and tackle each of them one by one. It is much easier to make a first move concession on a small, lest costly issue than on the entire problem.

But as the conflict in the Caucasus endures and no efforts are being made to establish lasting trust, a real solution to the problem might not come any time soon, despite the best attempts of State mediators, the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group.

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The Situation in Xinjiang

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), has reported that in the last three years, the PRC built at least 380 ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang, with the intention to detain Uyghur Muslims and other supposed non-conformists. The official line will state that these camps were set up to help the Uyghurs, re-educate and ‘moderate’ an ethnic minority plagued by Islamic fundamentalism and boost their socio-economic outcomes by moulding them into citizens worthy of the PRC. In other words, the goal is to turn these supposedly hapless and anti-intellectual band of Turkic nomads into Han-Chinese model citizens. Any glance at the PRC’s aptly-named CCTV, or its Pravda-esque newspapers, will simply echo this lie.

What we are actually looking at is the systematic cultural genocide of Xinjiang’s majority Uyghur population and the incarceration of hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Muslim Chinese citizens in internment camps, since at least 2017. One does not have to look long to figure out just how inhumane conditions and treatment in these camps are. The reports of brutish psychological torture involving sleep deprivation and threats to one’s family as well as slave labour; other sources have obtained testimonials by on-camp teachers revealing forced sterilisation as well as the brutal rape of female inmates, the details are too gruesome to spell out here. The UN’s own criteria would characterise this brutality as a genocide.

What is the EU doing?

Suffice it to say that Xinjiang’s camps are inhumane and an affront to human dignity as insidious and extensive as anything we have seen since the end of World War II. Surprisingly, we have yet to see an official confrontation or even condemnation on the matter by European leaders. We recently saw prominent European politicians mark Black Ribbon Day, a day on which we commemorate the victims of the 20th century’s violent totalitarian regimes. References to the ongoing repression in Xinjiang were notably absent.

Indeed, any consistent criticism of from Europe’s high political circles seems to originate with outspoken Belgian liberal MEP, Guy Verhofstadt. By contrast, his liberal compatriot Charles Michel, now president of the European Council, had little more to offer than happy musings about European cheese and wine during and after a recent virtual Europe-China summit, with human rights issues assuming a relative backstage role, being labelled under ‘International affairs and other issues’, by the Council website. The Commission President, Ursula Von der Leyen, at least made sure to save space in a tweet about the event for ‘fundamental values’. It seems that our Union of Values is all bark and little bite when it comes to the most pressing human rights issue of our time.

Taking part in our video conference with Chinese President Xi. Looking forward to frank & open discussions. Engagement at the highest level with China is crucial if we are to promote European economic interests, protect our climate & defend fundamental values and rights. #EUChina pic.twitter.com/n3eyWwckKO

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) September 14, 2020

No concrete steps have been taken to leverage a Chinese shift in policy regarding the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Of course, the bloc’s armoury of policy instruments in external affairs is limited, but it can still rely on access to its internal market as a ploy. For instance, the EU could apply a surgical tariff, or ideally ban, on all goods imported from the PRC that are suspected or have been confirmed to have involved forced labour from Xinjiang.

For all his faults, President Trump is moving in the right direction, by considering to label what is happening in Xinjiang a genocide. Should he lose November’s election, his likely successor Joe Biden would do the same. Would it be too much for the EU to follow suit, or even go a few steps further? The EU’s economic soft power can easily be provided with a hard edge should access to its internal market be weaponised against transgressions demeaning human decency, including at the very least the cultural genocide being perpetrated in Xinjiang. Again, the US has already led the way in this regard, as the House of Representatives has voted in favour of banning import from Xinjiang over forced labour concerns.

The Economic Problem

The stumbling block, as per usual, appears to be internal. In this case, it appears to be of a Teutonic nature. Germany’s economy has become increasingly dependent on exports to China over the last few decades (€100bn alone last year). Increasingly as well, its car-manufacturing corporations are basing nodes of their value chains in the PRC. Most insidious amongst these must be Volkswagen’s factory in Xinjiang. As far as Berlin is concerned, Europe’s relationship with China is ‘complicated’ and ‘nuanced’, but most of all one defined by business interests.

This author is not an anti-globalist but does question the usefulness of paying lip-service in voicing concerns over human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, while German companies (read: Volkswagen) allegedly benefit from forced labour practices in the PRC. Are we not a Union of Values? Why has the European Parliament’s call to apply targeted sanctions and freeze assets been ignored so far in the Council? Why is it that Germany is able to mobilise a moral spine in order to threaten a veto on the Mercosur deal on deforestation grounds, but not on any future deal with a communist regime perpetrating cultural genocide?

Instead, active European leadership on the matter has been reliant on Sweden’s H&M banning Xinjiang cotton yarn from its production chain. At a political level, however, the EU’s inaction on the issue, as with other policy fields, is determined too much by Germany’s lack of geostrategic intelligence and backbone. Domestic political costs associated with cancelling a deal with China are eroding the EU’s veneer of international leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

Our Responsibilities

As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us, a (European) house divided simply cannot stand. In this case, it is unacceptable for the EU to turn its nose from the pungent smell of mass incarceration in Xinjiang, where the most heinous crime against humanity of our lifetimes is being perpetrated. What is being done, is an attempted ethnic cleansing at a scale and cold-hearted sophistication we have not seen since the 1940s. Hannah Arendt once said that ‘we must prevent wrongdoing because the world in which we all live, wrong-doer, wrong sufferer and spectator, is at stake.’ I fear that it might already be too late for Xinjiang’s Uyghurs.

Guest article by Adam Hall. The author is pursuing a PhD at the VUB in Brussels.

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An Israel Peace Agreement to Prepare for War?

Since the founding of the state of Israel, there has always been peace between Israel and the countries of the Gulf. Moreover, while the Gulf States support the Palestinians financially, they are also virtual allies with Israel against their mutual enemy Iran. So why was diplomatic recognition not accorded earlier? It was a largely symbolic choice to show solidarity with the Palestinian cause. More importantly, the normalisation of relations was also used as a bargaining chip to gain some concessions from Israel.

With the UAE and Bahrain peace agreements with Israel, these concessions have taken a precise shape, one strongly influenced by Washington. In particular, these have taken the form of Israeli approval of US arms sales to the Gulf and withdrawal of plans to annex the West Bank. Palestinian solidarity, such as it is, was thrown by the wayside, though humanitarian aid from the Gulf continues.

The significance of Israeli approval of US arms sales – agreed to as a quid pro quo for recognition – comes principally from the role Israeli lobbying plays in US politics. Without Israel’s approval, its AIPAC lobby in the US routinely painted any attempt to sell weapons to the Gulf States as a betrayal of Israel, even though there was no chance of them ever being used against it. With Israeli’s approval, the most modern weaponry can be sold at the highest prices, siphoning off hefty surcharges in form of bribes for all concerned.

By better arming the Gulf States, further preparation for the eventual Sunni-Israeli war with Shia Iran goes forward. The Sunnis would like to destroy the Shias once and for all, and Israel’s ambitions to expand its territory into a Greater Israel would find a smoother path without Iran acting as a major roadblock.

As for annexation of the West Bank, the increasingly expansionist Israeli population appears very disappointed that it will not take place. Its importance, however, is somewhat dubious. Just like as peace between Israel and the Gulf States was a reality even without any accord, the annexation of the West Bank has been the de facto state of being for a long time. Israel rules over every sneeze and twitch in the region. It is not clear that formal annexation would have helped Israel in any way. It is indeed quite possible that formal annexation would have focused international attention on the situation, leading to further sanctions and isolation for Israel. It just might have been a catalyst for some improvement, even if hardly ideal in and of itself.

As it is, the peace agreement does not change the situation in the West Bank and rather prepares the countries of the region for more war while assuring that the corruption by the elites continues apace. No wonder no one is celebrating peace.

Where is the EU?

The European Union currently has an association agreement with Israel which facilitates economic relations and also provides aid to the Palestinians. Relations were somewhat troubled by the 2015 EU decision to label Israeli products from the West Bank according to their origin in the settlements. This measure went to the heart of the international debate of Israel as a state, with Israelis fearing that the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement over the Palestinian situation would harm their interests substantially if allowed to take root.

The Israeli government did everything within its power to prevent this grassroots pro-Palestinian movement from gaining traction, including lobbying to make it illegal in many Western jurisdictions and systematically attacking its proponents, not to exclude disinformation campaigns without official attribution. After the EU nevertheless approved the labelling, Netanyahu decided to suspend, pending review, the EU’s role in the peace process.

The two most recent High Representatives of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini and Joseph Borrell, have generally been perceived to be pro-Palestinian. Within the Union itself, Franco-German leadership which pushes for a two-state solution that would recognise a Palestinian state has been somewhat compromised by positions taken by the Visegrad countries of Eastern Europe, more favourable to Israel. Anti-Muslim sentiment by the currently dominant political right in Eastern Europe, along with ideological considerations, have made them more favourable to the status quo and Israeli interests.

This internal conflict came to a head when the US moved its embassy to Jerusalem. Several Visegrad countries, along with Romania, prevented an EU resolution condemning the move. The countries were also persuaded to abstain on a UN resolution condemning the US move rather than voting with the position of the Union, under threats from US Ambassador to the UN Nicki Haley and intense lobbying from Israel.

The situation has not been without domestic repercussions inside the EU. The still large French-Jewish community has been troubled by Muslim-Jewish relationships and even more by third-party propaganda to the point of considering additional emigration to Israel. The refugee situation resulting from the Syrian conflict has also caused an upheaval in domestic politics and has been used by third parties to destabilize the Union.

All Roads Lead from Jedda To Teheran

The occupation of Palestine – while an international catastrophe that has been the leitmotif of international politics of the past 70 years – is yet but a minor scene in a larger conflict on the stage that of Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. This age-old religious conflict, now with additional geopolitical reasons, informs all of the wars in the region, either directly through active participation or indirectly through proxies, arms and diplomacy.

The Syrian conflict pits Shia Syria with aid from Iran and Russia, which has an important naval base and troops there, against Sunni insurgents including ISIS, aided by Saudi Arabia and Israel. France and the Netherlands, along with the United States and the UK, have aided the Syrian rebels while maintaining their opposition to ISIS, though other EU countries – notably Germany – have objected. The Kurds constitute a third force, opposing ISIS, but opposed by Turkey and in a somewhat ambivalent relationship with Assad’s Syrian government.

As the bet by the West to oust Assad has failed miserably, contributing to a refugee crisis in Western Europe, the conflict has to some extent reverted to its Shia-Sunni origins with the wild card of Kurdish independence and now Turkey thrown into the mix.

Though condemning the recent agreements recognizing Israel, Turkey’s role in the conflicts straddles both sides. Becoming the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949, Turkey has also been (together with Iran) one of the few reliable supporters of the Palestinians in the region. Relations with Israel, on the other hand, have ebbed and flowed. Turkey 80% Sunni majority has frequently supported Iran in regional conflicts, notably showing support for the country during its nuclear negotiations with the West.

It has had a more contentious relationship to Saudi Arabia, perhaps culminating in the killing of a Saudi journalist by the Saudis in their Consulate in Istanbul. Turkey is a member of NATO, but in its own region has shown considerable independence and is currently in a very contentious relationship with other NATO members in the Eastern Mediterranean where natural gas interests are at stake.

A Final Thought

These agreements bare the hallmark of the corrupt self-dealing that has subsumed politics in the Middle East. By upholding the values of peace, respect for human rights and democracy, the EU can play a major role in shining a light of hope during this period of darkness.

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