In mid-September, X was crawling with stories about these. Dozens, then hundreds, thousands of accounts reposted alarming claims about the “spread” across towns and cities. Every major news outlet picked it up, and the local press came in support.

And yet. The figures showed no surge compared to previous years. Reported cases remained in line with the usual yearly numbers. True, call-outs did increase but mostly because people panicked and demanded inspections they didn’t really need, messing with the actual numbers. Six schools were shut down nationwide, closures later deemed unnecessary. France typically sees about a million interventions a year, and 2023 only just nudged above that, notably due to the increase of intervention demands by worried people.

This could have been funny (without mocking the people that genuinely experienced a bedbug infestation, which is a miserable thing to live through) were it not so clearly part of the Kremlin’s playbook: disinformation and disruption, deliberately seeded in “unfriendly” countries. France’s Minister for European Affairs at the time, Jean-Noël Barrot, said as much in early 2024 that the bedbug hysteria was a textbook Russian operation.

Storm-1516 is the name French authorities gave to the massive disinformation campaign conducted by Russia in France, which has apparently been active in this form since August 2023. Unable to infest the beds of the French, the bedbugs had invaded their internet, a trial run of for what was to come, just as counter-interference services were beginning to track the operation.

But not all the attacks were virtual. That same autumn, dozens of Stars of David were sprayed on buildings in the Paris suburbs, home to Jewish families, in the tense weeks following Hamas’s terror attack and Israel’s assault on Gaza. Once again, these actions were amplified by countless bots on social networks, spreading the acts of individuals paid, directly or indirectly, by the Russian regime to socially destabilise the country. It would be dishonest to claim that it did not work: tensions flared, at least for a while, before the revelation that this was, yet again, foreign interference. A very similar action happened in May of 2024, where red hands were spotted on the Shoah memorial in Paris. The suspects were later found by the police to be Bulgarian and had just arrived in Paris.

On the 9th of September of this year, pig heads were dumped outside several mosques around Paris, sparking outrage and more online clashes.

The investigation, thankfully, moved quickly, helped by CCTV and witness accounts, allowed investigators to indentify that a Serbian-registered car had entered France, bought the heads from a farmer, dropped them at the mosques, then fled the country via Belgium.

Taken individually, these incidents were already worrying, but placed in the broader context of the Kremlin’s strategy, they take on a far more sinister dimension, that is undermining French citizens’ trust in their institutions and media, playing on identity fractures, and pouring oil on the dumpster fire that is the French political crisis.

General Thierry Burkhard, then Chief of the Defence Staff, said on the 11th of July that Moscow saw France as its “main enemy in Europe” and quoted Vladimir Putin himself to that effect.

Abroad, some shrugged this off as the French giving themselves too much importance yet again. But the point was well made. For years, Paris has been regarded by Kremlin-linked outlets and the Kremlin proper as a pivotal supporter of Ukraine.

The turning point was of course February 2022, when Russia invaded. Until days before, France was still trying to play the diplomacy card, in its long tradition as a “distant friend of Russia.”

In truth, French-Russian interests haven’t been aligned since 1917. Some would argue that they haven’t been since the Crimean War of 1853 considering the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892 was more about France’s will of revenge on Germany and Russia’s need to balance German power in occupied Poland than outspoken friendship. The Second World War, of course, is another story.

Moscow’s diplomats were fond of cultivating the illusion of a “special relationship,” as it shaped French hesitation and inconsistency about Russia for decades. France still maintained its ground and had parts of its military and diplomatic establishment deeply sceptical of Russia, seeing it as a growing threat, as opposed to the more conservative, older generation that could see them as a “partner” for the future.

For a while though, France’s elites thought they had the hear of the Kremlin. Notably in 2008 when Nicolas Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy with Putin, following the invasion of Georgia, effectively froze the conflict, much to Russia’s advantage, cementing the separatist “republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which served as general rehearsals for the future puppet states of Donetsk and Luhansk. This came at a time when Nicolas Sarkozy had actually been bullied by Putin in 2007, with him threatening him and France during their first meeting. Sarkozy famously looked distraught in the press conference shortly after.

The real break came only in 2022, after the assault on Ukraine, even though Putin had been received at Brégançon as recently as 2019, to the not-so-concealed irritation of France’s allies.

By April 2022, France expelled 35 Russian diplomats, suspected of running an espionage network from the Russian embassies and consulates.

France’s intentions not to humiliate Russia after the Soviet collapse came from good intentions and geopolitical goodwill. However, the oligarchs, who had pushed Yeltsin to hand power to Putin after the latter’s clever political manoeuvring, turned that goodwill into a tool for Moscow. The “special relationship” was, in truth, only going one way. Still, one could say, the French national bird is a rooster. And a rooster has claws. Paris’s sudden shift of tone caught Moscow off guard, and hybrid attacks escalated in response.

Now deprived of official diplomatic channels in France, Moscow has changed tactics, moving to the everyday and societal level. Imaginary bedbugs, hateful graffiti, decapitated pigs, bots, and fake media, even replicating sites like Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Le Parisien in 2024, now weave a web of not-so-subtle and pervasive attacks across the country. Networks of fake news online, often linked to far-right groups covertly directed by Russian services, exist globally, according to VIGINUM (the French vigilance and protection service against foreign digital interference).

Opinion manipulation is now one of the most serious threats to the French Republic, attacking its constitutional foundations and order. The very intensity of these attacks, online and offline alike, also betrays something else: Russia is hurting. Sanctions are biting.

France, being one of the keystones of European defence, is thus an enemy Russia seeks to destabilise. There is no need to defeat a country militarily when one can divide its society sufficiently and ensure that its agents thrive within the fractures it created.

The post Bedbugs, Pig Heads, and Chaos: France Under Russian Siege appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The 2023 shutdown of the last nuclear power plants in Germany, under Olaf Scholz’s chancellorship made a lot of noise on the continent. Some wondered if other countries were going to follow suit. But it seems that it will not be the case, and leaders of the nuclear sector in Europe, notably France and Finland, made it very clear that nuclear was gonna be the way forward and that Berlin would pay the price of what experts would call an incoherent energy policy. On the one side, Germany is indeed one of the global leaders of renewable energy, succeeding in the increase of wind and solar power where pessimists predicted failure, while on the other, they phased out their nuclear first, rather than their coal industry, which still accounts for nearly 25% of total electricity in Germany.

The Shift: The Nuclear Alliance and EDF’s victory

Indeed, since the closure of Isar 2, Emsland and Neckarwestheim 2 in April 2023 during the SPD-Grünen-FDP coalition, Germany’s reliance on imports has become a necessity to fulfil its needs. 8.66 TWh were imported that same year, ad well as a total of 25.19 TWh in 2024, with France filling the gap via EDF (Électricité De France, the state-owned and biggest French energy company), at the worst time of the energy crisis that hit Europe back then.

Notwithstanding the rejoicing of some of the European Greens that cheered for the dismantlement of the last German nuclear power plants, rather than more efforts focusing on shutting down the coal plants that make Germany’s electricity one of the least sustainable today in Europe, it seems the situation has evolved positively for the Nuclear industry in Europe. France has spearheaded that change and is now looking forward to strengthening its place in Europe, as the de facto head of the Nuclear Alliance, a group of 12 countries (France, Finland, Poland, Croatia, the Netherlands amongst others) founded in 2024, pushing forward for the development of nuclear energy as a key factor in decarbonization and energy independence efforts, something that has been in line with the french energy policy since the 70s.

In fact, it was only recently, after years of tensions with Berlin, that the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz  clearly stated in May 2025 during a visit to France that Germany wouldn’t further block the development of nuclear power in Europe.

This warmed up relations between the two countries, as France and Germany underwent a relatively cool phase of their relations in the previous years, notably because of energy and defence policies that saw Berlin and Paris clash on multiple occasions. The lowest point of the relations was probably 2023 after it was revealed that two German foundations on the Bundestag payroll (The Heinrich Böll and Rosa Luxemburg foundations) were directly conducting efforts to hinder the development of the French nuclear industry, which sparked a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

This comes as a double victory for the French nuclear industry, as the ARENH (Meaning regulated access to historic nuclear energy) scheme, which forced EDF to sell 100TW per year at the low cost €42/MWh is due to end by December 2025. The scheme, which had been implemented in 2011 during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, followed the European decision to break energy monopolies in Europe, had been widely criticised in the country, a lot of experts and people alike saying that neighbouring countries were using the scheme to provide themselves with cheap, carbon-free energy rather than accelerating their own transition. Germany was especially pointed, as the phasing out of their own nuclear industry was seen as highly hypocritical, as it was believed that they would need to import French power the moment their last reactor was turned off.

France did not defend its industry properly back then and has, it seems, learnt its lesson as EDF will quite literally regain a monopoly post 2025 with a much more favourable scheme.

Indeed, EDF will be free to sell its electricity at market prices, but if its volume of sales exceeds a certain threshold (based on historical “normal” profits or production costs), it will have to pay a tax going from 50 to 90% of that excess revenue to the French state.  If the ARENH provided French consumers with relatively low prices, EDF will now likely prioritise selling more abroad than raising prices domestically. This is seen as a great victory for the industry and the country as a whole as the feeling of the industry being “profited from” is eased, and hopes that neighbouring countries will invest more or rethink their phase out of nuclear rise.

This comes at a time when EDF is spearheading the replacement of existing reactors and the building of the new generation of EPR2.

Uranium back in fashion: The NZIA and its subsequent help to extending nuclear power in Europe.

All of this came after intense lobbying efforts on the part of pro-nuclear forces in Europe, which resulted in nuclear being included as one of the beneficiaries of the Net Zero Industry Act of June 2024, a crucial European text that recognises decarbonization and energy security as the utmost priorities, rather than competition. This would allow key industries in the sector to flourish and work in a monopolistic manner if needs be, towards these goals, as forced competition would only jeopardise them.

The NZIA was massively pushed by France and most of its nuclear industry firms (EDF and Framatome come to mind) as well as Finland. They all lobbied for the recognition of nuclear as a strategic tool that must be used to combat climate change alongside renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. The war in Ukraine only helped their line of argument.

This was accompanied by Belgium and the Netherlands announcing in May 2024 new investments for nuclear at the same period. If Belgium “just” plans to extend the life of its existing reactor with Prime Minister Alexander de Croo saying at the time that it was “unrealistic” to hope to phase out nuclear if the country wanted to reach its decarbonization goals, the Netherlands clearly announced their intent to build new power plants in the 2030s as well as extend the life of the Borssele plant. This marks a serious turn in their nuclear policies, considering the fact that both countries planned for a phase-out in the early 2000s. Two new EPRs in the Netherlands would provide something on the order of 5 GW of low-carbon electricity

Germany dropping its opposition to nuclear in Europe altogether may also unblock the long-lasting crisis between them and Poland, considering the former repeatedly stalled Polish plans to invest in nuclear and open its first power plant with regulatory (Via the EU), diplomatic and economical measures, a bewildering move considering Polish energy is today the most carbon heavy (Averaging 653g of Co²/kWh in the last 12 months. France or Finland on the same period were only 25 and 45g, respectively) on the continent.

France and Poland signed a deal in May 2025 on this specific matter, with EDF hoping to secure its share of the future Polish nuclear market, directly competing with the US company Westinghouse, which also expressed interest in the matter. The German blockade of Polish nuclear developments has soured relations between the two countries, though the change of government in Poland in 2023 has seemingly helped re-establish a form of dialogue, made even more possible with Germany backing off its anti-nuclear stance on a European level.

The future?

The recent international situation, as well as the climate emergency, has helped change the narrative regarding nuclear in Europe, now being seen as an essential tool if Europe wants to achieve energy sovereignty, as well as the ambitious climate goals it is aiming for. France’s role on the matter has not only been one of pure benevolence, as it aimed to preserve its industry and one of its greatest champions. But France’s energy policy has itself been a victim of a lack of coherence, with nuclear being both championed and attacked since the 70s, which has slowed down its rollout and its efficiency at times. It has now benefited of a coherent support for a solid twenty years, with governments throughout the period attempting to defend the “Filière” (Industry)  and defending France’s role on the European level. The end of ARENH is awaited by EDF and companies of this industrial sector, as it’s expected to boost the sector’s revenue.

As Europe recalibrates its energy strategy, nuclear seems to be no longer a question of ideology and has, for now, it seems, defeated dogmatism. For the Nuclear Alliance, it is a needed cornerstone alongside renewable for both decarbonization and strategic independence.

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Vaccine Nationalism And Political Myopia

Let’s start with the fundamentals. The EU’s negotiating wasn’t slow, nor was it inefficient. In fact, the EU – AstraZeneca purchasing agreement precedes the company’s similar deal with the United Kingdom. The “British first” clause did not stem out of a commercial contract. It was the result of public funds made available to Oxford, which AstraZeneca gained access to once the two teamed up to develop a vaccine.

Deploying early funding to support a vaccine for the new coronavirus is undoubtedly a sensible move. Vaccine nationalism, conversely, was extremely myopic. The funding being made conditional on Britain receiving doses before anybody else might seem like a nation-state ruthlessly pursuing its interests while leaving the rest of the world out to dry, and to a degree this is true. But even if one handwaves this selfishness as acceptable, the fundamental point is missing: this logic makes it harder, not easier, to fight the pandemic.

Every new generation of the virus increases the likelihood that it will mutate. The more people are infected all over the world, the likelier it is that the virus will change. The more the virus changes, the less effective vaccines will be. Should the UK manage to vaccinate its entire population, and open up to the rest of the world, it would be confronted with a situation in which contagions still surge in the majority of the planet, leading to more and more variants, and presenting the spectre of a new wave in the UK itself, endangering all the work done so far. Only a global rollout of vaccines can properly stem the tide of the pandemic.

The World “First”, Europe “Second”

This is not fringe epidemiology. This fact was well understood as far back as January 2020. For all the uncertainty surrounding the new coronavirus, it was still a coronavirus – many in this clade are already known to science, and while there could be no certainty as to how fast the virus would mutate, it was fair to assume it would eventually produce variants, especially if confronted with piecemeal vaccinations. This is why, when Germany funded BioNTech like the UK did Oxford, the government in Berlin did not include a “Europe first” clause. Nor did the European Commission see it fit to intervene and request one. This attitude remained consistent when BioNTech partnered with American pharmaceutical company Pfizer. Meanwhile, the UK vetoed a partnership between Oxford and American company Merck, forcing a partnership with British AstraZeneca instead.

And yet, while the EU was making sound medical R&D decisions, and trusting its long-standing partners to do the same, worrying signs started coming out of the Atlantic. Then-president Trump tried to steal BioNTech from Germany to gain exclusive American access to the vaccine. The move failed, and even so, back then it caused an uproar. Why the same indignation is not on display now, with countries monopolising vaccine doses, is a great mystery of public opinion.

Export Bans And The Global Vaccine Supply Chain

Trump didn’t seem overly concerned with his failure to steal the BioNTech vaccine. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to sign Pfizer supply contracts. This is because he knew that most of the new partnership’s production capacity was in the United States; he only needed a legal excuse to seize doses present on American soil, or block them with an export ban, and he would get all the jabs his country would need. The absurdity of this beggar-thy-neighbour policy is that European vaccines are being used, not only in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but also Mexico and Canada – the two countries bordering the Continental United States, who have no other option given their neighbour’s export ban on vaccines.

The legal cover for this – which the Biden administration is still using at time of writing – is twofold: one is Trump’s December 2020 executive order, giving Americans first priority to vaccines produced on American soil. The other, more substantial basis is the Defense Production Act.

We’re not discussing a trickle here, either: millions of EU doses have been used in the aforementioned countries, as well as in developing countries, while the United States and the United Kingdom simply seize EU doses produced on their soil and regularly purchased well in advance. This unilateral seizing is nothing short of vaccine piracy, and as mentioned, it’s making it all the harder to have a meaningful global impact on the pandemic. Should dangerous variants proliferate, it might even backfire, causing untold damage to the economy, as well as – and more seriously – additional loss of life. The United States alone has got its hands on over five million EU vaccine doses.

EU-UK Relations Take Centre-Stage

On the other side of the coin is the UK’s own vaccine piracy – primarily fueled by what the EU deems AstraZeneca’s breach of contract. Already on 29th January, AstraZeneca informed the EU that it would be unable to meet promised shipments due to “production problems” in its two European plants. This was because doses slated for the EU had been delivered to the UK instead. Brussels demanded AstraZeneca uphold its contract, which obliged it to make use of all four of its production facilities (two in the UK, two in the EU) to meet its obligations on deliveries. Shielded by the “British first” clause, AstraZeneca refused to bridge the gap with exports from the UK. The stage was set for a cross-channel battle of wills that is not yet concluded at time of writing.

Up to January 2021, the EU had included the UK in all of its anti-pandemic industrial coordination plans, making sure Britain was not isolated from the world economy on critical items such as ventilators and medical equipment during the first and second surges of covid cases. This has included as many as ten million vaccine doses exported from the EU to the UK. Britain’s current manipulation of vaccine exports has ended that cooperation. The Commission has retaliated and is moving ahead with its own export ban, and it is likely that additional countermeasures will be forthcoming. As more vaccines enter the market, AstraZeneca’s leverage will diminish. Legally, the battle might well last for years to come. Politically, the tide has already turned against them.

The Strategic And Political Bankruptcy Of European Member States

A final consideration should be made to close out this much-needed reframing of the vaccine narrative. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that the EU was naive to trust in its international partners to put collective long-term interests ahead of their own short-term benefit. This misses the fundamental point on two levels. First is the already explored medical argument: a piecemeal rollout of vaccines in select countries is an own goal, as the virus rages everywhere and the number of mutations increase. The failure to coordinate vaccine distribution on an international scale ultimately represents the failure of humanity to address this crisis effectively; it will lengthen it, not shorten it.

A narrower but equally important point is that the EU did not act naively – rather, it acted as it has always been intended to act, by design. It is completely unreasonable to expect the EU to act and think like a hard power, neorealist security institution, when Member States still jealously guard their monopoly on security and national defence. As we have emphatically argued before, Member States are in the driver seat when it comes to running the Union through the pandemic, and they’re making a terrible job of it.

The Catch 22 Vaccine Scenario

Healthcare is also a competence lying primarily with the Member States. Their refusal to equip the EU with the proper tools to handle security responsibilities has left this flank open to Anglo-American vaccine piracy. It is their political timidity which leads them to preserve this institutional status quo even in the face of a world-changing crisis. In addition, their pathological concerns with short-term gains over long-term strategy is what motivates them to use the EU as a scapegoat for everything they fail to accomplish.

Unfortunately, this is the “Catch 22” European institutions are constantly exposed to. Had the European Commission truly tried to force BioNTech to end its partnership with Pfizer and find a European partner instead, Member States today might be playing the blame game the other way, pointing to the failed partnership as the reason for the delayed availability and rollout of anti-covid jabs. This crisis has made it obvious that 19th-Century European nation states are not fit to govern themselves in a crisis.

If you want evidence of the need for true European integration, look no further than the vaccine rollout crisis. This is more than recrimination about the past – it contains a concern about the future. The end of the pandemic is not yet in sight. Even as immunisations mount, the process to make the virus both endemic and harmless will be long and arduous. Will Europe get through to the end of this great challenge still in one piece? How exactly do European Member States plan to survive climate change when the coronavirus has so thoroughly outmatched them? These remain, at the moment, tragically open questions.

The post Stop Blaming The EU Over The Slow Vaccine Rollout appeared first on My Country? Europe..

This is leadership?

When Ursula von der Leyen first faced the European Parliament as Commission President-Elect, she stated that ‘we sometimes forget that our greatest achievements have always come when we are bold.’

As of 2021, to act boldly boils down to the following: allow your Health Commissioner to initiate a war of words with AstraZeneca, leading to embarrassing communication errors and half-arsed vaccine nationalism (imagine, the EU threatening vaccine export controls); throw your Trade Commissioner under the bus over the Ireland protocol Article 16 debacle, despite evidence of your own cabinet being directly responsible for the mishap; and lash out at the UK for accelerating vaccine approval procedures as it goes through a nightmarish mortality crisis.

In the face of backlash, Ms Von der Leyen’s initial strategy has been to release pre-recorded and scripted videos filmed from within an apparently sun-lit Berlaymont (anyone staying in Brussels these days cannot help but wonder whether she resides in a Teletubbies-esque infantile dystopia), appearing to dig in and insisting no fault on her part in the events unfolding over the last weeks.

These releases are doctored and vacuous, not least after having publicly dragged DG Trade through the mud. Crucially, she would not even face questions from journalists, much to the chagrin of the Eurobubble’s press corps. She would only accept a videocall with concerned MEPs, or whenever she’s in the mood, offering preferential access to German media. A craven silo mentality is slipping in at the European Commission.

It appears that we, citizens of the EU, have a ‘leader’ who refuses to take on responsibility, prefers to sacrifice her subordinates on the altar of her own incompetence, who to wants to reinvent the wheel everywhere she goes (no less her botched micro-management of filling in senior Commission positions), and refuses to be held accountable. After fleeing Germany, whereto will she flee now?

It all really begs the question: is the current Commission president out of her depth? Can the European Union afford an Ursula von der Leyen? The same person whose German defence ministry oversaw machine gunners training with broomsticks, resorting to their own vocal cords to mimic the steady discharge of their weapons?

Europe invested billions to help develop the world‘s 1st COVID vaccines & create a global common good.

Now the companies must deliver & honour their obligations. We will set up a vaccine export transparency mechanism.

EU is committed to contribute. But we also mean business. pic.twitter.com/lvq0KkCWJD

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) January 26, 2021

The alternatives that were not meant to be

What makes this author shiver with regret and now dread, is that this scenario could have been averted. Were it a Margrethe Vestager, a Frans Timmermans or Alexander Stubb in charge, facing off with pharmaceutical giants and delivering the same tough messages, we would at least have a Commission President commanding an aura of sincerity, charisma, and proven European leadership.

Margrethe Vestager has a history of successfully facing down large multinationals and the benefit of world recognition and respect. Frans Timmermans is a seasoned polyglot, a successful diplomat, the European Green Deal’s very own champion and unrelenting in his views on the rule of law. Alexander Stubb would have combined academic acumen with experience in the European Council. What exactly did Ms Von der Leyen bring to the table?

The spectre of intergovernmentalism haunts Europe

Our predicament is rather clear: we are shackled by the doctrine of lowest common denominator, rendering our leadership mere puppets of the Member States at best; or incompetent and hapless at worst. In either case, leadership selected on pathetically unimpressive criteria makes the Commission an easy scapegoat in its by-now institutionalised role as the European Council’s overstretched and underfinanced secretariat.

Why else does it seem that the Commission prioritised cost-savings and created the illusion of strong-arming big pharma rather than focussing on swift vaccine development, production, and delivery, regardless of price?

Regrettably, find ourselves in an equilibrium best described by so-called (new) intergovernmentalism, with power concentrated in the (European) Council, whose modus operandi is one of consensus-building rather than democratic accountability. In other words, the least unsatisfactory option to all, whether it be policy or the Commission presidency, is fair game.

The toolbox of this equilibrium? Deliberation and persuasion, giving us the mercurial talent of Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borell, a commissioner to ‘protect the European way of life’, and of course a ‘geopolitical European Commission’. Instead of a union of values, we are fast becoming a union of platitudes, led by the intellectually vacuous and craven, rather than the entrepreneurial example of Jacques Delors. Oh… what could have been with Margrethe Vestager at the helm.

Democratic federalism

The current state of affairs, one of political eurosclerosis, is lamentable. That does not mean, however, that the European project has plateaued and is bound for steady decline as the rot of the intergovernmental equilibrium takes root. There is a medicine: democratic federalism. It would, however, be a bitter pill to swallow for the Member States and a rude awakening for the institutional set-up we have normalised since Lisbon.

Above all, it would require political courage, especially from the European Parliament in facing off with the Member States. Concretely, the Spitzenkandidaten process must be formalised, and pan-European lists allowing citizens from across the EU to cast one of their votes directly for one of these candidates must become the norm. It is farcical for a political union that preaches democracy and transparency to the world, to have an executive led by a person parachuted in after secretive deliberation between the Member States. Nobody voted, and more importantly, nobody would have voted for Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, yet she ‘leads’.

It is not good enough for the European Union to merely survive. This is the lowest of benchmarks, a craven measure of success worthy only of the conniving, cynical and Janus-faced politicking of intergovernmentalism that is institutionalising a new, political, eurosclerosis. Ursula von der Leyen, European Council, Member States, and European Parliament, when will you be bold?

Until then, steerless, rudderless, and devoid of captaincy, the EU ship is left alone to face the boisterous waves of our time.

The post Von der Leyen’s Vaccine Woes: Symptom of a Political Eurosclerosis appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Unquestionably, this sentence is yet more proof that the Russian State under Vladimir Putin’s presidency is nothing but a ruthless dictatorship which stomps on virtually everyone that dares oppose it. However, it doesn’t mean that Alexei Navalny would be a much better alternative for Russia in any regard. In fact, many of Navalny’s political stances should raise red flags for Russian and Western observers alike.

Navalny’s Political Ideology

On paper, an uninformed observer may point at the amorphous Russian Communist Party as the main opposition to the Russian regime. Indeed, the party holds the dubious honour of being the second-largest political party in Russia with its 43 out of 450 seats in the State Duma. Reality, however, shows a much different picture.

By virtue of being consistently suppressed by the government and being more appealing to the Russian youth than the Russian Communist Party, the title of main opposition party undoubtedly goes to the social-liberal Yabloko. Protesters have rallied around this party like a beacon of hope and it is not unusual to see the Yabloko’s flag during protests and anti-governmental rallies. It is not surprising, then, that it was the only non-system party which managed to secure multiple seats in Moscow’s 2019 local election, despite the standard electoral fraud by the Russian regime.

Navalny himself was, in the early days, involved with Yabloko. However, he was expelled in 2007 for his far-right views. That same year, he then went on to co-found a new political movement called The People, which allied itself with two other ethnic nationalist groups called Movement Against Illegal Immigration and Great Russia. All these groups were characterised not only by their zealous nationalism but also by a generalised unsatisfaction with Putin’s leadership, which was considered “too weak”.

But Navalny’s links to the far-right go beyond mere association. Since the first edition in 2006, he has been involved in the yearly Russian March, a gathering of far-right nationalists from all political groups. He has routinely been accused of using racial slurs and basing his relations with people on their ethnicity. Most concerningly, his foreign policy doesn’t mark any significant departure from the status quo.

In the past, Navalny has stated his support for Russian presence in Ukraine, notably stating that “Russia should strive for the integration of Belarus and Ukraine” and claiming that they are a part of Russia and form only one country together. While he criticised Russia’s policy in Ukraine – because it was led by Vladimir Putin’s government – he has been remarkably silent about his criticism on the annexation of Crimea in itself. When asked about possibly returning it to Ukraine if he was ever to lead Russia, he confirmed that his government would not start such a procedure.

When it comes to the Caucasus, his track record is even more appalling. He supported Russia in its war against Georgia in 2008, going as far as calling for all Georgians to be expelled from Russia. In a recording of a pro-gun rights video around the same time, he also compared people from Russia’s mostly Muslim North Caucasus to “cockroaches” and mimicked shooting one. His efforts were crowned by the ardent endorsement of the nationalist campaign “Stop Feeding the Caucasus”, in which he called for an end to the federal subsidies for the poor, ethnic minority-populated autonomous regions in the south of the country.

A Moderate Turn?

Despite never retracting many of his controversial statements, in recent years Navalny’s inflammatory rhetoric has mellowed out. His attention has turned primarily to another one of his special interests: the fight against corruption and authoritarianism in his country. His dabbling in journalism, through which he uncovered many high-profile investigations against State-owned companies, served to launch him well beyond his far-right niche and propelled him as a Russian opposition hero in Western media. The most recent assassination attempt has cemented this distorted legacy of a “champion of democracy” fighting for the rule of law in Russia.

This image couldn’t be farther from the truth. His attempts to seem more moderate now are simply a consequence of his desire to garner more sympathy from the West. He is not interested in being a “champion of democracy” as much as he is interested in preserving Russian integrity. If he has been more discreet about his – really important – ties with nationalist groups, it is probably only to enjoy the support that the West has been giving him.

There is a reason why Navalny isn’t really liked by significant parts of the Russian opposition. Though he makes better attempts to hide them, he has the same authoritarian tendencies as Putin. It would be absolutely foolish to think the Russian Constitution and democracy would be better off with him in charge. Nor would he be any more friendly towards the West than Putin is right now.

Navalny isn’t the best hope for Russia, but merely another side to the Russian autocracy with a “reformer” label that he knows how to use. Unlike the way in which he is pictured in Western media, he doesn’t represent the entirety of the Russian opposition in and of himself, but rather he is merely one opponent amongst others. He should not be getting all the spotlight, or in fact any at all.

If Not Navalny, Who Else?

For those looking in, the real question then becomes: if we don’t shine a spotlight on Navalny, the public face of Russian opposition to the regime, who else should we shine the spotlight on? The question is not as simple as it may seem.

It would be wrong to assume that everyone who voices support for him in Russia is backing him for all his positions. This is especially the case in recent years, as Navalny has indeed presented himself as a moderate. His work on exposing corruption remains fundamental to the democratic progress of Russia as a whole. At the same time, however, the people he has worked with, in particular the Russian ultranationalists, are not personalities that are keen to uphold the rule of law or ensure basic democratic freedoms.

For this reason, it is important not to conflate the struggle of Russian opposition about the rule of law and democracy merely with Navalny. The focus has to be less on him and more on individuals from civil society, opposition mayors or people in elected positions, and so on. Through Western media, we should promote more groups like Yabloko and the ultra pro-western Republican Party of Russia, which have been doing important work in this respect, and the legacy of people like Boris Nemtsov, former Deputy Premier assassinated in 2015, who is still today an important symbol of pro-democracy protesters in Russia.

The hopes of a lot of people are pinned on a regime change that will finally bring an end to Putin’s reign. It may seem easy to support Navalny in this respect, if only because he clearly and outspokenly opposes Putin himself. However, supporting someone with his own, different brand of autocracy could prove to be a critical short-term mistake, one dangerous to the West as much as it is to the democratic aspirations of the Russian people. 

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England, like the rest of Europe, has changed enormously since that time. Europe itself is happily learning to put all these national and class conceits behind, although some think they can now turn them towards third world immigrants. Despite those anticipated changes, writers like George Orwell stand above their époque leading us by example into a future few could see at the time.

The Engaged Writer

Writers since the time of the Greeks and Romans have addressed governing the polis as an integral part of their art and vocation. During the Middle Ages, Dante and Machiavelli continued these traditions. In France, Voltaire, Rousseau and d’Alembert prepared the path for Chamfort, Mirabeau, then Zola and Hugo. Schiller and Heine played similar roles in German literature.

In the wake of World War II and the flowering of philosophical thought in Europe, the old was shed in a search for new social paradigms. The ‘engaged writer’ became a thing in contemporary parlance with the existential philosophy of Sartre, though writers had often embraced social activism before. This now articulated existential posture was embodied in the writing and social action of Camus and his contemporaries.

In a world governed by existence, the writer was no longer assigned his or her place in society by fate or religion; but chose it. The ‘nothing’ inside Sartre’s seminal work Being and Nothingness allowed man to create his existence and its meaning from whole cloth. Few were better suited to do this than the writer who combined intellect with action.

Enter Eric Blair

Much of the reversal of values finding its expression in philosophy and literature was created by the war – in fact, two World Wars – as well as an intervening pandemic and economic depression. It is not surprising then to find engaged writers preceding by a few years Sartre’s discovery of them. Such a writer was George Orwell, born Eric Blair. Similar engagement characterised many others, both in the pre and post-war period. Had the challenges of the time solicited such an ardent response?

For Eric Blair, who had come from Burmese service, the path to writing was different than that of his aristocrat peers. From little England and a scholarship to Eton to run off to Paris, joining the anarchists to fight in Spain’s civil war, and even writing and organising for the British Labour Party, his accomplishments are a heroic feat for his time and class.

Upbringing and Background

Eric Blair was born in Burma the son of an ennobled bourgeois family who had lost their fortune and found their way to a middle-class existence through the sinecure of foreign service. Eric was too young to know Burma when he returned to England with his mother and sister to await their father’s retirement shortly before the birth of a younger sister.

To understand Eric, or more particularly what he refused to become, it is necessary to understand the rigid class system of the period. The system in its current form dates from the Normans. The Normans used their newfound power in invasion and defeat of the English at Hastings in 1066 to rule over the English nobility. The English were relegated to the status of minor nobility with circumspect local powers. Status was guarded jealousy.

The Normand-English now allied with the royal houses of Europe were at the pinnacle of the hierarchy; English dukes, counts and minor nobles ruled locally at their pleasure. Unlike on the continent, the English yeoman was nearly completely alienated from his ultimate rulers. For a time after the invasion, the Normans spoke French obliging the lower nobility to get on as they could linguistically. Latin was the second language of the educated, ahead of Anglo-Saxon English.

Even today, the multiplicity of class accents reflects these divisions. Ennoblement was a distinction meant to keep the system functioning and turn successful local functionaries into allies and members of the establishment. The boarding school system, itself separated into hierarchical tiers, reinforced the power of the upper classes through education.

The Boarding School System: Orwell’s Education

Eric Blair’s status put him at the bottom rungs of this system, though well above the toiling class. His family’s finances made climbing those rungs difficult. But he was fortunate in several ways and also enterprising. His studies paved the way for a partial scholarship. Both the first World War, which emptied the school dormitories of future officers for the front and his own success on the two and a half-day entry exam enabled Eric to obtain a place and scholarship to Eton at the upper limit of his class aspirations.

The boarding school system, especially his preparatory school Saint Cyprian’s, was a brutal and lonely experience that stunted the growth of many Englishman from Oscar Wilde to C.S. Lewis when it wasn’t producing hardened officers for the Empire. Orwell’s uniqueness began here as he did not accept the unreasonable demands of what C.S. Lewis, George Monbiot and Virginia Woolf call an ‘English pathology’. His own scathing critique of the school in Such, Such Were The Joys was so unique and disturbing at the time that it was rarely read and hardly republished.

A friend and fellow Saint Cyprian, Cyril Connolly, one of the few to also reject his school experience, writes of Eric (now George): “The remarkable thing about Orwell was that he alone among the boys was an intellectual and not a parrot, for he thought for himself, read Shaw and Samuel Butler, and rejected not only [St. Cyprian’s] but the war, the Empire, Kipling, Success and Character”. A false sense of ‘Success and Character’ was the principal mantra of the school’s education according to Connolly, and undoubtedly Orwell as well.

Early Reflections of George Orwell

Orwell’s rejection of the war in 1918 as a ‘meaningless slaughter’ was not yet cemented in stone. This would come later as he was still prone to youthful moments of patriotism. No longer working as hard at Eton he would not present himself for a scholarship to Oxford. That would end his schooling, a bourse a ‘sine qua non’ given family finances for university. This was hardly uncommon for the period, even for an Etonian.

It was the exam for the Imperial Police that he presented instead. Successfully competing, he received a posting to Burma where his ideas on imperialism, war and socialism would take further shape. The education, as inadequate as Orwell considered it, for he was a voracious reader beyond the confines of his courses, gave him a humanitarian culture and confidence. Experience of the world gave him material for reflection. He was fast becoming an engaged writer, a democratic socialist and humanist. In the eyes of the governing half of England though, he was, if not entirely a traitor to his class, on the margins of ‘acceptable’ behaviour’.

Spain and World War II

In 1936, Orwell left a grocery store that he had started with his wife to volunteer to fight with the anarchists and Trotskyites in Spain, After 115 days fighting on the Aragon front, he returned to England – not without a souvenir, having experienced a bullet to the neck and partial paralysis of the right arm and loss of his voice. Home, in England he found the Spanish Civil War had resolved nothing in Europe’s march to a continent-wide conflagration. Shortly thereafter, he captured his experience of the civil war in Homage To Catalonia, a book criticized both by the British Tory establishment and Labour which was decidedly pro-Moscow and anti-Trotskyite and anarchist.

Orwell was not surprised. The allies had let the fascists triumph in Spain next door while making all sorts of noise about Munich and the Sudetenland in the inaccessible heart of Europe. They would not have been able to stop Hitler there even if they had wanted to. Nearby Spain might well have been another story. The machinations of the communists too were clear to him.

Post-War

World War II had been anticipated by Orwell’s My Country Right or Left. Orwell was, when all was said and done despite his reservations, a patriot. Hitler had to be defeated. He still held out hope that all the killing might result in some sort of revolutionary moment, improving the conditions of the working class once and for all.

He tried in various ways to make himself useful to the war effort, including enlisting, but his tuberculosis always got in the way. Furthermore, he wrote for numerous publications, his insights becoming increasingly recognized as political reporting of the first order. Eventually, he was signed up as a program broadcaster for the BBC Far Eastern service, something between reporting and propaganda, which he was more than willing to do.

Major Works of George Orwell

George Orwell died in 1950 at the age of 46 from tuberculosis, which plagued him all his life and caused him to have several serious bouts of pneumonia. In spite of this, he led an active life and was a very prolific writer. He is survived by his adopted son with his first wife Eileen.

We can add to the works already cited, Wigan’s Pier, his tribute to the coal miners and the working class of northern England, written shortly before the war. His major works, Animal Farm and 1984 came after the war and are classics of world literature. The latter, written while he was ill from Tuberculosis, has given its name to regimes of dystopian tyranny, especially ‘Newspeak’, the invented language of the totalitarian state.

Reading Orwell has been somewhat distorted by the success of these major works. They are truly brilliant and classical works of world literature but they have themselves become tools of the propaganda he detested. These two books were used to portray Orwell as an anti-communist and defender of liberal capitalism. The former he was, though not religiously, his socialism leaned toward the Trotskyite, the latter he certainly was not.

Why Should You Read Orwell?

Today’s Europe was formed through two World Wars, the struggle between fascism, capitalism, communism and decolonization. Orwell was present at the forefront of these events as a journalist and writer. His keen eye of observer, lucid intelligence, experience and emphasis on clear expository writing makes him indispensable for understanding Europe’s formative years. Read and appreciated by both left and right, he cuts through much of the dross of ideologies to understand the fate of man in this tumultuous period.

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UK’s historical involvement

After the Russo-Turkish war, the Ottoman Empire agreed to let the British Empire set an outpost in the Mediterranean by leasing them the island of Cyprus. The island was of key importance for the UK, which needed the location to monitor the Suez Canal and all the colonial routes going through. Once the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in WW1, the UK formally annexed Cyprus, as well as many other Ottoman territories such as Egypt.

The UK officially made Cyprus a British crown colony in 1925, after the Turkish Republic had given up on Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the Greek population of the island believed that the British rule would lead them to Enosis, the reunification with Greece, as part of a “Greater Greece” (Megali Idea) plan. As the UK did not seem to move towards this, a guerrilla organisation was born in 1955: the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which had Enosis as its goal. Turkish nationals wanted at first a full annexation by Turkey, but then preferred a partition after realising that Turkish Cypriots made up only 20% of the total population. As a response to EOKA, the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) appeared and aimed for Taksim, the partition of the island.

Independence, the Greek coup, and the Turkish invasion

After many riots provoked by EOKA and supported by the majority of the population, Cyprus got its independence in 1960. The first president elected is Makarios III, an archbishop that aimed for Enosis. By trying to keep the Turkish out of government and out of decision loops, violence only escalated. The UN had to intervene with UN peacekeepers and impose a cease-fire in 1964 to maintain peace.

In July 1974, the Greek Military Junta orchestrated a successful coup in Cyprus. The new government formed, a junta led by Nikos Sampson, was aiming at reuniting Cyprus with Greece. In response, Turkey tried to gather international support for an invasion through the UN but failed. Under the Guarantee Treaty of 1960 signed by Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, each one of these signatories could orchestrate a unilateral military invasion of Cyprus to restore democracy. The situation remained frozen since then.

Reunification and the Annan plan

After such an escalation of violence, how can a nation ever reunite? Both regions would need devolution of powers, as neither side would accept the other having more power. The most sustainable solution appears to be the federal model. It would allow more flexibility and less state centralisation, taking more into account the needs of local communities. Such a plan has been already thought by the United Nations: the Annan plan. It suggested a restructuration and reunification of the Republic of Cyprus into a “United Republic of Cyprus” that would be a federation of two states, more or less based on the Swiss model.

A reconciliation committee was proposed along with the federation plan, with the aim to bring the two communities back together. It also allowed Greece and Turkey to keep permanent military bases on the island, with a strong limit on the military size.

Different versions of the plan were made, up to the Annan plan V. The resolution was put to a referendum in 2004 in both communities. Northern Cypriots voted in favour of the reunification plan with almost 65% in favour, while Greek Cypriots voted the referendum down with a vast 75% against. On exit polls, most Greek Cypriots were concerned about security, which was the main reason for the rejection.

Towards a two-state solution?

In response to the Greek Cypriot’s rejection of the referendum, the UN called for a lift on unnecessary trade barriers and restrictions. Their hope is, if a reunification federation plan is not accepted, that the two entities can at least cooperate on basic inter-state matters. This means implementing a de-facto two-state solution until the Republic of Cyprus eventually officially recognises Northern Cyprus.

The conflict evolved from aggressiveness, threats or even annihilatory conflict at times, to disagreements, or questioning. As shown in the behaviour graph below, the general trend over the years shows that the conflict is slowly settling. Many elected Cypriots, both Turkish and Greek, concede that both populations grew apart by several generations, acknowledging that they share little except the name.

The only way left to move forward is thus a two-state solution. It would allow Northern Cyprus to vary its trade and avoid being dependent on Turkey. Normalisation would also mean further diplomatic relations between the two parts of the island and to aim eventual agreements at common growth. It will also resolve a century-long dispute for Cyprus and could ease tensions between the European Union and Turkey.

But Turkey does not seem willing to ease these tensions. Many aspects show that the country will not finalise its accession process to the EU, and President Erdoğan understood it. The Cyprus question is a point of pressure they have on the Union, a powerful lever just like the migrants and their diaspora. A United Cyprus would mean giving away their military control over the North of the island, being even more contained in the Mediterranean Sea, which has been the source of many tensions in 2020.

The need to reunify is also less present in the Northern part. They used to be much poorer than Cyprus which was a pro-unity argument for long. They are however rapidly closing the gap, showing that they do not need the unification to develop properly. Cyprus’ nominal GDP per capita is estimated at $26,240, while Northern Cyprus’ is almost equal to $15,000. It might be almost two times lower, but it is almost equal to Poland’s and Hungary’s nominal GDP per capita. It also is higher than the ones of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria.

While not ideal, it clearly shows that this part of the island can develop on its own. And with the recent discovery of increasingly more natural gas in Northern Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, the space for development increases with it.

With Turkey having little incentives to let go of its influence over the island and Northern Cyprus developing well, the pressure other than political will to reunite the two parts will remain low for a very long time. The situation is certainly not pushing for a United Cyprus. Citizens of both areas report more and more their doubts about a possible reunification and become more and more used to the situation. This is normalisation in process.

Finally, this conflict is a “comfortable” conflict for Cyprus, as it gives its leaders great political leverage. Not only it fosters patriotism within its population, but it also allows Cyprus to have a real say in the European Council by threatening to veto unless Cyprus receives concessions whenever they may use it.

Whatever the future negotiations will lead to, the European Union is pushing for a normalisation of the situation as part of its long-term plan of Development and Cooperation. Whether it is under the form of a United Republic of Cyprus, or as the recognition and trade agreements with Northern Cyprus (and eventually welcome them as Member State in the future), the best thing that can happen is the end of this century-long conflict.

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With radical Islam the latest addition to the European terrorist ecosystem, similar discussions are taking place in how best to counter it – particularly in France, which has recently witnessed the murder of French teacher Samuel Paty. Eighteen-year-old radical Islamist, Abdoullakh Abouyedovich Anzorov, is the person responsible for the murder, and the fallout from the crime is still reverberating in French society and politics.

Islam and radicalised communities

The radicalisation of Muslim communities living in Western European countries has deep roots, with old and new grievances and problems contributing to explain the phenomenon. There is little doubt, however, that the most recent shock to the system came from the deteriorating situation and spillover of the Syrian Civil War in Europe. This allowed terrorist groups like ISIS to weaponise modern technology such as social media to radicalise young Muslims in Europe, as well as key people in their communities – such as imams.

The turmoil surrounding the Syrian Civil War and its dislocations has allowed radical groups to establish an ideological foothold in Europe. This radicalisation has triggered episodes of brutality in the streets of cities across Western Europe, with the murder of Samuel Paty setting a sad record on the scale of violence.

The murder of Samuel Paty also broke precedent on such incidents, as it seems that the murder was not strictly motivated by adherence to a radical Islamic movement, but due to sheer intolerance of different opinions, with worrying implications for the prospects of Islam in Europe. This fact also raises concerns over the overall European approach to radicalism, which is essentially laissez-faire, “let-it-be until public opinion turns against it”.

When that switch does happen, responses tend to be knee-jerk and based on populism and stoking anger, rather than mending wounds. It is apparent that this approach simply doesn’t work and the philosophy behind it is fully illogical: central governments voluntarily choose not to use their tools and deliberately ignore the problem of radicalisation, until the popular mood turns so sour that putting forth sensible policies becomes impossible.

Western European states need to find a way to mitigate radicalisation within their Muslim communities. Needless to say, they equally need an effective strategy to defang extremism across the political spectrum, and the rise of right-wing extremism, in particular, poses a serious threat to the future of democracy in countries such as Italy and France. These movements have greatly capitalised on the dislocation caused by the battle against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and have repeatedly made breaches into the mainstream by building their political narrative and cause around these questions.

As mentioned, however, the roots of radicalisation go deeper than just ISIS. Muslim communities in Western Europe were already marginalised and treated as a dangerous foreign community. This marginalisation has deprived people of a sense of belonging – belonging to the country that they were born in, and where they’d spent the majority or entirety of their lives. The insular mentality this has triggered has greatly amplified the power of fundamentalist imams to radicalise their communities. Any effective real-world solution which at once addresses the issue and combats the populist, far-right perspective of the matter, will have to go straight to the root of the problem – and look at successful examples of social cohesion.

A real-world example

The Greek Muslim community living in Western Thrace, on the border with Turkey, is a success story with many lessons for policymakers looking for inspiration. This region has a large Muslim community from a mixed ethnic background, coming at around 33% of the population. The minority enjoys several protections to guarantee an even keel with the Greek majority, including constitutional guarantees of non-discrimination, and political representation.

But where the integration process truly shines is in education: a dense network of minority schools provide education in Greek and Turkish. The schools are state-funded and aimed at minority students, with distinct curricula based on the unique social and cultural context of the local communities. Imams and religious scholars participate in this educational effort, which includes elective secondary education in religious studies in Turkish, and the Quran in Arabic.

This network includes two high schools, located in Komotini and Xanthi – where the concentration of Greek Muslims is highest. Public transportation for students living in isolated, rural or mountainous areas is subsidised by the state, to ensure no one falls through the cracks of the system, and Islamic theological seminaries are available for interested students, with an equal footing with Orthodox seminaries before the law. Additionally, 0,5% of slots in national higher education institutes are reserved to members of the Greek Muslim minority.

This set up has succeeded in keeping radical Islam out of the picture, and unable to get a foothold in a community that sees this arrangement as largely equitable. There are issues, of course. A particular point of contention is the appointment of muftis – currently split between the state and Greek Muslims, with a mufti appointed by the former and another elected by the latter. Controversies regarding citizenship clauses and the ethnic composition of the community are still existent. But these pale in comparison with the fractious relationship between Muslims in Western Europe and their countries.

Western Thrace offers a model for peaceful coexistence far removed from the far right’s cries for deportation or worse. State-funded mosques, a special curriculum in areas with high percentages of Muslims and positive discrimination measures would root out radical Islam and its ideological narrative. If we want to see things to change, we need to take real action and implement real strategies to properly assimilate the Muslim communities and root out the far-right’s rhetoric of radical Islam in Western Europe.

Guest article Aggelos Tzitziras. The author is an 18-year-old university student living in Heraklion, Greece, Member of the Greek Youth Parliament (2017-2018), and Press Secretary of the think tank Symmaxia (Alliance).

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The Situation in Xinjiang

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), has reported that in the last three years, the PRC built at least 380 ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang, with the intention to detain Uyghur Muslims and other supposed non-conformists. The official line will state that these camps were set up to help the Uyghurs, re-educate and ‘moderate’ an ethnic minority plagued by Islamic fundamentalism and boost their socio-economic outcomes by moulding them into citizens worthy of the PRC. In other words, the goal is to turn these supposedly hapless and anti-intellectual band of Turkic nomads into Han-Chinese model citizens. Any glance at the PRC’s aptly-named CCTV, or its Pravda-esque newspapers, will simply echo this lie.

What we are actually looking at is the systematic cultural genocide of Xinjiang’s majority Uyghur population and the incarceration of hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Muslim Chinese citizens in internment camps, since at least 2017. One does not have to look long to figure out just how inhumane conditions and treatment in these camps are. The reports of brutish psychological torture involving sleep deprivation and threats to one’s family as well as slave labour; other sources have obtained testimonials by on-camp teachers revealing forced sterilisation as well as the brutal rape of female inmates, the details are too gruesome to spell out here. The UN’s own criteria would characterise this brutality as a genocide.

What is the EU doing?

Suffice it to say that Xinjiang’s camps are inhumane and an affront to human dignity as insidious and extensive as anything we have seen since the end of World War II. Surprisingly, we have yet to see an official confrontation or even condemnation on the matter by European leaders. We recently saw prominent European politicians mark Black Ribbon Day, a day on which we commemorate the victims of the 20th century’s violent totalitarian regimes. References to the ongoing repression in Xinjiang were notably absent.

Indeed, any consistent criticism of from Europe’s high political circles seems to originate with outspoken Belgian liberal MEP, Guy Verhofstadt. By contrast, his liberal compatriot Charles Michel, now president of the European Council, had little more to offer than happy musings about European cheese and wine during and after a recent virtual Europe-China summit, with human rights issues assuming a relative backstage role, being labelled under ‘International affairs and other issues’, by the Council website. The Commission President, Ursula Von der Leyen, at least made sure to save space in a tweet about the event for ‘fundamental values’. It seems that our Union of Values is all bark and little bite when it comes to the most pressing human rights issue of our time.

Taking part in our video conference with Chinese President Xi. Looking forward to frank & open discussions. Engagement at the highest level with China is crucial if we are to promote European economic interests, protect our climate & defend fundamental values and rights. #EUChina pic.twitter.com/n3eyWwckKO

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) September 14, 2020

No concrete steps have been taken to leverage a Chinese shift in policy regarding the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Of course, the bloc’s armoury of policy instruments in external affairs is limited, but it can still rely on access to its internal market as a ploy. For instance, the EU could apply a surgical tariff, or ideally ban, on all goods imported from the PRC that are suspected or have been confirmed to have involved forced labour from Xinjiang.

For all his faults, President Trump is moving in the right direction, by considering to label what is happening in Xinjiang a genocide. Should he lose November’s election, his likely successor Joe Biden would do the same. Would it be too much for the EU to follow suit, or even go a few steps further? The EU’s economic soft power can easily be provided with a hard edge should access to its internal market be weaponised against transgressions demeaning human decency, including at the very least the cultural genocide being perpetrated in Xinjiang. Again, the US has already led the way in this regard, as the House of Representatives has voted in favour of banning import from Xinjiang over forced labour concerns.

The Economic Problem

The stumbling block, as per usual, appears to be internal. In this case, it appears to be of a Teutonic nature. Germany’s economy has become increasingly dependent on exports to China over the last few decades (€100bn alone last year). Increasingly as well, its car-manufacturing corporations are basing nodes of their value chains in the PRC. Most insidious amongst these must be Volkswagen’s factory in Xinjiang. As far as Berlin is concerned, Europe’s relationship with China is ‘complicated’ and ‘nuanced’, but most of all one defined by business interests.

This author is not an anti-globalist but does question the usefulness of paying lip-service in voicing concerns over human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, while German companies (read: Volkswagen) allegedly benefit from forced labour practices in the PRC. Are we not a Union of Values? Why has the European Parliament’s call to apply targeted sanctions and freeze assets been ignored so far in the Council? Why is it that Germany is able to mobilise a moral spine in order to threaten a veto on the Mercosur deal on deforestation grounds, but not on any future deal with a communist regime perpetrating cultural genocide?

Instead, active European leadership on the matter has been reliant on Sweden’s H&M banning Xinjiang cotton yarn from its production chain. At a political level, however, the EU’s inaction on the issue, as with other policy fields, is determined too much by Germany’s lack of geostrategic intelligence and backbone. Domestic political costs associated with cancelling a deal with China are eroding the EU’s veneer of international leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

Our Responsibilities

As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us, a (European) house divided simply cannot stand. In this case, it is unacceptable for the EU to turn its nose from the pungent smell of mass incarceration in Xinjiang, where the most heinous crime against humanity of our lifetimes is being perpetrated. What is being done, is an attempted ethnic cleansing at a scale and cold-hearted sophistication we have not seen since the 1940s. Hannah Arendt once said that ‘we must prevent wrongdoing because the world in which we all live, wrong-doer, wrong sufferer and spectator, is at stake.’ I fear that it might already be too late for Xinjiang’s Uyghurs.

Guest article by Adam Hall. The author is pursuing a PhD at the VUB in Brussels.

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When I was a student in Belgium at the Universite de Louvain in the 1970s, I first heard that Friedrich Nietzsche’s collected writings were the books of choice on the nightstand of every European intellectual. Though I had already read some Nietzsche, this practice impressed me. I continued with my reading of the great thinker alongside my regular studies in economics. Nietzsche can be best defined as a thinker and, through his writings, thinking for one’s self is precisely what is acquired.

I am no longer in touch with the new generation of intellectuals and students to know if this still holds true. At the time, though, it did. The notions learned from frequenting the great European thinkers shed light on the deep roots of problems we otherwise only understand on a deceptive surface. Such a problem, I surmise, is the European project. In these times, dusting off Nietzsche’s insights can help us understand European unity both that which we have lived since his time and that still to come.

A Philosophical Note

Nietzsche’s philosophy is not one of the theorems and their derivatives but rather an exploration of the dialectical contradiction found in life’s phenomenon. He often states an observation than its opposite. He opens our minds more than transmitting a ready-made doctrine.

Nietzsche has long suffered from unfortunate associations with Nazi ideology and from being summarily dismissed in the Anglo-Saxon world. Despite this, he has remained an influential thinker on modern culture. His association with Nazi philosophy has always been a distortion. It was enthusiastically encouraged by his sister Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche, an Aryan zealot, who became curator of his literary estate upon Nietzsche’s death.

Concepts like Nietzsche’s ‘Ubermensch’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra are unclear at best, but here certainly relate more to a wise philosopher and elite aristocrat than any mass movement. Such concepts, grossly distorted, were seized upon to claim the great thinker for Nazi ideology. This conclusion would be impossible for anyone who actually read Nietzsche.

A Proponent of ‘Europe’

Nietzsche was a proponent of ‘Europe’ and a critic of the narrowness of the European nation-state. Germany is often the subject of his ire. One of the few things on which Nietzsche is abundantly clear is his dislike of the militant elements in German politics and culture of his epoch, ones that he predicted would lead to national destruction, long before Hitler was born. He sees no dialectic here, only looming disaster.

Take, for example, this one of very many of denunciations Nietzsche levelled against German militarism, antisemitism and nationalism, taken from Gaya Scienza: “No, we do not love humanity; but on the other hand, we are not merely ‘German’ enough, in the sense in which the word ‘German’ is constantly being used these days, to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it were a matter of quarantine […]”.

And, if it was necessary for him to be clearer, here is an excerpt from a letter he wrote while in Switzerland in 1887: “I feel kinship only with the most cultivated French and Russian people, but not at all with the so-called distinguished elite among my own countrymen who judge everything from the principle: ‘Germany above everything’ (Deutschland über alles)”.

Cultural Views from Nietzsche

Nietzsche repeatedly denounces the anti-semitism that he finds rabid in German culture dating at least from the writings of Martin Luther, which he considers a sickness of weak-minded individuals lacking self-esteem. Any careful reader of the philosopher would confidently conclude that he would say the same about anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment today.

It is also apparent reading Nietzsche that the marriage between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxons was on shaky footing from the start. Nietzsche finds Anglo-Saxon culture radically different from the values he cherishes on the continent. Plebian values of “individual happiness” and “practicality” made the Anglo-Saxons unfit for the great cultural projects that Nietzsche felt were at the heart of any civilization and that he saw as the future of Europe.

Making Good Europeans

Nietzsche does not content himself with simply dissecting the nationalist illness of the day. Instead of prophesising where it would lead, he attempted to embrace an alternative.

Writing to his mother from Sils Maria, the Romanish-speaking village in the Engadine valley in Switzerland, that he liked to frequent,  in 1886 he sets himself apart from those he criticizes: “Even if I should be a bad German, I am at all events a very good European”.

Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ had a few important common traits: a secular, cosmopolitan culture that was at home across the continent. They were individuals comfortable with many languages and cultures, and who display open and inquisitive minds. They were Renaissance men, Europeans, completely free from the national and religious passions of their day.

He also gives a few important examples of individuals who he perceives to fit this description. In addition to Napoleon, these are Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and even Wagner, whom he’d previously fallen out with due to the nationalist elements present in his music.

“We are, in one word – and let this be our word of honour – good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit.” – Gaya Scienza.

A Final Reflection

Nietzsche appreciated the folk evolution of the European peoples in their variety. However, after having created diverse types of excellence influenced by geography, climate, language, diet and the many other factors that constitute a culture, he thought that their day had come to an end. His “good Europeans” had taken a dialectical step beyond this stage of evolution. They were citizens of the world comfortable anywhere.

At a time when nationalist and racist passions have again come into fashion, along with narrow-minded interests not too different from those prevailing in Nietzsche’s time, we find some in Europe turned inward and against any notion of openness. It would be good to remember, especially now, his warnings and where Europe may be headed again if not heeded.

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