Vaccine Nationalism And Political Myopia

Let’s start with the fundamentals. The EU’s negotiating wasn’t slow, nor was it inefficient. In fact, the EU – AstraZeneca purchasing agreement precedes the company’s similar deal with the United Kingdom. The “British first” clause did not stem out of a commercial contract. It was the result of public funds made available to Oxford, which AstraZeneca gained access to once the two teamed up to develop a vaccine.

Deploying early funding to support a vaccine for the new coronavirus is undoubtedly a sensible move. Vaccine nationalism, conversely, was extremely myopic. The funding being made conditional on Britain receiving doses before anybody else might seem like a nation-state ruthlessly pursuing its interests while leaving the rest of the world out to dry, and to a degree this is true. But even if one handwaves this selfishness as acceptable, the fundamental point is missing: this logic makes it harder, not easier, to fight the pandemic.

Every new generation of the virus increases the likelihood that it will mutate. The more people are infected all over the world, the likelier it is that the virus will change. The more the virus changes, the less effective vaccines will be. Should the UK manage to vaccinate its entire population, and open up to the rest of the world, it would be confronted with a situation in which contagions still surge in the majority of the planet, leading to more and more variants, and presenting the spectre of a new wave in the UK itself, endangering all the work done so far. Only a global rollout of vaccines can properly stem the tide of the pandemic.

The World “First”, Europe “Second”

This is not fringe epidemiology. This fact was well understood as far back as January 2020. For all the uncertainty surrounding the new coronavirus, it was still a coronavirus – many in this clade are already known to science, and while there could be no certainty as to how fast the virus would mutate, it was fair to assume it would eventually produce variants, especially if confronted with piecemeal vaccinations. This is why, when Germany funded BioNTech like the UK did Oxford, the government in Berlin did not include a “Europe first” clause. Nor did the European Commission see it fit to intervene and request one. This attitude remained consistent when BioNTech partnered with American pharmaceutical company Pfizer. Meanwhile, the UK vetoed a partnership between Oxford and American company Merck, forcing a partnership with British AstraZeneca instead.

And yet, while the EU was making sound medical R&D decisions, and trusting its long-standing partners to do the same, worrying signs started coming out of the Atlantic. Then-president Trump tried to steal BioNTech from Germany to gain exclusive American access to the vaccine. The move failed, and even so, back then it caused an uproar. Why the same indignation is not on display now, with countries monopolising vaccine doses, is a great mystery of public opinion.

Export Bans And The Global Vaccine Supply Chain

Trump didn’t seem overly concerned with his failure to steal the BioNTech vaccine. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to sign Pfizer supply contracts. This is because he knew that most of the new partnership’s production capacity was in the United States; he only needed a legal excuse to seize doses present on American soil, or block them with an export ban, and he would get all the jabs his country would need. The absurdity of this beggar-thy-neighbour policy is that European vaccines are being used, not only in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but also Mexico and Canada – the two countries bordering the Continental United States, who have no other option given their neighbour’s export ban on vaccines.

The legal cover for this – which the Biden administration is still using at time of writing – is twofold: one is Trump’s December 2020 executive order, giving Americans first priority to vaccines produced on American soil. The other, more substantial basis is the Defense Production Act.

We’re not discussing a trickle here, either: millions of EU doses have been used in the aforementioned countries, as well as in developing countries, while the United States and the United Kingdom simply seize EU doses produced on their soil and regularly purchased well in advance. This unilateral seizing is nothing short of vaccine piracy, and as mentioned, it’s making it all the harder to have a meaningful global impact on the pandemic. Should dangerous variants proliferate, it might even backfire, causing untold damage to the economy, as well as – and more seriously – additional loss of life. The United States alone has got its hands on over five million EU vaccine doses.

EU-UK Relations Take Centre-Stage

On the other side of the coin is the UK’s own vaccine piracy – primarily fueled by what the EU deems AstraZeneca’s breach of contract. Already on 29th January, AstraZeneca informed the EU that it would be unable to meet promised shipments due to “production problems” in its two European plants. This was because doses slated for the EU had been delivered to the UK instead. Brussels demanded AstraZeneca uphold its contract, which obliged it to make use of all four of its production facilities (two in the UK, two in the EU) to meet its obligations on deliveries. Shielded by the “British first” clause, AstraZeneca refused to bridge the gap with exports from the UK. The stage was set for a cross-channel battle of wills that is not yet concluded at time of writing.

Up to January 2021, the EU had included the UK in all of its anti-pandemic industrial coordination plans, making sure Britain was not isolated from the world economy on critical items such as ventilators and medical equipment during the first and second surges of covid cases. This has included as many as ten million vaccine doses exported from the EU to the UK. Britain’s current manipulation of vaccine exports has ended that cooperation. The Commission has retaliated and is moving ahead with its own export ban, and it is likely that additional countermeasures will be forthcoming. As more vaccines enter the market, AstraZeneca’s leverage will diminish. Legally, the battle might well last for years to come. Politically, the tide has already turned against them.

The Strategic And Political Bankruptcy Of European Member States

A final consideration should be made to close out this much-needed reframing of the vaccine narrative. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that the EU was naive to trust in its international partners to put collective long-term interests ahead of their own short-term benefit. This misses the fundamental point on two levels. First is the already explored medical argument: a piecemeal rollout of vaccines in select countries is an own goal, as the virus rages everywhere and the number of mutations increase. The failure to coordinate vaccine distribution on an international scale ultimately represents the failure of humanity to address this crisis effectively; it will lengthen it, not shorten it.

A narrower but equally important point is that the EU did not act naively – rather, it acted as it has always been intended to act, by design. It is completely unreasonable to expect the EU to act and think like a hard power, neorealist security institution, when Member States still jealously guard their monopoly on security and national defence. As we have emphatically argued before, Member States are in the driver seat when it comes to running the Union through the pandemic, and they’re making a terrible job of it.

The Catch 22 Vaccine Scenario

Healthcare is also a competence lying primarily with the Member States. Their refusal to equip the EU with the proper tools to handle security responsibilities has left this flank open to Anglo-American vaccine piracy. It is their political timidity which leads them to preserve this institutional status quo even in the face of a world-changing crisis. In addition, their pathological concerns with short-term gains over long-term strategy is what motivates them to use the EU as a scapegoat for everything they fail to accomplish.

Unfortunately, this is the “Catch 22” European institutions are constantly exposed to. Had the European Commission truly tried to force BioNTech to end its partnership with Pfizer and find a European partner instead, Member States today might be playing the blame game the other way, pointing to the failed partnership as the reason for the delayed availability and rollout of anti-covid jabs. This crisis has made it obvious that 19th-Century European nation states are not fit to govern themselves in a crisis.

If you want evidence of the need for true European integration, look no further than the vaccine rollout crisis. This is more than recrimination about the past – it contains a concern about the future. The end of the pandemic is not yet in sight. Even as immunisations mount, the process to make the virus both endemic and harmless will be long and arduous. Will Europe get through to the end of this great challenge still in one piece? How exactly do European Member States plan to survive climate change when the coronavirus has so thoroughly outmatched them? These remain, at the moment, tragically open questions.

The post Stop Blaming The EU Over The Slow Vaccine Rollout appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Students’ attitude towards the European Union is generally positive in all Member States. Young professionals and high-skilled young people overwhelmingly voted to “Remain” during the Brexit referendum, with as many as nine out of ten young researchers casting their vote in that direction. Young people are also among those responsible for the rise of distinctly pro-European forces, such as the Greens or ALDE, especially in large cities – a phenomenon that became evident during the 2019 European elections.

Here’s a look at the main instruments and policies developed by the EU to support the continent’s students and researchers.

The European Framework

European funds for young people, students and researchers are distributed in numerous programmes, some more specific than others. It’s easy to associate young people with Erasmus+ programmes – indeed, the association is so strong that all young Europeans who have benefited from this programme are collectively known as the “Erasmus Generation”.

Erasmus programmes, however, are a lot more far-reaching than this strong association would suggest. It’s true that they typically involve high school and university students, even though that inherently includes the participation of teachers and/or group leaders. But it also comprises a wider portfolio of education, training, youth, and sports programmes. In effect, Erasmus + serves as a single framework a large number of different activities – or Key Actions, as they’re officially known.

The very famous “Erasmus abroad” targeted to university students is part of Key Action 1, and is also intended for teachers and miscellaneous education workers, with an emphasis on trans-European mobility. Key Action 2 finances projects developed in cooperation by several entities from different European countries, generally at least three. These projects need to revolve around education, training, and youth to solve a common problem, through the creation of an operational model, a guideline or an innovative product and/or the exchange of knowledge, experience, and best practices.

A Popular Choice: Erasmus+ (Studying and Working)

The Erasmus+ study programme is undoubtedly the most renowned of all. To study abroad with the Erasmus+ programme, you must be enrolled in a higher education institution and attend a course that involves the issue of a diploma or a recognized tertiary level qualification. First cycle students must be at least in their second year. The period of study abroad must be in line with the degree’s learning needs, with a focus on personal development, and must fit into the student’s pre-existing study programme. The receiving and sending institutions must sign an inter-institutional agreement for the programme to have validity.

Both institutions must also have signed the Erasmus Charter for Higher Education (ECHE) – if they are based in Programme Countries. This hefty programme operates under the auspices of the ECHE, which administers the standard quality framework for European and international cooperation projects. The fulfilment of the ECHE’s criteria is a pre-requisite for every institution carrying out E+ activities.

Erasmus + grants are available to help students with travel, room, and board expenses. The amount can vary depending on various factors: the difference between the cost of living in your country and the destination country, the number of students applying for a grant, the distance between nations and the availability of other grants. The study period abroad can last from a minimum of 3 months (or an academic quarter) to a maximum of 12 months. Students can also combine periods of study abroad with an internship to gain work experience, which is particularly important when entering the job market.

Alternatively, E+ also offers mobility programmes exclusively focused on internships. These allow participants to boost their training and professional curriculum through work experience abroad, in public or private companies in one of the European countries participating in the programme. The Erasmus + Mobility for Internship Call is published annually. The duration of the internship mobility within the Erasmus + programme lasts from a minimum of 2 months to a maximum of 12 months, and the student can receive a community contribution to the costs incurred for the mobility up to a maximum of 3 months.

Other Opportunities for Student Mobility

There are lesser-known opportunities, too. Long-term mobility for school pupils is one such: it allows upper secondary school students to attend a part of the school year at a European partner institution for a period of 2 to 12 months, based on of a learning agreement between the sending school and the hosting institution, aimed at agreeing on the study programme and the recognition of the experience upon return to the country of origin. Long-term mobility of pupils is organized among schools involved in a strategic partnership, as part of Key Action 2.

During my experience with Area Europa, I worked on the CitriVET project on the reuse of agricultural waste from citrus cultivation. High school students from Spain, Italy and Portugal were also involved and pursued mutual exchange study periods.

University students can also benefit from long-term mobility programmes, such as the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD). This is an integrated, international study programme, jointly delivered by an international consortium of higher education institutions. It includes a high number of joint degrees such as 4CITIES + Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree in Urban Studies (Belgium – Denmark – Austria – Spain). Here is a list of joint degrees according to the field of study, countries and universities involved. Another specific opportunity for university students is a financial contribution (in the form of scholarships) for master/postgraduate studies in conference interpretation.

Specific Funds for Researchers and Students

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships

The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships (IF) actions are individual research fellowships that aim to support career development and research training for researchers with PhDs or four years of research experience. They include both European and Global Fellowships. Through the former, researchers are able to carry out their research projects at a European institution for a period of 12-24 months. Grants are open to researchers moving within Europe or arriving in Europe, specifically to a country they have not been in for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Global Fellowships, on the other hand, primarily benefit researchers who wish to acquire new knowledge and skills through a research project that includes a period of 12 to 24 months at a non-European institution of excellence, and a return period of 12 months in Europe, to transfer and consolidate the skills newly acquired. The researcher must not have been in the non-European country of the institution hosting the first phase of the project for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Financial contributions cover 100% of the costs for the entire period. The average salary of a Marie Curie fellow is around 4000 euros per month – there are no fees. Funding includes the researcher’s salary, mobility costs, research costs and a contribution to the host institution’s overheads explicitly. All research areas are covered.

Horizon Opportunities

Horizon 2020 is the most extensive EU programme for research and innovation. The programme aims to promote the European Research Area (ERA) by harmonizing national research strategies. Horizon 2020 is also implementing the European environmental research and innovation policy to turn into a green economy conversion plan, to achieve sustainable development and help fight climate change.

Differently from Marie Curie Fellowships, Horizon doesn’t usually involve individual researchers, but institutions such as universities and research centres. Horizon 2020 will be followed by the European Framework Program for Research and Innovation 2021/2027 Horizon Europe (HEU). With a budget of around € 100 billion, it is the most ambitious European research and innovation programme ever.

Universities and generally, research institutions can also benefit from other opportunities, such as LIFE programmes, which are the European Union’s funding instrument for actions on the environment and climate. INTERREG programmes help regional and local governments across Europe in developing better policy to support interregional cooperation.

JUSTICE programmes are rather self-explanatory, helping research on justice issues and the rule of law. The European Technology Platform Nanomedicine (ETPN) is an industry-led initiative established in 2005 with the European Commission to address the application of nanotechnologies in the health sector. It brings together more than 125 members from 25 different Member States, covering all interested parties in nanomedicine: universities, SMEs, industry, public agencies, representatives of national platforms and the European Commission.

The list goes on and on. EuroMarine is the European marine science network, aimed at supporting the development of emerging scientific issues and methodologies and including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda into concrete projects. The European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) is Europe’s largest low carbon energy research community, works closely with industry and policymakers to deliver the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan).

This plethora of programmes operate under a series of coordinating and managing bodies, such as the European Research Council (ERC). This is the most prestigious European research funding agency, with the mission of retaining and attracting the best researchers from all over the world to Europe. The Agency for the Promotion of European Research (APRE) works at joining together public and private research and innovation bodies, working in close connection with national research authorities.

Finally, universities can also join the European University Association (EUA). This association represents more than 800 national universities and rector conferences in 48 European countries. It plays a crucial role in influencing EU policies on higher education, research and innovation.

The post The EU Does a Lot for Students and Researchers – Here’s How appeared first on My Country? Europe..

This is leadership?

When Ursula von der Leyen first faced the European Parliament as Commission President-Elect, she stated that ‘we sometimes forget that our greatest achievements have always come when we are bold.’

As of 2021, to act boldly boils down to the following: allow your Health Commissioner to initiate a war of words with AstraZeneca, leading to embarrassing communication errors and half-arsed vaccine nationalism (imagine, the EU threatening vaccine export controls); throw your Trade Commissioner under the bus over the Ireland protocol Article 16 debacle, despite evidence of your own cabinet being directly responsible for the mishap; and lash out at the UK for accelerating vaccine approval procedures as it goes through a nightmarish mortality crisis.

In the face of backlash, Ms Von der Leyen’s initial strategy has been to release pre-recorded and scripted videos filmed from within an apparently sun-lit Berlaymont (anyone staying in Brussels these days cannot help but wonder whether she resides in a Teletubbies-esque infantile dystopia), appearing to dig in and insisting no fault on her part in the events unfolding over the last weeks.

These releases are doctored and vacuous, not least after having publicly dragged DG Trade through the mud. Crucially, she would not even face questions from journalists, much to the chagrin of the Eurobubble’s press corps. She would only accept a videocall with concerned MEPs, or whenever she’s in the mood, offering preferential access to German media. A craven silo mentality is slipping in at the European Commission.

It appears that we, citizens of the EU, have a ‘leader’ who refuses to take on responsibility, prefers to sacrifice her subordinates on the altar of her own incompetence, who to wants to reinvent the wheel everywhere she goes (no less her botched micro-management of filling in senior Commission positions), and refuses to be held accountable. After fleeing Germany, whereto will she flee now?

It all really begs the question: is the current Commission president out of her depth? Can the European Union afford an Ursula von der Leyen? The same person whose German defence ministry oversaw machine gunners training with broomsticks, resorting to their own vocal cords to mimic the steady discharge of their weapons?

Europe invested billions to help develop the world‘s 1st COVID vaccines & create a global common good.

Now the companies must deliver & honour their obligations. We will set up a vaccine export transparency mechanism.

EU is committed to contribute. But we also mean business. pic.twitter.com/lvq0KkCWJD

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) January 26, 2021

The alternatives that were not meant to be

What makes this author shiver with regret and now dread, is that this scenario could have been averted. Were it a Margrethe Vestager, a Frans Timmermans or Alexander Stubb in charge, facing off with pharmaceutical giants and delivering the same tough messages, we would at least have a Commission President commanding an aura of sincerity, charisma, and proven European leadership.

Margrethe Vestager has a history of successfully facing down large multinationals and the benefit of world recognition and respect. Frans Timmermans is a seasoned polyglot, a successful diplomat, the European Green Deal’s very own champion and unrelenting in his views on the rule of law. Alexander Stubb would have combined academic acumen with experience in the European Council. What exactly did Ms Von der Leyen bring to the table?

The spectre of intergovernmentalism haunts Europe

Our predicament is rather clear: we are shackled by the doctrine of lowest common denominator, rendering our leadership mere puppets of the Member States at best; or incompetent and hapless at worst. In either case, leadership selected on pathetically unimpressive criteria makes the Commission an easy scapegoat in its by-now institutionalised role as the European Council’s overstretched and underfinanced secretariat.

Why else does it seem that the Commission prioritised cost-savings and created the illusion of strong-arming big pharma rather than focussing on swift vaccine development, production, and delivery, regardless of price?

Regrettably, find ourselves in an equilibrium best described by so-called (new) intergovernmentalism, with power concentrated in the (European) Council, whose modus operandi is one of consensus-building rather than democratic accountability. In other words, the least unsatisfactory option to all, whether it be policy or the Commission presidency, is fair game.

The toolbox of this equilibrium? Deliberation and persuasion, giving us the mercurial talent of Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borell, a commissioner to ‘protect the European way of life’, and of course a ‘geopolitical European Commission’. Instead of a union of values, we are fast becoming a union of platitudes, led by the intellectually vacuous and craven, rather than the entrepreneurial example of Jacques Delors. Oh… what could have been with Margrethe Vestager at the helm.

Democratic federalism

The current state of affairs, one of political eurosclerosis, is lamentable. That does not mean, however, that the European project has plateaued and is bound for steady decline as the rot of the intergovernmental equilibrium takes root. There is a medicine: democratic federalism. It would, however, be a bitter pill to swallow for the Member States and a rude awakening for the institutional set-up we have normalised since Lisbon.

Above all, it would require political courage, especially from the European Parliament in facing off with the Member States. Concretely, the Spitzenkandidaten process must be formalised, and pan-European lists allowing citizens from across the EU to cast one of their votes directly for one of these candidates must become the norm. It is farcical for a political union that preaches democracy and transparency to the world, to have an executive led by a person parachuted in after secretive deliberation between the Member States. Nobody voted, and more importantly, nobody would have voted for Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, yet she ‘leads’.

It is not good enough for the European Union to merely survive. This is the lowest of benchmarks, a craven measure of success worthy only of the conniving, cynical and Janus-faced politicking of intergovernmentalism that is institutionalising a new, political, eurosclerosis. Ursula von der Leyen, European Council, Member States, and European Parliament, when will you be bold?

Until then, steerless, rudderless, and devoid of captaincy, the EU ship is left alone to face the boisterous waves of our time.

The post Von der Leyen’s Vaccine Woes: Symptom of a Political Eurosclerosis appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Up until the New Year, but not one day longer, the United Kingdom, despite having formally left the EU already, will remain a member of the single market for goods and services and, although not a member of the Schengen area, it will also continue allowing free movement of people. This gives rise to an issue when considering the possibility of further extensions of the negotiations for a post-Brexit arrangement for trade and people: any agreements before January 1, when the existing arrangements become null and void.

What does No-Deal mean?

If Great Britain exits the EU in a no-deal situation on January 1, trade would automatically return to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. WTO rules are liberal in the sense that they admit most goods and services and impose low tariff rates. However, they are more restrictive than the current ‘single market’ arrangement the UK enjoys with the EU. Currently, 50% of UK trade, imports and exports, is with the EU – this would make raising tariffs and other impediments costly for the UK. It would also, of course, have an impact on the EU, but with the EU’s total external trade with the UK only representing about 12% of the total, the impact will be inferior.

Major categories of UK exports such as automobiles would further be affected by 10% WTO tariffs, making many car exports uncompetitive. Large automakers with factories in the UK, like Nissan, have already suggested they would be forced to leave. UK suppliers for products finished in the EU could also be replaced,  for example as in the case of the British Rolls Royce engines for the Airbus, which compete with the USA’s GE Aviation or Pratt & Whitney.

Imported foodstuffs, of which 80% come from the EU and which supply nearly one-third of total UK consumption, could also be affected. Here, the issue is not only tariffs and higher prices for consumers, but also differing phytosanitary regulations. Once again, the EU will also be affected, although to a lesser extent. Whether EU rules will still allow for the importation of UK sourced lamb and some other products remains to be seen.

Pharmaceuticals also present a serious problem.  Approval mechanisms and production controls will no longer be accepted mutually and will result in significant pipeline delays for many medications people need.  Hopefully this can be remedied through stop gap measures but so far this has not been done.

Immediate Disruption

A UK government study has estimated that, in a worst-case scenario surrounding a no-deal outcome, roughly 7,000 lorries could be held up from crossing the channel. Even in the case of a deal implemented at the last minute, significant disruption will take place as few of the new tariff codes and phytosanitary regulations would be in place to apply to incoming and outgoing goods on both sides of the Channel.

The UK has put in place traffic and staging plans to deal with the situation, but the disruptions in southeast England and northern France and the Benelux would be enormous. For its part, the EU has put in place contingency plans that would allow airline flights to continue for six months with grandfathered inspection recognition, providing mutual action by the UK. The EU contingency also calls for a one-year grandfathering of fishing rights also contingent on reciprocity. Fishing industries in both the EU and UK would be hit hard by a no-deal. Navies are already being prepped to enforce the rules.

Movement of People

Free movement of people between the EU and UK will end on January 1. Though visas are not envisaged for visits under 90 days, passports, medical attestations of insurance, automobile insurance papers and other documentation will become more onerous than at present. After 90 days, EU citizens wishing to remain in the UK will have to apply for a change of status. This will be true even for spouses of UK citizens. It is not yet clear how various EU member states might regulate UK citizens in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the EU travel ban on non-EU countries due to COVID-19 could be extended to the UK with the New Year.

Northern Ireland

The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland was a key aspect of contention in the withdrawal agreement. Keeping the border open for the thousands of people who cross daily for work and social activities has been since the Good Friday Agreement are a major focus of both Irish governments.

Although the UK agreed to maintain open borders by checking goods for EU compliance at sea, the UK has already tried to renege on this agreement. It immediately back stepped after meeting stiff resistance from the EU as well as third parties like the US, with its incoming Biden administration, and the UN. Nevertheless, as this issue touches on UK sovereignty, in the absence of a post-Brexit deal it may come under further pressure.

Who is to blame?

If there is such a thing as blame in the failure to reach an agreement beneficial to both sides, it must certainly fall on the side which may want a no-deal agreement in the first place. In the eyes of most observers, this appears to be the UK. Though the popular movement around the original Brexit vote was strong, it was fanned by a political class of Tory politicians having a lot to gain personally by a return of greater sovereignty to the UK.

As the rather nebulous aspects of UK ‘sovereignty’ have inserted themselves into the negotiations for a new trading agreement, they have made any agreement difficult to reach on purely beneficial terms. The perceived matter of the UK having final say has made agreement elusive. Final say in trade is, unfortunately, a non sequitur as both sides must adhere to the rules if there is to be any equitable trade at all.

The post What Happens Next in Case of a No-Deal Brexit? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

While governments scrambled to take action in response to the early scandals of the 2010s, the adopted measures had significant loopholes. This prompted intense negotiations at the EU level to review the legislation. After more than four years in the works, the review of the Dual-Use Regulation is finally done. This regulation creates new rules for all those technology products which potentially have both civilian and military applications. But does final text uphold the expectations of human rights advocates?

Why exporting cyber-surveillance tech is an issue

In 2015 a massive data leak involving the Italian IT firm Hacking Team confirmed the company’s alleged sale of spyware to several authoritarian regimes over the previous years. Among its customers figured Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco. At the time of the sales, the World Press Freedom Index reported severe breaches of the rule of law and press freedom in all the above-mentioned countries.

The main products sold by Hacking Team were so-called Remote-Control Systems (RCSs). The RCSs are intrusion software which covertly infect electronic devices to collect stored data and incoming/outgoing communications. Unsurprisingly, subsequent investigations unveiled that the Moroccan and UAE Intelligence Agencies used the software to spy on human rights activists during the governments’ crackdown on the Arab Spring protests in 2012. In the same year, the Ethiopian government employed the software to spy on a collective of dissenting journalists.

Hacking Team was not alone in carrying forward this dirty business: the Surveillance Industry Index by the NGO Privacy International displays a long list of companies engaging in such unethical deals. Another notable case involves the same FinFisher which is currently under investigation. Its homonymous software was employed by a multitude of countries governed by repressive regimes, from Bahrein and Ethiopia to Vietnam and Turkmenistan.

By 2014, before the Hacking Team scandal unleashed, world governments had already updated the Wassenaar Arrangement control list. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the international control regime governing the exports of dual-use goods and technologies. Items such as intrusion software and Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance were added to the list.

The intrusion software by Hacking Team and FinFisher clearly fell under the arrangement’s scope, but many technologies were intentionally left out. Indeed, a recent investigation by Amnesty International revealed that European companies continued to export surveillance tools despite the disastrous human rights records of their customers; such technologies did not fall under the scope of the Arrangement’s updated control list. However, the companies also failed to carry out their due diligence obligations. In this context, due diligence is a principle whereby companies make sure that the products they are going to sell may not be misused by their customers.

In 2015, the French multinational Morpho (now Idemia) sold facial recognition equipment to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau in China. The corporation later introduced an internal policy forbidding to sell surveillance equipment to Chinese authorities, but it should be evident by now that private companies cannot be exclusively left to self-regulate. The People’s Republic of China is implementing mass surveillance projects like Skynet and Sharp Eyes throughout the mainland without any regard for the privacy of its citizens, a fundamental human right as defined in Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In Xinjiang, the Chinese government is enforcing repressive policies against Uyghurs, the region’s main ethnic group. These policies include segregation, internment, forced sterilization, cultural erasure and mass surveillance. Yet, this did not stop another European company, the Dutch Noldus Information Technology, from selling face reading technology to the Xinjiang Normal University for “scientific and research purposes” in 2018. At the time, the crimes of the Chinese regime were public knowledge already.

The indiscriminate export of such double-edged technologies clearly appears problematic. The end-use of cyber-surveillance is inextricably linked to the political context of the importing countries. Unscrupulous regimes secure their own survival by crushing dissidents and subjugating entire populations: their wrongdoings should not be facilitated by European cutting-edge technology.

The reform of the Dual-Use Regulation

On November 9^th, the EU finally took important steps forward in this regard: the three main institutions, namely the Commission, the Council of the EU and the Parliament, concluded trilogue negotiations to revise the 2009 Dual-Use Regulation. Cyber-surveillance technology is now comparable to other dual-use goods, and as such must be subject to export controls when there are risks of misuse by the countries of destination.

After six (!!!) years of negotiations on new #dualuse control regulation the destination port is near.Chaired a really constructive trilogue.Thank you for the great work @EU2020DE @DRedonnet @Trade_EU the #EP rapporteur @MarketkaG + shadows @svensimon @LSchreinemacher @EP_Trade pic.twitter.com/BrH8WqesYP

— Bernd Lange (@berndlange) September 22, 2020

The updated text features a number of important provisions. In particular:

• Definition of cyber-surveillance technology. The definition is quite broad in scope and includes items such as monitoring centres and data retention systems as well as intrusion software. Overall, cyber-surveillance items which enable to covertly monitor, extract, collect and analyse the data of natural persons fall under the scope.
• Autonomous EU export control list. The text gives way to the creation of an EU autonomous list, independent from the one established under the WA. It will contain all the dual-use items in the single market subject to export control. This will allow public authorities to add more swiftly new specific items to the list.
• Transparency. The Commission will be tasked with providing the Parliament and the Council an annual report illustrating the enforcement progress of the regulation. Member States will be obliged to furnish relevant data to the Commission for that purpose. This will enable the public to name and shame those Member States which fail to properly enforce the regulation.
• Catch-all clause. The catch-all clause enables authorities to add non-listed cyber-surveillance technologies to the control list in case potential abuses linked to the violation of human rights by the final users were to be identified.

Where to next?

With the new dual-use regulation, the EU finally confronts a long-existing issue, a source of profound discomfort among those who hold European values dear. Nevertheless, ambiguous wording and inexistent references to certain technologies could make the text less impactful than actually needed. Firstly, biometric technology is never explicitly mentioned. Indeed, the text defines cyber-surveillance technology as uniquely “covert”. This particular wording may potentially result in the exclusion of facial recognition systems, usually employed in public spaces, from the scope of the definition.

Secondly, it appears that the addition of new items to the control list will require a unanimous decision by the 27. Such caveat should not come as a surprise: some Member States have repeatedly tried to water down the text’s most stringent articles. While the Commission and the Parliament made themselves bearers of bold proposals, the Council took a more conservative stance by taking the side of the surveillance industry.

All in all, the recast of the dual-use regulation represents a meaningful achievement for the prevention of human rights violations abroad. Despite the loopholes, European companies will surely have a hard time supplying oppressive regimes and agencies with the technology they need to spy on their own citizens. Now it is up to Member States to properly enforce export controls as contemplated by the traditional division of competences.

The post The EU Will Restrict Surveillance Tech Exports: A Win for Human Rights? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The attitude of rural areas towards the European Union is not particularly positive in several Member States. Different explanations can be given to this phenomenon depending on local and national variants, but there is a general conservative trend in rural areas, due to an extremely critical view of globalisation. Moreover, local institutions face various struggles in the effective deployment of EU agricultural funds, ranging from corruption to misallocation and everything else in between. This is especially true in some Southern European regions. Finally, poor communication results, ironically, in widespread lack of knowledge of the European Union and its agricultural policies among its primary beneficiaries.

Here’s a look at the main instruments and policies developed by the EU to support the continent’s agricultural sector.

The CAP

The common agricultural policy (CAP) is perhaps the most well-known of all agricultural policies in the EU. It promotes the viability and financial sustainability of rural communities through rural development measures. The EU has set three long-term rural development goals for the 2014-2020 period: to encourage competitiveness through the adoption of new technologies and best business practices. To assist the switch to a green, sustainable EU agricultural sector in the ongoing fight against climate change. And finally, to balance territorial development in rural economies through a large-scale works creation programme.

The CAP is not without controversy. Opposed by many as a fundamentally protectionist tool, it has recently come under fire for the lack of climate action conditionalities in the allocation of funds. EU Commissioner for Competition, Vestager, has set her sights on CAP reform from the very first days of the current Commission’s mandate, in an effort to both modernise the industry and forge it into a weapon to fight climate change, as we detailed in this analysis.

Funds managed by local institutions

Some European funds are direct – meaning the EU institutions themselves deploy them according to their criteria, such as in the case of Erasmus+ grants. Most funds, however, are indirect, and thus managed at the Member State level – and sometimes, the local level directly. For agriculture, fund oversight is under the coordination of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). European Regions also play a role, in coordination with the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Rural development funds see distribution through so-called Rural Development Programs (RDPs). Another important source of investments is the European Fund for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME).

While the ERDF and COSME support the world of SMEs in general, the EAFRD is a tool that specifically helps agricultural interventions, including the creation and development of new businesses. It’s a particularly effective policy, with cascading consequences for growth in all of the EU’s rural areas.

Networks and farmers partnerships

European policy decisions are not made in a vacuum. Businesses, workers, and other stakeholders are continually consulted to ensure coordination between the political world and civil society. For agriculture, one such tool is the European Rural Development Network (ENRD).

This Network is an information platform for rural development policies, plans, projects, and other initiatives. The purpose is to reach out and include as many businesses and professionals as possible, and draft policies close to the needs of farmers and communities. The Network supports the efficient implementation of the aforementioned Rural Development Programmes, by creating and sharing knowledge. The exchange of information and collaboration throughout rural Europe is one of the primary engines of growth and business development in the industry.

However, knowledge-sharing is all the more effective when paired with innovation. To this purpose, the EU has introduced the European Partnership for Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability Innovation (PEI-AGRI). This Partnership also encourages rural development goals, specifically by supporting innovation in agriculture and rural communities. PEI-AGRI exists to bridge the gap between the innovative solutions coming out of universities and research labs, and their adoption by the wider farmers’ communities.

Direct funds to farmers

As mentioned, some funds are under the direct control of the European Union and its institutions. These direct funds see allocation through specific calls prompting candidacies, covering a diverse array of potential beneficiaries. Among them is the agricultural sector, which sees a robust share of calls and funds. While some of these are generic and available to most agricultural activities, a few select calls cover very specific programmes.   As part of my experience with European Projects Consultancy Company “Area Europa”, I have witnessed first-hand how EU funds are changing the economy. The push towards low-carbon agriculture wouldn’t be possible without access to European direct funds.

Horizon 2020 is the largest EU programme for research and innovation, and deserves a mention on this list. The programme aims to develop the European Research Area (ERA) by harmonising national research policies. Horizon 2020 is also implementing the EU’s environmental research and innovation policy to complete the continent’s transition to a green, sustainable economy. This includes funds to research on sustainable agriculture and rural development, with an eye to forestry as well.

Horizon 2020 will be followed by the European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 2021/2027 Horizon Europe (HEU). With a budget of around € 100 billion, it is the most ambitious European research and innovation programme in the history of European integration. Given the full involvement of Member States’ ministries and universities, Horizon has a significant impact on national policies. The same size and popularity of the programme, however, places considerable barriers of entry for smaller projects without key institutional partners.

Where Horizon focuses on research, LIFE is focused on implementation instead. Products and practices developed thanks to Horizon funds can therefore see widespread testing by farmers and communities through LIFE funds. This programme is all about preserving the environment, natural habitats, and biodiversity. In practice, this usually means finding a way for nature and agriculture to coexist – placing ever greater emphasis on the efficient and sustainable use of natural resources. Reducing pollution and emissions, as well as mobilising against climate change, are very much the target of a campaign to introduce more effective circular economy-based systems.

LIFE is perfect for close-to-market projects. This is a very crucial point that leads to an immediate and concrete impact. It’s also one of the most competitive European Programmes, with strong participation and competition for the available grants.

Finally and most famously, Erasmus+ is the EU’s education, training, youth and sports programme. It is incredibly extensive, as it brings together in a single framework a large number of different activities. It is divided into Key Actions according to the type of action which is supported. This means in turn that the effectiveness of any given Erasmus+ undertaking depends on the specific project. In the context of agriculture, a Key Action 1 project might help disseminate knowledge about permaculture or rural development. A project based on Key Action 2 can instead include internships and be, therefore, more based on innovative practices for farmers or agronomists.

Erasmus + is undoubtedly the most varied EU-financed programme, with the widest range of opportunity for all applicants – in this case, farmers and rural communities. The existence of Key Actions allows an incredibly diverse array of projects to see review and examination by EU institutions. However, it is generally not a close-to-market programme, so results can look less tangible – even though they can have an essential role in the definition of new politics.

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Germany has just taken up the mantle of a six-month rotating Council of Ministers Presidency this past July, in what promises to be a momentous time for Europe. The challenges of the virus, economic collapse, Chinese ambitions and American disarray demand a new cap for the European ship of state. What can we hope to see from this German Presidency, and what can we expect to see from European leaders in light of these challenges?

An Augean Challenge

There are several challenges for the German Presidency which will test Merkel’s mettle, her political alliances and the will of the European population to survive the crisis together or fail separately. The first and most immediate challenge, now overcome, was the unanimous approval of the budget and the Eurobonds that had been proposed to pay for the trillion-euro plus relief and budgetary package.

Calling themselves the “Frugal Four”, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands early on indicated their opposition to Eurobond financing, though not to relief loans. Equal measures of pressure and concessions on budget rebates, though, prevented the unique one “no” vote sufficient to scuttle the whole package. To achieve this, some concessions had to be made on the Hungarian and Polish front, setting aside concerns over the rule of law and political differences.

It was certainly a relief to France and Germany at the start of the process, in spite of other regrets they may have, that a less than communal oriented UK is no longer a voting member. This is not an observation unique to us. In the May 30 edition of the UK weekly The Economist, one of their regular staff writers speculated that even under a Cameron government the UK would have vetoed the budget with Eurobonds and a relief package included. The unwieldiness of unanimous voting in a community of 27, not to mention 28 before the UK left, is clear when major reforms like this one are needed.

The second step for Merkel’s Presidency will be one over which she has no direct control: getting the budget through Parliament. There are issues with research and the Parliament will want to put their own stamp on things, but after compromises agreement is anticipated.

That brings us to the third issue for the six-month German Presidency: institutional reforms. A reform conference on the future of the Union that was scheduled to begin in May has been postponed sine die. The conference is needed and will in all likelihood be rescheduled. Will it be too much for Merkel to handle the pressing needs of the economic and health crisis as well as build consensus around further reform? Or will she see the crisis as an opportunity to push through an ambitious agenda?

Beyond German Leadership: EU Leaders to the Fore

Much of managing a 445 million member community is highly technical in nature. Leadership must demonstrate technical competence as well as personal character. Paying for the huge sums necessary to redress the economic and social issues caused by the virus will be an enduring problem. Christine Lagarde – though attacked for some early faux pas’s in initially addressing the crisis – has the experience and competence as well as character to do what is necessary at the European Central Bank.

No one can ignore the important role Donald Tusk, head of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, can play. Of Polish (specifically Kashubian) origin, born in a working-class family in Gdansk, Tusk has taken upon himself the task of neutralising the populist political and cultural revolt. This will certainly be key to progress in a European federation, as populist parties have generally been determined nationalists rejecting federalism.

Another emerging leader is the head or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EU Parliament, Irate Garcia. She has already been responsible for several important portfolios, notably concerning women and the family, and will continue to play an important role.

Leadership will also emerge from beyond the institutions and from places we might not always expect. George Soros, head of the Open Society Foundation, an NGO founded and financed by him and working on supporting democratic institutions in Eastern Europe is no stranger to European finance. He is also the founder of the Central European University (CEU) recently forced, for having come afoul of the Hungarian Government, to move from Budapest to Vienna. Soros made his fortune, now used philanthropically, as an investor and speculator in currencies, stocks, and bonds. These are markets he knows well and the precise markets which will be needed to finance the Eurobonds. Soros has proposed a novel but not untried idea for low-cost financing of the crisis response: perpetual bonds.

Perpetual Bonds – A Radical Solution?

In 1648, Holland faced an existential threat from rising seawater. A Dutch Water Board issued the first “perpetual” bonds to pay for the building of a massive system of dikes. Now, 350 years later, the bonds are still paying interest to the remaining holders, but they have been forgotten by almost everyone else.

Similar bonds, also known as consols, have been successfully used for financing during several crises since the Dutch issuance. The first British Consols were issued in 1751. In 1927, under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, consols were issued again as partial refunding of the 1917 National War Bonds. The UK has a long history of using consols for financing.

The mechanism is simple: perpetual bonds pay interest but the principal is never repaid. Let’s say an investor buys a 10.000 euro perpetual bond at 1% interest – these bonds have been in the past subscribed to at very low interest rates because they pay in perpetuity. The holder would receive 100 euros per year for the rest of his life, at which time the bonds could be passed to his or her heirs. There is no end to this stream of 100 Euro income to the holder.

Perpetual bonds are less costly in the immediate future, the ideal feature in times of crisis when much money is required. However, they are considerably more expensive in the long run, though for the first 100 years or thereabouts depending on their interest rate they would be less expensive than an equivalent bond.

There are further ways that the costs can be curtailed over time. There is the natural attrition of bonds being lost with death and the transfer of estates. In times of inflation, payments become worth less in real terms naturally reducing their real cost. Costs can further be reduced by offering a buyout of remaining bonds, especially if inflation is such that return to the holders has diminished. This was the case with the 1751 British Consols which were bought out and retired in 2015.

One reason why more countries have not used consol financing is that, in order for the bonds to be subscribed to at a reasonable rate, the credit standing of the country must be good. This feature should appeal to the more frugal countries, as the issuance of such bonds will oblige the EU to keep its finances in order and revenues in line with expenditures. All in all, the proposal seems like an excellent way to provide low-cost Eurobonds in a time of crisis.

Where To From Here?

Spain has already proposed consols to the Council, but the proposal was not fully vetted as it came at a time when there was no agreement to use Eurobonds of any type, whether perpetual or ordinary term bonds. Now that has changed with the French and German proposal and Council approval of mutual Eurobonds backed by the credit of the EU.

The German Presidency will have to face these and many other issues and ideas. A new leadership, if not new leaders, will have to emerge to meet these huge challenges. It is difficult to be a leader today as 24/7 media coverage will eventually show off anyone’s foibles in a poor light. But make no mistake, there are real leaders. The question is not so much whether Europe will find the leaders it needs, nor the solutions to today’s challenges, but whether it will find the followers.

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When Did Things Get This Bad?

When we say Member States are the undisputed leaders of the EU, some readers might be taken by surprise. After all, so much political campaigning in Europe today is based on scapegoating an “unelected bureaucracy” which is allegedly over-mighty in its interference with national politics. However, that is not what the actual practice of politics in Europe tells us. Even aside the very extensive powers given to the Council by the Treaties themselves, customs have evolved considerably. Consider this: between 1961 and 1973, only six European summits took place. The Treaty of Lisbon contains provisions for four meetings a year. Now, the European Council meets about twice that number every year, sometimes more.

This is a momentous change, so it would be sensible to ask what brought it about. The answer is the series of blows that hit the continent over the past decade. The Great Recession of 2008, the Euro debt crisis of 2012, the Crimean crisis in 2014 and the refugee crisis in 2015, and finally the Brexit negotiations. The latter negotiations are an excellent example of what we mean: the Commission received a mandate from the 27 Member States to conduct negotiations with the UK, but the buck always eventually stopped with national capitals. They were the only ones who could authorise an extension, for example.

Now, the situation here described need not necessarily be bad. Europe has evolved in the direction of a permanent diplomatic conference, one that never disbands but carries on indefinitely and really does try to work in concert. It’s a political development without precedent in history. Diplomacy by conference also has some inherent strengths: the ability to cut deals on a face-to-face basis and the trust and familiarity developed by its participants over time, amongst others.

However, it also has glaring weaknesses. The horse-trading behind closed doors hampers political legitimacy, and institution-building is inherently weakened by the resurgence of national diplomacy, which risks turning Europe from a power in its own right into a mere forum. Moreover, European nations specifically suffer from weaknesses which are unique to them. Those weaknesses have led to widespread mismanagement of European policies. The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has laid them bare for all the world to see, and it’s a truly ugly spectacle.

Chronic And Acute Mismanagement

A Reuters exclusive has revealed just how painfully incompetent Member States have been when exercising their share of healthcare competences. Already in early February, the European Commission was warning Member States that the storm was coming – and was inquiring into their preparations. Member States did not heed the warning and reported to the Commission that national healthcare systems were in an advanced state of readiness. No need to alter procedures or place orders for more ventilators, masks, and other essential supplies. Everything was under control.

And then it wasn’t. As the pandemic sucker-punched the EU, Member States threw themselves headlong into a shambolic race to secure masks and stick to their national stockpiles. It took weeks of diplomatic work for the Commission to enact joint stockpiles, joint industrial production, and to keep transfers of medical equipment going. The measures taken by the Commission and the ECB are impressive – you can read more on them here – but where the supranational institutions have acted well, Member States have failed.

The spectacle of unpreparedness didn’t stop with the question of coordination. What followed was an increasingly incoherent discussion over what financial tools were best suited to address the coronavirus-triggered economic recession. In this, all sides displayed exceeding political myopia.

Southern States have grounded their argument for coronabonds (which is otherwise perfectly reasonable) with bizarre and rather grotesque attempts at blackmail. This is Italy did when it threatened not to make use of the European Stability Mechanism if bonds were rejected – even though it is the country that would currently benefit from the ESM the most. Nordic countries, meanwhile, have shown their complete inability to grasp the magnitude of the situation, with the Netherlands in particular actively looking for a solution that would require the smallest amount of change to the EU as it stands. In other words, a band-aid.

The problem with band-aids is that deep wounds remain open below. This is the same approach the EU undertook to address the 2012 debt crisis. Change the least possible amount of things in such a way that you can barely make it through the crisis. This is extremely poor risk management: the risk of doing too much is much smaller than the risk of doing too little. The Great Recession has taken a full decade to play out across the West. It has poisoned the wells of our political debate, encouraged radicalisation, lowered social trust, and some Western countries are still to return to pre-2008 GDP levels.

The coronavirus crisis will be worse. The numbers clearly show that it is the worst economic crisis since 1929, and it’s only just getting started. It is completely naive to believe it will not have a similar impact. And it is completely reckless to assume we can just scrape by with an ad-hoc, barely workable, fundamentally timid response. And yet, eight years after the Euro debt crisis, it’s happening again.

Active Leadership Avoidance

In the summer of 2019, we wrote an article dissecting the truly shambolic spectacle of the European nominations which followed the elections. Re-reading the closing paragraph to that article almost twelve months on is peculiar:

“The European Union’s real problem is not in the Treaties or their implementation or even in the apparent and increased fragmentation of its electorate. The real problem is that its policy elites are not ready to rule the continent. After the Great Recession and the 2012 Eurozone crisis, one wonders what other near-apocalyptic scenario will be required to snap European politics out of its sclerotic complacency.”

It is perhaps an example of supreme irony at work that the question received a prompt answer. Apparently, we can scratch global pandemic off the list of crises capable of waking European leaders to the reality of the dangerous 21st Century. But it’s also useful to illuminate what the problem is: there is no reason why even a Europe of nations had to mismanage coronavirus so badly.

There is no magic barrier protecting the European institutions from reforms. Proposals that come to mind would be concentrating emergency healthcare competences at the EU level, giving the EU a budget worth of its status as a regional great power, or even just taking the Commission’s warnings about a pandemic seriously. All these things are easily doable with political will. Sadly, that’s when we get to the hard part.

Can we move forward?

The core problem is that European policy elites do not take the EU seriously. They lack the vision, the determination and the ambition to make use of its great potential. They are content with its market and financial achievements, and – in the words of economic historian Adam Tooze – prefer to argue endlessly over milk quotas as opposed to dealing with high politics. Of course, just because our leaders are uninterested in high politics, that doesn’t mean high politics are uninterested in them.

If anything, in the present century, questions of high politics are multiplying. Territorial defence is back on the agenda, and so is war on European soil, along with problems of nuclear security. The United States can no longer be assumed to have our best interests in mind. The continent needs a revamp of its infrastructure, has to worry about Russian ships in the melting Arctic, and peace in Ireland. And in all of this, climate change is coming.

Coronavirus has been very educational in showing just how unprepared we are to deal with existential crises. A virus cannot be argued away or swept under the rug. No amount of wishful thinking will make it disappear. It does not care for our leadership’s intense desire to keep Europe frozen in the 1990s forever, or to remain on the benches while letting others be the big players.

For all the doom and gloom in this article, it must be made clear that we can pull through these crises. The EU has a high technological base, a genuinely cutting-edge single market, a solid industry, and our societies are relatively peaceful and trusting. But we cannot get the job done if Member States refuse to rise up to the challenge. They must start taking Europe seriously – or leave the room for other institutional actors who will.

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Anguilla is a small 91km² island of the Leeward Islands, situated east of Puerto Rico and North of the shared island of Sint-Maarten/Saint-Martin. It is home to about 14,000 Anguillians, all British and EU citizens under Council Decision 2013/755/EU. Anguilla was previously part of the associated states of Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, but seceded from the country to become a British Crown colony (now British Overseas Territory) again in 1971. The Anguillians are proud to say they fought to remain British, and it is part of who they are nowadays. However, Brexit is perceived as treason from the UK, especially considering that Anguilla did not have a say in the referendum.

A symbiotic relationship strengthened by the EU

The islands of Anguilla and Saint-Martin have an intertwined history that goes all the way back to the first inhabitants of the islands, the Arawak people. When the Europeans colonised this corner of the globe, both islands have often been alternatively under Dutch, French, or British rule.

Many families, even today, live and travel freely between the two islands. The best personification of this is Victor F. Banks, the Chief Minister of Anguilla, being the cousin of Daniel Gibbs, the President of the Collectivité of Saint-Martin. With the UK previously a Member State, the rules of free movement applied to these islands as well. The European single market deepened the links between the two islands, fostering prosperity.

It also allowed a symbiotic development. Sint-Maarten possesses an international airport acting as a regional hub, transiting up to 95% of all the traffic to Anguilla. Unlike the Anguillan airport, the Dutch hub Princess Juliana is long enough to welcome large aircrafts. The French side of Saint-Martin benefits from the provision of excellent healthcare services by metropolitan France, including an MRI scanner, dentistry, and a well-equipped hospital. It is no surprise that many Anguillians and Sint-Maarteners commute to the French side to have access to quality treatments. Anguilla, due to its flat geography, has a lot of space to produce food as well as alcoholic beverages. It is their main export and Saint-Martin is the main destination for these products.

But even more than Saint-Martin, Anguilla also strongly depends on Sint-Eustatius (Netherlands) for over 90% of the island’s fuel. It is not only essential for the production of most of their electricity, but also crucial for the desalinisation process needed to provide drinking water.

Most of the Leeward Islands, 11 of them, make up what is nicknamed the “Caribbean European Union”, soon to be weakened in a similar way as mainland Europe.

Is the EU more attractive than the UK?

As much as the Anguillians are proud to be British, the population feels disrespected by the UK’s attitude of imposing rules without ever asking their opinion. Brexit is the decision that threatens the very own survival of the island. The local government fears that being forced out of the EU will have  a much harsher impact than the strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic, Irma, which severely hit the island in 2017.

The UK’s attitude to the island offers many solutions maintaining an on-going culture of dependency. Whether or not it is intentional or simply a political error, it does not offer many development options to Anguilla. On the other side, the EU’s politic is to create stability and prosperity in the territories part of the Overseas Territories and Countries. The policy applied for the neighbouring countries of the Union is exactly the same. According to Victor F. Banks, the Chief Minister of Anguilla, this behaviour is much more profitable to the island. Hence the general feeling that it is more in their interest to collaborate with the EU than the UK.

Anguilla also depends a lot on international funding. The UK’s Department For international Development (DFID) does not classify Anguilla as eligible to receive financial help. The EU, however, represents 36% of Anguilla’s overall budget for a total of 14 million euros. The subsidy has stopped this year as the first direct consequence of Brexit.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank already expressed its concern about the economical effects of all (EU) citizens scattered across the Leeward islands, not only in Anguilla. The EU also contributed much more than the UK to the development of the island thanks to decisions such as trade policies, fisheries, maritime policies, blue growth, cohesion policies, environment and energy. The EU’s policies contributed to strengthen the historical relationship between the islands – now the UK’s decision threatens this special relationship.

Finally, as previously displayed, Anguilla relies heavily on trade and risks seeing a strong deceleration of its economy after losing access to the free movement of goods, putting at risk even their ability to provide enough fresh water.

The benefits for the 27

It is crystal clear that the EU plays a crucial role for Anguilla, but what does Anguilla have to offer to the EU? Much more than one would expect, and more than the UK even acknowledges.

Firstly, there’s the Anegada passage, also nicknamed the Oh-my-god-passage, where all European exports transiting through the Panama Canal must navigate through. It also represents 10% of all US maritime exports. This means that 20% of the world’s marine traffic goes through Anguillan waters. There is a clear strategic importance in controlling this passage that the UK fails to recognise according to Anguilla.

Free movement allows French and Dutch territories to benefit from the high-end tourism that Anguilla attracts. Businesses on the island of Saint-Martin, on both sides, would suffer important setbacks from losing access to the Anguillan market, jeopardising the economical stability of the island.

Finally, the airport Princess Juliana in Sint-Maarten aims to be a regional hub. It generates important wealth to the island and ensures direct links with European cities such as Paris or Amsterdam. Closing borders would redirect the traffic to Puerto Rico or Antigua, weakening the position of EU’s airport.

The available solutions

Now that Brexit is inevitable, the solutions available to Anguilla and the EU are narrowing. Anguillian officials have called on the UK to negotiate for a customs union specific to the Leeward EU islands. Free trade is an essential part of Anguilla’s sustainability. However, London remains deaf to the demands and simply replies that “every measure will be taken”. Hard to believe for the Anguillians

France and Netherlands have also been vague about it, failing to acknowledge the importance of the impact on their territories. Finally, there is one ultimate solution, independence. As much as Anguilla would rather not have to do this, the control over who they can trade with seems today more important than their relationship with the UK.

As much as this is a very specific problem posed by Brexit, it goes to show the UK’s poor handling of its overseas territories after Brexit, and highlights the importance of the EU for its citizens across the oceans. Just like Anguilla, 250 000 EU citizens living in the British Overseas did not have the right to vote for their divorce with the European Union.

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Eurogroup finance ministers agreed on a 540 billion-euro package to be used at the European level as financial firepower; the text also foresees a future Recovery Fund that will be financed through “innovative instruments”. The European Investment Bank (EIB) will guarantee loans of 200 billion euros with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises. The funds to draw from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amount to a maximum of 2% of each Member State’s GDP, meaning that 240 billion in total could be employed. The Eurogroup also welcomed the Commission’s proposal for a “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE), a loaning scheme providing up to 100 billion euros to help rescue workers and their jobs.

During the negotiations, the Netherlands did not buckle over Eurobonds, an instrument that according to the Dutch finance minister Hoekstra “will not help Europe in the long term”. The Netherlands, however, had to concede over the conditions of the ESM fund: loans targeted to cover healthcare-related costs will come with no strings attached, while conditions would be applied to revive the economy.  Eurobonds (dubbed coronabonds amid the current crisis) were originally advanced by Italy, Spain and France and six other Member States in a letter sent to the President of the European Council Charles Michel.

Many citizens welcomed the agreement negatively. In Italy, calls for Italexit are mounting while some European citizens display concerns over the real use of the allocated funds by the most indebted countries. To clarify the most salient points, here are three key takeaways from the Eurogroup’s negotiation:

1 – This outcome was to be expected: Eurobonds are a sensitive issue

The issuing of Eurobonds could take different shapes and modalities. However, a core pillar of the concept is that these new financial obligations would be jointly guaranteed by the Eurozone countries and issued by a supranational or intergovernmental institution. Being guaranteed by fiscally sound countries as well, these new obligations would decrease the borrowing costs for governments, primarily benefiting highly indebted countries.

The Commission already proposed several forms of Eurobonds in the past, but it was met with timid responses from countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. While it is not clear what effect Eurobonds would have on the existing debt, some economists argue that borrowing costs would converge, meaning that countries like Germany would lose out of the initiative. Moral hazard and free riding constitute another concern. Northern countries and fiscal conservatives fear that inefficient governments could take advantage of these bonds to overspend and avoid fixing structural problems afflicting their economic systems.

The mutualization of debt is a sensitive issue to many, and Italian citizens should think twice before painting themselves as outraged victims of the EU. Southern countries generally suffer from rampant corruption, waste of public money and high rates of tax evasion. Proving to the rest of the European family that they are committed to fixing these problems would be an excellent step in the right direction.

Furthermore, from a strictly economic point of view, the refusal to set up Eurobonds is not as tragic as it seems. The European Central Bank is already supporting the hardest-hit countries with its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which led to a fall in borrowing costs for Italy and therefore more financial levy to support its economy. The ECB also decided to accept junk-rated Greek government bonds to support the country during this emergency.

2 – Prejudices and irresponsible media are weakening our Union

The new coronavirus is a symmetric shock with asymmetric consequences which Spain and Italy did not bring onto themselves. The Dutch Minister Hoekstra was forced to apologize after his inexcusable remarks about Southern Eurogroup countries’ ability to face the looming economic crisis. In dire times of great suffering, such declarations from government officials, even if legitimate, feed mutual distrust between citizens of different Member States.

Many in the North of Europe see Italy as a bottomless pit which thrives out of European funds, forgetting the country’s role as founder and third net contributor of the EU budget and thus its fundamental role in the very financial sustainability of the EU. While problems are certainly present, stereotypes should never dominate public debates, especially in such delicate times.

The media have a great responsibility in conveying information from Bruxelles to European citizens. The weak public relations skills of the EU together with the language differences within the bloc, make national media the main harbingers of information to each country’s public opinion. The current international support to Italy is a topical case example: while the EU and its Member States have factually given and promised to Italy more support to face the epidemic than any other foreign power, many Italians still believe that China and Russia did more than the EU or that the EU did not support Italy at all.

Some might argue that this is the price to pay for the shameful refusal of Germany and France to send face masks to Italy at the onset of the emergency. However, few Italians know that the masks eventually reached the country thanks to the intervention of the European Commission. The media did not communicate such news as strongly and convincingly as they did with the negative news. Actually, they did not communicate it at all.

3 – A European Federation is still urgently needed

The federal government of the United States can adopt fiscal transfers to help poorer states recover from asymmetric economic shocks – rich states like New York or California sustain the finances of Arkansas and Mississippi in unfortunate times. After Germany’s unification, the federal government of Germany imposed a solidarity tax on the country’s rich western regions to foster the growth of its eastern territories, once controlled by the German Democratic Republic. Such measures are obviously unpopular within the richest regions, but it is difficult to find independent countries where some form of fiscal transfer from industrialized to poor regions is not in place. This also indirectly benefits richer regions, which find new customers and reinvigorated markets for their products and services.

European Member States are surviving in a multipolar world order where competing with emerging superpowers like China has become extremely difficult, also in military terms. The European Union represents the ideal platform to confront these powers as a unified bloc. However, the uncompleted integration process is revealing all its costly shortcomings. The EU can hardly be considered an independent foreign policy actor and its budget is completely inappropriate to face issues such as climate change and even pandemics in a coherent way. Yes, countries are also responding individually with their own resources, but this approach could also end up exacerbating existing disparities.

If some Member States are left with insufficient financial help, they could turn to China in search of more favourable credit lines. The signature of Memorandums of Understanding over the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative gives us a glimpse of what a more fragmented and less cohesive Europe could entail. China is known to use debt-trap diplomacy: this would risk leaving to the Asian power the control of key European assets and infrastructures.

While maybe politically unfeasible right now, the set up of Eurobonds must still be pursued to finally pave the way for a fiscal union and eventually a political union. When Eurogroup Member States realized that a Greek default would cause a grave rupture in the entire Eurozone, they set up the European Stability Mechanism because EU treaties did not allow direct fiscal transfers to the needy regions of the Union. It is time to rethink that mechanism. Leaders should, however, take into account democratic accountability in the process, in the hope that European citizens will come to realize that in unity lies strength.

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