In mid-September, X was crawling with stories about these. Dozens, then hundreds, thousands of accounts reposted alarming claims about the “spread” across towns and cities. Every major news outlet picked it up, and the local press came in support.

And yet. The figures showed no surge compared to previous years. Reported cases remained in line with the usual yearly numbers. True, call-outs did increase but mostly because people panicked and demanded inspections they didn’t really need, messing with the actual numbers. Six schools were shut down nationwide, closures later deemed unnecessary. France typically sees about a million interventions a year, and 2023 only just nudged above that, notably due to the increase of intervention demands by worried people.

This could have been funny (without mocking the people that genuinely experienced a bedbug infestation, which is a miserable thing to live through) were it not so clearly part of the Kremlin’s playbook: disinformation and disruption, deliberately seeded in “unfriendly” countries. France’s Minister for European Affairs at the time, Jean-Noël Barrot, said as much in early 2024 that the bedbug hysteria was a textbook Russian operation.

Storm-1516 is the name French authorities gave to the massive disinformation campaign conducted by Russia in France, which has apparently been active in this form since August 2023. Unable to infest the beds of the French, the bedbugs had invaded their internet, a trial run of for what was to come, just as counter-interference services were beginning to track the operation.

But not all the attacks were virtual. That same autumn, dozens of Stars of David were sprayed on buildings in the Paris suburbs, home to Jewish families, in the tense weeks following Hamas’s terror attack and Israel’s assault on Gaza. Once again, these actions were amplified by countless bots on social networks, spreading the acts of individuals paid, directly or indirectly, by the Russian regime to socially destabilise the country. It would be dishonest to claim that it did not work: tensions flared, at least for a while, before the revelation that this was, yet again, foreign interference. A very similar action happened in May of 2024, where red hands were spotted on the Shoah memorial in Paris. The suspects were later found by the police to be Bulgarian and had just arrived in Paris.

On the 9th of September of this year, pig heads were dumped outside several mosques around Paris, sparking outrage and more online clashes.

The investigation, thankfully, moved quickly, helped by CCTV and witness accounts, allowed investigators to indentify that a Serbian-registered car had entered France, bought the heads from a farmer, dropped them at the mosques, then fled the country via Belgium.

Taken individually, these incidents were already worrying, but placed in the broader context of the Kremlin’s strategy, they take on a far more sinister dimension, that is undermining French citizens’ trust in their institutions and media, playing on identity fractures, and pouring oil on the dumpster fire that is the French political crisis.

General Thierry Burkhard, then Chief of the Defence Staff, said on the 11th of July that Moscow saw France as its “main enemy in Europe” and quoted Vladimir Putin himself to that effect.

Abroad, some shrugged this off as the French giving themselves too much importance yet again. But the point was well made. For years, Paris has been regarded by Kremlin-linked outlets and the Kremlin proper as a pivotal supporter of Ukraine.

The turning point was of course February 2022, when Russia invaded. Until days before, France was still trying to play the diplomacy card, in its long tradition as a “distant friend of Russia.”

In truth, French-Russian interests haven’t been aligned since 1917. Some would argue that they haven’t been since the Crimean War of 1853 considering the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892 was more about France’s will of revenge on Germany and Russia’s need to balance German power in occupied Poland than outspoken friendship. The Second World War, of course, is another story.

Moscow’s diplomats were fond of cultivating the illusion of a “special relationship,” as it shaped French hesitation and inconsistency about Russia for decades. France still maintained its ground and had parts of its military and diplomatic establishment deeply sceptical of Russia, seeing it as a growing threat, as opposed to the more conservative, older generation that could see them as a “partner” for the future.

For a while though, France’s elites thought they had the hear of the Kremlin. Notably in 2008 when Nicolas Sarkozy’s shuttle diplomacy with Putin, following the invasion of Georgia, effectively froze the conflict, much to Russia’s advantage, cementing the separatist “republics” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which served as general rehearsals for the future puppet states of Donetsk and Luhansk. This came at a time when Nicolas Sarkozy had actually been bullied by Putin in 2007, with him threatening him and France during their first meeting. Sarkozy famously looked distraught in the press conference shortly after.

The real break came only in 2022, after the assault on Ukraine, even though Putin had been received at Brégançon as recently as 2019, to the not-so-concealed irritation of France’s allies.

By April 2022, France expelled 35 Russian diplomats, suspected of running an espionage network from the Russian embassies and consulates.

France’s intentions not to humiliate Russia after the Soviet collapse came from good intentions and geopolitical goodwill. However, the oligarchs, who had pushed Yeltsin to hand power to Putin after the latter’s clever political manoeuvring, turned that goodwill into a tool for Moscow. The “special relationship” was, in truth, only going one way. Still, one could say, the French national bird is a rooster. And a rooster has claws. Paris’s sudden shift of tone caught Moscow off guard, and hybrid attacks escalated in response.

Now deprived of official diplomatic channels in France, Moscow has changed tactics, moving to the everyday and societal level. Imaginary bedbugs, hateful graffiti, decapitated pigs, bots, and fake media, even replicating sites like Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Le Parisien in 2024, now weave a web of not-so-subtle and pervasive attacks across the country. Networks of fake news online, often linked to far-right groups covertly directed by Russian services, exist globally, according to VIGINUM (the French vigilance and protection service against foreign digital interference).

Opinion manipulation is now one of the most serious threats to the French Republic, attacking its constitutional foundations and order. The very intensity of these attacks, online and offline alike, also betrays something else: Russia is hurting. Sanctions are biting.

France, being one of the keystones of European defence, is thus an enemy Russia seeks to destabilise. There is no need to defeat a country militarily when one can divide its society sufficiently and ensure that its agents thrive within the fractures it created.

The post Bedbugs, Pig Heads, and Chaos: France Under Russian Siege appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The 2023 shutdown of the last nuclear power plants in Germany, under Olaf Scholz’s chancellorship made a lot of noise on the continent. Some wondered if other countries were going to follow suit. But it seems that it will not be the case, and leaders of the nuclear sector in Europe, notably France and Finland, made it very clear that nuclear was gonna be the way forward and that Berlin would pay the price of what experts would call an incoherent energy policy. On the one side, Germany is indeed one of the global leaders of renewable energy, succeeding in the increase of wind and solar power where pessimists predicted failure, while on the other, they phased out their nuclear first, rather than their coal industry, which still accounts for nearly 25% of total electricity in Germany.

The Shift: The Nuclear Alliance and EDF’s victory

Indeed, since the closure of Isar 2, Emsland and Neckarwestheim 2 in April 2023 during the SPD-Grünen-FDP coalition, Germany’s reliance on imports has become a necessity to fulfil its needs. 8.66 TWh were imported that same year, ad well as a total of 25.19 TWh in 2024, with France filling the gap via EDF (Électricité De France, the state-owned and biggest French energy company), at the worst time of the energy crisis that hit Europe back then.

Notwithstanding the rejoicing of some of the European Greens that cheered for the dismantlement of the last German nuclear power plants, rather than more efforts focusing on shutting down the coal plants that make Germany’s electricity one of the least sustainable today in Europe, it seems the situation has evolved positively for the Nuclear industry in Europe. France has spearheaded that change and is now looking forward to strengthening its place in Europe, as the de facto head of the Nuclear Alliance, a group of 12 countries (France, Finland, Poland, Croatia, the Netherlands amongst others) founded in 2024, pushing forward for the development of nuclear energy as a key factor in decarbonization and energy independence efforts, something that has been in line with the french energy policy since the 70s.

In fact, it was only recently, after years of tensions with Berlin, that the new German chancellor, Friedrich Merz  clearly stated in May 2025 during a visit to France that Germany wouldn’t further block the development of nuclear power in Europe.

This warmed up relations between the two countries, as France and Germany underwent a relatively cool phase of their relations in the previous years, notably because of energy and defence policies that saw Berlin and Paris clash on multiple occasions. The lowest point of the relations was probably 2023 after it was revealed that two German foundations on the Bundestag payroll (The Heinrich Böll and Rosa Luxemburg foundations) were directly conducting efforts to hinder the development of the French nuclear industry, which sparked a diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

This comes as a double victory for the French nuclear industry, as the ARENH (Meaning regulated access to historic nuclear energy) scheme, which forced EDF to sell 100TW per year at the low cost €42/MWh is due to end by December 2025. The scheme, which had been implemented in 2011 during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency, followed the European decision to break energy monopolies in Europe, had been widely criticised in the country, a lot of experts and people alike saying that neighbouring countries were using the scheme to provide themselves with cheap, carbon-free energy rather than accelerating their own transition. Germany was especially pointed, as the phasing out of their own nuclear industry was seen as highly hypocritical, as it was believed that they would need to import French power the moment their last reactor was turned off.

France did not defend its industry properly back then and has, it seems, learnt its lesson as EDF will quite literally regain a monopoly post 2025 with a much more favourable scheme.

Indeed, EDF will be free to sell its electricity at market prices, but if its volume of sales exceeds a certain threshold (based on historical “normal” profits or production costs), it will have to pay a tax going from 50 to 90% of that excess revenue to the French state.  If the ARENH provided French consumers with relatively low prices, EDF will now likely prioritise selling more abroad than raising prices domestically. This is seen as a great victory for the industry and the country as a whole as the feeling of the industry being “profited from” is eased, and hopes that neighbouring countries will invest more or rethink their phase out of nuclear rise.

This comes at a time when EDF is spearheading the replacement of existing reactors and the building of the new generation of EPR2.

Uranium back in fashion: The NZIA and its subsequent help to extending nuclear power in Europe.

All of this came after intense lobbying efforts on the part of pro-nuclear forces in Europe, which resulted in nuclear being included as one of the beneficiaries of the Net Zero Industry Act of June 2024, a crucial European text that recognises decarbonization and energy security as the utmost priorities, rather than competition. This would allow key industries in the sector to flourish and work in a monopolistic manner if needs be, towards these goals, as forced competition would only jeopardise them.

The NZIA was massively pushed by France and most of its nuclear industry firms (EDF and Framatome come to mind) as well as Finland. They all lobbied for the recognition of nuclear as a strategic tool that must be used to combat climate change alongside renewables and reduce reliance on fossil fuels. The war in Ukraine only helped their line of argument.

This was accompanied by Belgium and the Netherlands announcing in May 2024 new investments for nuclear at the same period. If Belgium “just” plans to extend the life of its existing reactor with Prime Minister Alexander de Croo saying at the time that it was “unrealistic” to hope to phase out nuclear if the country wanted to reach its decarbonization goals, the Netherlands clearly announced their intent to build new power plants in the 2030s as well as extend the life of the Borssele plant. This marks a serious turn in their nuclear policies, considering the fact that both countries planned for a phase-out in the early 2000s. Two new EPRs in the Netherlands would provide something on the order of 5 GW of low-carbon electricity

Germany dropping its opposition to nuclear in Europe altogether may also unblock the long-lasting crisis between them and Poland, considering the former repeatedly stalled Polish plans to invest in nuclear and open its first power plant with regulatory (Via the EU), diplomatic and economical measures, a bewildering move considering Polish energy is today the most carbon heavy (Averaging 653g of Co²/kWh in the last 12 months. France or Finland on the same period were only 25 and 45g, respectively) on the continent.

France and Poland signed a deal in May 2025 on this specific matter, with EDF hoping to secure its share of the future Polish nuclear market, directly competing with the US company Westinghouse, which also expressed interest in the matter. The German blockade of Polish nuclear developments has soured relations between the two countries, though the change of government in Poland in 2023 has seemingly helped re-establish a form of dialogue, made even more possible with Germany backing off its anti-nuclear stance on a European level.

The future?

The recent international situation, as well as the climate emergency, has helped change the narrative regarding nuclear in Europe, now being seen as an essential tool if Europe wants to achieve energy sovereignty, as well as the ambitious climate goals it is aiming for. France’s role on the matter has not only been one of pure benevolence, as it aimed to preserve its industry and one of its greatest champions. But France’s energy policy has itself been a victim of a lack of coherence, with nuclear being both championed and attacked since the 70s, which has slowed down its rollout and its efficiency at times. It has now benefited of a coherent support for a solid twenty years, with governments throughout the period attempting to defend the “Filière” (Industry)  and defending France’s role on the European level. The end of ARENH is awaited by EDF and companies of this industrial sector, as it’s expected to boost the sector’s revenue.

As Europe recalibrates its energy strategy, nuclear seems to be no longer a question of ideology and has, for now, it seems, defeated dogmatism. For the Nuclear Alliance, it is a needed cornerstone alongside renewable for both decarbonization and strategic independence.

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Vaccine Nationalism And Political Myopia

Let’s start with the fundamentals. The EU’s negotiating wasn’t slow, nor was it inefficient. In fact, the EU – AstraZeneca purchasing agreement precedes the company’s similar deal with the United Kingdom. The “British first” clause did not stem out of a commercial contract. It was the result of public funds made available to Oxford, which AstraZeneca gained access to once the two teamed up to develop a vaccine.

Deploying early funding to support a vaccine for the new coronavirus is undoubtedly a sensible move. Vaccine nationalism, conversely, was extremely myopic. The funding being made conditional on Britain receiving doses before anybody else might seem like a nation-state ruthlessly pursuing its interests while leaving the rest of the world out to dry, and to a degree this is true. But even if one handwaves this selfishness as acceptable, the fundamental point is missing: this logic makes it harder, not easier, to fight the pandemic.

Every new generation of the virus increases the likelihood that it will mutate. The more people are infected all over the world, the likelier it is that the virus will change. The more the virus changes, the less effective vaccines will be. Should the UK manage to vaccinate its entire population, and open up to the rest of the world, it would be confronted with a situation in which contagions still surge in the majority of the planet, leading to more and more variants, and presenting the spectre of a new wave in the UK itself, endangering all the work done so far. Only a global rollout of vaccines can properly stem the tide of the pandemic.

The World “First”, Europe “Second”

This is not fringe epidemiology. This fact was well understood as far back as January 2020. For all the uncertainty surrounding the new coronavirus, it was still a coronavirus – many in this clade are already known to science, and while there could be no certainty as to how fast the virus would mutate, it was fair to assume it would eventually produce variants, especially if confronted with piecemeal vaccinations. This is why, when Germany funded BioNTech like the UK did Oxford, the government in Berlin did not include a “Europe first” clause. Nor did the European Commission see it fit to intervene and request one. This attitude remained consistent when BioNTech partnered with American pharmaceutical company Pfizer. Meanwhile, the UK vetoed a partnership between Oxford and American company Merck, forcing a partnership with British AstraZeneca instead.

And yet, while the EU was making sound medical R&D decisions, and trusting its long-standing partners to do the same, worrying signs started coming out of the Atlantic. Then-president Trump tried to steal BioNTech from Germany to gain exclusive American access to the vaccine. The move failed, and even so, back then it caused an uproar. Why the same indignation is not on display now, with countries monopolising vaccine doses, is a great mystery of public opinion.

Export Bans And The Global Vaccine Supply Chain

Trump didn’t seem overly concerned with his failure to steal the BioNTech vaccine. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to sign Pfizer supply contracts. This is because he knew that most of the new partnership’s production capacity was in the United States; he only needed a legal excuse to seize doses present on American soil, or block them with an export ban, and he would get all the jabs his country would need. The absurdity of this beggar-thy-neighbour policy is that European vaccines are being used, not only in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but also Mexico and Canada – the two countries bordering the Continental United States, who have no other option given their neighbour’s export ban on vaccines.

The legal cover for this – which the Biden administration is still using at time of writing – is twofold: one is Trump’s December 2020 executive order, giving Americans first priority to vaccines produced on American soil. The other, more substantial basis is the Defense Production Act.

We’re not discussing a trickle here, either: millions of EU doses have been used in the aforementioned countries, as well as in developing countries, while the United States and the United Kingdom simply seize EU doses produced on their soil and regularly purchased well in advance. This unilateral seizing is nothing short of vaccine piracy, and as mentioned, it’s making it all the harder to have a meaningful global impact on the pandemic. Should dangerous variants proliferate, it might even backfire, causing untold damage to the economy, as well as – and more seriously – additional loss of life. The United States alone has got its hands on over five million EU vaccine doses.

EU-UK Relations Take Centre-Stage

On the other side of the coin is the UK’s own vaccine piracy – primarily fueled by what the EU deems AstraZeneca’s breach of contract. Already on 29th January, AstraZeneca informed the EU that it would be unable to meet promised shipments due to “production problems” in its two European plants. This was because doses slated for the EU had been delivered to the UK instead. Brussels demanded AstraZeneca uphold its contract, which obliged it to make use of all four of its production facilities (two in the UK, two in the EU) to meet its obligations on deliveries. Shielded by the “British first” clause, AstraZeneca refused to bridge the gap with exports from the UK. The stage was set for a cross-channel battle of wills that is not yet concluded at time of writing.

Up to January 2021, the EU had included the UK in all of its anti-pandemic industrial coordination plans, making sure Britain was not isolated from the world economy on critical items such as ventilators and medical equipment during the first and second surges of covid cases. This has included as many as ten million vaccine doses exported from the EU to the UK. Britain’s current manipulation of vaccine exports has ended that cooperation. The Commission has retaliated and is moving ahead with its own export ban, and it is likely that additional countermeasures will be forthcoming. As more vaccines enter the market, AstraZeneca’s leverage will diminish. Legally, the battle might well last for years to come. Politically, the tide has already turned against them.

The Strategic And Political Bankruptcy Of European Member States

A final consideration should be made to close out this much-needed reframing of the vaccine narrative. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that the EU was naive to trust in its international partners to put collective long-term interests ahead of their own short-term benefit. This misses the fundamental point on two levels. First is the already explored medical argument: a piecemeal rollout of vaccines in select countries is an own goal, as the virus rages everywhere and the number of mutations increase. The failure to coordinate vaccine distribution on an international scale ultimately represents the failure of humanity to address this crisis effectively; it will lengthen it, not shorten it.

A narrower but equally important point is that the EU did not act naively – rather, it acted as it has always been intended to act, by design. It is completely unreasonable to expect the EU to act and think like a hard power, neorealist security institution, when Member States still jealously guard their monopoly on security and national defence. As we have emphatically argued before, Member States are in the driver seat when it comes to running the Union through the pandemic, and they’re making a terrible job of it.

The Catch 22 Vaccine Scenario

Healthcare is also a competence lying primarily with the Member States. Their refusal to equip the EU with the proper tools to handle security responsibilities has left this flank open to Anglo-American vaccine piracy. It is their political timidity which leads them to preserve this institutional status quo even in the face of a world-changing crisis. In addition, their pathological concerns with short-term gains over long-term strategy is what motivates them to use the EU as a scapegoat for everything they fail to accomplish.

Unfortunately, this is the “Catch 22” European institutions are constantly exposed to. Had the European Commission truly tried to force BioNTech to end its partnership with Pfizer and find a European partner instead, Member States today might be playing the blame game the other way, pointing to the failed partnership as the reason for the delayed availability and rollout of anti-covid jabs. This crisis has made it obvious that 19th-Century European nation states are not fit to govern themselves in a crisis.

If you want evidence of the need for true European integration, look no further than the vaccine rollout crisis. This is more than recrimination about the past – it contains a concern about the future. The end of the pandemic is not yet in sight. Even as immunisations mount, the process to make the virus both endemic and harmless will be long and arduous. Will Europe get through to the end of this great challenge still in one piece? How exactly do European Member States plan to survive climate change when the coronavirus has so thoroughly outmatched them? These remain, at the moment, tragically open questions.

The post Stop Blaming The EU Over The Slow Vaccine Rollout appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Students’ attitude towards the European Union is generally positive in all Member States. Young professionals and high-skilled young people overwhelmingly voted to “Remain” during the Brexit referendum, with as many as nine out of ten young researchers casting their vote in that direction. Young people are also among those responsible for the rise of distinctly pro-European forces, such as the Greens or ALDE, especially in large cities – a phenomenon that became evident during the 2019 European elections.

Here’s a look at the main instruments and policies developed by the EU to support the continent’s students and researchers.

The European Framework

European funds for young people, students and researchers are distributed in numerous programmes, some more specific than others. It’s easy to associate young people with Erasmus+ programmes – indeed, the association is so strong that all young Europeans who have benefited from this programme are collectively known as the “Erasmus Generation”.

Erasmus programmes, however, are a lot more far-reaching than this strong association would suggest. It’s true that they typically involve high school and university students, even though that inherently includes the participation of teachers and/or group leaders. But it also comprises a wider portfolio of education, training, youth, and sports programmes. In effect, Erasmus + serves as a single framework a large number of different activities – or Key Actions, as they’re officially known.

The very famous “Erasmus abroad” targeted to university students is part of Key Action 1, and is also intended for teachers and miscellaneous education workers, with an emphasis on trans-European mobility. Key Action 2 finances projects developed in cooperation by several entities from different European countries, generally at least three. These projects need to revolve around education, training, and youth to solve a common problem, through the creation of an operational model, a guideline or an innovative product and/or the exchange of knowledge, experience, and best practices.

A Popular Choice: Erasmus+ (Studying and Working)

The Erasmus+ study programme is undoubtedly the most renowned of all. To study abroad with the Erasmus+ programme, you must be enrolled in a higher education institution and attend a course that involves the issue of a diploma or a recognized tertiary level qualification. First cycle students must be at least in their second year. The period of study abroad must be in line with the degree’s learning needs, with a focus on personal development, and must fit into the student’s pre-existing study programme. The receiving and sending institutions must sign an inter-institutional agreement for the programme to have validity.

Both institutions must also have signed the Erasmus Charter for Higher Education (ECHE) – if they are based in Programme Countries. This hefty programme operates under the auspices of the ECHE, which administers the standard quality framework for European and international cooperation projects. The fulfilment of the ECHE’s criteria is a pre-requisite for every institution carrying out E+ activities.

Erasmus + grants are available to help students with travel, room, and board expenses. The amount can vary depending on various factors: the difference between the cost of living in your country and the destination country, the number of students applying for a grant, the distance between nations and the availability of other grants. The study period abroad can last from a minimum of 3 months (or an academic quarter) to a maximum of 12 months. Students can also combine periods of study abroad with an internship to gain work experience, which is particularly important when entering the job market.

Alternatively, E+ also offers mobility programmes exclusively focused on internships. These allow participants to boost their training and professional curriculum through work experience abroad, in public or private companies in one of the European countries participating in the programme. The Erasmus + Mobility for Internship Call is published annually. The duration of the internship mobility within the Erasmus + programme lasts from a minimum of 2 months to a maximum of 12 months, and the student can receive a community contribution to the costs incurred for the mobility up to a maximum of 3 months.

Other Opportunities for Student Mobility

There are lesser-known opportunities, too. Long-term mobility for school pupils is one such: it allows upper secondary school students to attend a part of the school year at a European partner institution for a period of 2 to 12 months, based on of a learning agreement between the sending school and the hosting institution, aimed at agreeing on the study programme and the recognition of the experience upon return to the country of origin. Long-term mobility of pupils is organized among schools involved in a strategic partnership, as part of Key Action 2.

During my experience with Area Europa, I worked on the CitriVET project on the reuse of agricultural waste from citrus cultivation. High school students from Spain, Italy and Portugal were also involved and pursued mutual exchange study periods.

University students can also benefit from long-term mobility programmes, such as the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD). This is an integrated, international study programme, jointly delivered by an international consortium of higher education institutions. It includes a high number of joint degrees such as 4CITIES + Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree in Urban Studies (Belgium – Denmark – Austria – Spain). Here is a list of joint degrees according to the field of study, countries and universities involved. Another specific opportunity for university students is a financial contribution (in the form of scholarships) for master/postgraduate studies in conference interpretation.

Specific Funds for Researchers and Students

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships

The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships (IF) actions are individual research fellowships that aim to support career development and research training for researchers with PhDs or four years of research experience. They include both European and Global Fellowships. Through the former, researchers are able to carry out their research projects at a European institution for a period of 12-24 months. Grants are open to researchers moving within Europe or arriving in Europe, specifically to a country they have not been in for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Global Fellowships, on the other hand, primarily benefit researchers who wish to acquire new knowledge and skills through a research project that includes a period of 12 to 24 months at a non-European institution of excellence, and a return period of 12 months in Europe, to transfer and consolidate the skills newly acquired. The researcher must not have been in the non-European country of the institution hosting the first phase of the project for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Financial contributions cover 100% of the costs for the entire period. The average salary of a Marie Curie fellow is around 4000 euros per month – there are no fees. Funding includes the researcher’s salary, mobility costs, research costs and a contribution to the host institution’s overheads explicitly. All research areas are covered.

Horizon Opportunities

Horizon 2020 is the most extensive EU programme for research and innovation. The programme aims to promote the European Research Area (ERA) by harmonizing national research strategies. Horizon 2020 is also implementing the European environmental research and innovation policy to turn into a green economy conversion plan, to achieve sustainable development and help fight climate change.

Differently from Marie Curie Fellowships, Horizon doesn’t usually involve individual researchers, but institutions such as universities and research centres. Horizon 2020 will be followed by the European Framework Program for Research and Innovation 2021/2027 Horizon Europe (HEU). With a budget of around € 100 billion, it is the most ambitious European research and innovation programme ever.

Universities and generally, research institutions can also benefit from other opportunities, such as LIFE programmes, which are the European Union’s funding instrument for actions on the environment and climate. INTERREG programmes help regional and local governments across Europe in developing better policy to support interregional cooperation.

JUSTICE programmes are rather self-explanatory, helping research on justice issues and the rule of law. The European Technology Platform Nanomedicine (ETPN) is an industry-led initiative established in 2005 with the European Commission to address the application of nanotechnologies in the health sector. It brings together more than 125 members from 25 different Member States, covering all interested parties in nanomedicine: universities, SMEs, industry, public agencies, representatives of national platforms and the European Commission.

The list goes on and on. EuroMarine is the European marine science network, aimed at supporting the development of emerging scientific issues and methodologies and including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda into concrete projects. The European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) is Europe’s largest low carbon energy research community, works closely with industry and policymakers to deliver the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan).

This plethora of programmes operate under a series of coordinating and managing bodies, such as the European Research Council (ERC). This is the most prestigious European research funding agency, with the mission of retaining and attracting the best researchers from all over the world to Europe. The Agency for the Promotion of European Research (APRE) works at joining together public and private research and innovation bodies, working in close connection with national research authorities.

Finally, universities can also join the European University Association (EUA). This association represents more than 800 national universities and rector conferences in 48 European countries. It plays a crucial role in influencing EU policies on higher education, research and innovation.

The post The EU Does a Lot for Students and Researchers – Here’s How appeared first on My Country? Europe..

This is leadership?

When Ursula von der Leyen first faced the European Parliament as Commission President-Elect, she stated that ‘we sometimes forget that our greatest achievements have always come when we are bold.’

As of 2021, to act boldly boils down to the following: allow your Health Commissioner to initiate a war of words with AstraZeneca, leading to embarrassing communication errors and half-arsed vaccine nationalism (imagine, the EU threatening vaccine export controls); throw your Trade Commissioner under the bus over the Ireland protocol Article 16 debacle, despite evidence of your own cabinet being directly responsible for the mishap; and lash out at the UK for accelerating vaccine approval procedures as it goes through a nightmarish mortality crisis.

In the face of backlash, Ms Von der Leyen’s initial strategy has been to release pre-recorded and scripted videos filmed from within an apparently sun-lit Berlaymont (anyone staying in Brussels these days cannot help but wonder whether she resides in a Teletubbies-esque infantile dystopia), appearing to dig in and insisting no fault on her part in the events unfolding over the last weeks.

These releases are doctored and vacuous, not least after having publicly dragged DG Trade through the mud. Crucially, she would not even face questions from journalists, much to the chagrin of the Eurobubble’s press corps. She would only accept a videocall with concerned MEPs, or whenever she’s in the mood, offering preferential access to German media. A craven silo mentality is slipping in at the European Commission.

It appears that we, citizens of the EU, have a ‘leader’ who refuses to take on responsibility, prefers to sacrifice her subordinates on the altar of her own incompetence, who to wants to reinvent the wheel everywhere she goes (no less her botched micro-management of filling in senior Commission positions), and refuses to be held accountable. After fleeing Germany, whereto will she flee now?

It all really begs the question: is the current Commission president out of her depth? Can the European Union afford an Ursula von der Leyen? The same person whose German defence ministry oversaw machine gunners training with broomsticks, resorting to their own vocal cords to mimic the steady discharge of their weapons?

Europe invested billions to help develop the world‘s 1st COVID vaccines & create a global common good.

Now the companies must deliver & honour their obligations. We will set up a vaccine export transparency mechanism.

EU is committed to contribute. But we also mean business. pic.twitter.com/lvq0KkCWJD

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) January 26, 2021

The alternatives that were not meant to be

What makes this author shiver with regret and now dread, is that this scenario could have been averted. Were it a Margrethe Vestager, a Frans Timmermans or Alexander Stubb in charge, facing off with pharmaceutical giants and delivering the same tough messages, we would at least have a Commission President commanding an aura of sincerity, charisma, and proven European leadership.

Margrethe Vestager has a history of successfully facing down large multinationals and the benefit of world recognition and respect. Frans Timmermans is a seasoned polyglot, a successful diplomat, the European Green Deal’s very own champion and unrelenting in his views on the rule of law. Alexander Stubb would have combined academic acumen with experience in the European Council. What exactly did Ms Von der Leyen bring to the table?

The spectre of intergovernmentalism haunts Europe

Our predicament is rather clear: we are shackled by the doctrine of lowest common denominator, rendering our leadership mere puppets of the Member States at best; or incompetent and hapless at worst. In either case, leadership selected on pathetically unimpressive criteria makes the Commission an easy scapegoat in its by-now institutionalised role as the European Council’s overstretched and underfinanced secretariat.

Why else does it seem that the Commission prioritised cost-savings and created the illusion of strong-arming big pharma rather than focussing on swift vaccine development, production, and delivery, regardless of price?

Regrettably, find ourselves in an equilibrium best described by so-called (new) intergovernmentalism, with power concentrated in the (European) Council, whose modus operandi is one of consensus-building rather than democratic accountability. In other words, the least unsatisfactory option to all, whether it be policy or the Commission presidency, is fair game.

The toolbox of this equilibrium? Deliberation and persuasion, giving us the mercurial talent of Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borell, a commissioner to ‘protect the European way of life’, and of course a ‘geopolitical European Commission’. Instead of a union of values, we are fast becoming a union of platitudes, led by the intellectually vacuous and craven, rather than the entrepreneurial example of Jacques Delors. Oh… what could have been with Margrethe Vestager at the helm.

Democratic federalism

The current state of affairs, one of political eurosclerosis, is lamentable. That does not mean, however, that the European project has plateaued and is bound for steady decline as the rot of the intergovernmental equilibrium takes root. There is a medicine: democratic federalism. It would, however, be a bitter pill to swallow for the Member States and a rude awakening for the institutional set-up we have normalised since Lisbon.

Above all, it would require political courage, especially from the European Parliament in facing off with the Member States. Concretely, the Spitzenkandidaten process must be formalised, and pan-European lists allowing citizens from across the EU to cast one of their votes directly for one of these candidates must become the norm. It is farcical for a political union that preaches democracy and transparency to the world, to have an executive led by a person parachuted in after secretive deliberation between the Member States. Nobody voted, and more importantly, nobody would have voted for Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, yet she ‘leads’.

It is not good enough for the European Union to merely survive. This is the lowest of benchmarks, a craven measure of success worthy only of the conniving, cynical and Janus-faced politicking of intergovernmentalism that is institutionalising a new, political, eurosclerosis. Ursula von der Leyen, European Council, Member States, and European Parliament, when will you be bold?

Until then, steerless, rudderless, and devoid of captaincy, the EU ship is left alone to face the boisterous waves of our time.

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Up until the New Year, but not one day longer, the United Kingdom, despite having formally left the EU already, will remain a member of the single market for goods and services and, although not a member of the Schengen area, it will also continue allowing free movement of people. This gives rise to an issue when considering the possibility of further extensions of the negotiations for a post-Brexit arrangement for trade and people: any agreements before January 1, when the existing arrangements become null and void.

What does No-Deal mean?

If Great Britain exits the EU in a no-deal situation on January 1, trade would automatically return to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. WTO rules are liberal in the sense that they admit most goods and services and impose low tariff rates. However, they are more restrictive than the current ‘single market’ arrangement the UK enjoys with the EU. Currently, 50% of UK trade, imports and exports, is with the EU – this would make raising tariffs and other impediments costly for the UK. It would also, of course, have an impact on the EU, but with the EU’s total external trade with the UK only representing about 12% of the total, the impact will be inferior.

Major categories of UK exports such as automobiles would further be affected by 10% WTO tariffs, making many car exports uncompetitive. Large automakers with factories in the UK, like Nissan, have already suggested they would be forced to leave. UK suppliers for products finished in the EU could also be replaced,  for example as in the case of the British Rolls Royce engines for the Airbus, which compete with the USA’s GE Aviation or Pratt & Whitney.

Imported foodstuffs, of which 80% come from the EU and which supply nearly one-third of total UK consumption, could also be affected. Here, the issue is not only tariffs and higher prices for consumers, but also differing phytosanitary regulations. Once again, the EU will also be affected, although to a lesser extent. Whether EU rules will still allow for the importation of UK sourced lamb and some other products remains to be seen.

Pharmaceuticals also present a serious problem.  Approval mechanisms and production controls will no longer be accepted mutually and will result in significant pipeline delays for many medications people need.  Hopefully this can be remedied through stop gap measures but so far this has not been done.

Immediate Disruption

A UK government study has estimated that, in a worst-case scenario surrounding a no-deal outcome, roughly 7,000 lorries could be held up from crossing the channel. Even in the case of a deal implemented at the last minute, significant disruption will take place as few of the new tariff codes and phytosanitary regulations would be in place to apply to incoming and outgoing goods on both sides of the Channel.

The UK has put in place traffic and staging plans to deal with the situation, but the disruptions in southeast England and northern France and the Benelux would be enormous. For its part, the EU has put in place contingency plans that would allow airline flights to continue for six months with grandfathered inspection recognition, providing mutual action by the UK. The EU contingency also calls for a one-year grandfathering of fishing rights also contingent on reciprocity. Fishing industries in both the EU and UK would be hit hard by a no-deal. Navies are already being prepped to enforce the rules.

Movement of People

Free movement of people between the EU and UK will end on January 1. Though visas are not envisaged for visits under 90 days, passports, medical attestations of insurance, automobile insurance papers and other documentation will become more onerous than at present. After 90 days, EU citizens wishing to remain in the UK will have to apply for a change of status. This will be true even for spouses of UK citizens. It is not yet clear how various EU member states might regulate UK citizens in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the EU travel ban on non-EU countries due to COVID-19 could be extended to the UK with the New Year.

Northern Ireland

The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland was a key aspect of contention in the withdrawal agreement. Keeping the border open for the thousands of people who cross daily for work and social activities has been since the Good Friday Agreement are a major focus of both Irish governments.

Although the UK agreed to maintain open borders by checking goods for EU compliance at sea, the UK has already tried to renege on this agreement. It immediately back stepped after meeting stiff resistance from the EU as well as third parties like the US, with its incoming Biden administration, and the UN. Nevertheless, as this issue touches on UK sovereignty, in the absence of a post-Brexit deal it may come under further pressure.

Who is to blame?

If there is such a thing as blame in the failure to reach an agreement beneficial to both sides, it must certainly fall on the side which may want a no-deal agreement in the first place. In the eyes of most observers, this appears to be the UK. Though the popular movement around the original Brexit vote was strong, it was fanned by a political class of Tory politicians having a lot to gain personally by a return of greater sovereignty to the UK.

As the rather nebulous aspects of UK ‘sovereignty’ have inserted themselves into the negotiations for a new trading agreement, they have made any agreement difficult to reach on purely beneficial terms. The perceived matter of the UK having final say has made agreement elusive. Final say in trade is, unfortunately, a non sequitur as both sides must adhere to the rules if there is to be any equitable trade at all.

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While governments scrambled to take action in response to the early scandals of the 2010s, the adopted measures had significant loopholes. This prompted intense negotiations at the EU level to review the legislation. After more than four years in the works, the review of the Dual-Use Regulation is finally done. This regulation creates new rules for all those technology products which potentially have both civilian and military applications. But does final text uphold the expectations of human rights advocates?

Why exporting cyber-surveillance tech is an issue

In 2015 a massive data leak involving the Italian IT firm Hacking Team confirmed the company’s alleged sale of spyware to several authoritarian regimes over the previous years. Among its customers figured Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco. At the time of the sales, the World Press Freedom Index reported severe breaches of the rule of law and press freedom in all the above-mentioned countries.

The main products sold by Hacking Team were so-called Remote-Control Systems (RCSs). The RCSs are intrusion software which covertly infect electronic devices to collect stored data and incoming/outgoing communications. Unsurprisingly, subsequent investigations unveiled that the Moroccan and UAE Intelligence Agencies used the software to spy on human rights activists during the governments’ crackdown on the Arab Spring protests in 2012. In the same year, the Ethiopian government employed the software to spy on a collective of dissenting journalists.

Hacking Team was not alone in carrying forward this dirty business: the Surveillance Industry Index by the NGO Privacy International displays a long list of companies engaging in such unethical deals. Another notable case involves the same FinFisher which is currently under investigation. Its homonymous software was employed by a multitude of countries governed by repressive regimes, from Bahrein and Ethiopia to Vietnam and Turkmenistan.

By 2014, before the Hacking Team scandal unleashed, world governments had already updated the Wassenaar Arrangement control list. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the international control regime governing the exports of dual-use goods and technologies. Items such as intrusion software and Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance were added to the list.

The intrusion software by Hacking Team and FinFisher clearly fell under the arrangement’s scope, but many technologies were intentionally left out. Indeed, a recent investigation by Amnesty International revealed that European companies continued to export surveillance tools despite the disastrous human rights records of their customers; such technologies did not fall under the scope of the Arrangement’s updated control list. However, the companies also failed to carry out their due diligence obligations. In this context, due diligence is a principle whereby companies make sure that the products they are going to sell may not be misused by their customers.

In 2015, the French multinational Morpho (now Idemia) sold facial recognition equipment to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau in China. The corporation later introduced an internal policy forbidding to sell surveillance equipment to Chinese authorities, but it should be evident by now that private companies cannot be exclusively left to self-regulate. The People’s Republic of China is implementing mass surveillance projects like Skynet and Sharp Eyes throughout the mainland without any regard for the privacy of its citizens, a fundamental human right as defined in Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In Xinjiang, the Chinese government is enforcing repressive policies against Uyghurs, the region’s main ethnic group. These policies include segregation, internment, forced sterilization, cultural erasure and mass surveillance. Yet, this did not stop another European company, the Dutch Noldus Information Technology, from selling face reading technology to the Xinjiang Normal University for “scientific and research purposes” in 2018. At the time, the crimes of the Chinese regime were public knowledge already.

The indiscriminate export of such double-edged technologies clearly appears problematic. The end-use of cyber-surveillance is inextricably linked to the political context of the importing countries. Unscrupulous regimes secure their own survival by crushing dissidents and subjugating entire populations: their wrongdoings should not be facilitated by European cutting-edge technology.

The reform of the Dual-Use Regulation

On November 9^th, the EU finally took important steps forward in this regard: the three main institutions, namely the Commission, the Council of the EU and the Parliament, concluded trilogue negotiations to revise the 2009 Dual-Use Regulation. Cyber-surveillance technology is now comparable to other dual-use goods, and as such must be subject to export controls when there are risks of misuse by the countries of destination.

After six (!!!) years of negotiations on new #dualuse control regulation the destination port is near.Chaired a really constructive trilogue.Thank you for the great work @EU2020DE @DRedonnet @Trade_EU the #EP rapporteur @MarketkaG + shadows @svensimon @LSchreinemacher @EP_Trade pic.twitter.com/BrH8WqesYP

— Bernd Lange (@berndlange) September 22, 2020

The updated text features a number of important provisions. In particular:

• Definition of cyber-surveillance technology. The definition is quite broad in scope and includes items such as monitoring centres and data retention systems as well as intrusion software. Overall, cyber-surveillance items which enable to covertly monitor, extract, collect and analyse the data of natural persons fall under the scope.
• Autonomous EU export control list. The text gives way to the creation of an EU autonomous list, independent from the one established under the WA. It will contain all the dual-use items in the single market subject to export control. This will allow public authorities to add more swiftly new specific items to the list.
• Transparency. The Commission will be tasked with providing the Parliament and the Council an annual report illustrating the enforcement progress of the regulation. Member States will be obliged to furnish relevant data to the Commission for that purpose. This will enable the public to name and shame those Member States which fail to properly enforce the regulation.
• Catch-all clause. The catch-all clause enables authorities to add non-listed cyber-surveillance technologies to the control list in case potential abuses linked to the violation of human rights by the final users were to be identified.

Where to next?

With the new dual-use regulation, the EU finally confronts a long-existing issue, a source of profound discomfort among those who hold European values dear. Nevertheless, ambiguous wording and inexistent references to certain technologies could make the text less impactful than actually needed. Firstly, biometric technology is never explicitly mentioned. Indeed, the text defines cyber-surveillance technology as uniquely “covert”. This particular wording may potentially result in the exclusion of facial recognition systems, usually employed in public spaces, from the scope of the definition.

Secondly, it appears that the addition of new items to the control list will require a unanimous decision by the 27. Such caveat should not come as a surprise: some Member States have repeatedly tried to water down the text’s most stringent articles. While the Commission and the Parliament made themselves bearers of bold proposals, the Council took a more conservative stance by taking the side of the surveillance industry.

All in all, the recast of the dual-use regulation represents a meaningful achievement for the prevention of human rights violations abroad. Despite the loopholes, European companies will surely have a hard time supplying oppressive regimes and agencies with the technology they need to spy on their own citizens. Now it is up to Member States to properly enforce export controls as contemplated by the traditional division of competences.

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The attitude of rural areas towards the European Union is not particularly positive in several Member States. Different explanations can be given to this phenomenon depending on local and national variants, but there is a general conservative trend in rural areas, due to an extremely critical view of globalisation. Moreover, local institutions face various struggles in the effective deployment of EU agricultural funds, ranging from corruption to misallocation and everything else in between. This is especially true in some Southern European regions. Finally, poor communication results, ironically, in widespread lack of knowledge of the European Union and its agricultural policies among its primary beneficiaries.

Here’s a look at the main instruments and policies developed by the EU to support the continent’s agricultural sector.

The CAP

The common agricultural policy (CAP) is perhaps the most well-known of all agricultural policies in the EU. It promotes the viability and financial sustainability of rural communities through rural development measures. The EU has set three long-term rural development goals for the 2014-2020 period: to encourage competitiveness through the adoption of new technologies and best business practices. To assist the switch to a green, sustainable EU agricultural sector in the ongoing fight against climate change. And finally, to balance territorial development in rural economies through a large-scale works creation programme.

The CAP is not without controversy. Opposed by many as a fundamentally protectionist tool, it has recently come under fire for the lack of climate action conditionalities in the allocation of funds. EU Commissioner for Competition, Vestager, has set her sights on CAP reform from the very first days of the current Commission’s mandate, in an effort to both modernise the industry and forge it into a weapon to fight climate change, as we detailed in this analysis.

Funds managed by local institutions

Some European funds are direct – meaning the EU institutions themselves deploy them according to their criteria, such as in the case of Erasmus+ grants. Most funds, however, are indirect, and thus managed at the Member State level – and sometimes, the local level directly. For agriculture, fund oversight is under the coordination of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). European Regions also play a role, in coordination with the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Rural development funds see distribution through so-called Rural Development Programs (RDPs). Another important source of investments is the European Fund for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME).

While the ERDF and COSME support the world of SMEs in general, the EAFRD is a tool that specifically helps agricultural interventions, including the creation and development of new businesses. It’s a particularly effective policy, with cascading consequences for growth in all of the EU’s rural areas.

Networks and farmers partnerships

European policy decisions are not made in a vacuum. Businesses, workers, and other stakeholders are continually consulted to ensure coordination between the political world and civil society. For agriculture, one such tool is the European Rural Development Network (ENRD).

This Network is an information platform for rural development policies, plans, projects, and other initiatives. The purpose is to reach out and include as many businesses and professionals as possible, and draft policies close to the needs of farmers and communities. The Network supports the efficient implementation of the aforementioned Rural Development Programmes, by creating and sharing knowledge. The exchange of information and collaboration throughout rural Europe is one of the primary engines of growth and business development in the industry.

However, knowledge-sharing is all the more effective when paired with innovation. To this purpose, the EU has introduced the European Partnership for Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability Innovation (PEI-AGRI). This Partnership also encourages rural development goals, specifically by supporting innovation in agriculture and rural communities. PEI-AGRI exists to bridge the gap between the innovative solutions coming out of universities and research labs, and their adoption by the wider farmers’ communities.

Direct funds to farmers

As mentioned, some funds are under the direct control of the European Union and its institutions. These direct funds see allocation through specific calls prompting candidacies, covering a diverse array of potential beneficiaries. Among them is the agricultural sector, which sees a robust share of calls and funds. While some of these are generic and available to most agricultural activities, a few select calls cover very specific programmes.   As part of my experience with European Projects Consultancy Company “Area Europa”, I have witnessed first-hand how EU funds are changing the economy. The push towards low-carbon agriculture wouldn’t be possible without access to European direct funds.

Horizon 2020 is the largest EU programme for research and innovation, and deserves a mention on this list. The programme aims to develop the European Research Area (ERA) by harmonising national research policies. Horizon 2020 is also implementing the EU’s environmental research and innovation policy to complete the continent’s transition to a green, sustainable economy. This includes funds to research on sustainable agriculture and rural development, with an eye to forestry as well.

Horizon 2020 will be followed by the European Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 2021/2027 Horizon Europe (HEU). With a budget of around € 100 billion, it is the most ambitious European research and innovation programme in the history of European integration. Given the full involvement of Member States’ ministries and universities, Horizon has a significant impact on national policies. The same size and popularity of the programme, however, places considerable barriers of entry for smaller projects without key institutional partners.

Where Horizon focuses on research, LIFE is focused on implementation instead. Products and practices developed thanks to Horizon funds can therefore see widespread testing by farmers and communities through LIFE funds. This programme is all about preserving the environment, natural habitats, and biodiversity. In practice, this usually means finding a way for nature and agriculture to coexist – placing ever greater emphasis on the efficient and sustainable use of natural resources. Reducing pollution and emissions, as well as mobilising against climate change, are very much the target of a campaign to introduce more effective circular economy-based systems.

LIFE is perfect for close-to-market projects. This is a very crucial point that leads to an immediate and concrete impact. It’s also one of the most competitive European Programmes, with strong participation and competition for the available grants.

Finally and most famously, Erasmus+ is the EU’s education, training, youth and sports programme. It is incredibly extensive, as it brings together in a single framework a large number of different activities. It is divided into Key Actions according to the type of action which is supported. This means in turn that the effectiveness of any given Erasmus+ undertaking depends on the specific project. In the context of agriculture, a Key Action 1 project might help disseminate knowledge about permaculture or rural development. A project based on Key Action 2 can instead include internships and be, therefore, more based on innovative practices for farmers or agronomists.

Erasmus + is undoubtedly the most varied EU-financed programme, with the widest range of opportunity for all applicants – in this case, farmers and rural communities. The existence of Key Actions allows an incredibly diverse array of projects to see review and examination by EU institutions. However, it is generally not a close-to-market programme, so results can look less tangible – even though they can have an essential role in the definition of new politics.

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The Political Definition of Empire

Political scientists defining the EU as an imperial polity do so in reference to a very specific definition of empire. At this point, it’s important to stop and keep in mind that such definition – like most definitions in the field – is arbitrary to a degree, subjective, and usually quite distinct from the vernacular meaning. This means that its applicability to everyday language is limited. No matter how many papers are published detailing lists of supposed EU imperial characteristics, European citizens are unlikely to start referring to the Union as an empire any time soon. Nevertheless, given the growing references in the academic literature, it is interesting to explore what lens European integration is being read through.

Scholars such as Hoerber, Sigalas, Muenkler, Grande, and others define an “empire” as a more fragmented alternative to the modern, territorial nation-state. Rather than a classical pre-national political entity based on military might (like the Roman Empire) or a hegemonic project on the part of a nation-state to assert dominion over the planet (like the British Empire), the European Union would be classified as a new type of empire, with some critical differences. Traditional empires (and, to some degree, nation-states) have a centralised institutional framework, with a distinctive capital from which all power emanates to the periphery. This is a far cry from the mesh of regional, national, and supranational governance the EU is built upon.

Clear borders are one of the hallmarks of nation-states, but imperial borders tend to be fuzzy. Scholars point to the uncertainty surrounding European borders – while EU membership is pretty distinct, the circles of affiliation involving the EEA, EFTA, and various special partnerships, make the European borderlands considerably harder to pin down exactly in a political and economic dimension. But where a traditional empire typically involves an exploitative relationship between the centre and the periphery, driven by a monocephalic power structure, an imperial polity is driven by civil and cooperative policymaking. The fragmentation of institutions leads to a polycephalic system of power, where “loser’s consent” is a fundamental requirement for every policy. The taboo of violence, rather than coercive violence towards the periphery, is what these authors place at the heart of European integration.

Scholars also cite an overarching mission as a defining characteristic of old and new empires – as opposed to nation-states, whose primary concern is their preservation and furthering of their interests. This kind of imperial mission is a specific, ontological purpose that justifies the existence of the political entity. For the European Union, this objective is regularly identified as the establishment of peace and prosperity in Europe, following the calamity of the two world wars. This mission is what motivates the EU’s continued existence, and serves as the “guiding light” of its policies.

Imperial Priorities

Scholars who adopt this definition of the EU as an imperial polity are quick to point out this has real-world implications, mostly apparent in European political debate. Furthering peace, security and prosperity across a sphere comprising multiple nations is one such implication, which usually goes hand in hand with the promotion of economic prosperity. Preoccupations about both areas figure prominently in debates about European integration and crisis management.

More importantly, there is a clear civilisational divide between the imperial polity and the outside world, which is contrasted with domestic political life for its stark differences in values and norms. For instance, European attitudes that go beyond national specifics – on subjects like healthcare, foreign policy, human rights etc – are often defined in opposition to the other great powers of the day, such as the United States, Russia, and China. This divide is typically not met with hostility, but with a desire to promote one’s values abroad. The European Union is certainly greatly preoccupied with strengthening democratic standards across the world, for example by including human rights clauses wherever possible when striking trade deals with third countries.

Last but not least, policy both at home and abroad should be in accordance with the overall mission at the heart of the political entity. If this means promoting human rights and free trade abroad, it also means fighting against corruption and stimulating economic development at home. Most critically, the imperial polity becomes a successful mediator for political conflicts between its centre and its periphery. Thanks to its decentralised structure, and the common desire from the various political actors to have stakes in the outcome of negotiations, the millennia-old practice of imperial discrimination on its borderlands is avoided.

A Union by any Other Name

When looking at the above criteria, we can see why an increasing number of political scientists refer to the EU as an imperial polity. However, the earlier caveats on subjectivity and arbitrariness remain. All we can really say for certain is that the analysis is internally consistent, based on the parameters established at the outset. To put it bluntly, that doesn’t mean it’s “true”, broadly speaking. Whether it’s politically expedient, useful, or accurate from a communication standpoint to label the EU as an empire is an open question, and one which non-academics can reasonably be sceptical about. The term did make its way outside of academia, as noted by Hoerber and Sigalas. EU Commission President Barroso said as much in 2007, claiming that the EU was the world’s “first non-imperial empire”.

Ultimately, it is hard not to escape the conclusion that this is just another chapter in the constant soul-searching that marks European political culture. “What is the EU?” is a question that evades simple answers. There is no historical or contemporary equivalent for this ambitious project of regional integration, and attempts to make the EU fit the categories of the past always come up somewhat short of the mark. Sitting somewhere between being an international organisation, a confederation of states, a federal state in its own right, or a multi-national federation, the EU is a bit of all the above, but neither of those can describe it fully and accurately.

“Empire” is a definition that is, therefore, in good company – a partially accurate attempt, at best, to define a daring political project that defies definition. Whether it will have more success than its counterparts will have to be seen. The European Union will continue to change and deal with a difficult world around it, but the quest for a handy label to describe it still has no end in sight.

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Germany has just taken up the mantle of a six-month rotating Council of Ministers Presidency this past July, in what promises to be a momentous time for Europe. The challenges of the virus, economic collapse, Chinese ambitions and American disarray demand a new cap for the European ship of state. What can we hope to see from this German Presidency, and what can we expect to see from European leaders in light of these challenges?

An Augean Challenge

There are several challenges for the German Presidency which will test Merkel’s mettle, her political alliances and the will of the European population to survive the crisis together or fail separately. The first and most immediate challenge, now overcome, was the unanimous approval of the budget and the Eurobonds that had been proposed to pay for the trillion-euro plus relief and budgetary package.

Calling themselves the “Frugal Four”, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands early on indicated their opposition to Eurobond financing, though not to relief loans. Equal measures of pressure and concessions on budget rebates, though, prevented the unique one “no” vote sufficient to scuttle the whole package. To achieve this, some concessions had to be made on the Hungarian and Polish front, setting aside concerns over the rule of law and political differences.

It was certainly a relief to France and Germany at the start of the process, in spite of other regrets they may have, that a less than communal oriented UK is no longer a voting member. This is not an observation unique to us. In the May 30 edition of the UK weekly The Economist, one of their regular staff writers speculated that even under a Cameron government the UK would have vetoed the budget with Eurobonds and a relief package included. The unwieldiness of unanimous voting in a community of 27, not to mention 28 before the UK left, is clear when major reforms like this one are needed.

The second step for Merkel’s Presidency will be one over which she has no direct control: getting the budget through Parliament. There are issues with research and the Parliament will want to put their own stamp on things, but after compromises agreement is anticipated.

That brings us to the third issue for the six-month German Presidency: institutional reforms. A reform conference on the future of the Union that was scheduled to begin in May has been postponed sine die. The conference is needed and will in all likelihood be rescheduled. Will it be too much for Merkel to handle the pressing needs of the economic and health crisis as well as build consensus around further reform? Or will she see the crisis as an opportunity to push through an ambitious agenda?

Beyond German Leadership: EU Leaders to the Fore

Much of managing a 445 million member community is highly technical in nature. Leadership must demonstrate technical competence as well as personal character. Paying for the huge sums necessary to redress the economic and social issues caused by the virus will be an enduring problem. Christine Lagarde – though attacked for some early faux pas’s in initially addressing the crisis – has the experience and competence as well as character to do what is necessary at the European Central Bank.

No one can ignore the important role Donald Tusk, head of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, can play. Of Polish (specifically Kashubian) origin, born in a working-class family in Gdansk, Tusk has taken upon himself the task of neutralising the populist political and cultural revolt. This will certainly be key to progress in a European federation, as populist parties have generally been determined nationalists rejecting federalism.

Another emerging leader is the head or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EU Parliament, Irate Garcia. She has already been responsible for several important portfolios, notably concerning women and the family, and will continue to play an important role.

Leadership will also emerge from beyond the institutions and from places we might not always expect. George Soros, head of the Open Society Foundation, an NGO founded and financed by him and working on supporting democratic institutions in Eastern Europe is no stranger to European finance. He is also the founder of the Central European University (CEU) recently forced, for having come afoul of the Hungarian Government, to move from Budapest to Vienna. Soros made his fortune, now used philanthropically, as an investor and speculator in currencies, stocks, and bonds. These are markets he knows well and the precise markets which will be needed to finance the Eurobonds. Soros has proposed a novel but not untried idea for low-cost financing of the crisis response: perpetual bonds.

Perpetual Bonds – A Radical Solution?

In 1648, Holland faced an existential threat from rising seawater. A Dutch Water Board issued the first “perpetual” bonds to pay for the building of a massive system of dikes. Now, 350 years later, the bonds are still paying interest to the remaining holders, but they have been forgotten by almost everyone else.

Similar bonds, also known as consols, have been successfully used for financing during several crises since the Dutch issuance. The first British Consols were issued in 1751. In 1927, under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, consols were issued again as partial refunding of the 1917 National War Bonds. The UK has a long history of using consols for financing.

The mechanism is simple: perpetual bonds pay interest but the principal is never repaid. Let’s say an investor buys a 10.000 euro perpetual bond at 1% interest – these bonds have been in the past subscribed to at very low interest rates because they pay in perpetuity. The holder would receive 100 euros per year for the rest of his life, at which time the bonds could be passed to his or her heirs. There is no end to this stream of 100 Euro income to the holder.

Perpetual bonds are less costly in the immediate future, the ideal feature in times of crisis when much money is required. However, they are considerably more expensive in the long run, though for the first 100 years or thereabouts depending on their interest rate they would be less expensive than an equivalent bond.

There are further ways that the costs can be curtailed over time. There is the natural attrition of bonds being lost with death and the transfer of estates. In times of inflation, payments become worth less in real terms naturally reducing their real cost. Costs can further be reduced by offering a buyout of remaining bonds, especially if inflation is such that return to the holders has diminished. This was the case with the 1751 British Consols which were bought out and retired in 2015.

One reason why more countries have not used consol financing is that, in order for the bonds to be subscribed to at a reasonable rate, the credit standing of the country must be good. This feature should appeal to the more frugal countries, as the issuance of such bonds will oblige the EU to keep its finances in order and revenues in line with expenditures. All in all, the proposal seems like an excellent way to provide low-cost Eurobonds in a time of crisis.

Where To From Here?

Spain has already proposed consols to the Council, but the proposal was not fully vetted as it came at a time when there was no agreement to use Eurobonds of any type, whether perpetual or ordinary term bonds. Now that has changed with the French and German proposal and Council approval of mutual Eurobonds backed by the credit of the EU.

The German Presidency will have to face these and many other issues and ideas. A new leadership, if not new leaders, will have to emerge to meet these huge challenges. It is difficult to be a leader today as 24/7 media coverage will eventually show off anyone’s foibles in a poor light. But make no mistake, there are real leaders. The question is not so much whether Europe will find the leaders it needs, nor the solutions to today’s challenges, but whether it will find the followers.

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