When I was a student in Belgium at the Universite de Louvain in the 1970s, I first heard that Friedrich Nietzsche’s collected writings were the books of choice on the nightstand of every European intellectual. Though I had already read some Nietzsche, this practice impressed me. I continued with my reading of the great thinker alongside my regular studies in economics. Nietzsche can be best defined as a thinker and, through his writings, thinking for one’s self is precisely what is acquired.

I am no longer in touch with the new generation of intellectuals and students to know if this still holds true. At the time, though, it did. The notions learned from frequenting the great European thinkers shed light on the deep roots of problems we otherwise only understand on a deceptive surface. Such a problem, I surmise, is the European project. In these times, dusting off Nietzsche’s insights can help us understand European unity both that which we have lived since his time and that still to come.

A Philosophical Note

Nietzsche’s philosophy is not one of the theorems and their derivatives but rather an exploration of the dialectical contradiction found in life’s phenomenon. He often states an observation than its opposite. He opens our minds more than transmitting a ready-made doctrine.

Nietzsche has long suffered from unfortunate associations with Nazi ideology and from being summarily dismissed in the Anglo-Saxon world. Despite this, he has remained an influential thinker on modern culture. His association with Nazi philosophy has always been a distortion. It was enthusiastically encouraged by his sister Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche, an Aryan zealot, who became curator of his literary estate upon Nietzsche’s death.

Concepts like Nietzsche’s ‘Ubermensch’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra are unclear at best, but here certainly relate more to a wise philosopher and elite aristocrat than any mass movement. Such concepts, grossly distorted, were seized upon to claim the great thinker for Nazi ideology. This conclusion would be impossible for anyone who actually read Nietzsche.

A Proponent of ‘Europe’

Nietzsche was a proponent of ‘Europe’ and a critic of the narrowness of the European nation-state. Germany is often the subject of his ire. One of the few things on which Nietzsche is abundantly clear is his dislike of the militant elements in German politics and culture of his epoch, ones that he predicted would lead to national destruction, long before Hitler was born. He sees no dialectic here, only looming disaster.

Take, for example, this one of very many of denunciations Nietzsche levelled against German militarism, antisemitism and nationalism, taken from Gaya Scienza: “No, we do not love humanity; but on the other hand, we are not merely ‘German’ enough, in the sense in which the word ‘German’ is constantly being used these days, to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it were a matter of quarantine […]”.

And, if it was necessary for him to be clearer, here is an excerpt from a letter he wrote while in Switzerland in 1887: “I feel kinship only with the most cultivated French and Russian people, but not at all with the so-called distinguished elite among my own countrymen who judge everything from the principle: ‘Germany above everything’ (Deutschland über alles)”.

Cultural Views from Nietzsche

Nietzsche repeatedly denounces the anti-semitism that he finds rabid in German culture dating at least from the writings of Martin Luther, which he considers a sickness of weak-minded individuals lacking self-esteem. Any careful reader of the philosopher would confidently conclude that he would say the same about anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment today.

It is also apparent reading Nietzsche that the marriage between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxons was on shaky footing from the start. Nietzsche finds Anglo-Saxon culture radically different from the values he cherishes on the continent. Plebian values of “individual happiness” and “practicality” made the Anglo-Saxons unfit for the great cultural projects that Nietzsche felt were at the heart of any civilization and that he saw as the future of Europe.

Making Good Europeans

Nietzsche does not content himself with simply dissecting the nationalist illness of the day. Instead of prophesising where it would lead, he attempted to embrace an alternative.

Writing to his mother from Sils Maria, the Romanish-speaking village in the Engadine valley in Switzerland, that he liked to frequent,  in 1886 he sets himself apart from those he criticizes: “Even if I should be a bad German, I am at all events a very good European”.

Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ had a few important common traits: a secular, cosmopolitan culture that was at home across the continent. They were individuals comfortable with many languages and cultures, and who display open and inquisitive minds. They were Renaissance men, Europeans, completely free from the national and religious passions of their day.

He also gives a few important examples of individuals who he perceives to fit this description. In addition to Napoleon, these are Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and even Wagner, whom he’d previously fallen out with due to the nationalist elements present in his music.

“We are, in one word – and let this be our word of honour – good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit.” – Gaya Scienza.

A Final Reflection

Nietzsche appreciated the folk evolution of the European peoples in their variety. However, after having created diverse types of excellence influenced by geography, climate, language, diet and the many other factors that constitute a culture, he thought that their day had come to an end. His “good Europeans” had taken a dialectical step beyond this stage of evolution. They were citizens of the world comfortable anywhere.

At a time when nationalist and racist passions have again come into fashion, along with narrow-minded interests not too different from those prevailing in Nietzsche’s time, we find some in Europe turned inward and against any notion of openness. It would be good to remember, especially now, his warnings and where Europe may be headed again if not heeded.

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This narrative, which is particularly popular online, is also seeping through public debate. One need only take a look at Emmanuel Macron‘s speeches to see the conflating of western European (or even French) values with those of the entire Union, sidestepping what is actually listed in the Treaties. The picture painted is more or less thus: the original founding countries are able and willing to push forward along the path of ever closer union. The partners that joined in the two eastern enlargements, on the other hand, are backward and stubbornly opposed to more integration, thus holding the entire project back. Some even draw the conclusion that the EU has expanded too fast, and that proper federalisation had to take precedence over enlargement.

This is a comforting narrative, at least for western Europeans. It also contains a kernel of truth: concerns about the rule of law and separation of powers in Eastern European Member States are legitimate and well-grounded. It is also undeniable that these countries and their governments have been quick in pointing to Brussels as a scapegoat for all their ills. What does not follow is the belief that, in their absence, the rest of the continent could speedily achieve unification. Upon closer scrutiny, this belief is revealed to be little more than wishful thinking.

In Search of a Liberal Core

The first problem, when romanticising the EU’s supposed western liberal core, is defining its borders. When it comes to dogged defence of State autonomy, Austria is not that different from Poland. Even if one assumes that the demarcation overlaps with the old ideological borders of the Cold War, the comparison does not look stronger. The current Italian government, which openly cites Orbán as a role model, has no claim on a moral high ground over Eastern Europe. In the United Kingdom, the Tories (who share ECR membership with the ruling Law and Justice party in Poland) are entrenched both in protection of the establishment and in some cases literal aristocracy – hardly a better track record than the Czech Republic or Slovakia.

One may refine this even further, and argue that the western integrationist core corresponds to at least five of the six original founders. This subdivision, however, also fails scrutiny. France has done much to retain its autonomy, particularly in foreign policy and security. The Kingdom of the Netherlands – a liberal western European country if ever there was one – remains one of the most determined opponents of federalisation, especially on military matters and Eurozone reform.

When it comes to European integration and European political culture, there is no such thing as a pro-integration, liberal core. Significantly more lip service is paid in the West to the ideas and values of European integration, but the willingness to translate that into a meaningful pooling of sovereignty is low. French vetoes date back to the foundation of the Coal and Steel Community, and the recent wave of illiberalism sweeping across the West has dimmed prospects even further.

The Blame Game

The turn towards illiberalism is a common phenomenon all over the Western world, even at its margins like in the Philippines. The Republican Party in the United States started to change in the early 1990s with the likes of Dick Cheney and Newt Gingrich, when the EU was newborn and ended at the Oder. This point cannot be repeated too often: what is branded as “populism” in current political discourse is, as a phenomenon, very much independent of the EU and its existence, let alone its membership composition.

Its specific European manifestation is also significant to this argument. Several European countries have increasingly shifted towards illiberal positions – not just in Eastern Europe, but also in the west. Track records on integration are negative all across the map. It is completely unfair – and in many ways gaslighting – to blame Eastern Europe for the halt to integration.

The UK undoubtedly holds the record of vetoes, exemptions, and red lines, covering a broad range of matters from collective defence to the single currency. London’s outright exemption from the principle of ever closer union was in itself an admission of defeat for serious prospects of political unification. Britain’s prominence, however, shouldn’t blind us to the obstacles placed by others. Britain itself was often an excellent alibi for other sceptical countries, allowing to entirely skirt discussion on topics like common defence because London had already vetoed them anyway.

Several European Member States didn’t even need this alibi to shoot down integration. France voted down the proposed European Constitution in a referendum. While it is currently busy trading thinly veiled accusations with Germany over who is falling short on what initiative, it has also displayed a dogged determination at patrolling its own borders in the wake of the refugee crisis. Denmark also has opt outs, and is profoundly sceptical of further integration. The Netherlands, Germany, and all Nordics are squarely against Eurozone reform, while their equivalents in Club Med are vehemently against aligning their policies to those required to make a banking union function.

The conclusion is inescapable: there is no popular legitimacy anywhere in Europe for more integration. But if European integration is dead in the water, who is the culprit? Curiously, very few political camps in the Union have actually owned up to the chronic lack of political will that allowed this to happen. Pointing fingers and outsourcing the blame is a popular strategy, but it leads down a dangerous road – one with no answers and an abundance of acrimony.

Eastern Europe Is Europe

When the discussion moves to the economy and workers’ movement, its ugliness becomes all the more apparent. A popular narrative, particularly among left-wing circles in Italy and France, is that the eastern enlargement was driven by companies in the quest for cheap labour. Reinterpreting the enlargement as a product of shadowy forces is a way of delegitimising it. The short-sightedness of this argument is so total that it’s hard to tackle what makes it so wrong.

The Single Market, of course, grants freedom to trade and move across the Union, and that naturally includes businesses. Ultimately, however, the Single Market is also about long-term economic convergence. Companies truly committed to a quest for cheap labour on meaningful time-scales go to South-East Asia – wages in eastern Europe will not remain low forever. Thirdly, and most importantly: businesses do not dictate EU policy, nor that of its Member States. There is no secret cabal of corporations who manipulate governments from the shadows.

There is little doubt that powerful economic actors like corporations have played a role in European integration, and that these same actors can count on powerful lobbyists. But this is part and parcel of political life in any democratic country. The belief that these actors could unilaterally drive a political undertaking of such a scale based on profit sheets alone is close to a conspiracy theory – the obsessive quest for an agent on whom to pin the blame.

Paradoxically, Eastern Europe tends to be a lot more outspoken than the West in its support for the EU in general, in spite of the sometimes stark disagreements over the rule of law and democratic values. This is no coincidence: for many of these Member States, the EU and NATO are a matter of survival, not of policy-making. With an aggressive Russia to the east, and a history of totalitarian dictatorship still eerily close in their past, there is little room for geopolitical experiments. Hungary is at present the only Member State in Eastern Europe bucking the trend, and openly adopting an openly friendly position towards Russia.

The entrance of Eastern Europe into the EU was a bold political act that took place within a limited window of opportunity. Together with NATO’s expansion, it banished the spectre of further Russian domination of the newly independent countries. Renouncing it over political rows is another classic example of the myopia that affects European political culture.

Meaningful Unity

Ultimately, playing the blame game by exploiting regional rivalries is the epytome of failures when it comes to integration discourse. European unity is about undoing the damage the continent wrought upon itself through two global conflicts and the Cold War. The latter in particular divided Europe in half for forty years, resulting in very different experiences, problems, and ways of looking at the world. The hypothetical future unification of Europe resembles the reunification of Germany, but on a much larger scale.

This can feel daunting – and so it should. The quest for peaceful, democratically legitimate European unity is an ambitious and unprecedented undertaking, one spanning many generations. This lofty goal cannot be meaningfully pursued without keeping an eye on the obstacles that lie on the road ahead. It will take decades to even start mitigating the damage done by forty years of division, Communist dictatorship, and foreign occupation of the eastern half of the continent. Playing the blame game, however, is one sure way of failing in this grand endeavour.

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However, this is a very state-centric view on it on the integration journey, and it leaves little room for the agency of other actors and their influence. An actor that has been somewhat disregarded in European integration discourse, is that of multinational corporations (MNC). Enterprises that stretch across multiples borders, giving them a transnational dimension, are a huge part of the everyday life of a 21^st century European. Despite that, their agency is hardly mentioned in regards to integration.

What are multinational corporations?

An MNC can be described as a company that has facilities and other assets in at least one country other than its home country. Some scholars go further and say that MNCs are any enterprise that engages in foreign direct investments (FDI) and which own or, to a certain extent, control value-added activities in several countries (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, p. 3). They are the main force of modern enterprises. So much so that the world’s largest MNCs make more money than most countries on Earth combined. In fact, the top 10 largest multinational corporations in 2016 had a combined $2.9 trillion, otherwise expressed as larger than China’s tax revenue from a population of 1.4 billion.

Nowadays, one cannot ignore the importance of these transnational companies. Some academics even believe that MNCs have gotten so large and powerful nowadays that they have destroyed the very fabric of our democratic society. Europe is one of the biggest markets in the world for these companies. In turn, there is a huge presence of them and their activities on the continent.

Setting the scene: theories of European integration

From a theoretical perspective, some of the main theories regarding European integration are both inter-governmentalism and supranationalism. Both of these theories place the state as the most important actor and decision-maker in integration, and thus are both state-centred approaches to explaining the integration process in Europe. These theories leave little room for the agency and influence of multinational corporations.

In particular, inter-governmentalism focuses on the most powerful Member States, national political and economic agendas and bargaining power. With inter-governmentalism, states remain the only important actors within European politics. Supranationalism, on the other hand, is problematic as it fails to offer an explanation of the roots of transnational interests or why multinational corporations would be powerful. This is in fact one of the main criticisms of international relations generally speaking.

That being said, many academics believe multinational corporations play a significant role in European politics and affairs. Theories that offer an explanation to the agency of MNCs in European integration are transnationalism and Neo-Gramscian transnationalism.

Gramsican school of thought seeks to interpret how “class strategy plays a role in the construction of hegemony.”. Gramsci goes further to say that a plethora of actors such as think tanks, far-sighted bankers or industrialists can be “organic intellectuals”. This is a group of intellectuals that can have influence in “social and political fields. Furthermore, it can be a viewed as élites who are capable of being “an organiser of society in general”.

In fact, scholars Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Coleman and Underhill (1998) claim that the European integration process, primarily the relance européenne of the 1980s, can be viewed as an elite response to collectively perceived challenges. These élites they speak of, in the cadre of this article, are the capitalist and business elite – the force that is the MNC.

Multinational corporations in Europe: a history

MNCs and Europe have a long relationship together. In today’s world, most large companies have a headquarters in Europe. One of the reasons for this is to avail of the opportunities presented in the European Single Market. However, it has not always been plain sailing for MNCs on the European continent.

Between the first and second World War, the European market turned from a relatively liberal trade area into a collage of cautiously protected national markets. Throughout the inter-war years, companies functioned in a business landscape of segmented national markets, divided by tariffs and exchange controls, and that is before mentioning the historical inheritance of different languages, cultures, and consumption patterns.

States put tariffs in place and deliberately set out to build powerful, national industries. Protectionism became the norm. This made transnational transactions very difficult as countries were more focused on building up and developing their own national companies before looking abroad. Effectively, it meant that there was little space for MNCs in Europe during this time period.

Nevertheless, multinational corporations have been present on the European continent for quite a large period of time. Prior to the Schuman proposal and the creation of the ECSC, different countries opted for different strategies and ways to secure the liberalisation of markets, which ultimately lead to great uncertainty and confusion in Europe at the time for multinational corporations. The creation of the ECSC was a huge step, and indeed a huge benefit for companies based in any of the six initial member states.

Following on from the Rome Treaty of 1957, import tariffs were diminished bit by bit, eventually leading to the establishment of a common external tariff charge. This meant both advantages and indeed disadvantages for European firms. Disadvantages included increased competition, whereas free trade between Member States was looked upon as a plus for companies with intentions to expand their trade to other markets in other countries.

That being said, many American MNCs tried their luck on the European market. In fact, many scholars argue that the United States played a large role in European integration. The chemical companies Dow, Monsanto, and Du Pont, which had few investments in Europe before 1939, moved to build European organisations which became a fundamental aspect of post-war entry strategies. US companies were, at the time, much more accustomed to doing business in a geographically diverse and heterogeneous market, and due to this, were more willingly to try and enter the European market.

Historically speaking, US big businesses have been a step ahead of any other nationality. 54 of the 100 largest firms in 1912 (and eight of the top ten) were American, as against 15 for the UK, 14 for Germany and six for France. In many respects, big businesses and MNCS could be seen mainly as an American phenomenon.

The Unilever Case

European big businesses as a whole, were not as willing or as experimental. Having said that, one cannot generalise all European businesses into having the same mindset or even into having a common or shared perspective. One company that engaged in transnational behaviour before many other European competitors on the market was Unilever, who pushed the UK’s bid for membership of the European Economic Community.

Unilever was arguably Europe’s largest firm when formed in 1929. Following a merger between the Lever Brothers and Margarine Urin, the company was a dominant force in the soap market. Unilever had a significant impact on European integration, in lobbying in European decision and policy-making. Unilever were huge believers in further European integration, to the point where they were even described as a “child of Europe”.

It supported the numerous drives and attempts to further deepen and expand the European Economic Community (EEC). The company fully supported Britain’s application to join the Community. When the British government put membership of the EEC to a vote to the British people in the form of a referendum, Unilever posted a “briefing sheet” explaining their interest in the UK’s membership (Unilever Information Bulletin, 1975 as cited in Jones & Miskell, 1990).

In aiming to benefit from the European Community’s trade policy to compete with global US firms such as Coca-Cola present in Europe already, and to internationalise their business, Unilever had much to gain from the UK’s membership. Britain imported around 70% of the world’s butter exports in the 1960s. The market price for butter in the UK was 55% of the average price in EEC countries in 1960. They were a formidable force in Europe, with market shares in Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain—the main consumers of the product—of over two-thirds.

The company were a huge component of the UK’s membership bid and pushed their agenda throughout the membership process. One could argue that efforts of the MNC that pushed for further European integration domestically, truly aided Britain in its bid to become a member of the EEC, thus deepening and widening European integration in 1973.

What we can learn from Unilever

Unilever is a very interesting company to use an example of how multinational corporations play an active role in developing integration in Europe. First of all, it is an Anglo-Dutch company, thus fundamentally European in principle and indeed in turn, multinational in nature. The president of Unilever, around the time that the idea of European integration was building a head of steam in the 1950s, was a man called Paul Rijkens. As well as being president of one of Europe’s largest companies, he was also on the board of Rotterdam Bank.

Rijkens, along with Joseph Retinger, played a fundamental role in the establishment of the Bilderberg group and their first Bilderberg meeting of 1954. The meeting was paid for by both Unilever and the CIA. Here, world leaders, both from political and business backgrounds, discussed transnational issues and concerns in a very private manner, behind closed doors. It has also been described as a place where European and North American elites unite. Perhaps the best definition of the group came from Van der Pijl (1984) when he said that:

“Bilderberg served…as the environment for developing ideas in that direction, and secrecy was necessary for allowing the articulation of differences rather than for keeping clear-cut projects from public knowledge. In this sense, Bilderberg functioned as the testing ground for new initiatives for Atlantic unity”.

Multinational corporations make up a large part of these meetings. The Bilderberg group were very keen on the idea of a unified Europe from early on. At the third Bilderberg conference in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, September 1955, the relance européenne was discussed at length. Representatives from MNCs such as Lehman Brothers, Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, Société Générale Belgique, and Chase Manhattan Bank were present, along with Unilever and others.

Paul Rijkens, along with two other members present, advanced arguments for a European common market. Rijkens believed that there would be “an immediate positive effect on the European economy, even if it would take a decade to establish a common market”.

It is quite remarkable that many CEO’s of large MNCs, such as Rijkens of Unilever, in 1955 were advocating for a common market in Europe. With the president of Unilever and the fact that his opinion was backed by many leaders at the conference, this idea of further market integration in Europe was taken very seriously by the politicians present at the conference.

Based on this evidence, it is plausible to argue that the ideas and agendas pushed by the MNCs and their representatives at the Bilderberg meetings, especially that of 1955, helped advance this idea of further European market integration, which would take place barely two years later. In 1957, the European Economic Community and in turn, the European common market with the signing of the Treaty of Rome, came into play.

Industrialists for the common market: the ERT example

Another group of MNCs and their respective representatives who are said to have impacted European affairs is the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). The ERT have been largely disregarded concerning their influence of European integration, but wrongly so.

This group is another example of a “transnational capitalist elite” group and their rise as key actors in global politics.  The former chairperson of the ERT Wisse Dekker, described it as “more than a lobby group as it helps to shape policies”. The group was formed in 1983 after an initiative from then Volvo CEO Pehr Gyllenhammer and Etienne Davignon, a European Commissioner. The first meeting included 17 industrialists from major European companies. Today, this number stretches to 45.

The fact that ERT members control Europe’s largest multinational corporations in turn results in a power that at least in its immediacy cannot be matched by any interest group. Peter Sutherland, a former EU Commissioner for competition, stated the ERT has privileged political access to “the highest level of government” with “unimpeded access to government leaders because of the position of their companies”.

It was in the 1980s, with the relaunching of Europe, that the influence of the ERT can be observed. In the late 1970s and 80s businesses were able to exert a high level of political autonomy at an international level. They did so by raising the agenda of deregulation at home and the creation of a single market in Europe.

The ERT’s campaign for a completed internal market began directly following its foundation in 1983. Commissioner Davignon expressed his dissatisfaction with the current “separated national markets” that prevented lots of European firms “from reaching the scale necessary” in order to compete with non-European competitors. This new market, had to serve as a unified home base so that European firms could develop as powerful competitors in world markets.

The ERT members were amongst the first in Europe’s elite to publicly propose this idea of an integrated European market. Wisse Decker’s “European Community Home Market” proposed programme in 1984, which passed through the ERT, is said to have acted as inspiration for the Commission’s White Paper in 1985. Former commissioner Peter Sutherland went as far as saying that the ERT played “a significant role in the development of the 1992 programme” with “Dekker… and Philips playing a significant role”.

Sutherland also claims that “one can argue that the whole competition of the internal market project was initiated not by governments but by the Round Table”. In using their influence and indeed position of privilege, it could be argued that the ERT helped push their agenda of a fully integrated European market, which in turn seemingly had a knock-on effect politically with the Commission adopting many of the ERT’s ideas in their White Paper just one year later. Their efforts pushed further European market integration. It is plausible to suggest this backing from the transnational elitist CEO’s of European multinational corporations furthered market integration in Europe.

Furthering the European Monetary Union

The launching of the internal market in Europe contributed greatly to the renewed desire for a European Monetary Union in Europe. The creation of an EMU represented a substantial development in European integration and an important departure from national sovereignty over monetary policy.

Another body of transnational cooperation seldomly mentioned in European integration discourse is the Association for Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). This association was a break-away organisation created by the members of the ERT that were in favour of an EMU, formed in 1987. Companies such as Fiat, Siemens, Total and Philips were amongst the founding members, with Wisse Decker once again acting as chairman. The committee had close ties with many European politicians, but especially with the prominent figure in French and indeed European affairs: Jacques Delors.

In a joint conference held by then European Commission President Delors and the EMUE, Delors claimed that “company managers not only follow us, but often precede us”, thus granting MNCs great agency in European decision-making. It is a popular rhetoric in European integration discourse that the Delors committee of June 1988 paved the way for a common EMU.

However, many scholars believe that the EMU was created due to transnational actors, such as multinational corporations. Transnational actors and their politics were influential throughout the development of the EMU initiative, from the first meeting of the Delors Committee in 1988. The efforts from the EMUE representatives, and their close relationship with Delors, could be argued to have influenced European integration, this time furthering monetary integration within the European Community.

Multinational corporations as actors for integration

Coming back to European integration theories and where the Bilderberg group, the ERT and the EMUE lie, this has been a very debated issue in both intergovernmental and supranational theory circles. Moravcsik (1988) from the intergovernmental camp firmly believes that “structural economic conditions translated [only] into diffuse business support”. Businesses, on the other hand, did not play an active role, only offering “essential support” and “reacted to initiatives from the Commission and the Parliament, as well as member governments.”. In doing this, Moravcsik denies both bodies any agency in European initiatives and ideas.

Nevertheless, applying a neo-Gramscian translationalist theoretical scope, all bodies with MNCs at the heart of their organisation, have played a fundamental in European integration, especially in the examples cited. That being said, European integration, as aforementioned, is primarily viewed upon from a state-centric phenomenon.

In my personal opinion, multinational corporations have truly had a significant impact on further European integration and will continue to do so. In fact, I would go as far as saying that their influence in European affairs is only going to increase as time goes on. Nowadays, we are really beginning to see just how impactful multinational corporation are, in an economical but also a political sense.

Companies such as Facebook are substantially influencing elections through the use of personalised data targeting, as we all saw in the election of Donald Trump as the US president in 2016. The American MNC had so much power that when summoned to speak to the European Parliament, the CEO Mark Zuckerberg, spoke vaguely for 10 minutes. It’s hard to fathom that his company has a user base of over 2 billion people worldwide, compared to the EU population of 510 million.

One begs the question, where does the real power lie in this modern age? It would be fascinating to see what the Bilderberg group or the ERT are currently saying about Brexit.  Are they having any influence on decision-making? It’s difficult to tell. European integration is a very complex phenomenon and has happened due to an array of factors. Nevertheless, although less mediatised and generally not as well-known, multinational corporations have had, for a long time in European history, a strong influence and agency in EU affairs.

Although there are prominent scholars in the field, especially from the Amsterdam Transnational Studies school, this remains a field heavily under-researched. At the end of the day, the relationship between multinational corporations and European affairs boils down to a question of power and influence. Once again, European integration is rather complex phenomenon to fathom. However, so is the multinational company.

Guest article by Sean Pender. This content does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of My Country? Europe. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the author.

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

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