Much has been written, and is being written all the time, about the large-scale efforts to fight climate change, and why they hopelessly fall short of the mark. At the same time, however, this is not one single fight, contained to the realms of high politics.

Regular citizens, activists, people from all walks of life, have also been doing what they can to stem the tide, to make the world more prepared, to make it more sustainable. We have chosen to sit down with one of these people for an interview.

Meet Dr. Ruxandra Lupu. She is a distinguished researcher, with a PhD in film/video and photographic arts from the University of Leeds. Professionally, she’s been working at the intersection between business and academia for a long time. She describes herself as “a traditional printmaker and digital humanities researcher”.

In 2020, she founded Eithne, a company that allows her to marry her academic and professional knowledge of textiles and printmaking, with the push for sustainability. You can read more about her extensive background here.

More interestingly from our point of view, Dr. Lupu has been disseminating her hard-won knowledge. Together with international partners, Eithne is implementing Sustainique, a project that aims to teach advanced and sustainable textile production techniques to “VET providers, textile designers, entrepreneurs, employees, and trainers in professional fashion firms”.

Of course, supporting research, education, and knowledge dissemination is one of the things the EU arguably does best, and we also believe it’s one of the essential tools in building a shared European home. That’s why we sat down with Dr. Lupu for a chat about sustainability and textiles.

Question: Which aspects of sustainability does your work address?

Answer: My work initially did not explicitly focus on sustainability. As a printmaker, I engaged in craftsmanship through textile printing. My focus shifted to sustainability when I researched the impact of innovation for a British media cluster. This project highlighted the importance of greening media technology and achieving sustainability through creative storytelling and processes.

Since then, my attention has turned completely into sustainability in arts and crafts, both as a researcher and an independent entrepreneur. In the past two years, my work has concentrated on the craft and textile fields, exploring sustainability in competencies, technologies (like haptics), storytelling, and innovation practices.

I particularly focus on responsible and hidden innovation in relation to sustainability. My approach now combines multimodal and interdisciplinary methods to address sustainability in arts and crafts, with an emphasis on care and responsibility, especially in textiles and fashion.

Q: How do you describe sustainable textile innovations, and their role within a more responsible fashion industry?

A: From a theoretical perspective, textile innovations are novel textiles created through new materials, designs, or production processes. The concept of novelty can be tricky, since changes occur daily. For example, is a textile fiber from an ancient crop innovative? Is engineered yarn from orange peels innovative? Both can be seen as innovative, but ensuring these products are durable, caring, and respectful to the environment and communities is key.

Labels like GOTS and Oeko-Tex should certify products, but their transparency and scope, especially in addressing social and economic aspects like fair trade and worker safety, can be limited. While traceability is vital, it’s challenging due to the complex production chains in textiles. We need comprehensive sustainability measurements, considering cultural, social, environmental, and economic factors in developing textile innovations.

Q: What is the state of the art of adoption of textile innovations in Europe?

A: Europe has high ambitions for textile innovations. Initiatives like Master programs at IAAC Spain and Boras University Sweden, and EU-funded projects such as WORTH, DeFine, and Re-Fashion, support this goal. Institutions like Fashion for Change advocate for a more resilient industry.

However, impact measurement and consistency of innovations lag behind. Many new products are not widely adopted due to low market availability, high prices, and risks associated with new materials. Young designers are more open to these innovations, often for limited editions or unique products, but mass adoption remains distant.

Q: How can material libraries contribute to fostering the uptake of textile innovations? What are the challenges they face?

A: Material libraries are places of discovery, stimulating designers by offering textiles and materials instead of books. Europe has fewer than ten material libraries, mainly serving architects and engineers, with few focusing on textiles. In 2022, a project with the University of Florence showed that designers are curious and open to new materials. However, material libraries face challenges like staff shortages, lack of funds, and a need for specialised experts. Educational institutions, especially at VET level, play a crucial role in promoting sustainability and innovation in textiles and fashion.

Question: How should holistic education be set up in terms of fostering the uptake of sustainable textile innovation?

A: Holistic education should encompass both external and deep knowledge. Designers need to understand, not only the physical properties of materials, but also how they were created, by whom, and their environmental and social impacts. This multifaceted knowledge helps designers make informed, sustainable choices. Future designers should be educated to assess materials’ properties for their specific needs, and understand their broader impact on communities and ecosystems. This approach fosters a resilient and caring practice in the textile industry.

The post Sustainable Textiles: An Interview With Dr. Ruxandra Lupu appeared first on My Country? Europe..

To date, the only evidence that Pratasevich is even alive is a video broadcast on the dictatorship’s State television. Here, the journalist bears clear marks of torture and declares – rather unconvincingly – that he has been treated well. This is followed by a “confession” regarding the “crimes” the regime alleges he committed against them. If Lukashenka feels he can get away with it, Pratasevich will be executed by firing squad. It’s a rarely used method even in Belarus, but one the regime has been preparing the ground for by labelling the journalist a “terrorist“, which enables the harshest punishments under what passes for “law” in Belarus.

The fact that a country in Europe is waging such a campaign of terror and despicable brutality against its own people is simply beyond the pale. But Lukashenka isn’t stopping there, as he fights tooth and claw to retain a position of power the rest of the world recognises is not his to have.

To get at Pratasevich and Sapega, Lukashenka has committed an act of State terrorism, directed against an EU-registered plane on an internal EU flight, which was “escorted” by a jet fighter – an act of military aggression that implicitly threatened EU civilians and the plane’s crew with death if they refused to comply. As part of this terror attack, EU citizens were left stranded at Minsk airport until the plane was released. Two passengers who were exercising their right to freedom of movement inside the Union’s borders were brazenly kidnapped.

The gravity of this act would warrant extraordinary measures, but the EU lacks the legal and political mandate required to meet force with force. It does have other tools at its disposal to strike back at Belarus, but is not utilising them too effectively yet.

A Toothless Great Power

The action carried out by Lukashenka against Ryanair would have been unthinkable against an internal Russian or USA flight packed with Russian or American citizens. The jet fighter involved in the act of aggression would have surely been downed, and possibly the airbase responsible for the operation would have been put out of action as well.

Unfortunately, the EU is a peculiar type of Great Power, one endlessly hampered by weakness and internal disunity, and most critically by the pathological shortsightedness of its Member States. The timidity, opportunism, and domestic constraints of national leaders mean that the EU lacks the competencies to respond to the hijacking the way it should – with a military response to protect the lives of EU citizens, force Belarus to respect its own citizens, and punish the perpetrators. But the chronic political anaemia that has taken root in every European capital prevents this. The internal disunity is even worse when considering the issue of Russian involvement, which is even more divisive to Member States.

But if the EU can’t react the way a Great Power should, what can it do? Luckily, it can do a few things, and to some degree it already is. However, a different approach will be needed to exploit the EU’s leverage to the fullest.

The Response So Far

Following an emergency session, the European Council has pushed through a sanctions package that goes some way to inflicting pain on Lukashenka’s regime without overturning the apple cart. The essence of the move is to lock Belarus out of international aviation by banning Belarusian overflight in the EU’s air space, as well as access to EU airports.

The Council has also called “on all EU-based carriers to avoid overflight of Belarus,” and while this measure has largely been heeded, at the time of writing both Ryanair and Alitalia have failed to respect it. Overflight is an important – if secondary – source of precious income for Belarus, particularly on flights bound eastward into Asia. All told, the measure will cost Lukashenka’s regime anywhere between 50-70 million USD.

A carrot has been put forward with the stick: should Belarus embark on a path of democratisation, the EU has a 3 billion EUR aid package waiting in the wings. This message is of course intended primarily for Belarus’ political opposition, but it’s not realistic to expect them to be in a position to take the EU up on its offer anytime soon.

The sanctions also target individuals close to the regime, blacklisting them from various activities. More countermeasures are expected to be announced in the coming days. While effective in their own right, these sanctions are a sign that the EU still hasn’t given up on its wait-and-see strategy towards Belarus. This approach is understandable, since it’s driven by forces outside of the EU’s control, but it’s also misguided. Lukashenka is essentially walking away with impunity and will continue to stir trouble – unless we stop him.

The Russian Problem

Russia benefits from this situation more than anyone else involved. The more Lukashenka loses face in the West, the narrower his political room for manoeuvre becomes. Left with only Russia as a bridge to the rest of the outside world, as well as a patron in economic and military terms, Lukashenka has no choice but to hang on to Putin even tighter. This in turn puts him on an even more confrontational path with the West, in a positive feedback loop.

The EU has tackled this through, primarily, ambivalence. It has sought to punish Lukashenka, but not too harshly, always dangling the hope of a Euro-Belarusian rapprochement should Minsk change its tune.

Some Member States recognise this strategy has failed. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are spearheading a political effort to extend sanctions on Russia as well. This effort isn’t based on the analysis that Putin is the primary beneficiary of the current crisis, although that certainly plays a part. Rather, it rests on the (most probably correct) assumption that the Belarusian KGB lacks the operational capabilities to carry out the espionage operation required to keep tabs of Pratasevich’s trip to Athens without direct Russian assistance. France is also leaning towards this position, as President Macron has become manifestly frustrated with the timidity of European sanctions against its eastward opponents.

But the rest of the Union is a lot more ambivalent. Countries like Italy have a long history of opposition to new rounds of sanctions against Russia, primarily based on (largely imaginary) commercial grounds. Orban’s Hungary is of course always ready to cozy up with the Kremlin, a strategy Budapest calls the “eastern pivot”. Germany, torn by ambivalent political inclinations and its own commercial ties with Russia, is also a source of frustration for those wishing for a tougher EU response.

We Have Nothing to Gain by Waiting

That, however, doesn’t mean the situation is hopeless. Even ignoring Russia’s involvement and sticking with current sanctions against the Kremlin, and even within the current mandate of the EU, there is considerable room to manoeuvre and develop a better foreign policy towards Belarus, one much more effective at pursuing Brussels’ objectives and interests.

For a start, the loss of overflight fees will not bankrupt Lukashenka’s regime, but other countermeasures might. Large State-owned companies are the primary pillar on which Lukashenka’s regime lays its foundations. These oligarchs form the elite in the country, provide precious connections to Russia and the rest of the world, and bankroll the heavy militarisation of society required to maintain Lukashenka’s illegal hold on power. Hitting these companies would mean striking at Lukashenka where it actually hurts.

One such example is Belarusian mining and extraction company Belaruskali, whose employees are deprived of the right to strike – among others. Belaruskali enjoys strong connections with a Norwegian energy giant, Yara, which acts as a gateway into the European Economic Area – of which Norway is a member. Why should this situation continue, in a context where Belarus has clearly decided to douse its bridge with Europe in gasoline, and burn it?

The Americans, untroubled by the internal division and uncertainty that hampers the EU’s every move, have been following precisely this strategy, heaping so many economic sanctions on Belarusian refineries that Russia has been forced to cut its oil exports to Minsk. These oil exports, which are subsidised by the Kremlin, are the economic lifeline of the regime. Cutting it would do more to restrain Lukashenka’s bloodthirst than a thousand overflight restrictions.

Another low-hanging fruit that would make sure sanctions are not a half-measure would be to restrict the sale and holding of Belarusian treasury bonds. No financial institution inside Europe should help bankroll the regime that is going to put that cash flow into even more repression of its own citizens. Other key Belarusian economic interests, such as the illegal smuggling of cigarettes from and into the EU (which has reached truly dazzling proportions), would make for easy targets for any concerted response. It would also very quickly exert financial pressure on Lukashenka.

The only carrot Europe should offer to Lukashenka is to ease some of the restrictions if Minsk releases its political prisoners. This doesn’t mean Pratasevich and Sapega alone. There are now hundreds of political prisoners lost inside the depths of the Belarusian security apparatus, a number that keeps growing ever since the parody of national elections held last year. Only by de-escalating his war against his own people should Lukashenka be able to win some breathing room. And even then, the ultimate objective should always be his removal from power, by any means necessary.

Belarus has turned into a black hole of repression and State-sanctioned violence right at the border with the EU. The poison pouring out of Minsk is beginning to cross the border, threatening the lives and safety of European citizens as well as the opposition figures that, at this critical juncture, should enjoy our protection. It is clear that the strategy of half-measures has failed. Lukashenka will keep stirring up trouble unless he’s unable to, and it is up to us to make him stop. That will, unfortunately, require European national leaders to take their heads out of the sand. One wonders how bad things will have to get before they are forced to do so.

The post With Belarus, the EU Has Nothing to Gain by Waiting appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The links between Morocco and the European Communities traces back to 1987, when King Hassan II sent an official demand to integrate his country in all three institutions: the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community. His demand was rejected stating that the country was not European, a criterion written on the paper only 6 years later with the approval of the Copenhagen criteria.

Despite the rejection, Hassan II knew that his country had little chances of being considered as a potential candidate after sending representatives to test the waters in Brussels. However, this did not stop the two parties from collaborating. Many treaties were signed, especially on subjects such as fisheries, free trade, agriculture, and many others. These bilateral treaties, combined with the country’s membership of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, give Morocco today almost all the benefits of being a Member State of the European Union without having decisional power.

The European Union is Morocco’s main trade partner, with about 60% exports and around 57% imports, while Morocco does not make it in the top 20 biggest partners of the EU. Then why is the country so close to the European Union? In three words: strategy, oil, and fish.

Morocco today

Despite Spain’s apparent contentions with Morocco about its exclaves, both countries share a lot of information in terms of security, antiterrorism, border control, etc. France as well has multiple strategic interests in collaborating with the Kingdom. The country is a stable ally in the Maghreb and offers a door to the Saharan countries. It is also on the path of migration flows from Africa to Europe and acts as a gatekeeper on behalf of Europe, in exchange of financial compensation. The second aspect consists in the fisheries. The scenario here is simple: Europe sends money to Morocco and European fishermen are allowed to fish in Moroccan waters.

The final major aspect is oil. Western Sahara, or Sahrawi, is located in southern Morocco and it is believed that there might be major oil resources there. The first problem is that Western Sahara is a disputed land that is classified as a “non-self-governing territory to be decolonised”. The second problem is that there might not be any oil in that region. But an oil-endowed ally is in the interest of Europe, hence why the French company Total helped prospecting on behalf of Morocco, and why the National Norwegian Oil Fund invested in the venture. However, both companies pulled out due to international pressure from the UN.

Despite the help and the collaboration, there is contention over the three exclaves owned by Spain on the Moroccan coast: Ceuta, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Melilla. The European country refuses to address the issue while Morocco repeatedly tried to get control of the exclaves in the past. However, it became a comfortable issue recently for both countries.

With the increase in migration to Europe, Spain decided to build large walls at the borders to keep the waves of migrants out as much as possible. Europe is also paying Morocco to police the border on behalf of Europe, comfortably outsourcing the responsibility to the Kingdom. This heavy, external border control led to several deaths and caused NGOs such as Amnesty International to ask Spain to take responsibility for such events. Meanwhile, nothing is being done, with Morocco and Europe silently shaking hands.

Finally, the biggest and most embarrassing problem for both parties is the aforementioned Western Sahara. Morocco’s central power claims the land as its own, while the United Nations designated this land as an occupied country. The UN’s and the EU’s law forbid the latter to have a trade agreement including products from a territory whose status is the same as Sahrawi’s.

It is based on this law that the Front Polisario, a rebel liberation movement, sued the European Union at the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016. The Court found the EU guilty and forced to annul the trade agreement.

The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the time, Federica Mogherini, dismissed the issue, and another trade agreement was found excluding specifically products (and fish) made on the Western Saharan land. Morocco briefly protested by cutting ties with the EU, but they were quickly restoed.

As of today, the status quo remains intact. The presence of a stable, cooperating ally in the region is a too good opportunity to pass for the EU. Especially when it gives the opportunity for Member States to relocate its migratory problems outside of its borders, just by closing their eyes on the spiky issue of Western Sahara.

The post Morocco: The EU’s Uncomfortable Ally appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Vaccine Nationalism And Political Myopia

Let’s start with the fundamentals. The EU’s negotiating wasn’t slow, nor was it inefficient. In fact, the EU – AstraZeneca purchasing agreement precedes the company’s similar deal with the United Kingdom. The “British first” clause did not stem out of a commercial contract. It was the result of public funds made available to Oxford, which AstraZeneca gained access to once the two teamed up to develop a vaccine.

Deploying early funding to support a vaccine for the new coronavirus is undoubtedly a sensible move. Vaccine nationalism, conversely, was extremely myopic. The funding being made conditional on Britain receiving doses before anybody else might seem like a nation-state ruthlessly pursuing its interests while leaving the rest of the world out to dry, and to a degree this is true. But even if one handwaves this selfishness as acceptable, the fundamental point is missing: this logic makes it harder, not easier, to fight the pandemic.

Every new generation of the virus increases the likelihood that it will mutate. The more people are infected all over the world, the likelier it is that the virus will change. The more the virus changes, the less effective vaccines will be. Should the UK manage to vaccinate its entire population, and open up to the rest of the world, it would be confronted with a situation in which contagions still surge in the majority of the planet, leading to more and more variants, and presenting the spectre of a new wave in the UK itself, endangering all the work done so far. Only a global rollout of vaccines can properly stem the tide of the pandemic.

The World “First”, Europe “Second”

This is not fringe epidemiology. This fact was well understood as far back as January 2020. For all the uncertainty surrounding the new coronavirus, it was still a coronavirus – many in this clade are already known to science, and while there could be no certainty as to how fast the virus would mutate, it was fair to assume it would eventually produce variants, especially if confronted with piecemeal vaccinations. This is why, when Germany funded BioNTech like the UK did Oxford, the government in Berlin did not include a “Europe first” clause. Nor did the European Commission see it fit to intervene and request one. This attitude remained consistent when BioNTech partnered with American pharmaceutical company Pfizer. Meanwhile, the UK vetoed a partnership between Oxford and American company Merck, forcing a partnership with British AstraZeneca instead.

And yet, while the EU was making sound medical R&D decisions, and trusting its long-standing partners to do the same, worrying signs started coming out of the Atlantic. Then-president Trump tried to steal BioNTech from Germany to gain exclusive American access to the vaccine. The move failed, and even so, back then it caused an uproar. Why the same indignation is not on display now, with countries monopolising vaccine doses, is a great mystery of public opinion.

Export Bans And The Global Vaccine Supply Chain

Trump didn’t seem overly concerned with his failure to steal the BioNTech vaccine. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to sign Pfizer supply contracts. This is because he knew that most of the new partnership’s production capacity was in the United States; he only needed a legal excuse to seize doses present on American soil, or block them with an export ban, and he would get all the jabs his country would need. The absurdity of this beggar-thy-neighbour policy is that European vaccines are being used, not only in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, but also Mexico and Canada – the two countries bordering the Continental United States, who have no other option given their neighbour’s export ban on vaccines.

The legal cover for this – which the Biden administration is still using at time of writing – is twofold: one is Trump’s December 2020 executive order, giving Americans first priority to vaccines produced on American soil. The other, more substantial basis is the Defense Production Act.

We’re not discussing a trickle here, either: millions of EU doses have been used in the aforementioned countries, as well as in developing countries, while the United States and the United Kingdom simply seize EU doses produced on their soil and regularly purchased well in advance. This unilateral seizing is nothing short of vaccine piracy, and as mentioned, it’s making it all the harder to have a meaningful global impact on the pandemic. Should dangerous variants proliferate, it might even backfire, causing untold damage to the economy, as well as – and more seriously – additional loss of life. The United States alone has got its hands on over five million EU vaccine doses.

EU-UK Relations Take Centre-Stage

On the other side of the coin is the UK’s own vaccine piracy – primarily fueled by what the EU deems AstraZeneca’s breach of contract. Already on 29th January, AstraZeneca informed the EU that it would be unable to meet promised shipments due to “production problems” in its two European plants. This was because doses slated for the EU had been delivered to the UK instead. Brussels demanded AstraZeneca uphold its contract, which obliged it to make use of all four of its production facilities (two in the UK, two in the EU) to meet its obligations on deliveries. Shielded by the “British first” clause, AstraZeneca refused to bridge the gap with exports from the UK. The stage was set for a cross-channel battle of wills that is not yet concluded at time of writing.

Up to January 2021, the EU had included the UK in all of its anti-pandemic industrial coordination plans, making sure Britain was not isolated from the world economy on critical items such as ventilators and medical equipment during the first and second surges of covid cases. This has included as many as ten million vaccine doses exported from the EU to the UK. Britain’s current manipulation of vaccine exports has ended that cooperation. The Commission has retaliated and is moving ahead with its own export ban, and it is likely that additional countermeasures will be forthcoming. As more vaccines enter the market, AstraZeneca’s leverage will diminish. Legally, the battle might well last for years to come. Politically, the tide has already turned against them.

The Strategic And Political Bankruptcy Of European Member States

A final consideration should be made to close out this much-needed reframing of the vaccine narrative. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that the EU was naive to trust in its international partners to put collective long-term interests ahead of their own short-term benefit. This misses the fundamental point on two levels. First is the already explored medical argument: a piecemeal rollout of vaccines in select countries is an own goal, as the virus rages everywhere and the number of mutations increase. The failure to coordinate vaccine distribution on an international scale ultimately represents the failure of humanity to address this crisis effectively; it will lengthen it, not shorten it.

A narrower but equally important point is that the EU did not act naively – rather, it acted as it has always been intended to act, by design. It is completely unreasonable to expect the EU to act and think like a hard power, neorealist security institution, when Member States still jealously guard their monopoly on security and national defence. As we have emphatically argued before, Member States are in the driver seat when it comes to running the Union through the pandemic, and they’re making a terrible job of it.

The Catch 22 Vaccine Scenario

Healthcare is also a competence lying primarily with the Member States. Their refusal to equip the EU with the proper tools to handle security responsibilities has left this flank open to Anglo-American vaccine piracy. It is their political timidity which leads them to preserve this institutional status quo even in the face of a world-changing crisis. In addition, their pathological concerns with short-term gains over long-term strategy is what motivates them to use the EU as a scapegoat for everything they fail to accomplish.

Unfortunately, this is the “Catch 22” European institutions are constantly exposed to. Had the European Commission truly tried to force BioNTech to end its partnership with Pfizer and find a European partner instead, Member States today might be playing the blame game the other way, pointing to the failed partnership as the reason for the delayed availability and rollout of anti-covid jabs. This crisis has made it obvious that 19th-Century European nation states are not fit to govern themselves in a crisis.

If you want evidence of the need for true European integration, look no further than the vaccine rollout crisis. This is more than recrimination about the past – it contains a concern about the future. The end of the pandemic is not yet in sight. Even as immunisations mount, the process to make the virus both endemic and harmless will be long and arduous. Will Europe get through to the end of this great challenge still in one piece? How exactly do European Member States plan to survive climate change when the coronavirus has so thoroughly outmatched them? These remain, at the moment, tragically open questions.

The post Stop Blaming The EU Over The Slow Vaccine Rollout appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Students’ attitude towards the European Union is generally positive in all Member States. Young professionals and high-skilled young people overwhelmingly voted to “Remain” during the Brexit referendum, with as many as nine out of ten young researchers casting their vote in that direction. Young people are also among those responsible for the rise of distinctly pro-European forces, such as the Greens or ALDE, especially in large cities – a phenomenon that became evident during the 2019 European elections.

Here’s a look at the main instruments and policies developed by the EU to support the continent’s students and researchers.

The European Framework

European funds for young people, students and researchers are distributed in numerous programmes, some more specific than others. It’s easy to associate young people with Erasmus+ programmes – indeed, the association is so strong that all young Europeans who have benefited from this programme are collectively known as the “Erasmus Generation”.

Erasmus programmes, however, are a lot more far-reaching than this strong association would suggest. It’s true that they typically involve high school and university students, even though that inherently includes the participation of teachers and/or group leaders. But it also comprises a wider portfolio of education, training, youth, and sports programmes. In effect, Erasmus + serves as a single framework a large number of different activities – or Key Actions, as they’re officially known.

The very famous “Erasmus abroad” targeted to university students is part of Key Action 1, and is also intended for teachers and miscellaneous education workers, with an emphasis on trans-European mobility. Key Action 2 finances projects developed in cooperation by several entities from different European countries, generally at least three. These projects need to revolve around education, training, and youth to solve a common problem, through the creation of an operational model, a guideline or an innovative product and/or the exchange of knowledge, experience, and best practices.

A Popular Choice: Erasmus+ (Studying and Working)

The Erasmus+ study programme is undoubtedly the most renowned of all. To study abroad with the Erasmus+ programme, you must be enrolled in a higher education institution and attend a course that involves the issue of a diploma or a recognized tertiary level qualification. First cycle students must be at least in their second year. The period of study abroad must be in line with the degree’s learning needs, with a focus on personal development, and must fit into the student’s pre-existing study programme. The receiving and sending institutions must sign an inter-institutional agreement for the programme to have validity.

Both institutions must also have signed the Erasmus Charter for Higher Education (ECHE) – if they are based in Programme Countries. This hefty programme operates under the auspices of the ECHE, which administers the standard quality framework for European and international cooperation projects. The fulfilment of the ECHE’s criteria is a pre-requisite for every institution carrying out E+ activities.

Erasmus + grants are available to help students with travel, room, and board expenses. The amount can vary depending on various factors: the difference between the cost of living in your country and the destination country, the number of students applying for a grant, the distance between nations and the availability of other grants. The study period abroad can last from a minimum of 3 months (or an academic quarter) to a maximum of 12 months. Students can also combine periods of study abroad with an internship to gain work experience, which is particularly important when entering the job market.

Alternatively, E+ also offers mobility programmes exclusively focused on internships. These allow participants to boost their training and professional curriculum through work experience abroad, in public or private companies in one of the European countries participating in the programme. The Erasmus + Mobility for Internship Call is published annually. The duration of the internship mobility within the Erasmus + programme lasts from a minimum of 2 months to a maximum of 12 months, and the student can receive a community contribution to the costs incurred for the mobility up to a maximum of 3 months.

Other Opportunities for Student Mobility

There are lesser-known opportunities, too. Long-term mobility for school pupils is one such: it allows upper secondary school students to attend a part of the school year at a European partner institution for a period of 2 to 12 months, based on of a learning agreement between the sending school and the hosting institution, aimed at agreeing on the study programme and the recognition of the experience upon return to the country of origin. Long-term mobility of pupils is organized among schools involved in a strategic partnership, as part of Key Action 2.

During my experience with Area Europa, I worked on the CitriVET project on the reuse of agricultural waste from citrus cultivation. High school students from Spain, Italy and Portugal were also involved and pursued mutual exchange study periods.

University students can also benefit from long-term mobility programmes, such as the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD). This is an integrated, international study programme, jointly delivered by an international consortium of higher education institutions. It includes a high number of joint degrees such as 4CITIES + Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree in Urban Studies (Belgium – Denmark – Austria – Spain). Here is a list of joint degrees according to the field of study, countries and universities involved. Another specific opportunity for university students is a financial contribution (in the form of scholarships) for master/postgraduate studies in conference interpretation.

Specific Funds for Researchers and Students

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships

The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships (IF) actions are individual research fellowships that aim to support career development and research training for researchers with PhDs or four years of research experience. They include both European and Global Fellowships. Through the former, researchers are able to carry out their research projects at a European institution for a period of 12-24 months. Grants are open to researchers moving within Europe or arriving in Europe, specifically to a country they have not been in for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Global Fellowships, on the other hand, primarily benefit researchers who wish to acquire new knowledge and skills through a research project that includes a period of 12 to 24 months at a non-European institution of excellence, and a return period of 12 months in Europe, to transfer and consolidate the skills newly acquired. The researcher must not have been in the non-European country of the institution hosting the first phase of the project for more than 12 months in the last 3 years.

Financial contributions cover 100% of the costs for the entire period. The average salary of a Marie Curie fellow is around 4000 euros per month – there are no fees. Funding includes the researcher’s salary, mobility costs, research costs and a contribution to the host institution’s overheads explicitly. All research areas are covered.

Horizon Opportunities

Horizon 2020 is the most extensive EU programme for research and innovation. The programme aims to promote the European Research Area (ERA) by harmonizing national research strategies. Horizon 2020 is also implementing the European environmental research and innovation policy to turn into a green economy conversion plan, to achieve sustainable development and help fight climate change.

Differently from Marie Curie Fellowships, Horizon doesn’t usually involve individual researchers, but institutions such as universities and research centres. Horizon 2020 will be followed by the European Framework Program for Research and Innovation 2021/2027 Horizon Europe (HEU). With a budget of around € 100 billion, it is the most ambitious European research and innovation programme ever.

Universities and generally, research institutions can also benefit from other opportunities, such as LIFE programmes, which are the European Union’s funding instrument for actions on the environment and climate. INTERREG programmes help regional and local governments across Europe in developing better policy to support interregional cooperation.

JUSTICE programmes are rather self-explanatory, helping research on justice issues and the rule of law. The European Technology Platform Nanomedicine (ETPN) is an industry-led initiative established in 2005 with the European Commission to address the application of nanotechnologies in the health sector. It brings together more than 125 members from 25 different Member States, covering all interested parties in nanomedicine: universities, SMEs, industry, public agencies, representatives of national platforms and the European Commission.

The list goes on and on. EuroMarine is the European marine science network, aimed at supporting the development of emerging scientific issues and methodologies and including the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda into concrete projects. The European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) is Europe’s largest low carbon energy research community, works closely with industry and policymakers to deliver the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan).

This plethora of programmes operate under a series of coordinating and managing bodies, such as the European Research Council (ERC). This is the most prestigious European research funding agency, with the mission of retaining and attracting the best researchers from all over the world to Europe. The Agency for the Promotion of European Research (APRE) works at joining together public and private research and innovation bodies, working in close connection with national research authorities.

Finally, universities can also join the European University Association (EUA). This association represents more than 800 national universities and rector conferences in 48 European countries. It plays a crucial role in influencing EU policies on higher education, research and innovation.

The post The EU Does a Lot for Students and Researchers – Here’s How appeared first on My Country? Europe..

This is leadership?

When Ursula von der Leyen first faced the European Parliament as Commission President-Elect, she stated that ‘we sometimes forget that our greatest achievements have always come when we are bold.’

As of 2021, to act boldly boils down to the following: allow your Health Commissioner to initiate a war of words with AstraZeneca, leading to embarrassing communication errors and half-arsed vaccine nationalism (imagine, the EU threatening vaccine export controls); throw your Trade Commissioner under the bus over the Ireland protocol Article 16 debacle, despite evidence of your own cabinet being directly responsible for the mishap; and lash out at the UK for accelerating vaccine approval procedures as it goes through a nightmarish mortality crisis.

In the face of backlash, Ms Von der Leyen’s initial strategy has been to release pre-recorded and scripted videos filmed from within an apparently sun-lit Berlaymont (anyone staying in Brussels these days cannot help but wonder whether she resides in a Teletubbies-esque infantile dystopia), appearing to dig in and insisting no fault on her part in the events unfolding over the last weeks.

These releases are doctored and vacuous, not least after having publicly dragged DG Trade through the mud. Crucially, she would not even face questions from journalists, much to the chagrin of the Eurobubble’s press corps. She would only accept a videocall with concerned MEPs, or whenever she’s in the mood, offering preferential access to German media. A craven silo mentality is slipping in at the European Commission.

It appears that we, citizens of the EU, have a ‘leader’ who refuses to take on responsibility, prefers to sacrifice her subordinates on the altar of her own incompetence, who to wants to reinvent the wheel everywhere she goes (no less her botched micro-management of filling in senior Commission positions), and refuses to be held accountable. After fleeing Germany, whereto will she flee now?

It all really begs the question: is the current Commission president out of her depth? Can the European Union afford an Ursula von der Leyen? The same person whose German defence ministry oversaw machine gunners training with broomsticks, resorting to their own vocal cords to mimic the steady discharge of their weapons?

Europe invested billions to help develop the world‘s 1st COVID vaccines & create a global common good.

Now the companies must deliver & honour their obligations. We will set up a vaccine export transparency mechanism.

EU is committed to contribute. But we also mean business. pic.twitter.com/lvq0KkCWJD

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) January 26, 2021

The alternatives that were not meant to be

What makes this author shiver with regret and now dread, is that this scenario could have been averted. Were it a Margrethe Vestager, a Frans Timmermans or Alexander Stubb in charge, facing off with pharmaceutical giants and delivering the same tough messages, we would at least have a Commission President commanding an aura of sincerity, charisma, and proven European leadership.

Margrethe Vestager has a history of successfully facing down large multinationals and the benefit of world recognition and respect. Frans Timmermans is a seasoned polyglot, a successful diplomat, the European Green Deal’s very own champion and unrelenting in his views on the rule of law. Alexander Stubb would have combined academic acumen with experience in the European Council. What exactly did Ms Von der Leyen bring to the table?

The spectre of intergovernmentalism haunts Europe

Our predicament is rather clear: we are shackled by the doctrine of lowest common denominator, rendering our leadership mere puppets of the Member States at best; or incompetent and hapless at worst. In either case, leadership selected on pathetically unimpressive criteria makes the Commission an easy scapegoat in its by-now institutionalised role as the European Council’s overstretched and underfinanced secretariat.

Why else does it seem that the Commission prioritised cost-savings and created the illusion of strong-arming big pharma rather than focussing on swift vaccine development, production, and delivery, regardless of price?

Regrettably, find ourselves in an equilibrium best described by so-called (new) intergovernmentalism, with power concentrated in the (European) Council, whose modus operandi is one of consensus-building rather than democratic accountability. In other words, the least unsatisfactory option to all, whether it be policy or the Commission presidency, is fair game.

The toolbox of this equilibrium? Deliberation and persuasion, giving us the mercurial talent of Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borell, a commissioner to ‘protect the European way of life’, and of course a ‘geopolitical European Commission’. Instead of a union of values, we are fast becoming a union of platitudes, led by the intellectually vacuous and craven, rather than the entrepreneurial example of Jacques Delors. Oh… what could have been with Margrethe Vestager at the helm.

Democratic federalism

The current state of affairs, one of political eurosclerosis, is lamentable. That does not mean, however, that the European project has plateaued and is bound for steady decline as the rot of the intergovernmental equilibrium takes root. There is a medicine: democratic federalism. It would, however, be a bitter pill to swallow for the Member States and a rude awakening for the institutional set-up we have normalised since Lisbon.

Above all, it would require political courage, especially from the European Parliament in facing off with the Member States. Concretely, the Spitzenkandidaten process must be formalised, and pan-European lists allowing citizens from across the EU to cast one of their votes directly for one of these candidates must become the norm. It is farcical for a political union that preaches democracy and transparency to the world, to have an executive led by a person parachuted in after secretive deliberation between the Member States. Nobody voted, and more importantly, nobody would have voted for Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, yet she ‘leads’.

It is not good enough for the European Union to merely survive. This is the lowest of benchmarks, a craven measure of success worthy only of the conniving, cynical and Janus-faced politicking of intergovernmentalism that is institutionalising a new, political, eurosclerosis. Ursula von der Leyen, European Council, Member States, and European Parliament, when will you be bold?

Until then, steerless, rudderless, and devoid of captaincy, the EU ship is left alone to face the boisterous waves of our time.

The post Von der Leyen’s Vaccine Woes: Symptom of a Political Eurosclerosis appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The agreement is still subject to review and cancellation by both parties and needs approval by the British and European parliaments, as well as by the Council of the EU. All EU Member States will also have to ratify it before it takes effect. There isn’t enough time left to get it done before the expiration of trading rights – which were supposed to lapse in January 2020 but were extended by one year to the dawn of 2021. EU Ambassadors have already stated that trading rights will be extended again, until the Council and Parliament vote to ratify the agreement.

What’s Been Agreed To?

As of December 13th, well past the initial deadlines for an agreement supposed to take effect at the end of the year, agreement on what was to be done in the case of abrogation of the accord and fishing rights in UK waters were still outstanding. Brussels and London eventually resolved this, even though it was by then impossible to have a new regime in place by the end of the year. The question of fishing remains perhaps one of the most perplexing aspects of the entire negotiations, with bizarre prominence both during the talks and in the text itself.

A free trade agreement with zero tariffs and quotas for all goods had already been agreed to by both parties. This is something the UK has already touted as the ‘largest’ free trade agreement ever and more than a justification for Brexit which would leave it in a privileged place along with Canada and Australia in regards to the community. This privileged trading position is, nevertheless, one which inhibits the prior free trade in services that the UK enjoyed as an EU member. All services account for over 80% of GDP. These include: financial, retailing, computer, medical, legal, realty, transport, hospitality and entertainment, to name only the most prominent,

The true body blow to the British economy, however, is the exclusion of financial services from the agreement. One of the mainstays of British power since the long-gone days of empire, its far reach kept London in competition with New York and Hong Kong on the short, gilded list of global financial hubs. Now, British finance will no longer have a privileged position in the EU. Paris and Frankfurt are likely to gain further ground, perhaps replacing the City altogether as the centre of European finance.

Though perhaps not as dire, the competitive position of British insurance companies – like the much-vaunted Lloyd’s of London – will also be in jeopardy. Other services too will no longer enjoy privileged status. Their professionals will need to apply for certification to practice in the EU. The services themselves may be taxed or subject to limitations.

These aspects of the new relationship are not new. Both parties entered into the final round of talks knowing, and accepting, that the UK would have to live with these limitations. The major point of contention was the continued acceptance of EU rules governing the quality and safety of traded goods, and what to do if they were no longer adhered to. The UK would agree to accept EU rules, not in perpetuity. They wanted to be able to change them and still have access. The EU stated that in such cases the playing field might no longer be level for its producers. They proposed arbitration before the European Court of Justice with the imposition of tariffs and quotas anew as a possible outcome.

Intervention by the European Court in adjudicating disputes was anathema to Brexiteers of all stripes. The talks were at an impasse. The break came when – after almost a year of discussions – the UK put forth a last-minute proposal to set up independent arbitration. In this context, London also accepted the imposition of tariffs and quotas as a possible remedy. The way was paved for an agreement on fishing rights and a final accord. Unfortunately, the clamour of contentious issues on the allotment of the fishing catch drowned out the critical question of its sustainability. One can only hope at this point that the green, or in the case of fish blue, aspects of future sustainability were taken into account.

British citizens will no longer have free access to the EU. There was no agreement on further cooperation in defence and intelligence. The popular Erasmus programme also will no longer accept British students – though there is an exception for Northern Ireland students, thanks to Ireland’s generous volunteering of funding for their northern neighbours.

Northern Ireland will also remain within the EU’s trade zone, with a special agreement allowing the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to remain open. Some commentators have quipped that London has managed the rather unremarkable feat of creating a free trade area that is actually smaller than the UK’s national borders. A further review of the Brexit agreement is scheduled for 2024, at which time the clauses may see further changes by mutual agreement.

The Future of Brexit

Lorries are already queued up for miles around Dover and throughout Kent – but this is now largely due to Covid restrictions, imposed recently because of new strains found in the UK. French President Macron has promised to lift restrictions for lorries tied to Covid. The often predicted queues from a no-deal Brexit will even under this agreement be likely to replace the Covid tie-ups with new ones, even before they are dissipated. This is because the late hour will leave no time to sort out loose ends.

Even if the EU ambassadors have their wish and the current status of the movement of goods is extended until the agreement can be ratified, the absence of detailed implementation regulations, which still need to be drawn up, will create impediments and slow border crossings. Such simple things as new tariff codes, lorry drivers’ passports, proper paperwork and compliance documents, will need to be worked out. It will be well into spring before trade is flowing smoothly again and until summer to return to normal.

Financial markets have already factored in the much greater effect Brexit will have on the UK. This does not pre-empt further deterioration. Absent other agreements with the United States, and some key markets in Asia, the UK will be stuck with diminished trade. Overall economic conditions will follow, though it is difficult to sort out precisely the effects of trade from those of COVID-19 and other geopolitical developments.

The post As the Ink Dries: What’s in the Brexit Agreement? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Up until the New Year, but not one day longer, the United Kingdom, despite having formally left the EU already, will remain a member of the single market for goods and services and, although not a member of the Schengen area, it will also continue allowing free movement of people. This gives rise to an issue when considering the possibility of further extensions of the negotiations for a post-Brexit arrangement for trade and people: any agreements before January 1, when the existing arrangements become null and void.

What does No-Deal mean?

If Great Britain exits the EU in a no-deal situation on January 1, trade would automatically return to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. WTO rules are liberal in the sense that they admit most goods and services and impose low tariff rates. However, they are more restrictive than the current ‘single market’ arrangement the UK enjoys with the EU. Currently, 50% of UK trade, imports and exports, is with the EU – this would make raising tariffs and other impediments costly for the UK. It would also, of course, have an impact on the EU, but with the EU’s total external trade with the UK only representing about 12% of the total, the impact will be inferior.

Major categories of UK exports such as automobiles would further be affected by 10% WTO tariffs, making many car exports uncompetitive. Large automakers with factories in the UK, like Nissan, have already suggested they would be forced to leave. UK suppliers for products finished in the EU could also be replaced,  for example as in the case of the British Rolls Royce engines for the Airbus, which compete with the USA’s GE Aviation or Pratt & Whitney.

Imported foodstuffs, of which 80% come from the EU and which supply nearly one-third of total UK consumption, could also be affected. Here, the issue is not only tariffs and higher prices for consumers, but also differing phytosanitary regulations. Once again, the EU will also be affected, although to a lesser extent. Whether EU rules will still allow for the importation of UK sourced lamb and some other products remains to be seen.

Pharmaceuticals also present a serious problem.  Approval mechanisms and production controls will no longer be accepted mutually and will result in significant pipeline delays for many medications people need.  Hopefully this can be remedied through stop gap measures but so far this has not been done.

Immediate Disruption

A UK government study has estimated that, in a worst-case scenario surrounding a no-deal outcome, roughly 7,000 lorries could be held up from crossing the channel. Even in the case of a deal implemented at the last minute, significant disruption will take place as few of the new tariff codes and phytosanitary regulations would be in place to apply to incoming and outgoing goods on both sides of the Channel.

The UK has put in place traffic and staging plans to deal with the situation, but the disruptions in southeast England and northern France and the Benelux would be enormous. For its part, the EU has put in place contingency plans that would allow airline flights to continue for six months with grandfathered inspection recognition, providing mutual action by the UK. The EU contingency also calls for a one-year grandfathering of fishing rights also contingent on reciprocity. Fishing industries in both the EU and UK would be hit hard by a no-deal. Navies are already being prepped to enforce the rules.

Movement of People

Free movement of people between the EU and UK will end on January 1. Though visas are not envisaged for visits under 90 days, passports, medical attestations of insurance, automobile insurance papers and other documentation will become more onerous than at present. After 90 days, EU citizens wishing to remain in the UK will have to apply for a change of status. This will be true even for spouses of UK citizens. It is not yet clear how various EU member states might regulate UK citizens in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the EU travel ban on non-EU countries due to COVID-19 could be extended to the UK with the New Year.

Northern Ireland

The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland was a key aspect of contention in the withdrawal agreement. Keeping the border open for the thousands of people who cross daily for work and social activities has been since the Good Friday Agreement are a major focus of both Irish governments.

Although the UK agreed to maintain open borders by checking goods for EU compliance at sea, the UK has already tried to renege on this agreement. It immediately back stepped after meeting stiff resistance from the EU as well as third parties like the US, with its incoming Biden administration, and the UN. Nevertheless, as this issue touches on UK sovereignty, in the absence of a post-Brexit deal it may come under further pressure.

Who is to blame?

If there is such a thing as blame in the failure to reach an agreement beneficial to both sides, it must certainly fall on the side which may want a no-deal agreement in the first place. In the eyes of most observers, this appears to be the UK. Though the popular movement around the original Brexit vote was strong, it was fanned by a political class of Tory politicians having a lot to gain personally by a return of greater sovereignty to the UK.

As the rather nebulous aspects of UK ‘sovereignty’ have inserted themselves into the negotiations for a new trading agreement, they have made any agreement difficult to reach on purely beneficial terms. The perceived matter of the UK having final say has made agreement elusive. Final say in trade is, unfortunately, a non sequitur as both sides must adhere to the rules if there is to be any equitable trade at all.

The post What Happens Next in Case of a No-Deal Brexit? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

While governments scrambled to take action in response to the early scandals of the 2010s, the adopted measures had significant loopholes. This prompted intense negotiations at the EU level to review the legislation. After more than four years in the works, the review of the Dual-Use Regulation is finally done. This regulation creates new rules for all those technology products which potentially have both civilian and military applications. But does final text uphold the expectations of human rights advocates?

Why exporting cyber-surveillance tech is an issue

In 2015 a massive data leak involving the Italian IT firm Hacking Team confirmed the company’s alleged sale of spyware to several authoritarian regimes over the previous years. Among its customers figured Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco. At the time of the sales, the World Press Freedom Index reported severe breaches of the rule of law and press freedom in all the above-mentioned countries.

The main products sold by Hacking Team were so-called Remote-Control Systems (RCSs). The RCSs are intrusion software which covertly infect electronic devices to collect stored data and incoming/outgoing communications. Unsurprisingly, subsequent investigations unveiled that the Moroccan and UAE Intelligence Agencies used the software to spy on human rights activists during the governments’ crackdown on the Arab Spring protests in 2012. In the same year, the Ethiopian government employed the software to spy on a collective of dissenting journalists.

Hacking Team was not alone in carrying forward this dirty business: the Surveillance Industry Index by the NGO Privacy International displays a long list of companies engaging in such unethical deals. Another notable case involves the same FinFisher which is currently under investigation. Its homonymous software was employed by a multitude of countries governed by repressive regimes, from Bahrein and Ethiopia to Vietnam and Turkmenistan.

By 2014, before the Hacking Team scandal unleashed, world governments had already updated the Wassenaar Arrangement control list. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the international control regime governing the exports of dual-use goods and technologies. Items such as intrusion software and Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance were added to the list.

The intrusion software by Hacking Team and FinFisher clearly fell under the arrangement’s scope, but many technologies were intentionally left out. Indeed, a recent investigation by Amnesty International revealed that European companies continued to export surveillance tools despite the disastrous human rights records of their customers; such technologies did not fall under the scope of the Arrangement’s updated control list. However, the companies also failed to carry out their due diligence obligations. In this context, due diligence is a principle whereby companies make sure that the products they are going to sell may not be misused by their customers.

In 2015, the French multinational Morpho (now Idemia) sold facial recognition equipment to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau in China. The corporation later introduced an internal policy forbidding to sell surveillance equipment to Chinese authorities, but it should be evident by now that private companies cannot be exclusively left to self-regulate. The People’s Republic of China is implementing mass surveillance projects like Skynet and Sharp Eyes throughout the mainland without any regard for the privacy of its citizens, a fundamental human right as defined in Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In Xinjiang, the Chinese government is enforcing repressive policies against Uyghurs, the region’s main ethnic group. These policies include segregation, internment, forced sterilization, cultural erasure and mass surveillance. Yet, this did not stop another European company, the Dutch Noldus Information Technology, from selling face reading technology to the Xinjiang Normal University for “scientific and research purposes” in 2018. At the time, the crimes of the Chinese regime were public knowledge already.

The indiscriminate export of such double-edged technologies clearly appears problematic. The end-use of cyber-surveillance is inextricably linked to the political context of the importing countries. Unscrupulous regimes secure their own survival by crushing dissidents and subjugating entire populations: their wrongdoings should not be facilitated by European cutting-edge technology.

The reform of the Dual-Use Regulation

On November 9^th, the EU finally took important steps forward in this regard: the three main institutions, namely the Commission, the Council of the EU and the Parliament, concluded trilogue negotiations to revise the 2009 Dual-Use Regulation. Cyber-surveillance technology is now comparable to other dual-use goods, and as such must be subject to export controls when there are risks of misuse by the countries of destination.

After six (!!!) years of negotiations on new #dualuse control regulation the destination port is near.Chaired a really constructive trilogue.Thank you for the great work @EU2020DE @DRedonnet @Trade_EU the #EP rapporteur @MarketkaG + shadows @svensimon @LSchreinemacher @EP_Trade pic.twitter.com/BrH8WqesYP

— Bernd Lange (@berndlange) September 22, 2020

The updated text features a number of important provisions. In particular:

• Definition of cyber-surveillance technology. The definition is quite broad in scope and includes items such as monitoring centres and data retention systems as well as intrusion software. Overall, cyber-surveillance items which enable to covertly monitor, extract, collect and analyse the data of natural persons fall under the scope.
• Autonomous EU export control list. The text gives way to the creation of an EU autonomous list, independent from the one established under the WA. It will contain all the dual-use items in the single market subject to export control. This will allow public authorities to add more swiftly new specific items to the list.
• Transparency. The Commission will be tasked with providing the Parliament and the Council an annual report illustrating the enforcement progress of the regulation. Member States will be obliged to furnish relevant data to the Commission for that purpose. This will enable the public to name and shame those Member States which fail to properly enforce the regulation.
• Catch-all clause. The catch-all clause enables authorities to add non-listed cyber-surveillance technologies to the control list in case potential abuses linked to the violation of human rights by the final users were to be identified.

Where to next?

With the new dual-use regulation, the EU finally confronts a long-existing issue, a source of profound discomfort among those who hold European values dear. Nevertheless, ambiguous wording and inexistent references to certain technologies could make the text less impactful than actually needed. Firstly, biometric technology is never explicitly mentioned. Indeed, the text defines cyber-surveillance technology as uniquely “covert”. This particular wording may potentially result in the exclusion of facial recognition systems, usually employed in public spaces, from the scope of the definition.

Secondly, it appears that the addition of new items to the control list will require a unanimous decision by the 27. Such caveat should not come as a surprise: some Member States have repeatedly tried to water down the text’s most stringent articles. While the Commission and the Parliament made themselves bearers of bold proposals, the Council took a more conservative stance by taking the side of the surveillance industry.

All in all, the recast of the dual-use regulation represents a meaningful achievement for the prevention of human rights violations abroad. Despite the loopholes, European companies will surely have a hard time supplying oppressive regimes and agencies with the technology they need to spy on their own citizens. Now it is up to Member States to properly enforce export controls as contemplated by the traditional division of competences.

The post The EU Will Restrict Surveillance Tech Exports: A Win for Human Rights? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The Situation in Xinjiang

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), has reported that in the last three years, the PRC built at least 380 ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang, with the intention to detain Uyghur Muslims and other supposed non-conformists. The official line will state that these camps were set up to help the Uyghurs, re-educate and ‘moderate’ an ethnic minority plagued by Islamic fundamentalism and boost their socio-economic outcomes by moulding them into citizens worthy of the PRC. In other words, the goal is to turn these supposedly hapless and anti-intellectual band of Turkic nomads into Han-Chinese model citizens. Any glance at the PRC’s aptly-named CCTV, or its Pravda-esque newspapers, will simply echo this lie.

What we are actually looking at is the systematic cultural genocide of Xinjiang’s majority Uyghur population and the incarceration of hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Muslim Chinese citizens in internment camps, since at least 2017. One does not have to look long to figure out just how inhumane conditions and treatment in these camps are. The reports of brutish psychological torture involving sleep deprivation and threats to one’s family as well as slave labour; other sources have obtained testimonials by on-camp teachers revealing forced sterilisation as well as the brutal rape of female inmates, the details are too gruesome to spell out here. The UN’s own criteria would characterise this brutality as a genocide.

What is the EU doing?

Suffice it to say that Xinjiang’s camps are inhumane and an affront to human dignity as insidious and extensive as anything we have seen since the end of World War II. Surprisingly, we have yet to see an official confrontation or even condemnation on the matter by European leaders. We recently saw prominent European politicians mark Black Ribbon Day, a day on which we commemorate the victims of the 20th century’s violent totalitarian regimes. References to the ongoing repression in Xinjiang were notably absent.

Indeed, any consistent criticism of from Europe’s high political circles seems to originate with outspoken Belgian liberal MEP, Guy Verhofstadt. By contrast, his liberal compatriot Charles Michel, now president of the European Council, had little more to offer than happy musings about European cheese and wine during and after a recent virtual Europe-China summit, with human rights issues assuming a relative backstage role, being labelled under ‘International affairs and other issues’, by the Council website. The Commission President, Ursula Von der Leyen, at least made sure to save space in a tweet about the event for ‘fundamental values’. It seems that our Union of Values is all bark and little bite when it comes to the most pressing human rights issue of our time.

Taking part in our video conference with Chinese President Xi. Looking forward to frank & open discussions. Engagement at the highest level with China is crucial if we are to promote European economic interests, protect our climate & defend fundamental values and rights. #EUChina pic.twitter.com/n3eyWwckKO

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) September 14, 2020

No concrete steps have been taken to leverage a Chinese shift in policy regarding the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. Of course, the bloc’s armoury of policy instruments in external affairs is limited, but it can still rely on access to its internal market as a ploy. For instance, the EU could apply a surgical tariff, or ideally ban, on all goods imported from the PRC that are suspected or have been confirmed to have involved forced labour from Xinjiang.

For all his faults, President Trump is moving in the right direction, by considering to label what is happening in Xinjiang a genocide. Should he lose November’s election, his likely successor Joe Biden would do the same. Would it be too much for the EU to follow suit, or even go a few steps further? The EU’s economic soft power can easily be provided with a hard edge should access to its internal market be weaponised against transgressions demeaning human decency, including at the very least the cultural genocide being perpetrated in Xinjiang. Again, the US has already led the way in this regard, as the House of Representatives has voted in favour of banning import from Xinjiang over forced labour concerns.

The Economic Problem

The stumbling block, as per usual, appears to be internal. In this case, it appears to be of a Teutonic nature. Germany’s economy has become increasingly dependent on exports to China over the last few decades (€100bn alone last year). Increasingly as well, its car-manufacturing corporations are basing nodes of their value chains in the PRC. Most insidious amongst these must be Volkswagen’s factory in Xinjiang. As far as Berlin is concerned, Europe’s relationship with China is ‘complicated’ and ‘nuanced’, but most of all one defined by business interests.

This author is not an anti-globalist but does question the usefulness of paying lip-service in voicing concerns over human rights abuses in Tibet and Xinjiang, while German companies (read: Volkswagen) allegedly benefit from forced labour practices in the PRC. Are we not a Union of Values? Why has the European Parliament’s call to apply targeted sanctions and freeze assets been ignored so far in the Council? Why is it that Germany is able to mobilise a moral spine in order to threaten a veto on the Mercosur deal on deforestation grounds, but not on any future deal with a communist regime perpetrating cultural genocide?

Instead, active European leadership on the matter has been reliant on Sweden’s H&M banning Xinjiang cotton yarn from its production chain. At a political level, however, the EU’s inaction on the issue, as with other policy fields, is determined too much by Germany’s lack of geostrategic intelligence and backbone. Domestic political costs associated with cancelling a deal with China are eroding the EU’s veneer of international leadership in the Asia-Pacific.

Our Responsibilities

As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us, a (European) house divided simply cannot stand. In this case, it is unacceptable for the EU to turn its nose from the pungent smell of mass incarceration in Xinjiang, where the most heinous crime against humanity of our lifetimes is being perpetrated. What is being done, is an attempted ethnic cleansing at a scale and cold-hearted sophistication we have not seen since the 1940s. Hannah Arendt once said that ‘we must prevent wrongdoing because the world in which we all live, wrong-doer, wrong sufferer and spectator, is at stake.’ I fear that it might already be too late for Xinjiang’s Uyghurs.

Guest article by Adam Hall. The author is pursuing a PhD at the VUB in Brussels.

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