With radical Islam the latest addition to the European terrorist ecosystem, similar discussions are taking place in how best to counter it – particularly in France, which has recently witnessed the murder of French teacher Samuel Paty. Eighteen-year-old radical Islamist, Abdoullakh Abouyedovich Anzorov, is the person responsible for the murder, and the fallout from the crime is still reverberating in French society and politics.

Islam and radicalised communities

The radicalisation of Muslim communities living in Western European countries has deep roots, with old and new grievances and problems contributing to explain the phenomenon. There is little doubt, however, that the most recent shock to the system came from the deteriorating situation and spillover of the Syrian Civil War in Europe. This allowed terrorist groups like ISIS to weaponise modern technology such as social media to radicalise young Muslims in Europe, as well as key people in their communities – such as imams.

The turmoil surrounding the Syrian Civil War and its dislocations has allowed radical groups to establish an ideological foothold in Europe. This radicalisation has triggered episodes of brutality in the streets of cities across Western Europe, with the murder of Samuel Paty setting a sad record on the scale of violence.

The murder of Samuel Paty also broke precedent on such incidents, as it seems that the murder was not strictly motivated by adherence to a radical Islamic movement, but due to sheer intolerance of different opinions, with worrying implications for the prospects of Islam in Europe. This fact also raises concerns over the overall European approach to radicalism, which is essentially laissez-faire, “let-it-be until public opinion turns against it”.

When that switch does happen, responses tend to be knee-jerk and based on populism and stoking anger, rather than mending wounds. It is apparent that this approach simply doesn’t work and the philosophy behind it is fully illogical: central governments voluntarily choose not to use their tools and deliberately ignore the problem of radicalisation, until the popular mood turns so sour that putting forth sensible policies becomes impossible.

Western European states need to find a way to mitigate radicalisation within their Muslim communities. Needless to say, they equally need an effective strategy to defang extremism across the political spectrum, and the rise of right-wing extremism, in particular, poses a serious threat to the future of democracy in countries such as Italy and France. These movements have greatly capitalised on the dislocation caused by the battle against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and have repeatedly made breaches into the mainstream by building their political narrative and cause around these questions.

As mentioned, however, the roots of radicalisation go deeper than just ISIS. Muslim communities in Western Europe were already marginalised and treated as a dangerous foreign community. This marginalisation has deprived people of a sense of belonging – belonging to the country that they were born in, and where they’d spent the majority or entirety of their lives. The insular mentality this has triggered has greatly amplified the power of fundamentalist imams to radicalise their communities. Any effective real-world solution which at once addresses the issue and combats the populist, far-right perspective of the matter, will have to go straight to the root of the problem – and look at successful examples of social cohesion.

A real-world example

The Greek Muslim community living in Western Thrace, on the border with Turkey, is a success story with many lessons for policymakers looking for inspiration. This region has a large Muslim community from a mixed ethnic background, coming at around 33% of the population. The minority enjoys several protections to guarantee an even keel with the Greek majority, including constitutional guarantees of non-discrimination, and political representation.

But where the integration process truly shines is in education: a dense network of minority schools provide education in Greek and Turkish. The schools are state-funded and aimed at minority students, with distinct curricula based on the unique social and cultural context of the local communities. Imams and religious scholars participate in this educational effort, which includes elective secondary education in religious studies in Turkish, and the Quran in Arabic.

This network includes two high schools, located in Komotini and Xanthi – where the concentration of Greek Muslims is highest. Public transportation for students living in isolated, rural or mountainous areas is subsidised by the state, to ensure no one falls through the cracks of the system, and Islamic theological seminaries are available for interested students, with an equal footing with Orthodox seminaries before the law. Additionally, 0,5% of slots in national higher education institutes are reserved to members of the Greek Muslim minority.

This set up has succeeded in keeping radical Islam out of the picture, and unable to get a foothold in a community that sees this arrangement as largely equitable. There are issues, of course. A particular point of contention is the appointment of muftis – currently split between the state and Greek Muslims, with a mufti appointed by the former and another elected by the latter. Controversies regarding citizenship clauses and the ethnic composition of the community are still existent. But these pale in comparison with the fractious relationship between Muslims in Western Europe and their countries.

Western Thrace offers a model for peaceful coexistence far removed from the far right’s cries for deportation or worse. State-funded mosques, a special curriculum in areas with high percentages of Muslims and positive discrimination measures would root out radical Islam and its ideological narrative. If we want to see things to change, we need to take real action and implement real strategies to properly assimilate the Muslim communities and root out the far-right’s rhetoric of radical Islam in Western Europe.

Guest article Aggelos Tzitziras. The author is an 18-year-old university student living in Heraklion, Greece, Member of the Greek Youth Parliament (2017-2018), and Press Secretary of the think tank Symmaxia (Alliance).

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The EU has been criticised during the current pandemic for a lack of empathy and the slow response. It has been challenged for its response’s limitations. In fact, significant levels of aid to Member States have been provided by the Community. Many of the limitations for which it has been criticised come from restrictions placed on the mandates that the Community is allowed to address by the Member States. The health of its citizens is a dossier that has been deliberately retained by the Member States and for which the Community encounters resistance in expanding its competence and taking action.

Will The EU Expand its Purview?

A common response to the virus is impossible under the current treaties unless in the unlikely event of agreement by all 27 Member States. The Community simply does not have the authority to impose common rules, quarantine or isolate certain communities or impose testing or common treatment protocols. Where it does have authority in monetary policy and some limited fiscal powers it is often hampered as it is currently in negotiations over Eurobonds by Member State vetoes. Nevertheless, a 500 billion Euro relief package from the “EU Stabilisation Fund” was agreed too.

Majority voting on all issues, enhanced and enlarged mandates and greater powers generally would aid the Community in responding better to member’s appeals for aid in this crisis and beyond. These basic reforms are required but have been impossible under the current structure where Member States are jealous of their ability to veto matters they consider important. Reforms, surrendering national powers in favour of greater federalism, but guarding prerogatives for those countries insisting on retaining current treaty guarantees, would allow the Community, or at least those participating in this reformed or ‘fast-tracked’ group, to respond to crises regarding health, environment or international with greater speed, reach and flexibility. Such an arrangement, a ‘fast-track’, could take place while maintaining current treaty frameworks.

Imaging Future Reforms

Reforms in the EU are often discussed to make the economic and political functioning of the bloc work more smoothly. Health has not been at the forefront of these discussions, but given its insurgence as a major concern certainly should be considered going forward. The argument around Eurobonds and the economy already high on the reform agenda has also been urgently highlighted by the crisis. Other proposed reforms seek to add new functions like a defence force or common foreign policy and diplomacy. The environment is also an area where urgent action is needed.

With 27  Member States, each possessing a veto power on matters of essential interest, reforms are difficult. One thought has been to fast-track reforms, applying them to only a smaller group of countries willing to move forward at a more rapid pace with federalism. There are many ways to do this coherently. This article will suggest one model, hopefully opening a discussion on the merits of further reforms whether fast-tracked or applying to all members. It is to be anticipated that the current crisis will enhance the urgency of these reforms and greater federalism generally.

How to Fast Track Reforms

Like all else new in the community fast-track reforms would need to be negotiated, here among potential willing partners. In the first instance these discussions, then negotiations, might understandably fall outside the legal EU framework which is, after all, one set-up for the needs of all the 27 Member States.

Proposals that might eventually be codified in an agreement, should if at all possible not contradict existing EU treaties or directives, so as not to require amendment and ratification by non-participating states, already part of the EU. Once a set of proposals was agreed to the fast-track states would ratify them and begin implementation.

Enhancing Federalism

One of the critical goals of fast-tracked reforms would be to enhance federalism, in view of making the community function more efficiently and democratically. A key arena that already discussed in an earlier article is the single market. The functioning of the union as a single market where goods and people can circulate freely and transactions take place across borders without impediment has been an essential goal in building the EU. Further federalising the enforcement of market regulations would be one way of overcoming persistent obstacles resulting mainly from the enforcement by self-interested member states.

A federalised market enforcement might take the form of an EU regulatory service that could piggy-back on national services, federalising them and replacing national leadership with the service’s own bureaucrats. Such officials would be required to speak the language of the country they were assigned to as well as a core language and would rotate between regulatory service headquarters in the European capital, and different service offices in member states. Their responsibility would be to see that all market directives are applied without prejudice resulting in free movement of goods and services across the fast-tracked Member States.

A Shared Executive, Judicial and Legislative Branch

A proposal for integrating executive, judicial and legislative branch functions for the fast-tracked countries would be to use existing EU organisations, sitting in special session to deal with fast-track country legislation and enforcement. This might work by having the elected members of the EU Parliament from the fast-tracked countries convene in special session, aside from their regular duties, to meet and legislate fast-track legislative affairs.

The EU Commission and European Court of Justice would not need to be reconstituted as their members do not represent specific countries but could act in camera in meetings devoted uniquely to fast-tracked member issues or jurisprudence.

A separate President of the Commission for Fast-Track could be elected by popular vote in the fast track countries and sit alongside the regular President. Its jurisdiction, however, should be strictly reserved to issues regarding the fast-track countries and not those governed by existing EU treaties.

Majority Voting

All issues regarding the fast-tracked countries should be decided by majority vote. A two-thirds majority weighted vote might be required with small countries receiving a weight of two and large countries three. Obviously this aspect of any federalisation will be highly fought over in any negotiation.

Joint Foreign Policy and Defence Force

Majority voting can pave the way for a consistent foreign policy and defence force. Members of the EU-27 could join in on the foreign policy initiatives on an ad-hoc basis and could participate in the defence force if they agreed to the majority voting provisions regarding its implementation. The elected President of the Commission (Fast-Track Countries) would represent these countries in their foreign policy.

Health & Environment

A common health and environmental policy should be part of any ‘fast track’ negotiations. If these policies are adopted by majority vote, buy-in should be possible by non-‘fast track’ Member States. Though probably coming too late for the current crisis such policies will aid in fighting future pandemics.

A Joint Budget

The common EU budget for the fast-tracked countries would be enhanced relative to the current commitment of these countries to the EU-27 budget. Majority voting would govern expenditures and additional revenues.

Enlargement

A period to build the new fast-track Union should be reserved without envisaging its enlargement. After such a period, say for example seven years, a new member might be added every three years – to allow for its integration – after a majority vote.

Next Steps for EU Reforms

Reforms in many of the areas discussed here could be helpful in the development of the EU into a viable and more sustainable body. They have been challenging to achieve because of the diversity of a 27-member Union. Whether the reforms would be better as fast-tracked or achieved perhaps in a slower manner but for the entire Union is an open question. So, too, is the nature the precise reforms might take and which ones are the priority.

For Member States, it is sometimes difficult to put forward reforms, even merely as ideas, because of the possibility of a strong domestic political reaction. The crisis will have given EU reforms more urgency and hopefully made advocacy and discussion easier. Though the article suggests a concrete and hopefully plausible way forward, its immediate goal is to inspire discussion without committing or advocating for a single preferred way.

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When the novel coronavirus appeared, it must have come as quite the shock when, suddenly, the death toll had already risen into the thousands. Whether this was because of the increase in the number of people of advanced age, or the increase of the number of multimorbid individuals or if the virus itself was more potent is still sort of a mystery. Perhaps, it was all the above. What we did notice was that this virus, this one was a killer. It penetrated our societies and struck at the weakest individuals, taking loved ones left and right. It left scars filled with sadness and anger that had no real direction, so people ended up lashing out at anyone they could possibly blame.

Some lashed out at China for hiding the outbreak. Some lashed out at the WHO that had initially underestimated the potential of the disease based on faulty Chinese information. Others lashed out at the EU for lack of action and others still at their own national governments. Some people even went as far as lashing out at people of Asian descent that had little to nothing to do with the coronavirus outbreak, just to get their anger out.  It was a mess.

Seasonal threat

Recent reports from Africa have suggested that as the sub-Sahara is entering its winter period the virus is making its way there as well. What this has caused researchers to suspect is that the disease might be seasonal. Some people celebrated this news thinking that our ordeal would soon be over, but researchers urged caution. If the virus is seasonal that meant that it would come again. It would kill again. Unlike its predecessor, COVID-19 is showing no signs of just leaving us alone, it has plans and those plans involve staying.

What worries me personally, is the apparent short memory of humanity. When one crisis is averted, we soon forget it. Even when we do prepare for the next one, when the moment comes, we still debate about whether we should deploy our preparations, as was seen with the European Stability Mechanism deployment. I fear that if this novel coronavirus does take a hiatus for the summer, we will once again be lulled to inaction by the sudden peace. Instead, we should be using our breather to try and finish our defences before we get hit again.

A light at the end of the tunnel – with a few bumps on the way

Now, there are multiple drugs that could potentially treat the disease, and vaccines are also in the pipeline. Through our experiences with the H1N1 vaccine, it seems likely that researchers and companies will, out of fear of litigation, not be rolling these out without large scale testing. This means that the earliest vaccines might be anything from 6 months to multiple years away.

Some French hospitals and South Korea have already decided to take the anti-malarial drug hydroxychloroquine into use. However, the hype for the substance brought on by the US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of it has caused many people to try and buy it in bulk and price gougers are likely to try to get their share as well.

It will never be quite the same

The virus is likely to stay with us for years to come, and maybe one day become a normal part of our lives that we vaccinate against and have regular drugs for. For now, though, it is a disease that has crashed the global economy, created a renewed rift between Southern and Northern Europe, brought the Chinese Dragon down from the sky, and revealed glaring problems in the US healthcare system.

The fact that the disease targets the elderly will likely cause a significant shift in the demographics of many countries like Italy, where the average age of those dying is around 81. In a quite horrifying twist of fate, it might even lead to a strengthened economy in some countries, as horrible as that is to say, at a massive cost of life. The scars and anger that people will have after this will most likely shape the global political landscape for years to come.

It is just my hope that the way the world changes is to take the threat of disease more seriously and understand the importance of cooperation and transparency. We would no longer consider diseases as something that go away and never need to be thought about again. A shift from short-term planning to long-term planning.

The post Corona Is Here to Stay, Even If It Goes Away appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Europe’s Nuclear Dilemma

All of this is of great interest to Europe, which has been a springboard for nuclear weapons for all of the aforementioned seventy-five years. Brexit, in particular, has brought the issue to the fore again. The departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union has been discussed in painstaking detail, and so have its many ramifications and consequences. One field that is often overlooked by the general audience, however, is the consequences Brexit is going to have on European security, and especially in one specific area of European security – nuclear deterrence. After the British departure, France is the sole EU Member State with nuclear capabilities. The situation is aggravated by Trump’s erratic and unpredictable foreign policy.

This is not lost on European leadership. For the past four years, the EU and its Member States have devoted an unusual amount of attention to the question of military integration. There have been more than just words, too. New common military projects, like PESCO and the European Defence Fund, have given a real incentive to cooperation between Member States. However, all these new developments primarily provide monetary incentives for joint defence procurement and make it easier to deploy troops across the EU. They do not even touch on questions of national defence spending, let alone on high politics and strategic culture, and leave out several glaring omissions – like nuclear deterrence.

There is good reason for these omissions. The EU is effectively built to make bargains possible and fruitful, and to avoid leadership at all costs. This has several advantages – notably, small Member States such as Malta or Cyprus get their voice amplified, avoiding a monopoly of the larger States. The reliance on institutional compromise is what makes grand bargains possible. This is a very effective scheme for overall European integration. However, it is a terribly unsuited one for military integration, which requires a chain of command, clear and fast decision-making, and centralised leadership. Nowhere is this truer than in the management of a country’s nuclear arsenal.

French President Macron was the first head of government to acknowledge the nuclear elephant in the room. He has recently made headlines with his call for a European debate on the French nuclear deterrent, but the precise intention behind his words remains unclear. It cannot be taken for granted that France will commit a national resource to wider Union defence with such high stakes, to the point of considering a nuclear threat to any EU Member State as a nuclear threat to France’s own soil. But what his words have done is to make clear beyond any possible equivocation that European institutions and governments must treat this as a very real, and very serious policy question. The departure of the UK, and the growing uncertainty surrounding NATO, present a twin problem: part of it is strategic, the other part political.

The Strategic Problem

The security situation in the West increasingly resembles the Cold War. This might come as a surprise to readers, who are used to a different narrative regarding foreign policy and military matters. With the Cold War over, it is true that the West in general and NATO, in particular, focused away from containing the dissolving Soviet Union, and toward military intervention all over the world. The last decade, however, has largely reverted the trend.

Russia is ahead of all of Europe in military capabilities. This might not be apparent from looking at government budgets and defence spending. Indeed, the Russian defence budget is low in absolute terms, although it’s a high share of the country’s GDP. Spending, however, does not linearly translate into capabilities. The high availability of raw materials, low salaries and procurement costs, along with other factors, make the Russian military comparatively cheap to run and build up.

All Russian armed forces are still beleaguered by a host of technical and organisational problems, and many of their flashy new pieces of equipment serve more for marketing purposes than for the actual battlefield. In capabilities, however, Russia is still ahead of continental Europe, at a time when European governments have been neglecting their own defence. This means the gap is widening. Crucially, Russia is able to conduct combined arms operations, something that can’t be said for any European military at the time of writing.

In response, Western countries are shifting focus once more, away from intervention and towards a more classical emphasis on territorial defence. This new situation means that everyone can re-evaluate their position, and the Trump administration has been doing just that. Further, the intensified rivalry between the USA and Britain on one hand, and the EU on the other, has weakened certainties that there would be a common nuclear deterrence. Transatlantic politics have shifted in a way that is pitting the United States and Great Britain against continental Europe on trade, finance, and the future of the liberal world order.

This poses a problem for Brussels. With wider alliances suddenly uncertain, all that remains is the French nuclear deterrent. This, alone, would be hard-pressed to cover the entirety of the European Union in the event of an attack. And the French willingness to risk nuclear devastation to defend another Member State cannot be taken for granted indefinitely.

At a time when Russia is ahead of the EU in terms of conventional military forces, a nuclear deterrent is an indispensable guarantee against the outbreak of war. We have taken this deterrent for granted over the past few decades – but now, we no longer can. Of course, nuclear proliferation by itself could greatly raise international tensions and would need very careful managing. But with the two Atlantic great powers drifting away from each other, we can no longer sweep the question under the rub: the EU needs a nuclear deterrent.

It is unthinkable for Europe alone to supplant NATO with domestic means. When it comes to nuclear deterrence, however, the technical capacity to handle nuclear weapons is already present in Europe. The technical aspect alone is not enough, though – there is also a political dimension to all this that cannot be ignored. Who would build, field, and maintain these nuclear weapons? Who would make the political commitment to territorial defence that makes a nuclear deterrent credible?

The Political Problem

The answer to these questions proves vexing. An EU nuclear arsenal would require an endowment of defence responsibilities upon the EU that is well beyond anything currently contemplated. It would also require a whole new framework to establish who has control over such weapons and through what procedures, and it would raise several questions about the status of this nuclear program under international law. So far, nuclear development has been exclusive to nation-States, and a supranational organisation acquiring one would certainly complicate the picture.

The other option, and on the surface of it a far more practical one, is to push at least one Member State to develop a nuclear arsenal, thus filling the void left behind by the United Kingdom. There are several historical precedents that might point to likely candidates. During the Cold War, multiple European countries ran, or considered running, semi-clandestine nuclear programs to acquire deterrence against a Soviet invasion.

Italy devoted simultaneous attention to its own indigenous nuclear program, as well as to the planned NATO multilateral development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Sweden’s own program was thinly disguised as research in civilian nuclear technology, and Germany also considered its own nuclear program but never officially pursued it. Eventually, the Non-Proliferation Treaty put an end to all these plans. Despite this, many European countries today remain part of NATO’s so-called nuclear sharing.

A single Member State acquiring nuclear deterrence certainly looks more practical, but this solution also has its own complications. Every EU Member State has acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it is unclear how the subject could be broached internationally to negotiate an addition to the official list of nuclear States. Of course, the Israeli option of running a clandestine nuclear program that remains just short of completion while in peacetime is always available. However, while that simplifies the approach on the international arena, it doesn’t help with domestic politicking. Member States would be putting a lot of trust into this hypothetical new nuclear Member State, and the horse-trading required to gain sufficient goodwill all-round might be too much for any one government to stomach. Further, there is no clear appetite anywhere in Europe, when it comes to public opinion, for the acquisition of new nuclear weapons.

A third, much more moderate proposal would be to replicate NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement, but at an EU level. This is certainly reflected in Macron’s statements that French nuclear forces play a deterrent role in Europe, reinforce European security through their mere existence and, in this respect, have an authentically European dimension. Macron has also proposed a strategic dialogue, with interested European partners, on the role of French nuclear deterrence in our collective security.

It’s possible that Macron is linking the introduction of an EU nuclear sharing agreement to concessions in other policy areas. For example, such a sharing agreement would certainly remove some headaches from Germany, given the touchy subject – but would enable Macron to demand that Berlin give way on some economic proposals advanced by Paris. The timing of his statements – just as negotiations over the EU budget have ground to a halt – certainly seems to suggest such a possibility.

A nuclear sharing agreement would not put EU nuclear deterrence on an equal footing with Russia, but it would be better than nothing. That seems to be the name of the game when it comes to European integration these days.

The post [OPINION] The European Union Needs its Own Nuclear Arsenal appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Helping Others, Building Europe

Originally from Romania, I am currently in a small Swedish town enjoying the opportunities that come with working with youth. With a little under 50.000 inhabitants, Östersund is neighbouring the 5th largest lake in Sweden and is the most important cultural and economic landmark in the region of Jämtland. Thanks to the organisation I am volunteering for, Navigatorcentrum, I work daily with youth with the goal to get them more active in 4 areas: mobility, health, culture and community life. We organise activities to stimulate our participants’ motivation for personal growth, improve physical and mental health, raise awareness on crucial matters and enjoy the cultural mix we’re in.

I have a lovely German partner also my age, Eva, and together we are adventuring into the learning process of our lives. Our motivation to make a change in the small community we’re in and our values in our lives are keeping us together and are making us stronger. This experience is also shaping us more and more every day. Our goal is to share our knowledge and skills and help youth find their way to the labour market, a healthier more balanced life and eventually to their dreams. Together with our supervisors in the organisation, we are a fantastic force. Between Swedish, Romanian, German and Italian, we can enjoy a variety of interesting exchanges about our cultures and the things that we have in common.

A Swedish Fika

Culturally adjusting to a more relaxed work environment, a linear hierarchy and toned-down organizational culture with a strong focus on work relationships have opened a whole new world of productivity for us. During fika, which in Sweden is a small coffee or tea break usually accompanied by something sweet, we gather by the couches in the lunchroom and everything becomes 70% cosier. We get new ideas, find out insights from our colleague’s work, share movie recommendations or events we’ve heard of and, most importantly, our opinions.

In the beginning, the days were much shorter and with a warm cup in hand and dim lights you could take the perfect 20-minute break. We found ourselves admiring our coworkers’ relaxed attitudes, and their habit of walking around the office in socks became our own dear habit. I guess it takes at least 3 to fika, but we do our own fruit plates in the office when we want to work through it.

My country? Europe!

As well as improving the employability of youth in our Swedish community, we also periodically invite new people to hang out and learn new things about each other’s cultures. The most recent event we’ve had was an International Café. Here, we talked about the myth of Europe, the forming of the EU, and learned some interesting facts about the continent we live in. Did you know there are fragments of temperate rainforest in southern Norway and northern Spain?

We also reflected upon hardships that come with the complexity of the EU and acknowledged the opportunities we benefit from. There was a mutual unspoken agreement that even far from perfect, the EU is a good place to live in and to strive for growth. Before everybody goes home, we ask them to write down a thought, a wish or an opinion about Europe and leave it with us.

Act of Solidarity

Five months into my one-year-journey, time is measured in learning experiences, in small changes in my daily life and in big perspective shifts. I have ice skated on the lake, disagreed with my partner only to find new ways of working, started yoga and changed my eating habits. It is time for a lot of new beginnings.

I chose to volunteer here because I felt that this is a setting where I can be myself and contribute to something meaningful. Solidarity is a two-way road: you give and you receive. Along with the game of expectations and reality, I started playing with my hobbies and interests, joining them with work, developing workshops and activities for our target group.

Volunteering for me it’s the chance to explore my interests in different work environments without having the same rigour of a job. I’ve worked more as a volunteer than I did for money so far. I am becoming the best possible version of myself. Having the time and space to discover my qualities and make mistakes (which happens a lot) is very precious for development. I work around 34 hours a week, and at least 17 of those hours are spent learning something new. The other 17  are spent using improving skills I already have. It’s something a hefty salary for fresh-out-of-university-graduate can’t buy.

In the spirit of solidarity, I leave you with a song about the Swedish fika.

Guest article by Raluca Stan. You can follow her and Eva’s adventures also on Instagram. The author can be contacted at the following email address: raluca.gstan@gmail.com.

The post My European Solidarity Corps Experience: Volunteering for the Better appeared first on My Country? Europe..

During a Model European Union, you will essentially roleplay as a Member of the European Parliament or a Minister sitting in the Council. Other positions are usually available too, depending on the event in question – journalists and lobbyists are typical alternatives. During the simulation, your task will be to simulate political wrangling over two real-life legislative proposals by the European Commission, proposing amendments that reflect the interests of your Member State or wider political affiliation, and voting on the final proposal once it is ready.

Getting Started

You might think all this sounds great – but how does one find an MEU, in practice? Well, for a start, you can head over to this calendar to check dates and locations for Model European Union simulations. These take place all over the continent at various points during the year – for example, applications for MEU Netherlands (July 2021) will open in the spring. Each MEU has distinct application processes, requirements, and conditions – so once you pick a likely MEU, make sure to read everything carefully!

What to Expect from a Model European Union

So you’re going to your first Model European Union. There are a plethora of motivations that could have inspired you to apply – maybe you love debating and you were looking for an event to practice. Maybe you are interested in the EU and want to learn more. Maybe you found an ad somewhere that piqued your curiosity. Or maybe a friend made you come along.

Either way, the first day is very much the same for everyone – you come to a city that you’ve never been to, and possibly a completely new country. Of course, you’ve prepared as best as you could, you’ve read the legislative proposal, googled some sources to simulate a realistic position, and you’ve put together a position paper. But you’re still not really sure how all that will turn out, and that’s fine, because at this stage, no first-time participant is.

Filled in equal measures with excitement and anxiety, you get to the meetup place, only to find formally dressed people that shower you in information and equipment. You get a name tag, some goodies, your room number and key, and a reminder that a so-called Eurofeast is scheduled for the evening! But first, you get to know the other participants. some are really talkative – maybe even annoying? – others are a bit shy. You tell them your role during the simulation and they tell you theirs, but you don’t really have a clue how that helps you in any way.

Now, on the first day, there is the formal opening of the event, maybe some speeches from politicians and personalities endorsing the simulation, or a podium discussion, but certainly workshops to get you even better acquainted with your topic. You’re quite happy that you recognise most of the stuff that the Commissioners are talking about – but maybe you also notice that some of the things you wrote in your position paper missed the mark a bit. Luckily, you can still quietly change your position.

Now, the Eurofeast is always on the first evening of a Model European Union. Every participant brings some food or drink from their home country and then you share it all. There are the most random and exotic things but also some well-known specialities. You have been warned that you should go easy on the alcohol, especially on the first evening; you want to make an impression on the first day of debate, after all.

The Simulation Is Underway

On day two, the simulation proper gets underway. You get to your spot for the first time, and take a look around your assigned chamber – it’s either the European Parliament or the Council – where you will be working on the laws of the EU for the coming days. A few faces are already familiar to you, some may already be new friends. And then the chairs (that’s the name for the people who preside over the chamber) open the debate. At first, it’s a bit difficult to keep track of all the rules of procedure. Remembering how you can use each point or motion is your first real lesson in how EU laws are made! The chairs are patient and explain whenever there are questions about what’s going on.

As the day progresses, you start making policy. You know what you want and you soon find allies. You want to change the proposal so that it better suits your position and your interests, and you submit amendments to the proposal to that effect. Making sure to find enough supporters for your ideas, you think that you have a good chance that some of your amendments will even get a majority. After a tiring day of cajoling and negotiating, the evenings offer no rest. You explore the city with local participants and with your new friends from all over Europe, you go to the craziest social events, and generally have a good time. But in the mornings, it’s formal attires and negotiating and cajoling again.

By this time, you feel like you’re getting a hang of this. You negotiate your way through the topics, article by article, amendment by amendment, and before you know it the final votes are fast approaching. Some of your amendments did actually make it into the final text! And now that just needs to pass the Parliament and the Council. Will it, though? That is the dramatic, climactic moment of every Model European Union simulation.

Sometimes, your amendments fail. Sometimes, they succeed. Either way, elation or disappointment soon give way to a different kind of feelings as the simulation winds down. That same evening, you will attend the most melancholic and fraternisation-inducing occasion of the whole simulation – the goodbye party. You’ve made friends in many countries that you just have to meet again – maybe at another Model European Union. But until then, it’s goodbye.

It’s an evening full of hugs, stories of the past and plans for the future. And then you’re back at the airport, and you feel like somebody who just ran a marathon for the first time. You feel like you’ve really accomplished something – and we’re not necessarily referring to the tangible things like the number of amendments you helped pass. You’ve learnt about others and thereby learnt about yourself. Because after all, a law is just something that several people can agree on.

You loved it. And you’ll come back. Because now, you’re hooked.

Guest article by Mathias Quickert, Deputy Director-General for MEU Netherlands 2021. This content does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of My Country? Europe. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the author. 

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The Morning After

In the run-up to the Brexit vote, I passionately campaigned for Remain in the London constituency of Lewisham & Deptford. I became firm friends with the core group with whom I had campaigned. In fact, almost four years later, we still keep in regular touch.

But it all seemed to be utterly pointless when a majority of British voters opted to leave the EU. I was in Palestine on 24^th June 2016. I went for a sunrise walk around Bethlehem before coming back to the news notification: UK votes to leave EU by 51.9% to 48.1%. It felt like a body blow, a punch to the gut. In some ways, it felt as though the Britain that I thought I knew, that I thought I had grown up in, was gone. In fact, I was left wondering if it had ever even existed.

Je Suis Européen

At this precise moment in time, it may seem extraordinary that a Briton is saying that he feels European. In fact, at the time of the Brexit vote, I did not feel at all European. To my mind, a ‘European identity’ was simply something espoused by pro-EU politicians. How could anyone possibly feel any sort of connection to an entire continent?

A large part of my change of mind has been the response to Brexit from across the EU. That body blow, that sense of deep loss that I felt on 24^th June 2016 has since been echoed across the entire union. As one person put it to me, “it’s as if my dull but sensible aunt has started drinking a bottle of vodka every night and staying out until 4 am” – blunt, but succinct. But the first time when I would feel a true sense of being European came on 23^rd June 2018, the second anniversary of the Brexit vote.

The fledgeling anti-Brexit organisation People’s Vote organised a march in order to mark the day. My friends and I went as a group. To my astonishment, 100,000 of us filed through central London to Parliament Square. Alongside me were EU citizens, Britons and non-EU citizens alike. All parts of the EU and beyond were represented in central London that day. We were a single European entity. We were not there to overturn the vote. We were not attempting to disrespect or push aside Leave voters. We were there because we wanted more democracy for our country.

Once we got to Parliament Square, MPs, high-profile grassroots activists and former Leave voters who had changed their minds addressed a crowd far larger than any of us could have realistically anticipated. None of us could then have known, but 100,000 would turn out to be the smallest attendance at a People’s Vote march.

A Deafening Chorus

On 15^th January 2019, MPs resoundingly rejected Theresa May’s dreadful Brexit deal. A large part of the scale of the rejection was due to grassroots Remainers, backed by People’s Vote, winning over undecided MPs. People’s Vote were coordinating the various factions of the Remain movement into one voice – and it was loud. I was at rallies in Parliament Square when the deal was rejected for the first two times, surrounded by my fellow Europeans as we cheered the rejection of May’s small-minded, nasty deal. I was at home with my staunchly Remain parents when Brexit was twice delayed. We celebrated with a cheer, some Belgian chocolate and some French wine. But the best was yet to come.

On 23^rd March 2019, mere days before Brexit was originally scheduled to happen, roughly 1,000,000 people descended on central London. It cannot be known for certain, but the Put It to the People march might well be the largest in British history. This was democracy at its finest. These were, like me, ordinary people – many of whom had never been politically active before – who just wanted to be heard. This was democracy and it was beautiful to see. Sadly, I could not make it to that march as I was in Kiev, but to see the images of it being beamed across the world made me incredibly proud of the movement that Remain had built – from the mere 50 who had attended the first post-referendum rally to 1,000,000 in just two-and-a-half years.

Democracy is not a moment in time. It is not a “once-and-forever” beast. It is not immutable. Democracy is fluid. It is an ongoing and ever-evolving process. 23^rd June 2016 was a moment in time. 1,000,000 people marching for their country and their collective future was the fluidity. Seeing those images broadcast whilst I was in Ukraine made me understand this. Democracy is an evolution, not an event.

Ultimately, we were not successful. In the autumn of 2019, we came agonisingly close to getting a people’s vote. But then the election came. All of that was swept aside. Brexit became a certainty. Much like Brexit itself, there is no one root cause for the election result being what it was, but there are a lot of “what ifs”.

The Fight Goes On

We did not get to put Brexit back to the people. It may seem as though we in the Remain movement have just wasted four years of our lives – but I beg to differ. The world and, more importantly, our European family now know that millions and millions of Britons are being dragged out of the EU against our will – not to mention two of the UK’s four nations. It is a great irony that a country that is leaving the EU is home to the largest grassroots pro-EU movement anywhere in Europe.

The message from this is simple but clear: politics may mean that the UK is turning its back on the EU, but many millions of Britons are not. Many millions of us are proudly European. On the morning of 1^st February 2020, I am sure that a ‘re-join’ movement will begin. It will grow, it will be beautiful and I hope that it will be successful.

I hope that ‘Re-join’ succeeds where Remain could not. I hope that those who will doubtlessly work tirelessly on it are successful in taking Britain back into the EU. But I will not be a part of it. Quite simply, I am too tired of fighting and not succeeding. ‘Re-join’ will require new life, new faces and breaths of fresh air. When it finds these, it will become unstoppable – and Britain shall be back in its rightful place in our family of nations once more.

About the Author: Luke Sandford is a Brit living in Sweden. He studies MA European Studies at Lund Univeristy. He also holds a Bachelor’s degree in Education from Goldsmiths College, University of London. Before you ask, he voted Remain. His English is passable; his Swedish is less-so.

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Others take a different view, arguing that the letter of the Treaties was respected. This is certainly true: having been tapped by the Council, the would-be president of the Commission needs to be confirmed in a secret ballot by an absolute majority in parliament. The leading candidate system, on the other hand, is not part of the Treaties: it was always a political deal that existed at the Council’s sufferance. And given that von der Leyen is a member of the largest party in Parliament, this is enough to liken the appointment to the process seen in many parliamentary democracies all over the world.

This debate is as old as the EU itself, and it’s unlikely to be resolved soon, regardless of the European Parliament having accepted von der Leyen’s appointment this time around. What is being overlooked in the public debate, however, is how we got here. The answer is that the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen is the product of a long chain of leadership failures. The Parliament, the Council as a whole, the individual Member States – every institution has seemingly outdone itself in botching the nomination process. The larger problem is not whether Ursula von der Leyen is a democratic choice for the presidency, but the staggering political immaturity by the Union’s policy elites. In the race for these nominations, there are no real winners: everybody lost.

A Tricky Nomination for the European Parliament

Few would doubt that the Parliament is the principal victim of this selection, given the flat reversal of the leading candidate system, which was introduced merely a legislature ago and led to the ascension of Jean-Claude Juncker. The consensus, however, stops there.

To some, the European Parliament is the victim of a dastardly power grab by a resurgent and indolent Council, seeking to bring the Union back under the control of the Member States. To others, the Parliament simply fulfilled its role as outlined under the Treaties, with the leading candidate system being an anomaly and a purely political experiment. What is left out of the equation is that the Parliament has largely itself to blame for the failure of this nomination system.

The Council’s opposition to the leading candidate system is not a new development, nor was it kept secret. The Council repeatedly expressed disappointment that European parties made a mockery of the process from the start, turning the nomination of a leading candidate into a festival of petty party politics. The choice by the EPP to nominate Manfred Weber, an uncharismatic German conservative with no prior governing experience, exacerbated the Council’s opinion that the leading candidate system had to go.

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the Council’s assessment, it cannot be denied that its hostility to the system was public knowledge long before the European elections, and in some cases even before the primaries. The right course of action for the European Parliament, then, would have been to act first: when the European elections delivered a picture of fragmentation, the EP should have quickly rally behind one of the leading candidates, granting them political legitimacy in dealing with the Council.

On the face of it, this would seem impossible. The Parliament hadn’t even held its opening session when the selection was made. That is not the full picture, however. Leading candidates had the mandate to represent their own parliamentary groups, and they could have reached a deal to secure that one of them commanded a majority. The candidates themselves knew this: Manfred Weber invited his fellow parliamentary lead candidates to dinner in the immediate aftermath of the nomination, hoping to secure support for his candidacy as the leader of the largest party (the EPP).

The other leading candidates turned him down, most likely because they had already expressed their intention to oppose an EPP presidency at all costs, a position strengthened by the greatly reduced clout of the EPP in the new parliament. Weber’s lack of charisma also didn’t help. However, that alone was no reason to sabotage the dinner. Attendance would have given the other leading candidates the opportunity to outmanoeuvre Weber, and garner support for themselves or someone else – indeed, considering that some parties fielded multiple candidates, one can hardly imagine a more favourable set up for them to try and sway the others.

The failure did not stop at the dinner. Between election night and the news of the appointment, the leading candidates did little and less to secure their nomination, with the possible exception of Frans Timmermans, whose run was curtailed by other people’s failures. The Parliament’s inability to agree on a name condemned it to reacting to the Council’s decisions. The chamber, therefore, largely sidelined itself, enabling the Council to go on and find its own solution.

The European People’s Party

If the whole European Parliament has itself to blame for the failure, the EPP in particular deserves a special mention for its staggering political myopia. As the largest party, as well as the incumbent of multiple mandates, the EPP’s failure to read the changing political landscape is astonishing. The selection of Manfred Weber as the party’s leading candidate was an early sign that the EPP was not entirely in sync with the political reality, and the Council’s open contempt for the way the EPP conducted the primaries should have been a strong hint.

The EPP remained oblivious to the writing on the wall. Even after the European elections delivered it a much diminished role in the European Parliament, the party still remained the individual largest, and thus naturally expected it could ram Manfred Weber down both the Council’s and the Parliament’s throat. Unsurprisingly, the Council rejected Weber and the EP never rallied behind him either. The EPP, however, doubled down, strenuously opposing Merkel’s plan to forge a compromise.

At least nominally, von der Leyen is an EPP candidate at the helm of the Commission. But, with the death of the leading candidate system, it’s unlikely that the EPP will have much reason to celebrate this appointment.

A Win for Germany?

On the surface, this looks like a win for Angela Merkel: after all, should von der Leyen be confirmed, she would be the first German to lead the Commission in fifty years. Moreover, she is a close political ally of Merkel’s, and owes her the entirety of her political career. Nevertheless, this save of face cannot hide the fact that Merkel’s intended plan failed miserably in the face of insurmountable internal opposition.

Merkel hatched a plan to save the leading candidate system, with Timmermans as the centerpiece of her efforts. She hammered the deal out with other European leaders during the G20 summit in Osaka, proposing the presidency of the European Parliament to Weber for two consecutive two and a half year mandates as a consolation prize. The plan was hatched together with German SPD politician Martin Schulz and Portugal’s Prime Minister Antonio Costa, and it had a major advantage: it would preserve the leading candidate system while at the same time refusing Weber the position.

In many ways, Timmermans was the ideal candidate: a social democrat coming from the Netherlands, a small Member State that is sceptical of further integration, and a much needed change from years of EPP leadership. He also had good odds of obtaining a parliamentary majority. Angela Merkel, however, committed one crucial mistake and didn’t (or failed to) bring the EPP itself behind the deal. The Council’s assumption that Merkel had taken care of internal party politics was soon shattered.

The EPP’s poisonous opposition to Merkel’s compromise deal is a clear demonstration of the growing rift between liberal conservatives and far right emulators within the EPP. It was also a humiliation for Merkel, and a display of her reduced legitimacy inside the party she has more or less directly ruled for over a decade.

The Outliers in the Game: V4 And Italy

The regional Visegrad group (V4) has clear ambitions of influencing European politics to a greater degree. This is completely understandable, since the grouping is entirely made up of new members trying to find their place among their wealthier western European partners. It also comes off as an entirely misplaced ambition, when the V4 manage to botch the nomination process to such a degree, and still pretend obliviousness to their own miscalculation – at least in public.

The Visegrad group had a clear red line in the nomination process: they didn’t want Timmermans. The S&D leading candidate was too outspoken about the deterioration of democratic standards in eastern Europe, and given Timmermans’ activism on the rule of law during his tenure as Commission Vice President, many within the V4 came to see him as their archenemy. In the same vein, they also opposed Renew Europe’s leading candidate Margrethe Vestager as too liberal an option for their liking – not to mention one too close to Macron.

The V4 even managed to enrol Italy to its anti-Timmermans crusade, in what seems like a rather bizarre move from Rome. As an S&D man known for his penchant for compromise, Timmermans would have been far likelier to express sympathy for Italy’s budget plights than conservative von der Leyen. It’s also not clear exactly what Italy expects to receive in return from its support of the V4: surely not relief on migration, considering this is the regional bloc more staunchly opposed to EU-wide redistribution of new arrivals.

The fact that Timmermans was denied the presidency undoubtedly makes for nice headlines, and the Polish government wasted no time in boasting that the next European Commission will be “less confrontational”. It’s also a political miscalculation of a bizarre degree. Ursula von der Leyen is a German, and Merkel’s pupil to the bone, owing her the entirety of her political career. She also owes a political debt to Macron, whose acceptance was crucial to greenlight her nomination.

Macron also managed to place his close ally, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel, in the presidency of the European Council. If this doesn’t look bad enough for the political prospects of V4 governments, just look at von der Leyen’s two proposed vice presidents: Vestager herself, a Danish liberal with little patience for governments (and corporations) who skirt the rules – and Timmermans, who, in addition to his well known stance on the rule of law, has now personal reasons to harbour a grudge against the Member States that denied him the presidency. In trying to drive away a potential enemy, the Visegrad group has attracted three. Hardly an impressive strategic record.

The Future of the Nomination Process

The nomination process might have followed the Treaties to the letter, and they might well have given the Council the control on the institutions that Member States crave, without damage to any Treaty-enshrined democratic provision. Subjectively, they may even have selected nominally qualified candidates for all positions, with a much-needed attention reserved to people with background in security and foreign policy. However one wants to spin it, though, it can’t be ignored that they also reopened the painful question of EU political legitimacy, at a time when it finally looked to be in the past.

Public opinion might not be a part of the intricacies and details of political dealings at all levels of European governance, and they might even not be interested in, or grasp the nuance that went into the final selection. But the tortured path to the nominations, and the abundance of mistakes and acrimony from all sides, was there for all to see, and this communications disaster alone would be enough to raise many question marks about the quality of Europe’s political leadership.

The European Union’s real problem is not in the Treaties or their implementation or even in the apparent and increased fragmentation of its electorate. The real problem is that its policy elites are not ready to rule the continent. After the Great Recession and the 2012 Eurozone crisis, one wonders what other near-apocalyptic scenario will be required to snap European politics out of its sclerotic complacency.

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What do Abuja (Nigeria), Astana (Kazakhstan), Naypyidaw, (Myanmar) and Sejong (South Korea) have in common? All were planned cities built in the 21st Century, breaking virgin ground to house a new national capital. These efforts to replace overcrowded national capitals and begin afresh with the aid of urban planning and modern technology are expensive but determined efforts to shape their national history and forge new modern identities.

Other capitals planned and built to accommodate national governments some time ago sought a similar national renaissance. These national capitals, proven by time as viable urban settings, have become very familiar to us:  Washington DC, built on reclaimed swampland in the 1800s, designed by French architect L’Enfant; Canberra, Australia, a century later designed by the Chicago architect Walter Burly Griffin; and Brasília (Brazil) inaugurated in 1960, are prominent examples. On a smaller scale than these national capitals, also Chandigarh, India, a regional capital for the states of Punjab and Haryana, was built, designed in large part by French architect Le Corbusier. Le Corbusier worked with numerous sociological and urban concepts to make the city function optimally for its inhabitants.

Besides those purposed on the relocation of their capital and administrative functions, there are many new preplanned cities for diverse purposes around the world. In Europe, beginning in the 1970s, Louvain-la-Neuve was built on agricultural land not far from Brussels. Its aim was the expansion of the French sections of the historic University in Leuven, a medieval city in nearby Flanders, Belgium.

Other new capital cities are currently underway in Egypt, on the outskirts of Cairo, along with new planned urban developments as the one in Amaravati, India. India itself has several fully planned cities as does China. If we begin to look at smaller planned units, towns and dedicated developments, the examples become too numerous to cite. Listed under ‘planned cities’ one can find several hundred of examples around the world: most European countries have several smaller ones; India and Israel standing out for numerous planned urban centers.

Advantages of a planned city are numerous.  Especially with the modern imperative of reducing carbon emissions and taking advantage of digital technology, they can revolutionise urban living. More traditional motives are at play too, like: decongestion, esthetics and indeed national unity, as the new capitals served to unite diverse regions and urban interests in one national center. Integrating social classes and income groups has been an imperative of many projects.  When the United States, Australia and Brazil built their capitals they were new countries cobbled together seeking to achieve national unity, a motive in the new construction which determined all the rest.

A Proposed Model for Europe

Europe is hardly a new country but, in an important sense, the European Union is new. There were European unions in the past with well recognized capitals: the Roman Empire with the seat of government in Rome and the Holy Roman Empire with the court of Charlemagne in Aachen. Today’s European Union, though, has no distinct capital.

There is Brussels, Belgium, seat of the European Commission and most of the administrative offices. The EU Parliament has its own dedicated parliamentary building in Strasbourg, France, as well as one in Brussels. The EU Central Bank is located in Frankfurt, Germany; the European Court of Justice in Kirchberg, Luxembourg. The Council of Ministers adapts its venue to the EU Council Presidency which rotates every six months to a different Member State.

Would a new EU capital built afresh create the type of unity other national capitals have tried to embody with differing success?  My suggestion would be to try through a series of modest steps. The first of these would be to create a European wide architectural competition to build a Museum of European Culture and European Cultural Center.  Building is something which Europeans excel at and like to do. Many of the world’s greatest architects and firms have a European pedigree and address. To name just a few of the more prominent, listed among the top ten architects worldwide, we can remember Renzo Piano (Italy), Jean Nouvel (France), Santiago Calatrava (Spain) or Peter Zumthor (Switzerland). Many of the world’s planned cities were designed by Europeans.

The Museum of European Culture and European Cultural Center, home to a vast modern edifice containing multiple cultural and media displays and venues, should be built at the geographic center of Europe to make its purpose clear. That center is located by geographers of the French Institut Géographique National (IGN) a bit south of Cologne on the German side of the Rhine, 40 km east of Frankfurt, Germany. Once finished, proceeds from visits to the museum and cultural events would be used to begin work on the new city ‘Europa’ springing up around it, taking care that bids and contracts include all European countries.

The project could function a bit like Air Bus Industries: on the outskirts of Toulouse, but receiving manufacturing and engineering inputs from all over Europe. Air Bus is a remarkable and truly European venture.  Late at night on the road to Toulouse one can see the jet engines from the UK, fuselages from Germany or tail assemblies from Spain being hauled on massive lorries into the Air Bus warehouses for further assembly. So too might diverse Member States participate in building Europa.   Eventually, when ready, the Parliament and other EU Offices would be moved to Europa creating a veritable European capital, source of pride and identity.

Guest article by Stephen Sposato. This content does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of My Country? Europe. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the author.

About the Author: Stephen Sposato is an American who received his Masters in Economic Development from the Rijksuniversiteit Gent and a second Masters in Theoretical Economics from the Universite de Louvain. He has lived an important part of his 72 years in Europe where he has also worked on East European reconstruction. He speaks a number of European languages fluently (English, French, Dutch and some German).

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