Up until the New Year, but not one day longer, the United Kingdom, despite having formally left the EU already, will remain a member of the single market for goods and services and, although not a member of the Schengen area, it will also continue allowing free movement of people. This gives rise to an issue when considering the possibility of further extensions of the negotiations for a post-Brexit arrangement for trade and people: any agreements before January 1, when the existing arrangements become null and void.

What does No-Deal mean?

If Great Britain exits the EU in a no-deal situation on January 1, trade would automatically return to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. WTO rules are liberal in the sense that they admit most goods and services and impose low tariff rates. However, they are more restrictive than the current ‘single market’ arrangement the UK enjoys with the EU. Currently, 50% of UK trade, imports and exports, is with the EU – this would make raising tariffs and other impediments costly for the UK. It would also, of course, have an impact on the EU, but with the EU’s total external trade with the UK only representing about 12% of the total, the impact will be inferior.

Major categories of UK exports such as automobiles would further be affected by 10% WTO tariffs, making many car exports uncompetitive. Large automakers with factories in the UK, like Nissan, have already suggested they would be forced to leave. UK suppliers for products finished in the EU could also be replaced,  for example as in the case of the British Rolls Royce engines for the Airbus, which compete with the USA’s GE Aviation or Pratt & Whitney.

Imported foodstuffs, of which 80% come from the EU and which supply nearly one-third of total UK consumption, could also be affected. Here, the issue is not only tariffs and higher prices for consumers, but also differing phytosanitary regulations. Once again, the EU will also be affected, although to a lesser extent. Whether EU rules will still allow for the importation of UK sourced lamb and some other products remains to be seen.

Pharmaceuticals also present a serious problem.  Approval mechanisms and production controls will no longer be accepted mutually and will result in significant pipeline delays for many medications people need.  Hopefully this can be remedied through stop gap measures but so far this has not been done.

Immediate Disruption

A UK government study has estimated that, in a worst-case scenario surrounding a no-deal outcome, roughly 7,000 lorries could be held up from crossing the channel. Even in the case of a deal implemented at the last minute, significant disruption will take place as few of the new tariff codes and phytosanitary regulations would be in place to apply to incoming and outgoing goods on both sides of the Channel.

The UK has put in place traffic and staging plans to deal with the situation, but the disruptions in southeast England and northern France and the Benelux would be enormous. For its part, the EU has put in place contingency plans that would allow airline flights to continue for six months with grandfathered inspection recognition, providing mutual action by the UK. The EU contingency also calls for a one-year grandfathering of fishing rights also contingent on reciprocity. Fishing industries in both the EU and UK would be hit hard by a no-deal. Navies are already being prepped to enforce the rules.

Movement of People

Free movement of people between the EU and UK will end on January 1. Though visas are not envisaged for visits under 90 days, passports, medical attestations of insurance, automobile insurance papers and other documentation will become more onerous than at present. After 90 days, EU citizens wishing to remain in the UK will have to apply for a change of status. This will be true even for spouses of UK citizens. It is not yet clear how various EU member states might regulate UK citizens in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the EU travel ban on non-EU countries due to COVID-19 could be extended to the UK with the New Year.

Northern Ireland

The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland was a key aspect of contention in the withdrawal agreement. Keeping the border open for the thousands of people who cross daily for work and social activities has been since the Good Friday Agreement are a major focus of both Irish governments.

Although the UK agreed to maintain open borders by checking goods for EU compliance at sea, the UK has already tried to renege on this agreement. It immediately back stepped after meeting stiff resistance from the EU as well as third parties like the US, with its incoming Biden administration, and the UN. Nevertheless, as this issue touches on UK sovereignty, in the absence of a post-Brexit deal it may come under further pressure.

Who is to blame?

If there is such a thing as blame in the failure to reach an agreement beneficial to both sides, it must certainly fall on the side which may want a no-deal agreement in the first place. In the eyes of most observers, this appears to be the UK. Though the popular movement around the original Brexit vote was strong, it was fanned by a political class of Tory politicians having a lot to gain personally by a return of greater sovereignty to the UK.

As the rather nebulous aspects of UK ‘sovereignty’ have inserted themselves into the negotiations for a new trading agreement, they have made any agreement difficult to reach on purely beneficial terms. The perceived matter of the UK having final say has made agreement elusive. Final say in trade is, unfortunately, a non sequitur as both sides must adhere to the rules if there is to be any equitable trade at all.

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The World After Hitler

As the devastating war neared its bloody conclusion, the Allies and the Soviet Union met in Yalta, to debate the future of the world after Hitler. There, they stipulated that Germany in general and Berlin separately would be split into four zones of control under Soviet, American, British, and French administration. Additionally, they agreed that all occupied and former Axis powers were to have free and fair elections to determine their own futures. Whether Churchill and Roosevelt were foolish enough to believe Stalin would honour this agreement, or whether they simply felt they could do nothing about it, remains unclear. It does seem Roosevelt actually trusted Stalin, as he later acknowledged being fooled by him. This didn’t last long: the brutality with which the Soviets treated Eastern Europe, such as the mass purges and massacres even in the territories of those who had never aligned with the Axis, awakened the Western Allies to the true nature of Soviet designs of power. Due to these atrocities, Britain passed the Polish Resettlement Act in 1947, to protect Polish troops who would undoubtedly have been in large part murdered or imprisoned by the Soviet backed authorities upon returning home.

There is little doubt that the Soviets betrayed the Allies’ trust in their treatment of eastern Europe. This heightened tensions, and made it more difficult to reach any positive agreements as to the status of Germany – which even in defeat remained a strategically critical country. The Soviets, in particular,  diligently followed Lenin’s maxim that “whoever has Germany has Europe”. Ultimately, negotiations were hampered by the fact that both sides feared that a unified Germany could end up on the opposing side and therefore hand them a huge amount of power. This is particularly clear when compared to Austria: while occupied in the same four part system for some time, the country was reunified in 1955 without even a requirement to neutrality, although the Austrians embraced it on their own accord afterwards. In Germany, the higher stakes prevented such harmony: by 1947, it was clear to all involved that Germany would not be united. When preparing for the new year, the United States gave up any hope of influencing the Soviet occupation zone, and began to concentrate fully on helping the three western zones to create a functioning economy. Soon after, the Truman doctrine was announced, revealing American intentions to contain Communism everywhere. The opening moves of the Cold War were beginning.

Gloves Off: Berlin Blockaded

Further negotiations at the Moscow conference involved Soviet proposals for a united but neutral Germany, with the industrial Ruhr area under four-power control. However, in large part due to Moscow breaking trust over the rest of the post war restructuring of Europe, the Americans concluded that this was a scheme to get the western powers out and assert Soviet control over all of Germany. Considering the Soviets’ previous record of making apparently reasonable agreements, only to immediately break them in order to ensure their own wider hegemony, the Americans were most likely right to be suspicious. Following the Czechoslovak coup in February 1948, where Soviet backed forces had seized full control of the country and begun purging the opposition, the plans to create a West German state were greatly accelerated.

The Soviets decided to throw the dice and initiated a partial blockade of Berlin on April 1^st 1948. The Soviets aimed to gain a symbolic victory by forcing out the western powers and gaining control of the whole city. The Americans were not intimidated, and doubled down on their plans of economic reconstruction. On the 19^th of June, they unveiled the new Deutschmark currency to replace the old Reichsmark. When the currency was allowed to circulate by the Berlin authorities on the 23^rd of June, the Soviets cut the power supply to the western zones, marking the start of the open attempt to starve out the city. The Soviets then compounded the blockade by cutting communications links and blocking supplies of food and coal.

The western powers retaliated with an embargo on the Soviet zone, cutting off steel and coal from the Ruhr. The official justification was designed to parrot Soviet bureaucratic excuses for the blockade, and accused Moscow of stealing empty railway wagons. British foreign minister Bevin was reasonably confident that supplies would last long enough for a solution to be found: Berlin’s food stocks were expected to last around a month, and fuel even longer. He outright rejected surrendering the city to the Soviets to the extent that he was willing to have the United Kingdom follow the United States into war if bullets began to fly.

A Miracle In Logistics: The Berlin Airlift

Fortunately, war proved unnecessary, in large part due to what had been intended as a mental exercise in planning by RAF air commodore Rex Waite. On being told that supplying Berlin entirely by air was impossible, he decided to prove the opposite. On June 23^rd his plan was rebuffed as not sufficiently detailed, but with more detail added the British and American authorities were inclined to take the idea seriously, at least as a temporary measure. This was largely because nobody else had presented a proposal other than shooting their way to Berlin, which had been vetoed by Washington as ludicrously dangerous as a strategy that relied entirely on the Soviets bluffing.

Very few saw the Berlin Airlift plan as likely to be successful, and with good reason: it required at least 4500 tons of goods to be transported per day, an unprecedented amount by air. And yet, it happened. The operation was a desperate rush to get enough planes carrying enough cargo into the air. Flying and maintenance crews worked tirelessly to ensure this came to be. The western powers had one significant advantage in carrying through such a punishing schedule, the extremely high motivation of the air crews who flocked to the opportunity to carry out such a humanitarian mission. As supplies started to come in, the effects of the Soviet blockade began to inflict negative consequences on the USSR too. The Western Allies embargo of steel and coal, if prolonged, would cripple the Baltic fishing fleet, as well as East German industry in general. As such the Soviets tried various means to frustrate the Berlin Airlift, from physical barriers to buzzing transport planes with fighters.

Despite these obstructions, by September 1948 the target of 4500 tons per day was being hit and, astonishingly, surpassed. On the 18^th of September nearly 8500 tons of coal were brought in, and in the end the Berlin airlift transported a phenomenal 2.3 million tons of goods. By January 1949, a full six months after Rex Waite’s original plan, the average of delivered goods rose to over 5500 tons per day. It was an unprecedented display of industrial might and political will, and it sent a very clear message. On the Soviet side, the reaction was one of muted stupor. Demands for a different settlement of postwar Germany were quietly dropped, and the focus shifted on trying to save face. Molotov took much of the blame, being replaced in punishment for his miscalculation. In the end, Stalin capitulated at the cost of face-saving negotiations. He consoled himself by ordering Soviet bureaucracy to keep being a nuisance to German rail traffic.

Berlin Airlift Successful: Round One To The West

The success of the Berlin Airlift allowed the Western Allies to continue their plans to create an independent state in West Germany, which came into being in May 1949, and holding onto the foothold of west Berlin at the same time. In the opinion of Bevin, failure would have been severe as he expected that abandoning Berlin would have made it impossible for the Western Allies to hold the rest of West Germany, leaving the Soviets the undisputed masters of Europe with a united communist Germany under their suzerainty.

Additionally, the crisis bound the West more tightly together, with Bevin requesting nuclear capable US bombers to be stationed in Britain, and launching a concerted P.R. counteroffensive against Soviet communism. It is also worth noting the attitude of Berliners themselves: despite their economic hardship, few defected to the Soviets. Conversely, Berliners living under Soviet administration did their best to flee, and the Soviets had to build walls and barriers to stem the tide of people leaving. The Berlin Airlift thus provided a great victory for the West – and set the demarcation lines of a frozen conflict that would make the world hold its breath for the next four decades.

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In this article, we will look at the status of secession in international law, look at countries that grant the right to secede, and examine Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union as an example of a formalised procedure for separation.

Right of Secession in International Law

Secession is a delicate subject, since it deals with fundamental aspects of present-day politics, above all the right to self-determination, and the sovereignty and unity of the state.
In recent years, international law has normally favoured the latter rather than the former, in the name of sustaining the stability of the international system. There has however been one exception: the right of self-determination of colonial people and states.
In addition to this, there is at least some support for the right to secede as a reaction to ethnic cleansing and genocide, with Kosovo being the most well-known example.

Nonetheless, this did not prevent secessions or secessionist attempts all over the world. A new, great wave of secessions occurred with the fall of the Soviet Union: fifteen new states emerged from the collapse of the USSR. Seven more came into existence with the fall of Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and gave birth to two different states. In the third world, South Sudan represents one of the newest sovereign states. Just one year ago, the whole world witnessed the secessionist attempt in Catalonia and the subsequent crackdown by Spanish authorities.

Historically and in academia, federalism and secession have been considered as antithetical cases, since federalism has the purpose of preserving unity between different constituent units (Stepan, 2005). In this light, secession is portrayed as a failure of federalism, especially when the parent state is a federation, a former federation or a regionalised, decentralised state, and the new state is a former constituent unit (Sanjaume I Calvet, 2018).

A Constitutional Right of Secession?

Currently, among the constitutional laws of the world, only two states carry the right of secession in their constitution: Ethiopia, and the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis. In the Ethiopian case, each constituent unit can, through a specific process described in Article 39, demand their secession from the federation. In the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis, a micro-federation composed of two islands, only Nevis has the right of secession.

The constitution describes the procedure that Nevis has to undergo in order to achieve independence. More specifically, secession can only be achieved through a referendum, provided that the separatist cause receives a supermajority of 2/3 of the voters. The theory was tested in practice in 1998, with the holding of an independence referendum in the island of Nevis. The referendum was invalidated: the votes in favour of independence reaching almost 62%, a whopping number which nonetheless fell short of the supermajority rule.

The enshrining of a right of secession in a federal constitution typically provides for the possibility of an orderly separation. It also protects those citizens who could be specifically harmed by the process, and ensures that secession is only a last resort scenario. This means that not only there is a parliamentary procedure to follow, but referenda also must meet a supermajority, as in the case of Nevis. Among former states, the Soviet constitution of 1936 also included the right of secession, although this remained a dead letter, like the vast majority of the document.

Secession Without Constitutional Guarantees

In a Bodinian vision of the state, sovereignty is considered impossible to split or divide, and therefore, subnational units cannot secede. In this view, the presence of a right of secession, or withdrawal as in the case of the EU, indicates that the political entity is not a state, but a non-state (i.e. a confederation or an international organisation).

The Bodinian view is rooted in the idea that the preservation of unity is one of the fundamental purposes of the state in the first place. However, it makes exceptions in cases where secession can solve conflicts, when other political solutions based on territorial autonomy and power-sharing fail.
This view is questionable and has attracted considerable criticism. Even on an empirical level, while many federal constitutions do not mention a right of secession and a related procedure, there remain other avenues to achieve separation.

Quebec and Canada represent a specific case. Voters in Quebec rejected independence twice, once in 1980 and again in 1995 with a lower margin. In both cases, the independence vote was called, in spite of the lack of a secession clause in the Canadian constitution. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that unilateral secession was not legal, but, in case of a referendum agreed by all parties, the rest of Canada had no right to forbid secession. In other words, the ruling established secession as a political, rather than strictly legal decision. The Clarity Act in 2000 settled the procedure regulating secessions of their provinces.

A very similar case is that of Scotland in 2014. Since the UK has constitutional customs and procedures, but not a constitution, the Scottish and British government reached a political deal in 2012, known as the Edinburgh agreement, clearing the way for a Scottish independence referendum. The referendum eventually failed in 2014.

As we have seen, the lack of specific constitutional provisions for secession, does not mean that secessions are automatically forbidden. This is true of other political entities: some lawyers argue that, if one of the cantons were to try and secede from Switzerland, a constitutional amendment might just be discussed and passed with the constitutional procedure, to allow the canton to secede. In the United States, a landmark case, Texas v White, ruled on by the supreme court in 1869, declared unilateral secessions illegal. Secessions are allowed only in case of revolution or consent of all parts.

Article 50: Withdrawal or Secession?

Separations are, to some extent, a form of secession. A key difference is that secession implies an asymmetry between the seceding unit and the parent state, while separation implies a form of symmetry between the two separating units. This was the case with Czecoslovakia: the two constituent republics agreed to split, resulting in the extinction of the former country and the emergence of two new entities.

The fact that the European Union has a right of secession, or withdrawal, is one of the main features that defines the EU as a polity other than a state, independent of its taxonomy. The economic and stability arguments might not play in favour of secessions or withdrawals, like in the case of Brexit, but the fact that the option can be unilaterally triggered or revoked is now out of the question, and it’s unlikely that any attempt at restricting this ability in the future would prove productive. The EU is, therefore, likely to keep Article 50 in place even in the event of further integration and outright federalisation.

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The long and painful Brexit negotiations have topped the headlines for the better part of two years, and it’s easy to view it as an isolated event. However, Brexit is part of a dramatic realignment of the British position on the world stage. The decision to leave the EU, of course, was determined by voters in a referendum. But the fact that a referendum was held in the first place is no coincidence, nor should we blind ourselves to the complex negotiations between London and Brussels prior to the Brexit referendum.

Cameron‘s domestic calculations in appeasing the far-right by pushing through a referendum are often discussed, but what typically goes under the radar is that the referendum proposal was part of a larger, if incoherent, high-risk foreign policy being conducted by his administration. Under Cameron, the United Kingdom sought a new place for itself in the world, one where British fortunes became inextricably linked with China.

In so doing, it sleepwalked into a dangerous position: it alienated its two major allies – the United States and the European Union – at the same time. The risks involved are massive, and this strategy’s failure – which seems likelier with every passing month – would have far reaching consequences on British foreign policy, and indeed, on the health of the UK as a whole.

The Post-Imperial Conundrum

Britain emerged victorious from the Second World War, at least on paper. In practice, however, it was left in financial and political straits, which made it impossible for it to maintain its empire and dependent on the United States for protection.

In this grim context, Britain found a new place in the growing Western bloc by closely aligning itself to the new hegemon, the United States. It did so not just in defense and foreign policy, but also financially. Britain quickly became the world’s one stop shop for Eurodollars. These were dollars, but made available for lending in Europe, and thus, critically, outside of the regulatory scope of the Federal Reserve.

This would prove particularly significant after the United States abandoned the gold standard. With American assent, the United Kingdom became the link in the financial chain between the two shores of the Atlantic – and later on, the rest of the world. On that bedrock, the City of London obtained its legendary status and spearheaded the phenomenal consolidation of European banks at the turn of the millennium.

Cameron’s High Risk Gamble

The meltdown of 2008 changed everything. It not only threatened to turn into a heart attack of the world economy, but it altered the geography of global finance, with American and Asian banks having more or less recovered, while European banks remained a shadow of their former selves. What, then, would be the UK’s role in this altered international environment? It is fateful that it would fall to David Cameron and his administration to answer this question.

As Prime Minister, Cameron quickly earnt for himself a reputation of a man who put party politics ahead of statesmanship. Starting with the Tory withdrawal from the EPP, Cameron pursued a confrontational strategy with the EU, in which he sought to win more concessions for Britain and placate the rumblings of Tory back-benchers.

It is undoubdted, therefore, that much of Cameron’s strategy of slamming the EU and undermining its authority was motivated by domestic calculations. However, it also fit the government’s vision for the future of the United Kingdom.

Cameron’s unimaginative strategy for the post-recession world was to replicate the strategy that had saved Britain’s prestige during the Cold War. After all, if the world was so hungry for Eurodollars, surely a market could be found for Chinese investment as well. With that in mind, London sought to reposition itself away from the Atlantic, and as the newfound financial link between China and the West.

Needless to say, the prospect of helping China’s grand entry into world finance and the world market held promises of great profits and geopolitical clout. When Tory politicians talk of a Global Britain, this is what they envision. And with HSBC in the lead, Britain has now been marketing itself as the door to China for a number of years.

What was perhaps underestimated in London was the political price of this strategy. The Chinese gamble profoundly displeased the United States, particularly as it became more and more apparent that the relationship was completely one-sided, with Britain giving way to increasing Chinese demands – a subservience that was strongly criticised by American diplomats in 2015.

Likewise, such a move put Britain on a clear course of competition with the European Union: not only was it harder for Britain to pursue a high-risk strategy as a member, but it was also harder to befriend the new hegemon. Neither the EU nor its members had any patience for the unilateral freedom of action the UK now demanded.

To reiterate: at the same time as Cameron was set on a collision course with Europe, he proceeded to also alienate Washington by enacting a policy of cooperation with a dictatorship that represents the greatest political challenge currently faced by the United States. The risks inherent to this strategy look high enough; they become even higher when we consider that there is a crucial difference between the Eurodollar system and the British-Chinese connection. The former was both an economic and a political alliance, but with Beijing there are no such guarantees. The financial ties are not shielded by friendly and long-standing political friendships.
The weakness of this strategy became fully apparent when Cameron lost control of his own referendum.

Intriguing with Allies: Brexit and Power Competition

If a recurring theme can be found when discussing Cameron’s tenure in government, it’s the complete failure to understand the priorities of his own allies. For years, Cameron shunned the EU and sought approval from Angela Merkel instead, firm in the belief that Brussels was powerless and that Germany ultimately called the shots. He also believed that German car-makers were the real grey eminence behind EU politics, and as such, they would eventually persuade Merkel to let Britain do what it wanted, so as not to lose export opportunities in the UK.

This, naturally, proved incorrect. Angela Merkel went on record multiple times, stating that the EU was far more important to German security, and the European Commission stubbornly refused to be sidelined. But all warnings fell on deaf ears in Downing Street. As recently as 2014, the administration claimed that Merkel viewed Cameron as the “naughty nephew”.

It is perhaps bewildering that one of the most developed countries on the planet based an extremely risky foreign policy on the assessment that its Prime Minister was simply too adorable to take no for an answer, but it is the reality we must contend with, when discussing the road taken by the United Kingdom after the recession.

After Cameron’s disgraced exit from politics in June 2016, the Tories have hardly abandoned this logic. David Davis and others were buoyant that Barnier and the European Commission could be bypassed entirely, if only an agreement was struck with Berlin.

Power is a word that is rarely mentioned in European politics these days, and yet there can be no doubt that the United Kingdom framed Brexit negotiations as a question of classic European power competition. By offering German carmakers access to the British market, London would in effect earn the right to become the leader of the continent. And if the bilateralism this requires led to the dismantling of the EU, so be it.

Just as with the American displeasure at British subservience to China, once again the miscalculation of its own allies made it impossible for Britain to pursue its goals. In the end, Brexit was negotiated with Barnier and the European Commission. Regardless of the outcome, which remains uncertain at time of writing, the fact of the matter is that the original Brexit strategy failed miserably.

The Die Is Cast

Independently of how Brexit ends and what lies in wait for British-American relations, the crucial part of Cameron’s plan has already been enacted. As revealed by the Bank of England, British banks are significantly more exposed to China than other European banks, not to mention the Americans. This represents a twin risk: political and financial.

Politically, as we have already seen, the idea (predominant in the 1990s) that power competition was no longer a factor in economic development is now no longer taken seriously. It is openly acknowledged that the rise of China presents a challenge to the West and to the United States. The comments by American diplomats that constant concessions are no way to handle a rising power are a case in point: it is highly doubtful that Britain can juggle a political alignment with its traditional allies, while giving way to Beijing on an increasing amount of matters.

Financially, exposure to China implies severe credit risks. Should Chinese finance so much as sneeze, the City of London would be the first Western financial hub to suffer the consequences – much like in 2008, when the meltdown of the recession nearly stopped the flow of transatlantic finance cold in its tracks.

Of course, in the complex reality of the world economy, everyone would suffer from a Chinese meltdown. Even the relative troubles of 2015 had profound effects on international finance. Nevertheless, in an attempt to salvage its primacy in world finance, Britain has already placed itself first in the line of fire, and this will remain true irrespective of future relations with the United States or the final outcome of Brexit. The future of British finance, and by extension the British economy, now lies with the fortunes of the Communist Party in China.

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The European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator Guy Verhofstadt recently stated that there could be no such thing as progress in the negotiations until a solution is found on this matter (The Guardian 2018). A “hard Brexit” and the consequent introduction of custom checks would damage the Irish economy, which for both geographical and cultural reasons is deeply integrated with the UK. The Kingdom’s investments in its small neighbour accounted for 30% of the Irish GDP in 2013 and multiple financial institutions operate transnationally between London and Dublin (Global Counsel 2015, 33). However, extremely low taxes – the corporate tax rate is 12,5% – and lax regulations are attracting several financial institutions especially from London, which are likely to contribute to the 6,7% GDP projected growth for this year (Foreign Policy 2018).

Although not all economists agree on the estimates of UK’s economic performance after Brexit, especially in the long-term (Begg & Mushövel 2015, 5), it is widely accepted that the event itself triggered the sudden depreciation of the sterling compared to the stronger Euro (Financial Times 2017) and general distrust of investors towards the British market; this reaction is above all a result of stagnating negotiations and uncertainty on their outcome. Infact, UK’s place in world economy after Brexit is still to be found, and most certainly will not be in the single European market, as declared by Prime Minister Theresa May in her 12-point plan (The Telegraph 2017).

Debates on whether the UK would seek affiliation to the EU in a looser way or completely isolate itself from the continent after its possible exit have been going on for years, even before the referendum was ever conceived by British policymakers.

The European Economic Area

The European economic framework comprises multiple “layers” of regional economic spaces with different degrees of integration. The Eurozone represents the most integrated area; its 19 members are part of a customs union, where a common tariff is set for goods entering the economic area (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2015, 290), the single market, which embodies the 4 freedoms – free movement of goods, capital, services and labour – and the monetary union, which provides the members with a common currency primarily aimed at keeping prices stable. Together with the remaining 11 non-euro member states, including the UK, these states constitute the European Union.

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), instead, comprises Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. These countries are not part of the customs union, and the latter three have access to the single market since the 1994 Agreement on the European Economic Area. Their economic contribution to the European Union budget is nonetheless of a lower amount compared to the EU member states; moreover, beside having an independent trade policy, they are exempted from participating to what is commonly known as Political Union and can autonomously determine the Value Added Tax (VAT) level (Schwok & Najy 2013).

Switzerland has been granted a particular economic status in 1994 which gives it the possibility to reach bilateral agreements with the EU and consequently retain more economic sovereignty. These agreements have been divided into two groups, Bilateral I and Bilateral II. The contract regarding Bilateral I between the EU and Switzerland contains a so called “Guillotine Clause”, that would make all the agreements null if Switzerland had to fail to implement one or more (European Parliament 2010, 11).

Where to look after Brexit?

The Leave campaigners’ main issues with the European Union are mostly of economic nature. The main one is the overall budget contribution. With 0.5% of its GDP sent to Brussels (Center for European Reform 2016, 38), UK is the largest contributor to the EU budget after Germany, making it one of the large net contributors.

The second complaint concerns the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which the United Kingdom has always been opposed to since its inception and which the country is helping fund through its budget. The CAP is responsible for raising the food prices for British consumers, but it also helps the poorest rural areas such as Cornwall by subsidizing local farmers (ibid. 16).

The third main reason can be found in the major influx of EU citizens the UK experienced in the last decades. This immigration wave, blamed for the depression of domestic wages (Woodford 2016), triggered a harsh reaction from the most conservative parts of British society and contributed to the results of the 2016 referendum.

Considering the above mentioned driving issues behind Brexit and the latest declarations by Prime Minister May to not let a second Brexit referendum happen, it now looks like a provision deal may have been reached, unless the current government loses its majority in the Parliament. While the details of the deal have not been shared yet, it is my opinion that this will entail a compromise of some sort on the free movement of people, the most sensitive topic for Irish citizens and the Remain campaigners, who still constitute a large minority – or could now constitute the new majority (Politico 2018).

As for the possible scenarios, a renowned standard membership to the EFTA as that of Norway would imply “regulations without representation” (CER 2016, 40) and would leave the UK bound to most of the single market constraints, angering the anti-EU base. Moreover, its budget contribution to the EU would only fall by 9% (Ibid. 110). A normal free trade agreement, like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, would not grant the UK sufficient access to the single market. Switzerland’s case offers an interesting example for a middle ground scenario that would neither leave Britain completely isolated nor obliged to follow most EU regulations.

The case for imitating Switzerland

In case of a deal with the EU, an arrangement similar to the one currently in force with Switzerland could help mitigate – but not eliminate – Brexit’s negative long-term economic effects in the UK and would represent a compromise likely to be welcomed by those who most fear a no-deal scenario. First, it must be noted that the UK’s contribution to the budget would fall by 55% (ibid.). Secondly, the British government would be able to negotiate independently again with third-party countries (Schwok & Najy 2013). To this regard, it should be stressed that together with the other EFTA countries, Switzerland was faster than the EU to sign trade agreements with Canada, Ukraine and South Korea, indicating higher flexibility on this matter (ibid.).

In order to extend the space for maneuver and placate the pro-EU population, the government could also try to obtain favourable economic agreements with the European Union by announcing a referendum on Schengen membership. Switzerland has currently signed multiple bilateral agreements concerning different matters (Clements 2014, 39) allowing for a non-automatic reception of EU legislation for most sectors. This aspect would be of great value for the UK, which has always felt uncomfortable with accepting the exclusive competence of the EU governance bodies on certain policies. 

Moreover, under a Swiss model arrangement the European Court of Justice, historically disliked by the UK for its legal interventionist attitude, would not to have any say in disputes between Great Britain in the EU. It is of note that only a few disputes have been occurred between Switzerland and the EU in the last 20 years of bilateral relationship (Schwok & Najy 2018, 8). Finally, as we are talking of a Swiss model, the way in which the bilateral agreements would be carried out would not necessarily have to follow the same tortuous path. Considering the established participation of the UK in the single market, the respective negotiators would not have to start from scratch.

However, while a Swiss kind of arrangement seems the most convenient option for the UK, British negotiators have to face a few obstacles to enjoy its benefits. First, in the last years the EU has showed dissatisfaction over the bilateral framework and called for Switzerland to integrate the acquis communitaire in greater measure and in a more uniform way (Schwok & Najy 2013). Second, Britain might be pushed to join the EFTA to secure a Switzerland-like arrangement and maintain trade agreements with its members; With regards to the UK’s membership, despite the favourable position laid out recently by the Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg (The Independent 2018), this could entail a long and difficult negotiation.

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden.

Bibliography

Baldwin, R. & Wyplosz, C. 2015. The economics of European integration. McGraw-Hill Education.

Begg, I. & Mushöve, F. 2016. The economic impact of Brexit: jobs, growth and public finances. London School of Economics.

Center for European Reform (CER). 2016. The economic consequences of leaving the EU.

Clements, B. 2014. Britain Outside the European Union. Institute of Economic Affairs.

European Parliament. 2010. Internal market beyond EU: EEA and Switzerland. Directorate-General for internal policies.

Financial Times. 2017. Brexit is an obvious culprit for a weak pound.

Foreign Policy. 2018. Britain Isn’t Just Losing Brexit. Europe Is Winning It.

Global Counsel. 2015. Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU.

Politico. 2018. UK support for Remain jumps in EU survey.

Schwok R. & Najy, C. 2018. Evidence presented at the House of Commons, exiting the EU Committee. UK Parliament.

Schwok R. & Najy, C. 2013. UK returning to EFTA: Divorcee at 40 and going back to mom and dad?. Written evidence at the Foreign Affairs Committee, UK Parliament.

The Guardian. 2018. May was first to raise option of transition extension, says EU

The Independent. 2018. Brexit: Norway drops objection to Britain staying in single market via European Economic Area.

The Telegraph. 2016. Theresa May confirms Britain will leave Single Market as she sets out 12-point Brexit plan.

Woodford. 2016. The Economic Impact of Brexit. Working Paper.

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As the Sudeten crisis brewed, Derek Rawnsley and Charles Kimber – colleagues and fellow students – decided to speak out against the state of anarchy of the international system. According to them, this left unpunished the criminal actions taken out by the authoritarian regimes. The object of the critique was the League of Nations. Already in the Twenties, men like Kurt Tucholsky and Richard Von Coudenhove-Kalergi had argued how the anomalous structure of the League paralyzed it.

The setting up of the League of Nations followed Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points declaration in 1918. Here, the idealist American President outlined a new order based on the principles of peace and liberty supervised by an international organization

The experiment ultimately failed, as the League lacked of its own armed forces. No country was willing to give up its sovereignty to defend collective security. Moreover, also due to the neo-isolationist wave that took on the country, the United States never became a member.

No military intervention was forthcoming to stop the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. When Fascist Italy declared war on Ethiopia (itself a member of the League) and unleashed chemical weapons against the population, only ineffective economic sanctions followed. The impunity of these two regimes, as Hitler himself claimed, assured Germany that it would not have found any obstacle on its way for Lebensraum.

According to federalists and radical internationalists, the League was clearly not enough. The world needed a democratic supranational government that could preserve peace and face the belligerence of nation-states.

A New Constitutional Project

Rawnsley and Kimber got to know Patrick Ransome, a journalist with a degree in international law, and invited him to join the adventure. The three began distributing pamphlets explaining the goal of the organisation: a democratic European federal union. Soon, hundreds of people showed their interest in Federal Union. At its peak, the organization could count on 200 branches and thousands of members.

A Panel of Advisers was formed, consisting of academics and political figures. Two of them were Lord Lothian, secretary of the UK Prime Minister at the Versailles Peace Conference, and Lionel Curtis, founder of the Royal Institute for International Affairs. These two were already active in the federalist landscape with several articles to their name. They were engaged in spreading the ideas contained in Union Now. This publication by New York Times journalist Clarence Streit called for a federal union between the United States, Ireland, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Federal Union kept growing and the founders decided to split it into different departments. Amongst these, a Research Institute, a Public Relations Department and a Central Office. Inspired by the Federal Convention of Philadelphia – which gave the USA its current federal structure – the organization drafted a federal constitution. The idea was to submit the document to all democratic countries that, if willing, would have called for a referendum on it. In case of a positive outcome, the Federal Union would have asked one of these countries to host an Institutional Conference to establish the definitive Constitution of the future federation together with the other agreeing states.

The Death of Federal Union

The constitutional project had little success. Ultimately, the organization became less and less important due to internal fights and diverging ideas. Additionally, they faced a lack of support from politicians and institutions both in Britain and abroad. What would prove to do its undoing, though, was the inability to find a compromise between Europeanists and Atlanticists.

In their enthusiastic support for unity, the British federalists somehow anticipated the mainland’s movement Paneuropean Union. However, the latter was more elitist and driven by a general sense of confederal unity rather than a federalist one.

This story sends an important message to the British people on the first anniversary of the Brexit referendum:. Don’t give up, there will always be a place for Britain in Europe. The Federal Union still exists today, you can visit its website here.

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Electoral System

There are 650 constituencies in the UK, which corresponds to the number of seats in the House of Commons. The current system in place requires citizens to cast their vote for one candidate within their own constituency, instead of voting for a party. The first candidate past the post in each constituency – that is the one with the most votes – is elected as an MP and holds a seat in the House of Commons, which is the lower House in the British parliament. The upper House, the House of Lords, remains unelected.

Main Parties

The UK has a considerable amount of political parties, although historically most of the Members of Parliament are affiliated with one of the two major parties. These are the Democratic Unionist Party and Labour, respectively on the centre-right and centre-left of the political spectrum. In recent decades, the centrist Liberal Democrats had also witnessed a rise in popularity, although this dropped after 2015.

In Scotland, it is the nationalist, social-democratic SNP which holds the majority of the seats, while in the other two devolved countries – Northern Ireland and Wales – it is respectively the Conservatives and Labour who have won the most constituencies.

Main issues

So what are the two main parties most concentrating on? To create a country ‘for the many, not for the few’, Labour is pledging the abolition of tuition fees and expansion of free childcare provisions; an increase in income taxes for the top 5% of earners; and a renationalisation of mail, rail and energy firms. They also aim to and to guarantee the ‘triple lock’, which ensures a minimum yearly increase in state pensions.

The Conservatives, instead, would scrap the ‘triple lock’ and universal free lunch schemes for pupils, and cut corporation taxes to 17%. They have also set a target reduction in migration below 100.000 people a year, and are planning an extra £8bn a year for the NHS – partially paid for by the tripling of health charges for migrant workers and international students.

And of course, the UK’s future relations with the EU have been key to influencing citizens’ votes, as well as being the most pressing issue for the EU. None of the six main parties is currently advocating to ignore or overturn the result of the referendum, but their proposals vary considerably.

On the hard Brexit end of the spectrum we can find UKIP and the Conservatives, both planning to take the UK out of the single market, the customs union and to end freedom of movement. On the other end we can find the Greens and the Liberal Democrats, who are not only proposing a soft Brexit retaining all freedoms, but also a ratification referendum on final deal with an option to remain in the EU.

An indefinite middle ground is held by the other two main parties in the race: SNP and Labour. Labour to have adopted a soft Brexit approach which will keep the UK in the single market and protect workers’ rights, while at the same time proposing to reform the management of migration. SNP, on the other hand, is fundamentally focused on Scotland. With no realistic possibility of forming the majority with only 59 constituencies to win, they have pledged to push for a second independence referendum after the terms of Brexit are known, in order to allow the Scottish people to reject a bad deal.

Polls

The 2015 elections gave rise to a Conservative government with Labour as main opposition, and history seems to be repeating itself: the Conservatives are leading with 44% in polls, and are set to largely increase the number of seats they hold in the House of Commons. However, Labour has witnessed a huge rise in public consensus ever since its manifesto was leaked, settling at around 38% of voting preferences.

Considering that the Conservatives held a 20-point lead when the election was announced, Labour’s come back has attracted quite a bit of attention. It is unlikely that they will manage to completely close the gap, but this will certainly be less of a landslide win for the Conservatives than was originally prospected.

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