While governments scrambled to take action in response to the early scandals of the 2010s, the adopted measures had significant loopholes. This prompted intense negotiations at the EU level to review the legislation. After more than four years in the works, the review of the Dual-Use Regulation is finally done. This regulation creates new rules for all those technology products which potentially have both civilian and military applications. But does final text uphold the expectations of human rights advocates?

Why exporting cyber-surveillance tech is an issue

In 2015 a massive data leak involving the Italian IT firm Hacking Team confirmed the company’s alleged sale of spyware to several authoritarian regimes over the previous years. Among its customers figured Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Ethiopia and Morocco. At the time of the sales, the World Press Freedom Index reported severe breaches of the rule of law and press freedom in all the above-mentioned countries.

The main products sold by Hacking Team were so-called Remote-Control Systems (RCSs). The RCSs are intrusion software which covertly infect electronic devices to collect stored data and incoming/outgoing communications. Unsurprisingly, subsequent investigations unveiled that the Moroccan and UAE Intelligence Agencies used the software to spy on human rights activists during the governments’ crackdown on the Arab Spring protests in 2012. In the same year, the Ethiopian government employed the software to spy on a collective of dissenting journalists.

Hacking Team was not alone in carrying forward this dirty business: the Surveillance Industry Index by the NGO Privacy International displays a long list of companies engaging in such unethical deals. Another notable case involves the same FinFisher which is currently under investigation. Its homonymous software was employed by a multitude of countries governed by repressive regimes, from Bahrein and Ethiopia to Vietnam and Turkmenistan.

By 2014, before the Hacking Team scandal unleashed, world governments had already updated the Wassenaar Arrangement control list. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the international control regime governing the exports of dual-use goods and technologies. Items such as intrusion software and Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance were added to the list.

The intrusion software by Hacking Team and FinFisher clearly fell under the arrangement’s scope, but many technologies were intentionally left out. Indeed, a recent investigation by Amnesty International revealed that European companies continued to export surveillance tools despite the disastrous human rights records of their customers; such technologies did not fall under the scope of the Arrangement’s updated control list. However, the companies also failed to carry out their due diligence obligations. In this context, due diligence is a principle whereby companies make sure that the products they are going to sell may not be misused by their customers.

In 2015, the French multinational Morpho (now Idemia) sold facial recognition equipment to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau in China. The corporation later introduced an internal policy forbidding to sell surveillance equipment to Chinese authorities, but it should be evident by now that private companies cannot be exclusively left to self-regulate. The People’s Republic of China is implementing mass surveillance projects like Skynet and Sharp Eyes throughout the mainland without any regard for the privacy of its citizens, a fundamental human right as defined in Article 12 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In Xinjiang, the Chinese government is enforcing repressive policies against Uyghurs, the region’s main ethnic group. These policies include segregation, internment, forced sterilization, cultural erasure and mass surveillance. Yet, this did not stop another European company, the Dutch Noldus Information Technology, from selling face reading technology to the Xinjiang Normal University for “scientific and research purposes” in 2018. At the time, the crimes of the Chinese regime were public knowledge already.

The indiscriminate export of such double-edged technologies clearly appears problematic. The end-use of cyber-surveillance is inextricably linked to the political context of the importing countries. Unscrupulous regimes secure their own survival by crushing dissidents and subjugating entire populations: their wrongdoings should not be facilitated by European cutting-edge technology.

The reform of the Dual-Use Regulation

On November 9^th, the EU finally took important steps forward in this regard: the three main institutions, namely the Commission, the Council of the EU and the Parliament, concluded trilogue negotiations to revise the 2009 Dual-Use Regulation. Cyber-surveillance technology is now comparable to other dual-use goods, and as such must be subject to export controls when there are risks of misuse by the countries of destination.

After six (!!!) years of negotiations on new #dualuse control regulation the destination port is near.Chaired a really constructive trilogue.Thank you for the great work @EU2020DE @DRedonnet @Trade_EU the #EP rapporteur @MarketkaG + shadows @svensimon @LSchreinemacher @EP_Trade pic.twitter.com/BrH8WqesYP

— Bernd Lange (@berndlange) September 22, 2020

The updated text features a number of important provisions. In particular:

• Definition of cyber-surveillance technology. The definition is quite broad in scope and includes items such as monitoring centres and data retention systems as well as intrusion software. Overall, cyber-surveillance items which enable to covertly monitor, extract, collect and analyse the data of natural persons fall under the scope.
• Autonomous EU export control list. The text gives way to the creation of an EU autonomous list, independent from the one established under the WA. It will contain all the dual-use items in the single market subject to export control. This will allow public authorities to add more swiftly new specific items to the list.
• Transparency. The Commission will be tasked with providing the Parliament and the Council an annual report illustrating the enforcement progress of the regulation. Member States will be obliged to furnish relevant data to the Commission for that purpose. This will enable the public to name and shame those Member States which fail to properly enforce the regulation.
• Catch-all clause. The catch-all clause enables authorities to add non-listed cyber-surveillance technologies to the control list in case potential abuses linked to the violation of human rights by the final users were to be identified.

Where to next?

With the new dual-use regulation, the EU finally confronts a long-existing issue, a source of profound discomfort among those who hold European values dear. Nevertheless, ambiguous wording and inexistent references to certain technologies could make the text less impactful than actually needed. Firstly, biometric technology is never explicitly mentioned. Indeed, the text defines cyber-surveillance technology as uniquely “covert”. This particular wording may potentially result in the exclusion of facial recognition systems, usually employed in public spaces, from the scope of the definition.

Secondly, it appears that the addition of new items to the control list will require a unanimous decision by the 27. Such caveat should not come as a surprise: some Member States have repeatedly tried to water down the text’s most stringent articles. While the Commission and the Parliament made themselves bearers of bold proposals, the Council took a more conservative stance by taking the side of the surveillance industry.

All in all, the recast of the dual-use regulation represents a meaningful achievement for the prevention of human rights violations abroad. Despite the loopholes, European companies will surely have a hard time supplying oppressive regimes and agencies with the technology they need to spy on their own citizens. Now it is up to Member States to properly enforce export controls as contemplated by the traditional division of competences.

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Eurogroup finance ministers agreed on a 540 billion-euro package to be used at the European level as financial firepower; the text also foresees a future Recovery Fund that will be financed through “innovative instruments”. The European Investment Bank (EIB) will guarantee loans of 200 billion euros with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises. The funds to draw from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amount to a maximum of 2% of each Member State’s GDP, meaning that 240 billion in total could be employed. The Eurogroup also welcomed the Commission’s proposal for a “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE), a loaning scheme providing up to 100 billion euros to help rescue workers and their jobs.

During the negotiations, the Netherlands did not buckle over Eurobonds, an instrument that according to the Dutch finance minister Hoekstra “will not help Europe in the long term”. The Netherlands, however, had to concede over the conditions of the ESM fund: loans targeted to cover healthcare-related costs will come with no strings attached, while conditions would be applied to revive the economy.  Eurobonds (dubbed coronabonds amid the current crisis) were originally advanced by Italy, Spain and France and six other Member States in a letter sent to the President of the European Council Charles Michel.

Many citizens welcomed the agreement negatively. In Italy, calls for Italexit are mounting while some European citizens display concerns over the real use of the allocated funds by the most indebted countries. To clarify the most salient points, here are three key takeaways from the Eurogroup’s negotiation:

1 – This outcome was to be expected: Eurobonds are a sensitive issue

The issuing of Eurobonds could take different shapes and modalities. However, a core pillar of the concept is that these new financial obligations would be jointly guaranteed by the Eurozone countries and issued by a supranational or intergovernmental institution. Being guaranteed by fiscally sound countries as well, these new obligations would decrease the borrowing costs for governments, primarily benefiting highly indebted countries.

The Commission already proposed several forms of Eurobonds in the past, but it was met with timid responses from countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. While it is not clear what effect Eurobonds would have on the existing debt, some economists argue that borrowing costs would converge, meaning that countries like Germany would lose out of the initiative. Moral hazard and free riding constitute another concern. Northern countries and fiscal conservatives fear that inefficient governments could take advantage of these bonds to overspend and avoid fixing structural problems afflicting their economic systems.

The mutualization of debt is a sensitive issue to many, and Italian citizens should think twice before painting themselves as outraged victims of the EU. Southern countries generally suffer from rampant corruption, waste of public money and high rates of tax evasion. Proving to the rest of the European family that they are committed to fixing these problems would be an excellent step in the right direction.

Furthermore, from a strictly economic point of view, the refusal to set up Eurobonds is not as tragic as it seems. The European Central Bank is already supporting the hardest-hit countries with its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which led to a fall in borrowing costs for Italy and therefore more financial levy to support its economy. The ECB also decided to accept junk-rated Greek government bonds to support the country during this emergency.

2 – Prejudices and irresponsible media are weakening our Union

The new coronavirus is a symmetric shock with asymmetric consequences which Spain and Italy did not bring onto themselves. The Dutch Minister Hoekstra was forced to apologize after his inexcusable remarks about Southern Eurogroup countries’ ability to face the looming economic crisis. In dire times of great suffering, such declarations from government officials, even if legitimate, feed mutual distrust between citizens of different Member States.

Many in the North of Europe see Italy as a bottomless pit which thrives out of European funds, forgetting the country’s role as founder and third net contributor of the EU budget and thus its fundamental role in the very financial sustainability of the EU. While problems are certainly present, stereotypes should never dominate public debates, especially in such delicate times.

The media have a great responsibility in conveying information from Bruxelles to European citizens. The weak public relations skills of the EU together with the language differences within the bloc, make national media the main harbingers of information to each country’s public opinion. The current international support to Italy is a topical case example: while the EU and its Member States have factually given and promised to Italy more support to face the epidemic than any other foreign power, many Italians still believe that China and Russia did more than the EU or that the EU did not support Italy at all.

Some might argue that this is the price to pay for the shameful refusal of Germany and France to send face masks to Italy at the onset of the emergency. However, few Italians know that the masks eventually reached the country thanks to the intervention of the European Commission. The media did not communicate such news as strongly and convincingly as they did with the negative news. Actually, they did not communicate it at all.

3 – A European Federation is still urgently needed

The federal government of the United States can adopt fiscal transfers to help poorer states recover from asymmetric economic shocks – rich states like New York or California sustain the finances of Arkansas and Mississippi in unfortunate times. After Germany’s unification, the federal government of Germany imposed a solidarity tax on the country’s rich western regions to foster the growth of its eastern territories, once controlled by the German Democratic Republic. Such measures are obviously unpopular within the richest regions, but it is difficult to find independent countries where some form of fiscal transfer from industrialized to poor regions is not in place. This also indirectly benefits richer regions, which find new customers and reinvigorated markets for their products and services.

European Member States are surviving in a multipolar world order where competing with emerging superpowers like China has become extremely difficult, also in military terms. The European Union represents the ideal platform to confront these powers as a unified bloc. However, the uncompleted integration process is revealing all its costly shortcomings. The EU can hardly be considered an independent foreign policy actor and its budget is completely inappropriate to face issues such as climate change and even pandemics in a coherent way. Yes, countries are also responding individually with their own resources, but this approach could also end up exacerbating existing disparities.

If some Member States are left with insufficient financial help, they could turn to China in search of more favourable credit lines. The signature of Memorandums of Understanding over the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative gives us a glimpse of what a more fragmented and less cohesive Europe could entail. China is known to use debt-trap diplomacy: this would risk leaving to the Asian power the control of key European assets and infrastructures.

While maybe politically unfeasible right now, the set up of Eurobonds must still be pursued to finally pave the way for a fiscal union and eventually a political union. When Eurogroup Member States realized that a Greek default would cause a grave rupture in the entire Eurozone, they set up the European Stability Mechanism because EU treaties did not allow direct fiscal transfers to the needy regions of the Union. It is time to rethink that mechanism. Leaders should, however, take into account democratic accountability in the process, in the hope that European citizens will come to realize that in unity lies strength.

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Aylward appeared to tacitly embrace the “One China Principle“, the tenet of the Communist Party of China (CPC) asserting that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) represents the only legitimate Chinese state. In 1949 a ferocious civil war changed China for ever: the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) heading the Republic of China (ROC) was defeated by the CPC; its leaders and members were forced to flee the mainland and repair on the Isle of Formosa, commonly known as Taiwan. Here, they relocated the ROC government. Since then, the CPC has refused to recognize Taiwan as an independent country and Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that Communist China will eventually take control of the island.

This stance had also ramifications on Taiwanese membership of international forums. Indeed, when in the Seventies the United States started to consider Communist China an interlocutor and an opportunity to gain an advantage over the Soviet Union, Taiwan lost its UN membership to the PRC and consequently its participation to UN bodies like the WHO.

Amid the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, however, Taiwanese authorities have proved extremely capable of containing the spread of the virus, with the country being internationally praised for its timely and effective response. Despite the emergency situation, Taiwan remains left out of the WHO. China keeps opposing to any official recognition of the Taiwanese government, but the small island could have a lot to offer in terms of experience in dealing with the virus.

Extending the Arm of Friendship

In Europe, one person recently emerged as a strong supporter of an independent Taiwan: the Mayor of Prague Zdeněk Hřib. Doctor by profession and politician from the Czech Pirate Party by vocation, last October Hřib severed ties with Beijing by cancelling a sister agreement between the two cities. Two months later he announced that Prague would sign a new deal with Taiwan’s capital Taipei. On January 2020, Taipei replaced Beijing as Prague’s sister city, an event that saw the mayor Ko Wen-Je visit the Czech capital to sign the agreement. The text established cooperation in areas such as education, culture and tourism.

Hřib opposed the “One China Policy” clause contained in the previous agreement with Beijing, according to which Prague was forced to recognize the PRC as the legitimate Chinese state. Following the new agreement with Taipei, the Chinese city of Shangai, also twinned with Prague, protested furiously and cut ties with the Czech city, as its mayor “had interfered in China’s internal affairs, and openly challenged the One China principle”.

Aside from the refusal by China to host the tour of the Prague Philarmonic Orchestra, it is probably too early to say if this move came with considerable costs in terms of trade with China. However, the benefits are already apparent. In early March, Taiwan sent to Prague important information regarding the country’s response to the epidemic, including big data analytics, the actions taken by date by Taiwanese authorities and hygiene education materials. Hřib provided to share the information with the national authorities.

Prague Leads, Czechia Follows

The mayor of Prague is not alone in his effort to forge a stronger relationship with Taiwan. Last January a planned visit to Taiwan by a high-level Czech politician prompted a quick response from China, which warned the European country of severe repercussions on its exports to China if the country had gone forward with its plan. While the visit did not take place, it is evident that many in Czechia oppose the country’s pro-China path inaugurated by the President of the Republic Miloš Zeman. Together with several European countries, the Czech Republic signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Chinese One Belt One Road Initiative and Zeman himself declared his intention to turn his country into “China’s gateway to Europe”.

The Czech dissident Vaclav Havel always highlighted the importance of morality in international relations and, drawing up from his confrontations with the Soviet Union, supported Tibet in its fight against Chinese imperialism. As Havel’s political heirs, Hřib and the Pirate Party are concerned that with China becoming more assertive, human rights will just become a buzz word.

Taiwan represents a drop of democracy in an ocean of authoritarianism. If the EU wants to reinforce its position as a normative power, it should take a clear stand and challenge the One China Policy when this prevents fruitful cooperation with Taiwan and threatens international public health and the very existence of a democratic country.

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The Security Council of the United Nations issued the first sanctions concerning the Iranian nuclear program in 2006, following resolution 1696. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had previously stated in a report that Iran was not following the rules of the Safeguards Agreement on uranium enrichment. After a first warning, the UN imposed sanctions due to Iran refusing to comply with said rules.

However, some countries had already begun talks with Iranian authorities in the early 2000s when it was already clear that Iran had set up a secret nuclear program for military purposes. With the Tehran Declaration of 2003 and the Paris Agreement of 2004, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France settled the matters momentarily through diplomatic efforts and an informal framework for the negotiations called E3. These three countries are the “lead group” or the “contact group” of the EU in this issue. Russia, China, and the United States later joined the framework and took part in the negotiations until an agreement was reached in 2015.

In mid-2004, the three European countries decided to involve the EU in the process to increase the political leverage vis-a-vis Iran. They opposed the involvement of the “foreign affairs troika” (the High Representative, the Council Presidency and the Commissioner for External Relations) as it would have enlarged the weight of bureaucracy in the negotiations.

Enter Solana: The First High Representative

They opted for the inclusion of the High Representative only, a post at the time occupied by the experienced Spanish diplomat Javier Solana. Such an alternative offered a good compromise: the general interest of the EU would be safeguarded through his presence, but the process would not suffer from the inclusion of additional Member States that could risk slowing down the pace of negotiations.

In the beginning, Italy was expected to take part in the joint framework as a major commercial partner. However, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi expressed concerns over the country’s economic relations with Iran and kept the government out of negotiations in spite of continuous bilateral talks with the Iranian authorities. Berlusconi also had strong ties with the Bush administration and did not want to displease Washington. Italy’s participation, however, would have been strongly welcomed by the Iranian authorities.

Javier Solana had a long diplomatic career behind him. He served as NATO Secretary General and as such supervised the Allied operations in the Balkans during the war in Kosovo, distinguishing himself by containing rivalries between Slavs and Albanians in Macedonia. Due to his previous experience with nuclear proliferation, as well as briefings by the E3 after every round of negotiations, he was deemed fit for the role the countries were entrusting him with.

The inclusion of the High Representative offered the E3 greater legitimacy and also access to the EU assets, although limited before the setting up of the External Action Service (EEAS). Solana had strong Atlanticist credentials but did not follow neoconservative thought. As a result, the United States, Russia, and China saw him as a moderate figure that could be trusted. He served as a bridge between the West and the two Asian powers also thanks to the personal network of contacts and relations cultivated during his tenure at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NATO.

It can be argued that the inclusion of Javier Solana boosted the image of the EU abroad as a united bloc. Indeed, the E3/EU group ended up representing all member states during the negotiations. While Germany, the United Kingdom, and France remained the main players behind the main discussing points of the deal, Solana played an important role in presenting a collective European position during the talks.  Indeed, Solana embedded the figure of the High Representative in the negotiations and confirmed its importance for what concerns the representation of the EU at the international level.

Ultimately, the role of the High Representative before the inclusion of the US, China, and Russia was secondary. The E3 counted on the advice of Solana and his assistant Robert Cooper, but they did not shape the negotiations. The EU had to act as a united bloc when the number of participants increased and the HR constituted the added value needed in that situation.

Indeed, Solana often represented the E3 during the talks. For instance, he met with the chief negotiator Ali Larijani several times, representing the position of the EU as a whole. Solana had direct access to the foreign ministers of the E3 so that a common position could be agreed upon. In 2007, when negotiations stalled, he proposed a “double suspension” that would entail both, a momentary freeze of nuclear enrichment by Iran and the removal of sanctions by the P5+1.

The Lisbon Treaty and Catherine Ashton

With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the High Representative became a double-hatted figure. The division of competences between Javier Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations had never been resolved before resulting in, at times, prominent conflicts and inter-institutional competition. The new reforms simplified the hierarchic structure and entailed the set up of a European diplomatic service (the EEAS). Ultimately, the High Representative also assumed the role of Vice-President of the Commission and became head of both the EEAS and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

With Catherine Ashton replacing the Spanish diplomat, the role of the High Representative in the negotiations changed slightly. Ashton did not possess the diplomatic skills of her predecessor but could count on the so-called “Iran people” working for the External Action Service. These officials briefed the High Representative before every round of negotiations so that she would have all the information needed at her disposal. Moreover, despite her different background, Lady Ashton had already dealt with issues concerning nuclear proliferation during her work for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the early Eighties.

Interestingly, Ashton had an excellent relationship with US Secretary of State John Kerry, who put much faith in her skills and considered her a fundamental asset for transatlantic relations on the issue. Indeed, the P5+1 decided to appoint her chief negotiator of the group after a decisive diplomatic move. When negotiations appeared on the verge of collapse, Ashton came up with the idea to include Mohammed Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, in the talks. Zarif had studied in the US in his youth and appeared more pro-West than other Iranian negotiators.

According to Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, a former member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Ashton was “discrete and perceptive, but also tenacious. That makes her an ideal negotiator”. Therefore we can argue that, at a certain point, the role of the High Representative went beyond representation and became active in part of the negotiations.

The High Representative in the Mogherini Years

Following the 2014 European elections, the European Council appointed the Italian politician Federica Mogherini as High Representative. Mogherini continued the work of her predecessors and, like Lady Ashton, heavily relied on EU officials in the EEAS. The staff, especially Helga Schmid, the EU expert in charge of the nuclear dossier, helped coordinate the final rounds of negotiations in 2014 and 2015 and provided her with relevant insights.

Mogherini controlled the agenda and the time for plenary and bilateral meetings between delegations and had contacts with other parties such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and US allies from Asia. Furthermore, Mogherini had a role in the wording of all versions of the deal. Helga Schmid closely collaborated with the US lead negotiator Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman and both worked on the conflict resolution mechanism without consulting the European national negotiators first.

The institutional reforms set up under the Lisbon Treaty certainly helped the EU in forming a foreign policy apparatus that could finally provide the Union with the telephone number Henry Kissinger was looking for some decades earlier. The negotiations with the Iranian authorities gave the High Representative a chance to test the newly adopted reforms. While the Iranian delegation was skeptic over the actual power of the High Representatives, the EU acquired an enhanced significance in the eyes of the other powers by ditspatching its diplomats.

Unfortunately, though, these institutional reforms had limits. The Common Foreign and Security Policy still suffers to this day from the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. Initiatives by the High Representative only become the policy of the EU if the Council agrees under a qualified majority vote.

Initially, the communication between the E3 and other Member States ran exclusively through national officials. The foreign ministers or minor officials of the E3 informed their peers on the progression of the negotiations during the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). When the High Representative stepped in, the HR was entrusted with said task.

The E3 and the HR decided not to involve other European institutions such as the Commission and the Council Presidency. While the Presidency was successfully kept out, it became difficult for the High Representative to retain the confidence of the Commission. First, the Lisbon Treaty made the HR vice-president of the Commission. Second, at the beginning of the nuclear talks, the Commission was negotiating a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran. The Commission did not separate the two dimensions as they used the TCA as leverage.

It’s interesting to inquire into the relationship between the E3 and the High Representative and to understand how the overall EU foreign policy changed throughout the last years. In 2016, for instance, the European Union adopted the European Union Global Strategy, replacing the European Security Strategy laid out by Solana in 2003. Drawn up under the authority of the High Representative Federica Mogherini, the Strategy gives great importance to her role and the European diplomatic corps.

The document states that lead groups, now considered a useful framework to carry out foreign policy actions, can “implement agreed positions of the Council upon invitation by the HR”. This differs from the action plan automatically adopted when negotiations with Iran started in 2003, where the E3 acted independently of the High Representative. This recent approach, of course, does not attract the sympathy of big member states, which are extremely protective of their sovereignty when it comes to foreign policy.

During the negotiations and afterward, newspapers and academics writing about the nuclear negotiations started speaking of the EU and the E3 interchangeably. This element does definitely play in favour of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which embraced the “lead groups” formula in other occasions; for instance, the contact group for the Balkans (which included the US and Russia) and the Normandy Format framed by France and Germany after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014.

We can use the agenda-setting categories laid out by Princen (2011) to better understand the impact of the High Representative on the Iran deal and the previous negotiations. The categories are 1) Mobilizing Support, 2) Arousing Interest, 3) Building Capacity, and 4) Claiming Authority. The first two can be described by the strategy of “gaining attention”, while the latter two can be attributed to the strategy of “building credibility”. As the High Representative was invited by the E3, the first two categories fall short of importance in this case. Indeed, it was Germany, France, and the UK that mobilized the support for the HR and the EEAS, not vice versa. Moreover, the determination of the Iranian government to continue enriching uranium lead to an interest in urgent action.

However, once embedded in the framework of the negotiations the European Union, represented by its EEAS diplomats and the HR, gained visibility and became accepted as a full actor thanks to the organizational capacities at its disposal. As for “claiming authority”, the HR succeeded in doing so by relying on the expertise and reliability first provided by Javier Solana and then by the diplomats engaged with the nuclear dossier on Iran working for the External Action Service.

Conclusion

The EU has a long tradition of support for non-proliferation policies. Therefore, its dedication and interest in the negotiations with Iran should not come as a surprise. This case study offers an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy, especially as carried out by the High Representative. Indeed, all three HRs appointed to the post until now have dealt with the negotiations. Moreover, the effects of the Lisbon Treaty reforms can be observed through the new approach adopted starting from the tenure of Catherine Ashton in 2009 and the new capabilities provided by the External Action Service.

At the same time, there has also been a continuity in the way the EU representatives and negotiators carried out their duties. Based on the data available, the High Representative’s participation was not decisive, as the parties would have agreed to a deal even without the contribution of Solana, Ashton, and Mogherini. However, their presence helped enhance the stature of the EU on the world stage and made more difficult for the E3 to break ranks. Despite their limited significance, Solana and Ashton made smart diplomatic moves. Their network of contacts also helped the US and Europe present a united front to the Iranian delegation. During Trump’s presidency, this unity has been damaged by a diverging policy approach towards Iran.

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

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China’s reawakening might not have been as abrupt and disruptive as Smaug’s, but it has certainly contributed to the narrative shift we are witnessing today: the centre of economic gravity will soon lie elsewhere, in what a 16th-century explorer from the West would have naively called “the rest”. EU’s share of the world GDP (PPPs) will almost halve by 2050 and the European powers are destined to lose their position as top global economies (Pwc 2017); major Chinese cities can already boast GDPs comparable to those of entire European countries, while the Old Continent is set to become a demographic pigmy according to most scenarios (European Environment Agency 2016).

“Hide Your Strength, Bide Your Time”

The Dengist maxim “hide your strength, bide your time” was officially discarded in 2017, when China’s Paramount Leader Xi Jinping announced China’s grand entrance into the global geopolitical arena. Such participation had already begun when its markets silently opened to foreign investments, and the government promoted outward-looking policies such as Go Global/Go Out and Peaceful Rise. However, this new assertiveness has taken a bigger, forward-looking tone with the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR) inaugurated in 2013.

The OBOR is more of a long-term vision than a clear project. The strategy entails a multitude of investments in infrastructures such as railways, pipelines, industrial parks, ports and highways along two main routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. OBOR involves more than 65 countries, the majority of which are in the Eurasian continent. Indeed, the Chinese government aims to develop the country’s western provinces further by bringing back the central role that the ancient Silk Road played in transcontinental commerce between Europe and the Far East; moreover, unstable countries in Central Asia and poor infrastructures along the maritime route to Europe curtail the potential economic gains that well-connected and economically prosperous countries could offer.

An Economic Uproar

The recent choice by the Italian government to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concerning the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has shaken the West, with the EU’s budget Commissioner Oettinger even suggesting to confer the EU veto power over matters of such importance. The uproar comes amid parallel fears in different contexts, such as spying accusations involving the Chinese technology giant Huawei and disagreements at the WTO level, where China is constantly criticized for unfair practices like price dumping.

Researchers agree that Belt and Road could lead to great economic benefits, especially for those landlocked countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the heavily indebted Southern member states. Overall, trade in the EU could increase by 6% (Garcia & Xu 2017). Moreover, the importance of the Mediterranean ports has steadily increased in the last years, with most of the traffic from the Suez Canal favouring them over the northern ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg (Prodi & Fardella 2017); Italy aims therefore to enhance the role of its ports (Genova, Venice and Trieste especially) as the fourth European economic power trails behind France, UK and Germany in imports and exports to and from China, and also lags behind in terms of investments and capital circulation.

The Belt and Road Initiative Between Wealth, Power and Politics

Despite assurances from President Xi Jinping that the strategy would only lead to economic prosperity, the EU is right to approach Belt and Road with caution: Chinese state-owned giants are privileged actors in this endeavour and their interests might not always overlap with the EU’s; transparency and project sustainability are also important issues that China has not sufficiently dealt with until now. Economic theory teaches us that trade and interdependence favour the well-being of consumers and create bonds that help prevent unwanted events such as wars. With wealth, nevertheless, power and politics come into the equation.

The EU is clearly divided on the issue: last week the French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed Xi Jinping together with Angela Merkel and EU’s Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, seemingly signalling that a multilateral EU-wide framework is needed to gain the most benefits out of this challenge (or opportunity). Italy’s embrace of the BRI, the first G7 country to do so, could therefore push European member states to seek more unity, after the adherence to the MoU by other 11 member states (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia) failed to attract the attention needed. Not coincidently, on March 12 the Commission issued a meaningful press release referring to China as both a negotiating partner and a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”. It is quite a symbolic defeat to witness a systemic rival, embodied by the state-owned giant COSCO Shipping, owning 51% stakes in the Port Authority of Piraeus in Athens, the cradle of European democracy.

But it’s not too late. MoUs are non-binding cooperation frameworks and the agreements signed between Italy and China during Xi’s visit to Europe have limited economic impact and do not confer Chinese companies the ownership of vital infrastructures; more specifically, the arrangement concerning the ports of Genova and Trieste and the corporation China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) does not contemplate the acquisition of the ports’ authorities but rather aims to enhance connectivity to railway infrastructures. There is still time for the EU to find a more coherent approach and to take a leading role in the initiative: the EU represents the ending destination of all trade routes and has therefore leverage and say over the agreements taking place within its borders.

Intra-European competition, however, represents a major restraint to the stronger coordination needed at the EU level. Ports in the Northern Range (Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg) also benefited from Chinese capital; the hostility coming from Northern member states over the cooperation agreements signed between the Chinese companies and the Italian ports might, therefore, be driven by fears that the economic significance of such ports would be downsized. Indeed, Professor Bart Kuipers, an expert on port economics from the University of Rotterdam, argues that the planned railway connections in Southern and Central Europe would reduce the container traffic in the Northern range ports by 1,6%. New interconnection projects could even increase such percentage.

COSCO Shipping has a 35% stake in the new generation terminal Etr Euromax Terminal Rotterdam, and 20% in the Antwerp Gateway terminal, while a Chinese consortium led by CCCC (which also includes Ali Baba founder Jack Ma) has been awarded the contract for the construction of a new automated terminal in the port of Hamburg in 2017. The competition also arises within the Mediterranean, where ports in the Adriatic seek to supplant the centrality of the Piraeus.

The EU’s timid response to this reality does not offer an effective solution to China’s “divide et impera” strategy. Xi Jinping has been engaging with CEE countries through the “16+1 platform”, a transnational initiative which further endangers the cohesion of the EU on the matter.

A Commission Proposal Approval From the EU

After insistence from France, Germany and the previous Italian government, the European Parliament approved a Commission proposal contemplating a screening mechanism for Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), already existing in the world’s major economies. The vote, which took place last month, saw an overwhelming majority (500 in favour, 49 against). While “critical sectors” to protect, such as aerospace, media and health, have grown in number thanks to MEPs, Member States will still have the final say over such investments.

Supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Parliament have the potential to counter member states’ egoism and safeguard the Union’s common interest. However, the economic crisis has left economically weaker Member States in need of financial resources and are therefore more inclined to entertain bilateral relationships with foreign investors and oppose intrusion from the EU. Manfred Weber, formerly the European People’s Party’s Spitzenkandidat for the presidency of the European Commission, has spoken in favour of a measure that would allow the EU to decide on a case-to-case basis whether foreign investment is detrimental to the EU’s interests.

A Much Bigger Phenomenon

The role of the Belt and Road Initiative in Europe is only one component of a much bigger phenomenon:  the transformation of the world order as we know it. Regionalization has brought the emergence of power blocs and their respective spheres of influence without the need of a Cold War in the background; China’s rise is particularly worrying for the hegemonic United States, which fear that a Thucydides trap could be waiting at the next corner. Chinese claims over Taiwan, its unprecedented activism in Africa and assertiveness in the South China Sea, which threatens the international maritime law, also contribute to the cautious and often confrontational approach taken by Western powers over the OBOR.

The signature of the Memorandum of Understanding by a G7 economy might have offered an important boost towards a more harmonised line of action without having created irremediable rifts in the West and sold fundamental assets to a foreign power; moreover, the long-term essence of the Belt and Road Initiative and the usually short life-span of Italian governments might play in favour of those who are showing scepticism over the Chinese strategy, with an unexpected change in direction from the next Italian government.

The rationale behind this signature appears less surprising when Italy’s intra-government dynamics are taken into account: the two parties in power are divided on the issue; the Five Star Movement is championing closer relations with China in the likely intent to gain more leverage over Brussels with regards to budget flexibility. The North League opposed the signature, but it might have given up its opposition in a show of gratitude to the 5SM, whose votes in Parliament were crucial to forestall a trial on Matteo Salvini over the seizure of an NGO ship.

The Economic Relevance of the EU

Nevertheless, we should not let paranoia poison the debate. The stability of Central Asia is also in the interest of the European Union and so is the rebuilding of the hard-hit economies in Southern Europe. The Belt and Road Initiative presents an opportunity for both economic development and reform of domestic governance in the EU, provided that sensitive assets remain in control of European democracies. The issuing of the EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy last year may be the indication that the EU is ready to curb Chinese soft power in Asia, but the difference in terms of resources available and strategic capability does not play in favour of the Old Continent. Indeed, a more coherent structure, a bigger budget and more effective decision-making are needed for the EU to avoid losing economic relevance in the next decades.

More than ever, the EU’s policymakers should ask themselves whether it is time to step up the game and advance European integration or remain in the limbo where the European Union is currently stuck. Uncoordinated responses, diverging policies and overlapping initiatives do nothing but offer foreign powers the possibility to have the high ground in negotiations and extract concessions more easily. The Union has already shown its potential in matters of trade, where it has managed to carve out an important role as market power, and even in foreign policy, although exceptionally and with mixed results. However, with a budget representing only 1% of the EU’s GDP, the Union is unlikely to keep up with competing for power blocs in general investments and many of the relevant fields of the near future, such as artificial intelligence and space exploration/exploitation.  Of course, a long-term economic strategy such as the Belt and Road Initiative might not be the only factor. Donald Trump’s repeated criticism over Europe’s commitment to NATO, Russian rearmament, climate change migration flows can also change in the mindset of policymakers, both in Member States and EU institutions.

Bibliography

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

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Running parallel to Wilson’s initiative in the United States, a few intellectuals, politicians and activists in the Old Continent, whose bodies and minds still suffered the consequences of war, were starting to conceive a different configuration of Europe, one that would put into question the centrality of nation-states and their borders. They were the pioneers of contemporary European regionification (Van Langenhove 2011, 67).

The rise of regionification

Even though heavily influenced by French exceptionalism (Imbert 1989), the writer Jules Romaines imagined common economic institutions in Europe alongside with a European civil society. His ideas were shared by the French Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux, who even pushed for a single currency (Pasture 2015, 104). In their book European Federation or League of Nations?, published in 1918, the Italian economist Attilio Cabiati and the entrepreneur Giovanni Agnelli argued in favour of a European federation with legislative, executive and judicial powers (Ibid, 102). Following a similar line, the German pacifist and satirical author Kurt Tucholsky advocated for the United States of Europe (King 2001, 169) and criticized the intergovernmental structure of the LoN, that made the organization weak and ineffective against international crises.

Indeed, within Europeanist circles many voices raised in favour of the League’s reform and more precisely of its decentralization, so that it would shift its focus from the global level to a regional one. We could refer to this approach as “open regionalism”, which considered the LoN complementary to the deepening of regional integration (Richards 2012, 234).

However, demands of European unity did not come solely from pacifists and internationalists, but attracted attention from other areas of the political spectrum as well. Some conservatives and reactionaries made the case for a united Europe out of concern that Europeans and their colonies would lose their privileged centrality on the world stage in favour of the emerging powers such as US, Japan, USSR (Pasture 2015, 106)

These selected examples show that a certain willingness to shape a new regional community was already present in most of Western Europe decades before the first bricks of the European Union were laid. However, these sentiments were met with strong scepticism by policymakers and hardly attracted any support from common citizens.

The liberal internationalist underpinnings were targeted with harsh criticism especially by the classical realist school, which conceived the international system as inherently anarchic and state-dominated;. The absence of a global government with the monopoly of violence, according to them, left the international arena at the mercy of states and their pursuit of self-interest. Liberal internationalism would later be renamed “idealism” by classical realist scholars because of its prescriptive, rather than descriptive nature: internationalists dedicated much time to explain how the world should be, but not much to enucleate the causes of war and power politics (Carr 1939).

Kalergi: being European in the interwar period

It was the undertakings of Count Richard Von Caudenhove-Kalergi that left the mark of pan-Europeanism on the interwar period. Son of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat and a Japanese noble-woman, he grew up in a cosmopolitan environment that would mark his future self. His thought, sincerely pacifist as well as proudly conservative and aristocratic, can be acknowledged as a synthesis of the many integrationist voices raised in that period.

In the book Pan-Europa, published in 1923, he addressed the disunity of Europe in a world by that time grounded on regional blocs. He referred to the Soviet Union and the United States as military and financial dictatorships respectively, to which Europe had to represent an alternative. The third threat was to be found within Europe, and that was the perennial Franco-German rivalry. With a proposal that sounds prophetic today, he suggested to entrust a Pan-European Coal and Steel Community with the management of French and German resources (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer 2012, 92). However, Europe’s rationale to create a cohesive bloc was not only determined by external and internal threats; indeed, he conceived arts, science and the common Christian-Hellenic roots as potentially unifying factors (ibid, 97).

While Kalergi’s concept of united Europe was rather similar to those introduced by contemporary intellectuals, his aristocratic origins granted him access to a plethora of high-ranking contacts among European political élites that he employed to gather consensus around the idea. Throughout the interwar years and beyond, he committed with perseverance to the pursuit of peace and convinced notable personalities that the attempt to unite the continent in order to avoid another vicious conflict was worth of consideration.

Following the publication of the book, Kalergi set up the Pan-European Movement with the aim to popularize the program and pressure policymakers; the extent of his influence is represented by the Briand Plan. In 1929, following heavy persuasion from Kalergi, the French President put forward the idea of a “European federation” at the ninth Congress of the LoN after having previously discussed the issue with the German president Gustav Stresemann, who had agreed even though with less enthusiasm.

However, Britain’s opposition and Stresemann’s sudden death delivered a fatal blow to Briand’s plan (Stirk 1996, 37). Later on, Hitler’s rise to power endangered the very existence of the Pan-European movement, which eventually ended up being outlawed by the Nazi regime (ibid, 99). Like some of the personalities previously mentioned, Kalergi was initially hopeful that the LoN would help re-establish international peace, but as events unfolded – the 1936 Italian invasion of Abyssinia, for instance – he became dominated by a sense of frustration and disappointment.  Nationalism, indeed, had come to rule once again the European political scene, leaving no space to grand designs of revolutionary stamp.

Pan-Europeanism and regional awareness       

The idea of Pan-Europeanism can be analyzed more in dept through the theories of regionalism. Hurrell’s theoretical perspectives, in particular, can help shed light on the reasons that triggered integrationist activism and on the obstacles encountered on its way towards actual regionalization. Two levels of analysis strike as most useful in this context: the systemic and regional.

Systemic level

For what concerns systemic theories, neorealism is of little help in understanding the emergence of early pan-Europeanism but provides a rather satisfactory explanation on why it failed in its endeavour. While Kalergi feared that Europe would find itself unprepared in case of a Soviet invasion, there was no meaningful geopolitical pressure exerted by outside powers that would push European countries together during the interwar years. These, instead, were too busy at keeping Germany at bay, while the US were not considered competitors but generous allies (see the Young plan).

Constructivism stresses the importance of ideas, values and other non-material factors in international relations; Kalergi and other conservative Europeans saw in bolshevism a sword of Damocles hanging over Europe. But as long as Nazi Germany kept threatening its neighbours, only a few were paying attention to the propagation of the communist ideology from the East.

In summary, the fragmentation of Europe was indeed perceived by some as problematic in a global context where the Old Continent was being outpaced by new geopolitical powers – the two dictatorships, in Kalergi’s words – incubating dangerous ideologies. However these feelings were not widespread at all as the German Question monopolized the minds of European policymakers.

Regional level

The regional level of analysis offers more valuable insights on early Pan-Europeanism as it investigates intra-regional dynamics rather than outside-in global pressures (Hurrell 1995, 58), whose extent was at the time limited. A constructivist reading would focus on the role of ideas behind Pan-Europeanism and the mechanism of élite socialization conceived to transform the new imagined community (Anderson 1983) into something concrete.

Pacifists identified the nationalist ideology as a source of major concern for the stability of the continent. Indeed, inter-state hostilities had produced countless deaths in Europe’s battlefields only a few years before the Pan-European Movement was set up. Consequently, many feared that the heavy toll imposed on Germany with the Treaty of Versailles (1919) could revive negative sentiments and drive Europe towards another destructive war.

Kalergi devised a stepped process that would embed European countries into a supranational framework thus preventing them to wage war against each other. First a Pan-European conference and then a series of arbitrary treaties and a customs union (Stirk 1997, 26) would constitute a regional linkage eventually leading nations to mold reciprocal sentiments of solidarity. The cultural premises of such architecture were to be found in the Christian-Hellenic roots that European countries shared and the consequent “cognitive region” (Amitav 2012, 188) that these elements would potentially inspire.

However, national interests and material factors ended up prevailing over the ideational considerations put on the table. Despite attempts to expand the network, the process mainly involved personalities from European epistemic communities – diplomats, bankers, aristocrats, intellectuals; in fact, Kalergi’s Pan-European project suffered from an elitist, top-down and, to some, anti-socialist nature (ibid, 27) that would ultimately prevent it from reaching the masses and popularize its message. Regional awareness only concerned a small percentage of individuals as common citizens and most of government officials remained attached to the state-centric paradigm inaugurated centuries earlier with the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

The failure of the Briand Plan

The conceiving and failure of the Briand Plan can be better explained from a neorealist and regional perspective. It was strictly related to the interplay between France and Germany and, more in general, to the striving of Western countries to arrange a new balance of power in the continent. The plan was welcomed with mixed feelings by German officials. Some mistrusted Briand and saw in its proposal the creation of an anti-American organization that would overlap with the LoN and entrap Germany in a French dominated framework.

Although Briand spoke of a European Federation, he guaranteed that all the members would have retained full sovereignty. This contrasted with the very definition of federalism, which necessarily entails some kind of sovereignty transfer from the state to the federal level of governance. Ultimately, the Briand Plan can be understood as a tool for France to reassert its control over Germany, which it was progressively losing. This would later be testified in the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1935).

Britain also eventually opposed the plan, out of concern that it would interfere with the Kingdom’s transatlantic bonds and damage the cohesion of the empire. Moreover, the political nature of the plan deeply concerned both countries, as such leap forward would have threatened their autonomy (ibid, 37).

Conclusion

A similar dynamic would resurface in the post-WWII period, when Schuman presented his plan. France proposed once again a framework that would keep Germany under strict control. However, a definite contextualization could explain why this time the attempt was crowned with success.

First, the Community envisioned by Schuman was a strictly economic one (Schuman 1950). This setting, as neo-functionalists argue, triggered the spillover effects that would have ultimately led, out of necessity rather than out of idealism, to some form of political union (Söderbaum 2008, 480). Second, the US isolationist foreign policy of the interwar period had come to an end. Americans started challenging the USSR through a policy of containment that also involved pressures toward Western European countries to set up a flourishing economic community.

Lastly, with the Soviet geopolitical influence reaching the heart of Europe, the Christian-Democratic party élites at the time governing in most of Western Europe feared that communism would spread in their countries as well and therefore committed themselves to a regional solution.

Bibliography

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

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In 2012, through these words, the Nobel Committee awarded the European Union with its prestigious Peace Prize (The Nobel Foundation, 2012). The initial steps of European integration are generally regarded as major catalysts for change that helped transform a war-torn continent into a “security community”, as Karl Deutsch put it (Deutsch 1957; Nathan 2010, 6). Europe’s political fabric was stripped away of nationalist sentiments and unilateralism in favour of cooperation mechanisms and multilateralism.

To this day, EU citizens enjoy an unprecedented degree of freedom and prosperity guaranteed by a long-lasting period of peace – around 70 years – in which the spectre of war survives in the minds of a few elderly citizens but is understandably ignored by younger generations. Indeed, a war between current member states is deemed “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Robert Schuman, 1950).

The EU and Power Politics

These premises certainly confirm that EU member states have renounced the use of military force to solve intra-European disputes, successfully scaling back the role of power politics in conflict resolution. By partially transferring their sovereignty to newly formed institutions, the founding countries created a supranational system that favours diplomacy and dialogue over hard power. Before digging into the analysis of the research question, it is essential to give a precise definition of power politics.

While some sources stress the preeminence of military assets, others include economic might in the set of instruments that a given country has at its disposal to exert influence over rival entities. Therefore, power politics can be defined as a way for states to conduct international relations where military, as well as economic tools, serve the purpose of advancing self-interest at the expenses of other actors (Merriam-Webster, 2018). This concept is central to the realist theory, which conceives international relations as a continuous struggle between states to satisfy their need of security and promote their interests in order to survive in the anarchic international system (Wohlforth 2008, 133).

Rebuilding Europe After WWII

The new European order emerged from the ashes of World War II. The consequent peace experienced over the following decades do not necessarily entail the definitive demise of power politics. Throughout the last century, some major member states have continued to use military projection and their international stature to strengthen their position both over fellow members and not. Moreover, the European Union has seen multiple conflicts rage not far from its Eastern borders. Some of these persist today in the form of frozen conflicts in which the bloc is more or less involved, although not militarily.

Greater economic interdependence and supranational law might have drastically changed the way European states interact, but the topic needs to be further explored from a historical perspective. It must be stressed that, as European integration has come to embrace the political realm as well, the role of power politics deserves a thorough analysis that also includes the study of EU foreign policy, and thus the external dimension.

The term “peace” needs to be carefully defined as well. By accepting a “minimalistic interpretation” (Pasture 2014, 8) we can easily argue that most of Europe has evolved from being a ravaged battlefield to a haven of democracy and justice, offering an excellent real-world example to democratic peace theorists. Peace, therefore, might simply result from the absence of war and violence. However, confrontations can take place without firing a single shot and by recurring to other less destructive means (nuclear deterrence, cyber-attacks, military exercises, missile defence systems setups etc.). By taking into account this dimension of power politics, for instance, the period encompassing the Cold War can hardly be considered peaceful; the weapons were cold, yet the tempers were not.

The rationale for peace-building

While it is widely accepted that European integration contributed to peace-building, academics have long argued on the rationales behind it using different theoretical frameworks, consequently reaching different conclusions. It is my opinion that a comprehensive understanding can only be achieved by considering the multiple perspectives available in the literature. Most importantly, the importance of a thematic and staged approach must be acknowledged.

The approach must be thematic because some policies, events and breakthroughs might be better explained by one theory rather than another. For instance, Haas’ theory of neo-functionalism confers special importance to supranational institutions and spillover effects. Meanwhile theorists of intergovernmentalism argue that national governments held the lead in order to advance their interests inside the European Community.

Some policies, like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), relied on strong intergovernmental negotiations. Meanwhile, the setting up of the Monetary Union can be explained as a direct consequence of previous results in integration (spillover effect).

The staged process helps identify the best theory – or combination of theories – to read certain events in a delimited period of time. The early years of the European Community were of course characterized by the protagonism of national governments, which led to the setting up of supranational institutions in the first place. However, the period that saw the much-praised Jacques Delors guide the European Commission might best be unfolded by the institutionalist perspective and its underscoring of activism in supranational institutions.

The early stages of European integration can give us a glimpse of how power politics were still prominent at the time. France, Germany, Italy and the other member states were not fighting on battlefields any more. However, each state, whenever the occasion made it possible, tried to get the most benefits from the process.

Academics’ Approaches

Some intergovernmentalist scholars explain European integration as a way for states to rescue themselves (Milward 1992, 7). Although, this must not overshadow the importance of Monnet’s pragmatic idealism (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 63) and the founding fathers’ personal characters, distinguished by the shared universalist views and Christian values they relied upon. This is best exemplified by Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer’s leading roles in their respective Christian-Democratic parties (Verovšek 2017, 529).

Because of their nature as major powers, it was mostly France and – after its accession – Great Britain that continued to use power politics as a way to conduct their foreign policies (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 230). Taking into account examples from the 20^th  as well as the 21^st century such as the Pleven Plan (1950) and the intervention in Libya (2011), we can argue that power politics did not disappear from the European scene. Indeed, it became subtler and less dependent on material and military assets. States used the new supranational platform to advance national interests and steer negotiations and new policies in a way that would favour them over other members.

The intergovernmentalist approach that featured the early integration process can be intended as a way for states to use power politics in a new ratio that would suit the new friendlier context. France, especially, used its weight, diplomatic power and reputation to oppose any initiative that would reduce significantly its sovereignty and would put into question its supremacy in continental Europe.

The Pleven Plan

Pressures from the United States aimed at convincing France about the importance of rehabilitating Western Germany’s military capacities and embedding them into a supranational defence platform showed to be insufficient to assuage the French political establishment, which still feared a resurgence of German expansionism.

The European Defence Community (EDC), a plan proposed precisely for this aim by the then Prime Minister René Pleven, entailed some form of political union that most of the French military deemed unnecessary and dangerous, as it undermined the possibility for France to freely project its military power (Gavin 2009, 80).

General Ely was one of the few prominent figures from the army to support the plan, though only from a political perspective, as France had heavily invested in it. General Juin fiercely opposed the plan, as it would have stripped the nation of its authority to confer it to a supranational institution (ibid.).

The French officials who supported the plan were not blindly underestimating the German question; the diplomat Helvé Alphand conceived the EDC as a way for France to keep a stricter control over Germany. France, after all, could count on a larger army, and could appoint its officials in key positions (ibid.) to not let others assume a leading role. In the end, both the factions were opposing or arguing in favour of the EDC because, in their opinion, the position of France would be strengthened. Any higher ideal of European unity was not the determining factor of the sides taken; the distribution of power could not be changed or reduced to the detriment of France.

These opposing views pushed the newly appointed Prime Minister Pierre Mendès in 1954 to rethink the plan and modify some of its core provisions, devoiding it of any supranational footprint. Any reference to a federal or confederal system was eliminated, while Germany would have been the only member state to integrate its army. By losing its meaning, the plan was never adopted despite the ratification by the other national parliaments. Power politics had come to shape post-world war Europe as well.

The Fouchet Plan

Other shows of force in the European arena concerned the Fouchet Plan and the negotiations over the CAP in the sixties, a source of grim debates among member states since its inception. The French President General de Gaulle played an important role in both events. When he came to power, it was immediately clear that he would try to assert French supremacy on the continent.“Europe”, he said, “is the means for France to recover what it ceased to be after Waterloo: first in the world” (Vanke 2001, 96).

De Gaulle’s objective was to drive Europe away from the influence of the USA and the Soviet Union and create the sufficient premises for France to lead European integration under its conditions and leadership (ibid.). Supranational institutions like the Commission and the European Parliament, designed by his predecessors, were seen as obstacles to overcome in order to reach the goal. The plan, named after the French ambassador Christian Fouchet, conceived a loose “political union of states” grounded on a solid intergovernmental structure that would include a security dimension as well.

The French proposal ultimately failed due to strong opposition from the Netherlands and Belgium, who favoured an Atlanticist approach and feared French supremacy (Dinan 2014, 101). The Dutch opposition strategy, led by the foreign minister Joseph Luns, consisted of linking the accession of the United Kingdom (the so called prealable englias/English prerequisite) to the new political union.

Indeed, conflicting views revolved around Britain. The French opposed British membership over concerns of excessive influence from NATO, de facto controlled by the US, on European affairs. Meanwhile, the Dutch had hoped since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that the UK would become a member to counter the early Franco-German axis. Nonetheless, Dutch opposition was so firm that the Netherlands would have even accepted the setting-up of the political union provided that they would not become part of it (Vanke 2001, 108).

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

Like the Fouchet Plan, some academics go as far as to say that the confrontation over the CAP in 1965 was deliberately pushed forward by the French, especially from the Gaullist faction, to shape the European Economic Community (EEC) in a way that would suit more their interests (Newhouse 1967, 21). However, according to the international historian N. Piers Ludlow, the conflict was primarily spurred by Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to jointly challenge the supremacy that France had assumed in the first decade of European integration (Ludlow 1999, 233).

It can be argued that the European Community was first and foremost a French project that would have never been realized if the French had not taken the initiative (ibid.). All the six founders undoubtedly gained advantages from the making of the customs union and were well aware that no further progress in integration would have taken place without France leading the operation. This acknowledgement reduced their negotiating power (ibid. 236). The Germans especially wanted to avoid the dissolution of the Community at all costs, as it served as a major tool to regain legitimacy on the international scene.

The possibility of such dissolution emerged in 1965 when the six failed to agree on details concerning the CAP. de Gaulle encountered strong resistance over the policy, which was clearly favouring the French agricultural industry at the expense of the other states’ finances. The three “rebels” felt they had given enough concessions to satisfy French demands. Italy, for instance, was the biggest net contributor to the common budget despite being the poorest of the six (ibid. 237).

Confident of its position, General de Gaulle withdrew the French permanent representative at the EEC from its post in Brussels and decided that no French delegation would be sent to the next Council and COREPER meetings. The crisis ultimately led to the so-called Luxembourg Compromise. It inflicted a fatal blow to the supranational character of the community as member states acquired veto power over matters considered too important for national interests, heavily reducing the importance of Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) in the decision-making process. According to the French politician and economist Robert Marjolin, the compromise “consecrated the victory of the Gaullist conceptions in the matter of European institutions” (Marjolin 1989, 347).

De Gaulle and the French Withdrawal from NATO

de Gaulle’s attempts to restore France’s grandeur also concerned the broader transatlantic relations. In 1966, in a move that shocked his allies, the general announced France’s withdrawal from the military command of NATO. The decision perfectly suited de Gaulle’s conception of international relations, a strongly realist one, that marginalized the role of ideology and focused entirely on the balance of power (Martin 2011, 233).

He had credibly declared himself anti-Communist before, but as his scepticism over US presence on the continent became more marked, he sought a softer relationship with the Soviet Union that would make space for a strategy of détente as opposed to US containment.

De Gaulle conceived the transatlantic alliance in a different way compared to his European partners, less reluctant to rely on the American leadership to counterbalance Soviet influence. Before leaving NATO, France had already halted its participation to common military activities, creating the premises for the treaty to be considered a “14 + 1” alliance more than a compact bloc (ibid. 235).

French national sovereignty was paramount, and any move towards transatlantic integration of military capabilities had to be rejected. This is the reason behind France’s refusal to take part in the Multilateral Force project (MLF), aimed at integrating the nuclear capabilities of all three major NATO powers. Nuclear independence became a primary objective as de Gaulle would not accept the Anglo-Saxon supremacy and prerogative on this matter. Furthermore, he went as far as to side with the Soviet Union to oppose German membership in the MLF project (ibid.).

The Élysée Treaty between Germany and France signed in 1963 corroborated the Franco-German axis but ran parallel with the two countries’ opposing views on transatlantic relations; despite Adenauer’s warm welcoming of such treaty, he also interpreted it as a way for de Gaulle to further distance France from NATO and embed a new security system in the axis. When the next year de Gaulle persisted with his stance by offering the new German president Ludwig Erhard a “veiled ultimatum” on what side to pick, Adenauer’s fears were confirmed (ibid. 237). However, Germany would eventually choose to affirm its loyalty to Washington.

De Gaulle’s ultimate goal was to free the European continent, stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals” (ibid.234), of the tension stemming from the Cold War. To him, the United States was responsible for feeding the flames of the conflict and only a European security system under French leadership and supervision would be able to restore some balance. History, though, would betray him.

France in the Cold War

Throughout the following 30 years of Cold War, France would uphold its distinct position and try to emerge as the third alternative to the bipolarity imprinted on the world stage by the two warring superpowers. Despite de Gaulle’s positioning on the right of the political spectrum, it would be the socialist President François Mitterrand more than anyone to keep afloat the General’s tenets of national independence and scepticism over the transatlantic alliance. France witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War under his presidency, in the eighties and early nineties, when NATO’s purpose was put into question and a reform of Europe’s defence structure seemed necessary (Menon 1995, 22).

After de Gaulle’s departure, the semi-presidential system which characterized the Fifth Republic laid the ground for institutional conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister over who had to be in control of foreign policy. Mitterrand feared that NATO would further push for an integrationist policy, eventually including the political dimension. The prime minister Édouard Balladur instead, represented the Atlanticist faction in the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), which envisioned a rapprochement with the alliance. Yet, France’s official position continued to come out as ambiguous and distrust mounted from both sides.

An official from the US declared that if “it wasn’t for the French, we might be able to accept the assurances that a new European security entity would be part of a trans-Atlantic partnership, but on this issue, we don’t trust the French” (ibid. 24). Indeed, France urged the other European allies to come together and embrace a common defence structure; nevertheless, her actions didn’t go much further than creating a Franco-German brigade in agreement with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Brown 2013, 291).

With all the major member states enclosed in the Atlantic framework, France was the only country ardently pushing for a European security arm that could challenge NATO leadership. Paradoxically, perhaps out of awareness that nothing would be accomplished at the European level, France also recognized the importance of the alliance and supported several US-led initiatives (Menon 1995, 27).

France’s Re-entry into NATO and Libyan Intervention

It was only in 2009 that, under the presidency of Nicolas Sarcozy, France re-joined NATO. This move followed years in which France’s attempts to shape an independent European security policy had slowed down.

Some success had been achieved in 1993 with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which institutionalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second of the three pillars forming the new European Union; however, the Petersberg Declaration issued the previous year had made clear that EU’s foreign policy activities would have only included crisis management, leaving the actual military tasks to NATO (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 231).

By joining the Alliance, Sarcozy recognized that France’s interests would thenceforth be better pursued within the transatlantic framework. In 2012 a report by the once strongly anti-NATO French politician Hubert Védrine stated that indeed France could not count on a European security apparatus and would be worse off out of NATO (ibid. 292). The country’s role in the transatlantic alliance was first tested during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The operation exemplified the persistence of power politics in the European landscape and, most likely, of de Gaulle’s ghost in French foreign policy (Brown 2013, 296).

Approved by the UN Security Council, the military intervention was primarily led by France and Great Britain to stop general Gaddafi from committing violence against his people. In 2010 pacific protests had erupted throughout the Arab world, especially by the hand of young citizens, and the strongmen in power did not restrain from using violence. However, other reasons might have led France to intervene.

Intervention in Libya and the Impact on European Relations

As outlined by the intelligence platform Stratfor, the event translated into an indirect and silent confrontation between Italy and France. Since the establishment of its old colony, Italy has always considered Libya to be extremely important for its national interests, with regular energy supply and stability as primary objectives.

France’s assertiveness during the crisis ended up convincing the Italians that its role risked being stripped away by its transalpine allies, especially through new potential energy contracts signed by the French company Total at the detriment of the Italian ENI. In fact, responding to clarifications over the future of the Italian business in Libya, the Deputy Chairman of the Libyan National Transition Council Hafiz al Ghogha said that this would depend on “the support that the various European countries have offered the grassroots uprising” (Stratfor 2011, 11).

Before the conflict started, France was also the most important European arms supplier for Tripoli, but its role was being challenged by Rome with deals worth more than one billion dollars in 2010 (ibid. 8). Today, eight years after the military intervention, the confrontation is still ongoing:  President Emmanuel Macron is tacitly backing General Khalifa Haftar, which controls the eastern region of Cyrenaica, while Italy supports the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli.

France’s renewed activism over the last years, in Lybia as well as in Mali, can be read, from a broader perspective, as a way to reassert its role as major European military power in contrast with German supremacy over the economic sphere (ibid. 7). Eventually, the crisis proved the complete disunity of EU’s member states in the field of foreign policy.

Conclusion

With the exception of the Algerian War of Independence, legally speaking an intra-European civil war (Pasture 2015, 2; Hansen & Jonsson 2014), the process of European integration has brought long-lasting peace over most of the continent’s territory. The Franco-German robust friendship represents the most successful achievement of the process. However, we must avoid resorting to teleological explanations. While historical thinking might lead us to conceive a linear progression of history pointing to a predetermined end, we cannot exclude the repetition of events, or the occurrence of new ones, possibly caused by multiple contingent factors (ibid. 8).

The EU immediate neighbouring regions host a few ongoing conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Ukraine, Libya) which threaten the geopolitical stability of the continent and affect intra-European dynamics. As shifts in the transatlantic relationships became clear after Trump’s trade tariffs against the bloc, the EU finds itself at a crossroads between departing from its status of “economic giant, political dwarf and military worm,” as in the words of former Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens and remaining anchored to a stagnating context fuelled by its leaders’ empty declarations. Yet, as demonstrated previously by exploring France’s historical behaviour, power politics have triggered and found a way into European integration since its inception, with countries today still reluctant to give up more sovereignty.

Supranational institutions have acquired a life of their own, but intergovernmentalism still persists consistently. President Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel have recently restated the question of a European army, but chances are that nothing tangible will come out of it, at least in the short and medium terms. Nonetheless, this proves once again that the military dimension is still central to the biggest economic bloc risen out of the ashes of war; further shifts in the international order could challenge the current dynamics and systems of alliances, leading the EU to assume a more proactive role in the new multipolar world, perhaps by overtaking NATO’s task, as hoped by France, or acting as a complement to it, as favoured by Germany.

Bibliography

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

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The European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator Guy Verhofstadt recently stated that there could be no such thing as progress in the negotiations until a solution is found on this matter (The Guardian 2018). A “hard Brexit” and the consequent introduction of custom checks would damage the Irish economy, which for both geographical and cultural reasons is deeply integrated with the UK. The Kingdom’s investments in its small neighbour accounted for 30% of the Irish GDP in 2013 and multiple financial institutions operate transnationally between London and Dublin (Global Counsel 2015, 33). However, extremely low taxes – the corporate tax rate is 12,5% – and lax regulations are attracting several financial institutions especially from London, which are likely to contribute to the 6,7% GDP projected growth for this year (Foreign Policy 2018).

Although not all economists agree on the estimates of UK’s economic performance after Brexit, especially in the long-term (Begg & Mushövel 2015, 5), it is widely accepted that the event itself triggered the sudden depreciation of the sterling compared to the stronger Euro (Financial Times 2017) and general distrust of investors towards the British market; this reaction is above all a result of stagnating negotiations and uncertainty on their outcome. Infact, UK’s place in world economy after Brexit is still to be found, and most certainly will not be in the single European market, as declared by Prime Minister Theresa May in her 12-point plan (The Telegraph 2017).

Debates on whether the UK would seek affiliation to the EU in a looser way or completely isolate itself from the continent after its possible exit have been going on for years, even before the referendum was ever conceived by British policymakers.

The European Economic Area

The European economic framework comprises multiple “layers” of regional economic spaces with different degrees of integration. The Eurozone represents the most integrated area; its 19 members are part of a customs union, where a common tariff is set for goods entering the economic area (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2015, 290), the single market, which embodies the 4 freedoms – free movement of goods, capital, services and labour – and the monetary union, which provides the members with a common currency primarily aimed at keeping prices stable. Together with the remaining 11 non-euro member states, including the UK, these states constitute the European Union.

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA), instead, comprises Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. These countries are not part of the customs union, and the latter three have access to the single market since the 1994 Agreement on the European Economic Area. Their economic contribution to the European Union budget is nonetheless of a lower amount compared to the EU member states; moreover, beside having an independent trade policy, they are exempted from participating to what is commonly known as Political Union and can autonomously determine the Value Added Tax (VAT) level (Schwok & Najy 2013).

Switzerland has been granted a particular economic status in 1994 which gives it the possibility to reach bilateral agreements with the EU and consequently retain more economic sovereignty. These agreements have been divided into two groups, Bilateral I and Bilateral II. The contract regarding Bilateral I between the EU and Switzerland contains a so called “Guillotine Clause”, that would make all the agreements null if Switzerland had to fail to implement one or more (European Parliament 2010, 11).

Where to look after Brexit?

The Leave campaigners’ main issues with the European Union are mostly of economic nature. The main one is the overall budget contribution. With 0.5% of its GDP sent to Brussels (Center for European Reform 2016, 38), UK is the largest contributor to the EU budget after Germany, making it one of the large net contributors.

The second complaint concerns the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which the United Kingdom has always been opposed to since its inception and which the country is helping fund through its budget. The CAP is responsible for raising the food prices for British consumers, but it also helps the poorest rural areas such as Cornwall by subsidizing local farmers (ibid. 16).

The third main reason can be found in the major influx of EU citizens the UK experienced in the last decades. This immigration wave, blamed for the depression of domestic wages (Woodford 2016), triggered a harsh reaction from the most conservative parts of British society and contributed to the results of the 2016 referendum.

Considering the above mentioned driving issues behind Brexit and the latest declarations by Prime Minister May to not let a second Brexit referendum happen, it now looks like a provision deal may have been reached, unless the current government loses its majority in the Parliament. While the details of the deal have not been shared yet, it is my opinion that this will entail a compromise of some sort on the free movement of people, the most sensitive topic for Irish citizens and the Remain campaigners, who still constitute a large minority – or could now constitute the new majority (Politico 2018).

As for the possible scenarios, a renowned standard membership to the EFTA as that of Norway would imply “regulations without representation” (CER 2016, 40) and would leave the UK bound to most of the single market constraints, angering the anti-EU base. Moreover, its budget contribution to the EU would only fall by 9% (Ibid. 110). A normal free trade agreement, like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, would not grant the UK sufficient access to the single market. Switzerland’s case offers an interesting example for a middle ground scenario that would neither leave Britain completely isolated nor obliged to follow most EU regulations.

The case for imitating Switzerland

In case of a deal with the EU, an arrangement similar to the one currently in force with Switzerland could help mitigate – but not eliminate – Brexit’s negative long-term economic effects in the UK and would represent a compromise likely to be welcomed by those who most fear a no-deal scenario. First, it must be noted that the UK’s contribution to the budget would fall by 55% (ibid.). Secondly, the British government would be able to negotiate independently again with third-party countries (Schwok & Najy 2013). To this regard, it should be stressed that together with the other EFTA countries, Switzerland was faster than the EU to sign trade agreements with Canada, Ukraine and South Korea, indicating higher flexibility on this matter (ibid.).

In order to extend the space for maneuver and placate the pro-EU population, the government could also try to obtain favourable economic agreements with the European Union by announcing a referendum on Schengen membership. Switzerland has currently signed multiple bilateral agreements concerning different matters (Clements 2014, 39) allowing for a non-automatic reception of EU legislation for most sectors. This aspect would be of great value for the UK, which has always felt uncomfortable with accepting the exclusive competence of the EU governance bodies on certain policies. 

Moreover, under a Swiss model arrangement the European Court of Justice, historically disliked by the UK for its legal interventionist attitude, would not to have any say in disputes between Great Britain in the EU. It is of note that only a few disputes have been occurred between Switzerland and the EU in the last 20 years of bilateral relationship (Schwok & Najy 2018, 8). Finally, as we are talking of a Swiss model, the way in which the bilateral agreements would be carried out would not necessarily have to follow the same tortuous path. Considering the established participation of the UK in the single market, the respective negotiators would not have to start from scratch.

However, while a Swiss kind of arrangement seems the most convenient option for the UK, British negotiators have to face a few obstacles to enjoy its benefits. First, in the last years the EU has showed dissatisfaction over the bilateral framework and called for Switzerland to integrate the acquis communitaire in greater measure and in a more uniform way (Schwok & Najy 2013). Second, Britain might be pushed to join the EFTA to secure a Switzerland-like arrangement and maintain trade agreements with its members; With regards to the UK’s membership, despite the favourable position laid out recently by the Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg (The Independent 2018), this could entail a long and difficult negotiation.

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden.

Bibliography

Baldwin, R. & Wyplosz, C. 2015. The economics of European integration. McGraw-Hill Education.

Begg, I. & Mushöve, F. 2016. The economic impact of Brexit: jobs, growth and public finances. London School of Economics.

Center for European Reform (CER). 2016. The economic consequences of leaving the EU.

Clements, B. 2014. Britain Outside the European Union. Institute of Economic Affairs.

European Parliament. 2010. Internal market beyond EU: EEA and Switzerland. Directorate-General for internal policies.

Financial Times. 2017. Brexit is an obvious culprit for a weak pound.

Foreign Policy. 2018. Britain Isn’t Just Losing Brexit. Europe Is Winning It.

Global Counsel. 2015. Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU.

Politico. 2018. UK support for Remain jumps in EU survey.

Schwok R. & Najy, C. 2018. Evidence presented at the House of Commons, exiting the EU Committee. UK Parliament.

Schwok R. & Najy, C. 2013. UK returning to EFTA: Divorcee at 40 and going back to mom and dad?. Written evidence at the Foreign Affairs Committee, UK Parliament.

The Guardian. 2018. May was first to raise option of transition extension, says EU

The Independent. 2018. Brexit: Norway drops objection to Britain staying in single market via European Economic Area.

The Telegraph. 2016. Theresa May confirms Britain will leave Single Market as she sets out 12-point Brexit plan.

Woodford. 2016. The Economic Impact of Brexit. Working Paper.

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However, given the limited options, a new government formed by both the 5 Star Movement (5SM) and the Democratic Party (DP) it’s in the country best interest, as it would set aside 1) the possibility of a right wing government with both the moderate and the extremist right as main partners, 2) a North League-5SM government and 3) new elections, that would further strenghten DP’s counterparts.

The DP already tried to form a government with the 5SM in 2013, but they failed to reach mutual understanding due to the 5SM hardline. This time could be different: the leader of the 5SM Luigi Di Maio seems more collaborative than his previous colleagues, although how and with whom he intends to carry out the negotiations remains to be seen.

If they were both open to such an agreement, they would have to compromise and share key government positions; the move would not be appreciated by both the respective voter bases, but that’s not surprising: every government coming out of this mess would displease large portions of the electorate. Sure, it is diffcult to imagine how parties which fought like cat and dog throughout the past years could lead a government without significant frictions or agree on a single program in the first place, but that would not be the first time though: the Democratic Party pondered – and consolidated – alliances with Berlusconi and other right-wing parties multiple times in the past.

Another, and maybe more likely, option would be for the DP to offer its external support, by letting the 5SM govern with its vote of confidence in the Parliament’s two chambers. Let’s be clear: doesn’t matter what moves the DP makes, its numbers are not going to rise in the short and the mid-term. As a citizen though, I am more concerned about the future of my country than the party’s fate.
Unfortunately, most of the DP leading figures rule out any form of alliance. They reject this idea with conviction, arguing that the party’s future is clearly to the opposition. That’s an easy way to escape responsibility though: Germany’s Socialdemocratic Party (SPD) offers a clear example of a deafeted party governing the country again to not let the far right gain power; the possibility of an extremist government should worry the Democrats as well. It should also be remembered that the DP is still the second most voted party: a M5S-DP government would represent more italians than a M5S-North League coalition.

Last week a Dutch-led group of North-European countries issued a document which clearly opposes the proto-federalist and reformist pathway outlined by the Franco-German axis, despite the Rome Declaration signed on March 25th; Macron and the German government need a strong, europhile Italy. While the 5 Star Movement is not exactly the best partner for a staunch Europeanist, it is the best we can get at this moment. We can’t allow for Germany and France to be crushed between nationalist approaches from both North and South.

The right has not the needed majority to form a governing coalition, but they are closer than anyone. As we all know, politics is unpredictable and if responsibility does not prevail we could experience the same shock which hit the United States in 2016.

Welcome, President Salvini.

Discover more about the Italian Elections

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In this regard, the claims by the Russian energy giant Gazprom that its Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines would just be a commercial project sound hardly believable. The Russian government is the major shareholder of the company (51%), and, as the past events have shown, it has no restraint in using its huge abundance of gas and its infrastructure as a leverage to gain geopolitical power.

What is Nord Stream 2?

Nord Stream 2 is a gas pipeline project, a further development of the already existing Nord Stream 1 consisting of two pipelines that stretch from the Russian city of Vyborg to the port of Greifswald, in Northern Germany, through the Baltic Sea. The total cost of the new project, that would add two more gas pipelines, amounts to €9.5bn. Its completion was initially expected in the end of 2019, but several administrative hurdles have caused significant setbacks.

The economic benefits that this would bring to Germany are clear: two of the five companies involved in the construction are German and the country would become a major transit-hub for the resource. Moreover, the new flow would replace the decreasing gas supplies coming from the Netherlands and the UK.

But many EU countries see this project unfavourably. While this solution may be cheaper for the Germans, it is considered a betrayal by some of the former Soviet republics, which rely almost entirely on Russian gas. On average, around 35% of the EU Member States’ gas supplies are provided by Gazprom through its pipelines (mainly through the “Brotherhood pipeline” in Ukraine. The construction of the Nord Stream 2 could bring the percentage to 40% over the next years.

More dependence on Russian gas means more leverage for the Russian government, which could use the resource as a political weapon, especially against its neighbouring countries. It already happened in 2006 and 2009, and more recently in 2014 and 2015, when Gazprom interrupted the flow to Hungary, Slovakia and Poland because they provided Ukraine with their gas. Countries such as Poland and Lithuania have already started building terminals to import Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to diversify their supplies.

Hot pipelines

The United States are among the fiercest opponents of Nord Stream 2. The Senate and the House of Representatives voted to tighten the sanctions against Russia this summer, but these were also aimed against two EU companies (German and Austrian) involved in the project. The former German Foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel and the Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern protested with a joint statement claiming that “Europe’s energy supply is a matter for Europe, not the United States“, heightening the tension between Berlin and the new US administration.

But this is not simply a Europe vs USA issue: the project goes against the EU Commission Energy Security Strategy, which states that in the long term the European Union should “increase energy production in the EU and diversify supplier countries and routes.” What Germany is doing is the opposite, but Angela Merkel and Gerhard Schröder, former Chancellor and current chairman of the consortium behind the project, seem determined to shrug off negative criticism, arguing that this is not a matter concerning EU institutions. That’s not entirely true though, as in 2014 the European Commission inaugurated the concept of Energy Union, still not implemented to this day despite the shared competence on energy between member states and the EU stated in the treaties.

Critical voices have risen in the corridors of EU institutions as well. The President of the European Council Donald Tusk sent a letter to Juncker claiming that Nord Stream 2 “is not in Europe’s interest” and that the project would deprive Ukraine, a heavily indebted country, of the gas tranist fees paid by Gazprom that amount to $2bn. With two more gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, Ukraine would basically have less revenues and would find itself more isolated and impotent in front of Russian blackmails. Within her ranks, Angela Merkel is countered by the head of the European People’s Party group (EPP) Manfred Weber who highlights the incompatibility of the project with the EU’s long term objectives.

Environmental concerns

Not any less important are the concerns raised by environmental groups. One of these, the Coalition Clean Baltic, claims that the project will have a negative impact on the territories involved in the construction. The pipelines start on the Kurgalsky natural reserve, despite it is forbidden to build in such areas according to Russian laws.

Some even argue that the project is going to break international laws, like the 1992 Helsinki Conventions protecting the Baltic Sea and the 1971 Ramsar Convention protecting wetlands. Greenpeace Russia, which is also fighting to end the project, claimed that EU members ignored their warnings and that “the project is illegal, not according to just Russian legislation, but international law.”.

Issues are raised also on the environmental assessment, which was conducted by a scientific consultancy group directly financed by Gazprom. Many ask themselves if such an assessment could be taken seriously. Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, an expert of the Baltic Sea region from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, complains about the timing and the “big holes” present in the report. It was released in April 2017 and the governments involved had two months to provide a feedback, but works already began before Sweden and Finland could greenlight the project. “Once you take a closer look at the smaller details in the hundreds and hundreds of pages of filings, there are a lot of gaps and questionable assumptions in the documents”, said Schmidt-Felzmann.

Some might argue that Germany is just acting in its interest as a sovereign state, by carrying out its plans in the most convenient and inexpensive way, but we should expect more geopolitical foresight from a country often regarded as the leading nation of the continent and the strongest proponent of European integration. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) currently under construction, will provide Europe with gas from Azerbaijan, showing that there are alternatives to the Russian one. European countries could also import more LNG or invest more on local energy sources.

Nord Stream 2 risks alienating Central and Eastern European countries even more, already reluctant to accept “migrant quotas” which some of them deem illegitimate. It would be a major setback for Ukraine’s economy, would imply more dependence on Russian gas and would have a significant impact on the environment. But above all, it would show that not even the current “leader” of the European project is truly committed to the long term plans set by the European Commission on such an important matter as energy.

Did you enjoy this article? You may also like: Five Key Facts On Western Sanctions Against Russia and How To Create A Common European Army In Four (Not So) Simple Steps.

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