While the alliances that ended up fighting each other in the First World War might seem like a foregone conclusion to us today, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, those same European Powers were still settling into their various alliances. Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed bound together, the two diplomatically isolated states France and Russia found common ground for that exact reason. Across the channel, Great Britain – while uncertain of its allegiance – certainly did seek closer relations with Germany. But how serious were these talks, and were these two powers close to joining forces?

The Dawn of Anglo-German Relations

Following the dismissal of Bismarck, Wilhelm II and Count Leo von Caprivi (Chancellor of Germany 1890 – 93) promised to continue the foreign relations Bismarck had set in place. Lord Salisbury (British Prime Minister 1886 – 1892 and then again 1895 – 1902) was not convinced, saying: ”if he [Wilhelm] thinks thus today, what guarantee have we that he will not change his mind overnight?”.

Three months after taking office, von Caprivi announced the signing of an agreement with Britain, the Heligoland Agreement. Through this treaty, Germany surrendered all claims in Zanzibar and the island of Pemba, and in return, Britain gave Germany the island of Heligoland. Germany also agreed to a border of German East Africa proposed by the British. In doing so, Germany lost access to Uganda and the sources of the Nile. However, Salisbury convinced the Sultan of Zanzibar to their sell coastal claims on East Africa, which gave Germany control of the coast. Ultimately, both Powers benefited from the treaty, which resolved former bones of contention.

While Wilhelm considered abandoning German East Africa, they nevertheless sought colonial prestige. One more British concession was that German East Africa now bordered the Congo Free state, a colony Germany hinted they might buy in the future. While the Agreement stirred political rumblings in both states, Salibury was pleased that it halted German expansion in Africa. Von Caprivi was even more against colonies than Bismarck, saying that ”the worst thing that could happen to us would be for someone to give us the whole of Africa”. Despite this, he understood the value of settling disagreements with Britain.

The Reception of the Heligoland Agreement in Europe

The Agreement did not sit well with France, who saw a possible future inclusion of Britain into the Triple Alliance, as Heligoland allowed Britain to focus on the Mediterranean. A later naval treaty between Italy and Britain made the French even more suspicious of British plans. The fall of the first Salisbury government in 1892, replaced by the Gladstone government, put Lord Rosebery, who favoured improved relations with Germany, as Foreign Secretary. This seemed to indicate that Salisbury’s policies would continue.

The friendship of the Triple Alliance was important to Britain both in Egypt and the Mediterranean. On one hand, Rosebery told Paul von Hetzfeldt (ambassador to Constantinople) that Britain might act with Italy (a member of said Alliance) in the Mediterranean, but on the other hand, Gladstone contended that Britain was in no position to ally any nation just yet. On top of this, Germany became more aggressive in their request for a formal treaty, implying that they might turn to Russia following the fall of Salisbury.

This shake-up of the newly formed relation took place during the time of the Eastern Question. As such, Britain was well aware that a Russo-German treaty might threaten British interests. By 1893, Russia and France had almost fully committed themselves to each other, with Britain as their common enemy. Russian efforts to cement their control of Afghanistan directly threatened British India, but harsh British protests forced Russia to retreat. France and Britain argued regarding Egypt, but their troubles were even worse in Siam (Thailand). France announced a blockade of the neutral state, and Britain turned to the Triple Alliance for assistance. Unfortunately for Anglo-German relations, no assistance was forthcoming. Despite this, tensions ran high as Britain sent warships to protect Burma and British citizens. Though France “won” the war against Siam, making Siam the buffer between French Indochina and British Burma, it was at the cost of further worsening relations with Britain.

The Other Side: French-Russian Relations

All the while, French-Russian relations were growing ever stronger, causing a political uproar in Germany. Bismarck had managed to politically isolate France, but now they were threatened with a two-front war. Britain could not be trusted to sit on the sidelines, only a formal alliance would satisfy Germany. When the Franco-Russian alliance became official in 1893, Russia sent a squadron of ships to Toulon, a Mediterranean port. As the Royal Navy was the strongest navy in the area, Britain became incredibly suspicious of these developments.

Once again, Britain turned to the Triple Alliance, and once again Germany remained decidedly cold. In 1894, Germany decided to more or less abandon the African concessions with Britain to placate colonial interests. This was one more nail in the coffin of the relations between the two powers. Even German liberals started to view Britain as their greatest rival, and anti-English sentiments were brewing. Later on, Germany also decided to renegade on a deal struck in 1893. In order to block the French expansion in Africa, Britain had ceded some land to Germany so that German Kamerun would share a border with British Sudan. The Germans had now decided to deal with France themselves by giving them territory Britain had given to Germany.

The Decline of Anglo-German Relations

Ultimately, Anglo-German relations reached their zenith in 1890, after that point Germany seemed to do everything in their power to sabotage those relations, not caring when Britain wanted help, and warming up to France and Russia instead. This was an incredibly short-sighted foreign policy on Germany’s part, constantly moving against British interests.

Eventually, it led to Britain and France resolving their disagreements. France recognised British Egyptian interests and in return, Britain acknowledged French Tunisia. When the two Moroccan crises happened, Britain threw down the gauntlet and forced Germany to back down on both occasions. At the end of the day, Germany had sabotaged all chances of friendship with Britain and it only had itself to blame when they faced Britain as their opponent in the First World War.

The post Relations Between Germany and Britain Pre-WW1: From Birth to Demise appeared first on My Country? Europe..

German unification, however, had deep roots. As the battlefield of choice should the Cold War go hot, Germany lived with the constant danger of complete nuclear annihilation hanging over its head. The two German governments made themselves the model of competing ideological systems, focused on defeating and superseding one another. Thirty years on, the scars of this confrontation still haven’t fully healed, and the pains of unification remain under the political spotlight in Germany. This momentous anniversary is as much a case for reflection as it is for celebration. And it is with reflection in mind that the story of German unification must be re-examined.

World War 2 ends

Following the end of the Second World War, Europe had been split in half between the Allied nations in the West, and the USSR with their satellite members of the Warsaw Pact in the East, separated by an “Iron Curtain” as Winston Churchill so famously said while delivering a speech in Fulton, Missouri. While Germany had suffered immensely, and now found itself torn into several pieces, each controlled by one power, most of Europe was reeling due to postwar poverty and hunger. This was one of the reasons that Western Europe, much to the dismay of the USA, saw strong, communist parties, heavily aligned with Moscow, popping up. Italy and France in particular deserve a mention.

The Americans managed to counter this Soviet threat, as they saw it, with the Marshall Plan, named after US Secretary of State, George C Marshall. The program provided broad economic aid to European states on condition only that they work together for their mutual benefit. The Soviet Union and its satellites were invited to participate. Finland and Czechoslovakia were willing, and Poland and Hungary showed interest.

Of course, Stalin could not allow this to happen and so forbade participation by the Soviet satellites. The Marshall Plan helped restore prosperity to Western Europe and set the stage for Europe’s unprecedented postwar economic growth. It also led to the waning of communist strength in the West and to the establishment of solid democratic regimes.

In February 1948 a dramatic and brutal display of power of Stalin’s new policy took place in Prague. The Communists expelled the democratic members of what had been a coalition government and murdered Jan Masaryk, the foreign minister and son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk. President Eduard Benes was forced to resign, and Czechoslovakia was brought fully under Soviet rule.

Germany is split

These sort of Soviet actions increased American determination to go ahead with its own arrangements in Germany. The Russians swiftly dismantled German industry in the Eastern zone, but the Americans chose to try and make Germany self-sufficient, which meant restoring rather than destroying its industrial capacity.

Disagreements over Germany produced the most heated postwar debate. When the Western powers agreed to go forward with a separate constitution for the Western parts of Germany in February 1948, the Soviets walked out of a joint Allied Control Commission.

Berlin, while well within Soviet control, was governed by all four powers. The Soviets chose to seal off the city by closing all railroads and highways to West Germany, in an effort to drive the Western powers out of Berlin. The Western Allies responded to the Berlin Blockade with an airlift of supplies to the city that lasted almost a year (June 1948 – May 1949). In May 1949, the Russians were forced to back down and to open access to Berlin.

The incident greatly increased tensions and suspicions between the two opponents and hastened the separation of Germany into two states, a situation that prevailed for 40 years. West Germany (BRD, Bundesrepublik Deutschland) formally became the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949, and one month later, East Germany (DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik), became the German Democratic Republic.

The Iron Curtain starts opening

In 1989 Soviet domination and communist rule in Eastern Europe came to an abrupt end, the USSR swallowed Eastern Europe after the Second World War, but they were not able to digest there, their ambitions exceeded its resources. It could no longer afford to garrison half of Europe and maintained an enormous military and police state apparatus that was unsustainable.

Soviet wealth was also largely illusory in that it was a closed economy, industry was inefficient because it had no competition to make it more efficient. Thus, when the Soviet market was opened to real competition, it proved unable to compete with much more efficient European and American production. This was much as Trotsky had predicted all along, and much as Andrei Parshev lamented would always be Russia’s fate.

The Soviet Union simply refused to intervene in the reemergence of Solidarity in Poland and Hungarian moves to independence, because they no longer had the power or desire to do so. And so, in the autumn of 1989, popular demonstrations erupted in many East German cities. The most important occurred in Leipzig, where the streets filled with people demanding democracy and an end to Communist Party rule.

Soviet Premier, Michail Gorbachev, told the Communist Party that they would no longer support them. With startling swiftness, the Communist leaders of the East German government resigned, making way for a younger generation of Communist Party members. These new leaders, who remained in power for only a few weeks, promised political and economic reforms. They convinced few East Germans, however, and the emigration to West Germany continued.

German unification is complete

In November 1989, in one of the most emotional moments in European history since 1945, the government of East Germany ordered the opening of the Berlin Wall. Tens of thousands of East Berliners crossed into West Berlin to celebrate, visit families, and to shop with money provided by the West German government. Shortly thereafter, free travel began between East and West Germany.

These changes were reflected also in the stance of the international community. Late in 1989, the ministers of the European Economic Community accepted in principle the unification of Germany. This led to reunification becoming a foregone conclusion by February 1990, accepted by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. Soon after, the Communist government of East Germany, after failing to reorganize itself, was swept away in free elections.

The revolution in East Germany had broad ramifications for international relations. The citizens of the two Germanies were determined to reunite. With the collapse of the Communist Party government in East Germany, there was no longer a viable distinction between them. Today, thanks to this spirit of unification of the German people, we can celebrate the 30th anniversary of German Unity.

The post It’s Been 30 Years Since German Unification. How Did We Get Here? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Church, beers, dances – a quick summary of the so-called Kirmes. Like many European traditions, the origins of the festivities around the Kirmes go back to the Middle Ages, when the consecration of the church was first celebrated. From the 12th century onwards, the fair developed more into a popular festival where friends and family met, people got married, and disputes were settled. In addition, the Kirmes was the perfect opportunity to meet suitable spouses.

The term Kirmes was established in the Westerwald, a low mountain range on the right bank of the river Rhine in West Germany. It is a combination of the German words “Kirche” (“church”) and “Messe” (“fair”). However, Germany has many more regional names for this annual tradition, such as Kerwe, Kerb or, in Swiss German, Chilbi.

In the villages of the rural region of the Westerwald, the fair has a special status as an annual highlight. Sophie, a young woman from this area, gives some insight and explains why the Westerwälder Kirmes is an entertaining attraction for locals, curious guests, or world travellers on voyage of discovery.

Tree Crowns and Flower Hats: The Kirmes Traditions

“What makes Kirmes in the Westerwald so special is that there is still a lot of tradition, while in areas on the Rhine it is more like an Oktoberfest,” reports Sophie. As a rule, the villages’ celebrations take place during the summer months. To understand why the Westerwälder Kirmes is so rich in tradition, some specific terms must first be clarified.

The celebration of the consecration is mainly characterized by the Kirmesburschen (“Kirmes lads”) together with their Kirmesmädchen (“Kirmes girls”), a group of young people mostly between 16 and their early 20s. The Kirmesbursch wears a Kirmeshut (“Kirmes hat”), which can be individually decorated with colourful flowers. In Sophie’s village, a girl must be asked by a Kirmesbursch to be his Kirmesmädchen. “We always joke that the men are still in charge here. But other places are a few steps further and the girls can decide themselves.” However, participation is open to everyone. Therefore, it is not uncommon that also Muslim men and girls get to participate.

The boys and girls then take care of the Kirmesbaum (“Kirmes tree”), a symbol of fertility and growth. The trees are taken from the local forest and their crowns are colourfully decorated. On the weekend of the fair, the Kirmes couples move through the village. The men put the trees in front of the church, at the mayor’s house, and on the village square.

Shouts of Joy and Plays of Wind Music

The Kirmes-company is accompanied by brass band music, and disco fox and waltzes are danced under the flamboyant trees. Some villages have their own songs and flags. Another component of these parades is the so-called Juchezen, a deafening cheer. Both the Juchezen and the village’s songs must be rehearsed well in the months before the celebrations. In Sophie’s case, there is also the so-called Brunnentaufe: to the delight of many spectators, the Kirmesburschen are dragged into the village’s fountain to be “baptized”.

The folk festival character manifests itself in the afternoon on the fairground, with merchants and carousels for the children. The big party continues here in the evening and at night. On the Sunday and Monday, the religious part of the fair takes place with the services in the church whose consecration is celebrated so sumptuously.

Physical Distancing and Social Convergence

Since COVID-19 was the only one dancing around the houses this year, many cultural events had to be cancelled. In Sophie’s village, it was the first time this recurrence was cancelled since the end of the Second World War.

“There were no meetings and no visits to other villages’ fairs. On Saturday, there were small street get-togethers outside organised by the neighbourhoods, and the Kirmes-company went through the village to greet the residents – at least that gave you a little Kirmes-feeling. Moreover, the Kirmesburschen offered to go to the supermarket for the elderly during these troubled times.”

After this summer of ceased singing from the heart and dancing crowds, we can only hope than soon cherished traditions from all over the world can be celebrated as before, in Munich, Venice, or elsewhere. And lost wanderers will be more than welcome to Juchezen way yonder in the Western woods.

The post Westerwälder Kirmes – Hidden Folklore in Germany’s Forests appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Germany has just taken up the mantle of a six-month rotating Council of Ministers Presidency this past July, in what promises to be a momentous time for Europe. The challenges of the virus, economic collapse, Chinese ambitions and American disarray demand a new cap for the European ship of state. What can we hope to see from this German Presidency, and what can we expect to see from European leaders in light of these challenges?

An Augean Challenge

There are several challenges for the German Presidency which will test Merkel’s mettle, her political alliances and the will of the European population to survive the crisis together or fail separately. The first and most immediate challenge, now overcome, was the unanimous approval of the budget and the Eurobonds that had been proposed to pay for the trillion-euro plus relief and budgetary package.

Calling themselves the “Frugal Four”, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands early on indicated their opposition to Eurobond financing, though not to relief loans. Equal measures of pressure and concessions on budget rebates, though, prevented the unique one “no” vote sufficient to scuttle the whole package. To achieve this, some concessions had to be made on the Hungarian and Polish front, setting aside concerns over the rule of law and political differences.

It was certainly a relief to France and Germany at the start of the process, in spite of other regrets they may have, that a less than communal oriented UK is no longer a voting member. This is not an observation unique to us. In the May 30 edition of the UK weekly The Economist, one of their regular staff writers speculated that even under a Cameron government the UK would have vetoed the budget with Eurobonds and a relief package included. The unwieldiness of unanimous voting in a community of 27, not to mention 28 before the UK left, is clear when major reforms like this one are needed.

The second step for Merkel’s Presidency will be one over which she has no direct control: getting the budget through Parliament. There are issues with research and the Parliament will want to put their own stamp on things, but after compromises agreement is anticipated.

That brings us to the third issue for the six-month German Presidency: institutional reforms. A reform conference on the future of the Union that was scheduled to begin in May has been postponed sine die. The conference is needed and will in all likelihood be rescheduled. Will it be too much for Merkel to handle the pressing needs of the economic and health crisis as well as build consensus around further reform? Or will she see the crisis as an opportunity to push through an ambitious agenda?

Beyond German Leadership: EU Leaders to the Fore

Much of managing a 445 million member community is highly technical in nature. Leadership must demonstrate technical competence as well as personal character. Paying for the huge sums necessary to redress the economic and social issues caused by the virus will be an enduring problem. Christine Lagarde – though attacked for some early faux pas’s in initially addressing the crisis – has the experience and competence as well as character to do what is necessary at the European Central Bank.

No one can ignore the important role Donald Tusk, head of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, can play. Of Polish (specifically Kashubian) origin, born in a working-class family in Gdansk, Tusk has taken upon himself the task of neutralising the populist political and cultural revolt. This will certainly be key to progress in a European federation, as populist parties have generally been determined nationalists rejecting federalism.

Another emerging leader is the head or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EU Parliament, Irate Garcia. She has already been responsible for several important portfolios, notably concerning women and the family, and will continue to play an important role.

Leadership will also emerge from beyond the institutions and from places we might not always expect. George Soros, head of the Open Society Foundation, an NGO founded and financed by him and working on supporting democratic institutions in Eastern Europe is no stranger to European finance. He is also the founder of the Central European University (CEU) recently forced, for having come afoul of the Hungarian Government, to move from Budapest to Vienna. Soros made his fortune, now used philanthropically, as an investor and speculator in currencies, stocks, and bonds. These are markets he knows well and the precise markets which will be needed to finance the Eurobonds. Soros has proposed a novel but not untried idea for low-cost financing of the crisis response: perpetual bonds.

Perpetual Bonds – A Radical Solution?

In 1648, Holland faced an existential threat from rising seawater. A Dutch Water Board issued the first “perpetual” bonds to pay for the building of a massive system of dikes. Now, 350 years later, the bonds are still paying interest to the remaining holders, but they have been forgotten by almost everyone else.

Similar bonds, also known as consols, have been successfully used for financing during several crises since the Dutch issuance. The first British Consols were issued in 1751. In 1927, under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, consols were issued again as partial refunding of the 1917 National War Bonds. The UK has a long history of using consols for financing.

The mechanism is simple: perpetual bonds pay interest but the principal is never repaid. Let’s say an investor buys a 10.000 euro perpetual bond at 1% interest – these bonds have been in the past subscribed to at very low interest rates because they pay in perpetuity. The holder would receive 100 euros per year for the rest of his life, at which time the bonds could be passed to his or her heirs. There is no end to this stream of 100 Euro income to the holder.

Perpetual bonds are less costly in the immediate future, the ideal feature in times of crisis when much money is required. However, they are considerably more expensive in the long run, though for the first 100 years or thereabouts depending on their interest rate they would be less expensive than an equivalent bond.

There are further ways that the costs can be curtailed over time. There is the natural attrition of bonds being lost with death and the transfer of estates. In times of inflation, payments become worth less in real terms naturally reducing their real cost. Costs can further be reduced by offering a buyout of remaining bonds, especially if inflation is such that return to the holders has diminished. This was the case with the 1751 British Consols which were bought out and retired in 2015.

One reason why more countries have not used consol financing is that, in order for the bonds to be subscribed to at a reasonable rate, the credit standing of the country must be good. This feature should appeal to the more frugal countries, as the issuance of such bonds will oblige the EU to keep its finances in order and revenues in line with expenditures. All in all, the proposal seems like an excellent way to provide low-cost Eurobonds in a time of crisis.

Where To From Here?

Spain has already proposed consols to the Council, but the proposal was not fully vetted as it came at a time when there was no agreement to use Eurobonds of any type, whether perpetual or ordinary term bonds. Now that has changed with the French and German proposal and Council approval of mutual Eurobonds backed by the credit of the EU.

The German Presidency will have to face these and many other issues and ideas. A new leadership, if not new leaders, will have to emerge to meet these huge challenges. It is difficult to be a leader today as 24/7 media coverage will eventually show off anyone’s foibles in a poor light. But make no mistake, there are real leaders. The question is not so much whether Europe will find the leaders it needs, nor the solutions to today’s challenges, but whether it will find the followers.

The post With the German Presidency Steering the Ship, Where Is EU Leadership Headed? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Eurobonds By Any Other Name

The current EU budget has a very restricted ceiling: it’s capped at 1% of the EU’s GDP. This puts severe limits on how effective, bold, and ambitious the EU can be with its policies even at the best of times – and a global pandemic is far from that.

This is where the Franco-German proposal comes in. In a surprising break from past timidity, France and Germany have proposed an increase for the EU budgetary ceiling for the next three years – raising it to 2% of GDP. That extra 1% would amount to some 165 billion Euros a year, for a total of 500 billion. Crucially, it would not be covered by Member State annual contributions: it would be debt, which the EU can issue in its own name.

This is critical in a number of ways. First and foremost, it means that this new debt would not show up in Member States’ national accounts. This would massively help Member States with low credit ratings and intractable debt problems, such as Italy. Secondly, it builds on a mechanism the EU can already use. Brussels is already allowed to issue debt, but for very limited purposes – typically, to support Member States with economic difficulties or to intervene on the balance of payments. What would change with the introduction of the Recovery Fund is that the sums of debt the EU is allowed to issue would be much larger.

Most fundamentally, this gives the European Commission a political backing and mandate it desperately needed to act. The issue of economic reconstruction is now being reframed as a European problem, not one restricted to the national economies. Technicalities still need outlining: we don’t know how new EU debt will be distributed among Member States, how reimbursing will work out in practice, and whether the system will become a permanent feature of EU policy-making after its expiration, three years from now. But the political commitment is serious. The word “Eurobond” was never mentioned in Franco-German press releases. Ultimately, however, that is what’s at stake right now – and the EU’s financial solidity with it.

The Bad News

It is, perhaps, depressing that this proposal is coming from the two largest Member States in the EU. But this should not surprise us, nor overly concern us. It’s no surprise, because the bitter truth is that the EU is still a low-trust political environment that Member States will only countenance so long as they feel they are in charge. The system can only truly be altered by them, by design. However, some of the claims made in the public debate – that Germany and France are going behind the Commission’s back, for instance – are wildly exaggerated. The Commission strongly endorses the initiative, and was kept informed of its development at all times, as were other Member States.

Claims that this is an undemocratic decision process are also off the mark. In order to become policy, the Fund will need approval from the parliaments of every Member State in the European Union. Naturally, the truly ideal option would be to give the European Parliament the final word. That scenario remains remote, at present. But that doesn’t mean that France and Germany have hijacked European decision-making.

The bad news is that several remain opposed to this scheme. Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland have already voiced their opposition. While Macron and Merkel were telling the press that France and Germany were standing up for Europe and that extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, Austrian chancellor Kurz took to Twitter to dampen enthusiasm for the move. The Visegrad countries have not shown their hands yet. It’s likely that they can be convinced to support the move. What price they will demand remains an open question.

There is a further element of uncertainty: what is going to guarantee repayment? The answer is vital, because the EU having solid credit and market confidence is fundamental for this plan to succeed. Since the Recovery Fund is not part of the Treaties, debt will require purely political backing. The EU needs to make credible commitments to debt servicing and its own financial soundness. This is certainly doable, but it does make the European credit position more volatile with an eye to the future.

The Good News

The need for unanimous approval on the part of the Member States is politically cumbersome, but it also solves a legal problem. The German constitutional court will not have jurisdiction over EU fiscal policy that is cleared by the German parliament (along with its other 26 equivalents in the EU).

The best news of all, perhaps, is that France and Germany are taking the EU seriously again. There is perhaps some reason to hope that the lessons imparted by the 2012 Euro debt crisis did not go unheeded. Paris and Berlin have both recognised the gravity of the situation and the necessity to take the initiative. The ability for the EU to issue its own debt in large scale is a transformative event.

Henrik Henderlein, an economist who serves as director to the Jacques Delors Centre, has labelled this the European Union’s “Hamiltonian moment”, a political signal that “the EU is more than a grouping of nation-states, and has its own federal identity.” Should the Recovery Fund become policy, it might be the EU’s real, first step towards statehood. It will be up to Member States to make that happen. Now more than ever, we need national capitals to rise up to the challenge, be brave – and take the plunge.

The post The Franco-German Recovery Fund Could Change the EU Forever appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Rügen: A Treasure Chest Full of Historical Pearls

When arriving in Rügen, travelers will likely journey through Binz. This small town is the island’s most crowded destination, and always has events on offer. Travelers will find no opulent hotels, just white, wooden beach villas of coastal architecture. Through decades of tourism, its panorama has remained true to the Zeitgeist of the 19th century. After reunification, the German government earmarked funds for the renovation of buildings and roads.

Prora, on the other hand, offers a very different experience. Also known as the Colossus of Prora, this enormous waterfront building complex is a symbol of Third Reich architecture. Its builders intended for it to host up 20,000 people. During the Nazi era, the KdF (Kraft Durch Freude, or Strength Through Joy, a party organ devoted to recreational activities) acquired land on the island. The KdF planned for Seebad Rügen to become the biggest and most modern seaside resort in Europe, stretching 4.5 kilometres. However, it remained unfinished due to the Outbreak of World War II. After its destruction during the war, only five of the original eight apartment blocks remain, for a total length of about 2.5 kilometers.

The pretty town of Sellin, however, makes one forget the horrors of the past. Colourful rows of houses, small shops full of amber and restaurant with local specialties adorn the streets. The place is also home to one of Rügen’s emblems – the Sellin pier. Today, Sellin is a perfect starting point for excursions – for instance, to the Jamsund National Park.

A Paradise to Conquer  

Uncountable beech trees characterise the Jasmund National Park. The Park has an exceptionally wide range of habitats thanks to the complex effects of climate, relief and soil. Since 2011, its beech forest is listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site. The 3,000-hectare forest invites explorers to take walks along the ancient trunks and below protective treetops.

In addition to beech trees, this section of Rügen sports its imposing Chalk Cliffs. They extend over a length of 15 kilometers on the peninsula Jasmund. The 120-meter-high rocks arose more than 50 million years ago from calcareous, fossil-like remains of various small animals, sand, clay and other rocks. The Chalk Cliffs have to endure constant erosion. With each storm, the rock changes and large pieces break out of the rocks and occasionally tear entire trees into the sea. A transient, but evolving beauty. This uniqueness was immortalised in 1818 by the German painter Caspar David Friedrich.

The Pirates of the Baltics

Some mysteries hide in those woods. Many waves ago, the notorious pirate Klaus Störtebeker was up to mischief. He and the “Victual Brothers” attacked ships of wealthy merchants to bring home gold and silver. They called themselves “Likedeeler” (= “equal sharers”), because they divided the plunder equally among them and the poor.

When the pirates were eventually condemned to beheading in Hamburg, Störtebeker had a last wish: all men he could pass with a severed head, should be saved from death. Störtebeker was beheaded, but with an upright gait the bloody body walked past eleven men. Then, however, the hangman tripped him up and he fell to the ground – all other fellows were beheaded. There are many legends about the pirate who is an essential part of Northern German folklore. Today, the Störetebeker Festival in Rügen brings the saga to life with live performances.

Hiddensee – Hidden in the Sea

If Rügen is still too “lively” for the above-mentioned reasons, one can continue the adventure on the near island of Hiddensee. “Dat söte Länneken” (local dialect for “the sweet land”) is proudly car-free. There are no engines to overshadow the shrieking of seagulls. No parking lots ruining the beach panorama. No emissions polluting the Baltic air.

Rügen’s little sister boasts of its picturesque cottages, crystal clear water and classic Northern German lighthouses, from which one can observe the peaceful sea. In autumn, a fabulous spectacle of nature takes place: the cranes move from the north into their winter quarters and take a break on Hiddensee – a very symbolic event, isn’t it?

The post Rügen: An Autumn Paradise in the Heart of Europe appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The World After Hitler

As the devastating war neared its bloody conclusion, the Allies and the Soviet Union met in Yalta, to debate the future of the world after Hitler. There, they stipulated that Germany in general and Berlin separately would be split into four zones of control under Soviet, American, British, and French administration. Additionally, they agreed that all occupied and former Axis powers were to have free and fair elections to determine their own futures. Whether Churchill and Roosevelt were foolish enough to believe Stalin would honour this agreement, or whether they simply felt they could do nothing about it, remains unclear. It does seem Roosevelt actually trusted Stalin, as he later acknowledged being fooled by him. This didn’t last long: the brutality with which the Soviets treated Eastern Europe, such as the mass purges and massacres even in the territories of those who had never aligned with the Axis, awakened the Western Allies to the true nature of Soviet designs of power. Due to these atrocities, Britain passed the Polish Resettlement Act in 1947, to protect Polish troops who would undoubtedly have been in large part murdered or imprisoned by the Soviet backed authorities upon returning home.

There is little doubt that the Soviets betrayed the Allies’ trust in their treatment of eastern Europe. This heightened tensions, and made it more difficult to reach any positive agreements as to the status of Germany – which even in defeat remained a strategically critical country. The Soviets, in particular,  diligently followed Lenin’s maxim that “whoever has Germany has Europe”. Ultimately, negotiations were hampered by the fact that both sides feared that a unified Germany could end up on the opposing side and therefore hand them a huge amount of power. This is particularly clear when compared to Austria: while occupied in the same four part system for some time, the country was reunified in 1955 without even a requirement to neutrality, although the Austrians embraced it on their own accord afterwards. In Germany, the higher stakes prevented such harmony: by 1947, it was clear to all involved that Germany would not be united. When preparing for the new year, the United States gave up any hope of influencing the Soviet occupation zone, and began to concentrate fully on helping the three western zones to create a functioning economy. Soon after, the Truman doctrine was announced, revealing American intentions to contain Communism everywhere. The opening moves of the Cold War were beginning.

Gloves Off: Berlin Blockaded

Further negotiations at the Moscow conference involved Soviet proposals for a united but neutral Germany, with the industrial Ruhr area under four-power control. However, in large part due to Moscow breaking trust over the rest of the post war restructuring of Europe, the Americans concluded that this was a scheme to get the western powers out and assert Soviet control over all of Germany. Considering the Soviets’ previous record of making apparently reasonable agreements, only to immediately break them in order to ensure their own wider hegemony, the Americans were most likely right to be suspicious. Following the Czechoslovak coup in February 1948, where Soviet backed forces had seized full control of the country and begun purging the opposition, the plans to create a West German state were greatly accelerated.

The Soviets decided to throw the dice and initiated a partial blockade of Berlin on April 1^st 1948. The Soviets aimed to gain a symbolic victory by forcing out the western powers and gaining control of the whole city. The Americans were not intimidated, and doubled down on their plans of economic reconstruction. On the 19^th of June, they unveiled the new Deutschmark currency to replace the old Reichsmark. When the currency was allowed to circulate by the Berlin authorities on the 23^rd of June, the Soviets cut the power supply to the western zones, marking the start of the open attempt to starve out the city. The Soviets then compounded the blockade by cutting communications links and blocking supplies of food and coal.

The western powers retaliated with an embargo on the Soviet zone, cutting off steel and coal from the Ruhr. The official justification was designed to parrot Soviet bureaucratic excuses for the blockade, and accused Moscow of stealing empty railway wagons. British foreign minister Bevin was reasonably confident that supplies would last long enough for a solution to be found: Berlin’s food stocks were expected to last around a month, and fuel even longer. He outright rejected surrendering the city to the Soviets to the extent that he was willing to have the United Kingdom follow the United States into war if bullets began to fly.

A Miracle In Logistics: The Berlin Airlift

Fortunately, war proved unnecessary, in large part due to what had been intended as a mental exercise in planning by RAF air commodore Rex Waite. On being told that supplying Berlin entirely by air was impossible, he decided to prove the opposite. On June 23^rd his plan was rebuffed as not sufficiently detailed, but with more detail added the British and American authorities were inclined to take the idea seriously, at least as a temporary measure. This was largely because nobody else had presented a proposal other than shooting their way to Berlin, which had been vetoed by Washington as ludicrously dangerous as a strategy that relied entirely on the Soviets bluffing.

Very few saw the Berlin Airlift plan as likely to be successful, and with good reason: it required at least 4500 tons of goods to be transported per day, an unprecedented amount by air. And yet, it happened. The operation was a desperate rush to get enough planes carrying enough cargo into the air. Flying and maintenance crews worked tirelessly to ensure this came to be. The western powers had one significant advantage in carrying through such a punishing schedule, the extremely high motivation of the air crews who flocked to the opportunity to carry out such a humanitarian mission. As supplies started to come in, the effects of the Soviet blockade began to inflict negative consequences on the USSR too. The Western Allies embargo of steel and coal, if prolonged, would cripple the Baltic fishing fleet, as well as East German industry in general. As such the Soviets tried various means to frustrate the Berlin Airlift, from physical barriers to buzzing transport planes with fighters.

Despite these obstructions, by September 1948 the target of 4500 tons per day was being hit and, astonishingly, surpassed. On the 18^th of September nearly 8500 tons of coal were brought in, and in the end the Berlin airlift transported a phenomenal 2.3 million tons of goods. By January 1949, a full six months after Rex Waite’s original plan, the average of delivered goods rose to over 5500 tons per day. It was an unprecedented display of industrial might and political will, and it sent a very clear message. On the Soviet side, the reaction was one of muted stupor. Demands for a different settlement of postwar Germany were quietly dropped, and the focus shifted on trying to save face. Molotov took much of the blame, being replaced in punishment for his miscalculation. In the end, Stalin capitulated at the cost of face-saving negotiations. He consoled himself by ordering Soviet bureaucracy to keep being a nuisance to German rail traffic.

Berlin Airlift Successful: Round One To The West

The success of the Berlin Airlift allowed the Western Allies to continue their plans to create an independent state in West Germany, which came into being in May 1949, and holding onto the foothold of west Berlin at the same time. In the opinion of Bevin, failure would have been severe as he expected that abandoning Berlin would have made it impossible for the Western Allies to hold the rest of West Germany, leaving the Soviets the undisputed masters of Europe with a united communist Germany under their suzerainty.

Additionally, the crisis bound the West more tightly together, with Bevin requesting nuclear capable US bombers to be stationed in Britain, and launching a concerted P.R. counteroffensive against Soviet communism. It is also worth noting the attitude of Berliners themselves: despite their economic hardship, few defected to the Soviets. Conversely, Berliners living under Soviet administration did their best to flee, and the Soviets had to build walls and barriers to stem the tide of people leaving. The Berlin Airlift thus provided a great victory for the West – and set the demarcation lines of a frozen conflict that would make the world hold its breath for the next four decades.

The post The Cold War Takes To The Sky: The Story Of The Berlin Airlift appeared first on My Country? Europe..

In 2012, through these words, the Nobel Committee awarded the European Union with its prestigious Peace Prize (The Nobel Foundation, 2012). The initial steps of European integration are generally regarded as major catalysts for change that helped transform a war-torn continent into a “security community”, as Karl Deutsch put it (Deutsch 1957; Nathan 2010, 6). Europe’s political fabric was stripped away of nationalist sentiments and unilateralism in favour of cooperation mechanisms and multilateralism.

To this day, EU citizens enjoy an unprecedented degree of freedom and prosperity guaranteed by a long-lasting period of peace – around 70 years – in which the spectre of war survives in the minds of a few elderly citizens but is understandably ignored by younger generations. Indeed, a war between current member states is deemed “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Robert Schuman, 1950).

The EU and Power Politics

These premises certainly confirm that EU member states have renounced the use of military force to solve intra-European disputes, successfully scaling back the role of power politics in conflict resolution. By partially transferring their sovereignty to newly formed institutions, the founding countries created a supranational system that favours diplomacy and dialogue over hard power. Before digging into the analysis of the research question, it is essential to give a precise definition of power politics.

While some sources stress the preeminence of military assets, others include economic might in the set of instruments that a given country has at its disposal to exert influence over rival entities. Therefore, power politics can be defined as a way for states to conduct international relations where military, as well as economic tools, serve the purpose of advancing self-interest at the expenses of other actors (Merriam-Webster, 2018). This concept is central to the realist theory, which conceives international relations as a continuous struggle between states to satisfy their need of security and promote their interests in order to survive in the anarchic international system (Wohlforth 2008, 133).

Rebuilding Europe After WWII

The new European order emerged from the ashes of World War II. The consequent peace experienced over the following decades do not necessarily entail the definitive demise of power politics. Throughout the last century, some major member states have continued to use military projection and their international stature to strengthen their position both over fellow members and not. Moreover, the European Union has seen multiple conflicts rage not far from its Eastern borders. Some of these persist today in the form of frozen conflicts in which the bloc is more or less involved, although not militarily.

Greater economic interdependence and supranational law might have drastically changed the way European states interact, but the topic needs to be further explored from a historical perspective. It must be stressed that, as European integration has come to embrace the political realm as well, the role of power politics deserves a thorough analysis that also includes the study of EU foreign policy, and thus the external dimension.

The term “peace” needs to be carefully defined as well. By accepting a “minimalistic interpretation” (Pasture 2014, 8) we can easily argue that most of Europe has evolved from being a ravaged battlefield to a haven of democracy and justice, offering an excellent real-world example to democratic peace theorists. Peace, therefore, might simply result from the absence of war and violence. However, confrontations can take place without firing a single shot and by recurring to other less destructive means (nuclear deterrence, cyber-attacks, military exercises, missile defence systems setups etc.). By taking into account this dimension of power politics, for instance, the period encompassing the Cold War can hardly be considered peaceful; the weapons were cold, yet the tempers were not.

The rationale for peace-building

While it is widely accepted that European integration contributed to peace-building, academics have long argued on the rationales behind it using different theoretical frameworks, consequently reaching different conclusions. It is my opinion that a comprehensive understanding can only be achieved by considering the multiple perspectives available in the literature. Most importantly, the importance of a thematic and staged approach must be acknowledged.

The approach must be thematic because some policies, events and breakthroughs might be better explained by one theory rather than another. For instance, Haas’ theory of neo-functionalism confers special importance to supranational institutions and spillover effects. Meanwhile theorists of intergovernmentalism argue that national governments held the lead in order to advance their interests inside the European Community.

Some policies, like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), relied on strong intergovernmental negotiations. Meanwhile, the setting up of the Monetary Union can be explained as a direct consequence of previous results in integration (spillover effect).

The staged process helps identify the best theory – or combination of theories – to read certain events in a delimited period of time. The early years of the European Community were of course characterized by the protagonism of national governments, which led to the setting up of supranational institutions in the first place. However, the period that saw the much-praised Jacques Delors guide the European Commission might best be unfolded by the institutionalist perspective and its underscoring of activism in supranational institutions.

The early stages of European integration can give us a glimpse of how power politics were still prominent at the time. France, Germany, Italy and the other member states were not fighting on battlefields any more. However, each state, whenever the occasion made it possible, tried to get the most benefits from the process.

Academics’ Approaches

Some intergovernmentalist scholars explain European integration as a way for states to rescue themselves (Milward 1992, 7). Although, this must not overshadow the importance of Monnet’s pragmatic idealism (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 63) and the founding fathers’ personal characters, distinguished by the shared universalist views and Christian values they relied upon. This is best exemplified by Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer’s leading roles in their respective Christian-Democratic parties (Verovšek 2017, 529).

Because of their nature as major powers, it was mostly France and – after its accession – Great Britain that continued to use power politics as a way to conduct their foreign policies (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 230). Taking into account examples from the 20^th  as well as the 21^st century such as the Pleven Plan (1950) and the intervention in Libya (2011), we can argue that power politics did not disappear from the European scene. Indeed, it became subtler and less dependent on material and military assets. States used the new supranational platform to advance national interests and steer negotiations and new policies in a way that would favour them over other members.

The intergovernmentalist approach that featured the early integration process can be intended as a way for states to use power politics in a new ratio that would suit the new friendlier context. France, especially, used its weight, diplomatic power and reputation to oppose any initiative that would reduce significantly its sovereignty and would put into question its supremacy in continental Europe.

The Pleven Plan

Pressures from the United States aimed at convincing France about the importance of rehabilitating Western Germany’s military capacities and embedding them into a supranational defence platform showed to be insufficient to assuage the French political establishment, which still feared a resurgence of German expansionism.

The European Defence Community (EDC), a plan proposed precisely for this aim by the then Prime Minister René Pleven, entailed some form of political union that most of the French military deemed unnecessary and dangerous, as it undermined the possibility for France to freely project its military power (Gavin 2009, 80).

General Ely was one of the few prominent figures from the army to support the plan, though only from a political perspective, as France had heavily invested in it. General Juin fiercely opposed the plan, as it would have stripped the nation of its authority to confer it to a supranational institution (ibid.).

The French officials who supported the plan were not blindly underestimating the German question; the diplomat Helvé Alphand conceived the EDC as a way for France to keep a stricter control over Germany. France, after all, could count on a larger army, and could appoint its officials in key positions (ibid.) to not let others assume a leading role. In the end, both the factions were opposing or arguing in favour of the EDC because, in their opinion, the position of France would be strengthened. Any higher ideal of European unity was not the determining factor of the sides taken; the distribution of power could not be changed or reduced to the detriment of France.

These opposing views pushed the newly appointed Prime Minister Pierre Mendès in 1954 to rethink the plan and modify some of its core provisions, devoiding it of any supranational footprint. Any reference to a federal or confederal system was eliminated, while Germany would have been the only member state to integrate its army. By losing its meaning, the plan was never adopted despite the ratification by the other national parliaments. Power politics had come to shape post-world war Europe as well.

The Fouchet Plan

Other shows of force in the European arena concerned the Fouchet Plan and the negotiations over the CAP in the sixties, a source of grim debates among member states since its inception. The French President General de Gaulle played an important role in both events. When he came to power, it was immediately clear that he would try to assert French supremacy on the continent.“Europe”, he said, “is the means for France to recover what it ceased to be after Waterloo: first in the world” (Vanke 2001, 96).

De Gaulle’s objective was to drive Europe away from the influence of the USA and the Soviet Union and create the sufficient premises for France to lead European integration under its conditions and leadership (ibid.). Supranational institutions like the Commission and the European Parliament, designed by his predecessors, were seen as obstacles to overcome in order to reach the goal. The plan, named after the French ambassador Christian Fouchet, conceived a loose “political union of states” grounded on a solid intergovernmental structure that would include a security dimension as well.

The French proposal ultimately failed due to strong opposition from the Netherlands and Belgium, who favoured an Atlanticist approach and feared French supremacy (Dinan 2014, 101). The Dutch opposition strategy, led by the foreign minister Joseph Luns, consisted of linking the accession of the United Kingdom (the so called prealable englias/English prerequisite) to the new political union.

Indeed, conflicting views revolved around Britain. The French opposed British membership over concerns of excessive influence from NATO, de facto controlled by the US, on European affairs. Meanwhile, the Dutch had hoped since the signing of the Treaty of Rome that the UK would become a member to counter the early Franco-German axis. Nonetheless, Dutch opposition was so firm that the Netherlands would have even accepted the setting-up of the political union provided that they would not become part of it (Vanke 2001, 108).

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

Like the Fouchet Plan, some academics go as far as to say that the confrontation over the CAP in 1965 was deliberately pushed forward by the French, especially from the Gaullist faction, to shape the European Economic Community (EEC) in a way that would suit more their interests (Newhouse 1967, 21). However, according to the international historian N. Piers Ludlow, the conflict was primarily spurred by Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to jointly challenge the supremacy that France had assumed in the first decade of European integration (Ludlow 1999, 233).

It can be argued that the European Community was first and foremost a French project that would have never been realized if the French had not taken the initiative (ibid.). All the six founders undoubtedly gained advantages from the making of the customs union and were well aware that no further progress in integration would have taken place without France leading the operation. This acknowledgement reduced their negotiating power (ibid. 236). The Germans especially wanted to avoid the dissolution of the Community at all costs, as it served as a major tool to regain legitimacy on the international scene.

The possibility of such dissolution emerged in 1965 when the six failed to agree on details concerning the CAP. de Gaulle encountered strong resistance over the policy, which was clearly favouring the French agricultural industry at the expense of the other states’ finances. The three “rebels” felt they had given enough concessions to satisfy French demands. Italy, for instance, was the biggest net contributor to the common budget despite being the poorest of the six (ibid. 237).

Confident of its position, General de Gaulle withdrew the French permanent representative at the EEC from its post in Brussels and decided that no French delegation would be sent to the next Council and COREPER meetings. The crisis ultimately led to the so-called Luxembourg Compromise. It inflicted a fatal blow to the supranational character of the community as member states acquired veto power over matters considered too important for national interests, heavily reducing the importance of Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) in the decision-making process. According to the French politician and economist Robert Marjolin, the compromise “consecrated the victory of the Gaullist conceptions in the matter of European institutions” (Marjolin 1989, 347).

De Gaulle and the French Withdrawal from NATO

de Gaulle’s attempts to restore France’s grandeur also concerned the broader transatlantic relations. In 1966, in a move that shocked his allies, the general announced France’s withdrawal from the military command of NATO. The decision perfectly suited de Gaulle’s conception of international relations, a strongly realist one, that marginalized the role of ideology and focused entirely on the balance of power (Martin 2011, 233).

He had credibly declared himself anti-Communist before, but as his scepticism over US presence on the continent became more marked, he sought a softer relationship with the Soviet Union that would make space for a strategy of détente as opposed to US containment.

De Gaulle conceived the transatlantic alliance in a different way compared to his European partners, less reluctant to rely on the American leadership to counterbalance Soviet influence. Before leaving NATO, France had already halted its participation to common military activities, creating the premises for the treaty to be considered a “14 + 1” alliance more than a compact bloc (ibid. 235).

French national sovereignty was paramount, and any move towards transatlantic integration of military capabilities had to be rejected. This is the reason behind France’s refusal to take part in the Multilateral Force project (MLF), aimed at integrating the nuclear capabilities of all three major NATO powers. Nuclear independence became a primary objective as de Gaulle would not accept the Anglo-Saxon supremacy and prerogative on this matter. Furthermore, he went as far as to side with the Soviet Union to oppose German membership in the MLF project (ibid.).

The Élysée Treaty between Germany and France signed in 1963 corroborated the Franco-German axis but ran parallel with the two countries’ opposing views on transatlantic relations; despite Adenauer’s warm welcoming of such treaty, he also interpreted it as a way for de Gaulle to further distance France from NATO and embed a new security system in the axis. When the next year de Gaulle persisted with his stance by offering the new German president Ludwig Erhard a “veiled ultimatum” on what side to pick, Adenauer’s fears were confirmed (ibid. 237). However, Germany would eventually choose to affirm its loyalty to Washington.

De Gaulle’s ultimate goal was to free the European continent, stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals” (ibid.234), of the tension stemming from the Cold War. To him, the United States was responsible for feeding the flames of the conflict and only a European security system under French leadership and supervision would be able to restore some balance. History, though, would betray him.

France in the Cold War

Throughout the following 30 years of Cold War, France would uphold its distinct position and try to emerge as the third alternative to the bipolarity imprinted on the world stage by the two warring superpowers. Despite de Gaulle’s positioning on the right of the political spectrum, it would be the socialist President François Mitterrand more than anyone to keep afloat the General’s tenets of national independence and scepticism over the transatlantic alliance. France witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War under his presidency, in the eighties and early nineties, when NATO’s purpose was put into question and a reform of Europe’s defence structure seemed necessary (Menon 1995, 22).

After de Gaulle’s departure, the semi-presidential system which characterized the Fifth Republic laid the ground for institutional conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister over who had to be in control of foreign policy. Mitterrand feared that NATO would further push for an integrationist policy, eventually including the political dimension. The prime minister Édouard Balladur instead, represented the Atlanticist faction in the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), which envisioned a rapprochement with the alliance. Yet, France’s official position continued to come out as ambiguous and distrust mounted from both sides.

An official from the US declared that if “it wasn’t for the French, we might be able to accept the assurances that a new European security entity would be part of a trans-Atlantic partnership, but on this issue, we don’t trust the French” (ibid. 24). Indeed, France urged the other European allies to come together and embrace a common defence structure; nevertheless, her actions didn’t go much further than creating a Franco-German brigade in agreement with Chancellor Helmut Kohl (Brown 2013, 291).

With all the major member states enclosed in the Atlantic framework, France was the only country ardently pushing for a European security arm that could challenge NATO leadership. Paradoxically, perhaps out of awareness that nothing would be accomplished at the European level, France also recognized the importance of the alliance and supported several US-led initiatives (Menon 1995, 27).

France’s Re-entry into NATO and Libyan Intervention

It was only in 2009 that, under the presidency of Nicolas Sarcozy, France re-joined NATO. This move followed years in which France’s attempts to shape an independent European security policy had slowed down.

Some success had been achieved in 1993 with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which institutionalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second of the three pillars forming the new European Union; however, the Petersberg Declaration issued the previous year had made clear that EU’s foreign policy activities would have only included crisis management, leaving the actual military tasks to NATO (Van Meurs et al. 2018, 231).

By joining the Alliance, Sarcozy recognized that France’s interests would thenceforth be better pursued within the transatlantic framework. In 2012 a report by the once strongly anti-NATO French politician Hubert Védrine stated that indeed France could not count on a European security apparatus and would be worse off out of NATO (ibid. 292). The country’s role in the transatlantic alliance was first tested during the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The operation exemplified the persistence of power politics in the European landscape and, most likely, of de Gaulle’s ghost in French foreign policy (Brown 2013, 296).

Approved by the UN Security Council, the military intervention was primarily led by France and Great Britain to stop general Gaddafi from committing violence against his people. In 2010 pacific protests had erupted throughout the Arab world, especially by the hand of young citizens, and the strongmen in power did not restrain from using violence. However, other reasons might have led France to intervene.

Intervention in Libya and the Impact on European Relations

As outlined by the intelligence platform Stratfor, the event translated into an indirect and silent confrontation between Italy and France. Since the establishment of its old colony, Italy has always considered Libya to be extremely important for its national interests, with regular energy supply and stability as primary objectives.

France’s assertiveness during the crisis ended up convincing the Italians that its role risked being stripped away by its transalpine allies, especially through new potential energy contracts signed by the French company Total at the detriment of the Italian ENI. In fact, responding to clarifications over the future of the Italian business in Libya, the Deputy Chairman of the Libyan National Transition Council Hafiz al Ghogha said that this would depend on “the support that the various European countries have offered the grassroots uprising” (Stratfor 2011, 11).

Before the conflict started, France was also the most important European arms supplier for Tripoli, but its role was being challenged by Rome with deals worth more than one billion dollars in 2010 (ibid. 8). Today, eight years after the military intervention, the confrontation is still ongoing:  President Emmanuel Macron is tacitly backing General Khalifa Haftar, which controls the eastern region of Cyrenaica, while Italy supports the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli.

France’s renewed activism over the last years, in Lybia as well as in Mali, can be read, from a broader perspective, as a way to reassert its role as major European military power in contrast with German supremacy over the economic sphere (ibid. 7). Eventually, the crisis proved the complete disunity of EU’s member states in the field of foreign policy.

Conclusion

With the exception of the Algerian War of Independence, legally speaking an intra-European civil war (Pasture 2015, 2; Hansen & Jonsson 2014), the process of European integration has brought long-lasting peace over most of the continent’s territory. The Franco-German robust friendship represents the most successful achievement of the process. However, we must avoid resorting to teleological explanations. While historical thinking might lead us to conceive a linear progression of history pointing to a predetermined end, we cannot exclude the repetition of events, or the occurrence of new ones, possibly caused by multiple contingent factors (ibid. 8).

The EU immediate neighbouring regions host a few ongoing conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Ukraine, Libya) which threaten the geopolitical stability of the continent and affect intra-European dynamics. As shifts in the transatlantic relationships became clear after Trump’s trade tariffs against the bloc, the EU finds itself at a crossroads between departing from its status of “economic giant, political dwarf and military worm,” as in the words of former Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens and remaining anchored to a stagnating context fuelled by its leaders’ empty declarations. Yet, as demonstrated previously by exploring France’s historical behaviour, power politics have triggered and found a way into European integration since its inception, with countries today still reluctant to give up more sovereignty.

Supranational institutions have acquired a life of their own, but intergovernmentalism still persists consistently. President Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel have recently restated the question of a European army, but chances are that nothing tangible will come out of it, at least in the short and medium terms. Nonetheless, this proves once again that the military dimension is still central to the biggest economic bloc risen out of the ashes of war; further shifts in the international order could challenge the current dynamics and systems of alliances, leading the EU to assume a more proactive role in the new multipolar world, perhaps by overtaking NATO’s task, as hoped by France, or acting as a complement to it, as favoured by Germany.

Bibliography

An earlier version of this article was originally written for the University of Leiden. 

The post How European Integration Changed French Power Politics and Transatlantic Relations appeared first on My Country? Europe..

It was promoted as a product fit for the future of Germany. East German magazines often praised caffeine’s effects. Alertness and productivity were desirable traits for the socialist people, so it was a beverage of the future.

For the past, the DDR wanted to tap into the German history, possibly avoiding the too recent past. A connection to the previous history would foster their position as legitimate Germany, so the German coffee tradition was perfect. Especially considering that the tradition was quite strong in Saxony as the firsts German coffee houses opened in Leipzig. As a form of luxury, coffee was relatively affordable. It was also easier to provide to the population than a working car… Or so they thought.

The black frost, chicory coffee, and other unpleasantries:

In 1975, the so-called “black frost” spoiled Brazilian production of coffee. It destroyed more than half of the coffee trees. At the same time, the civil war ravaged Angola and Ethiopia. An earthquake hit Guatemala and Colombia had floods. Coffee leaf rust appeared in Nicaragua.

Let’s just say that it wasn’t the best time for production. Prices hiked, and imports became prohibitively costly for the DDR. Oil imports already consumed a big part of the import budget, so the SED tried to curb the import of luxury goods. They pulled Kosta, the cheapest caffeine brand, away from the market. In its place, East German citizens found coffee mixes: fifty per cent coffee, and fifty per cent other, unpleasant, things. Mostly chicory, beans, and grains.

Citizens’ reactions were far from stellar. People jokingly called this mix Erichs Krönung, a play on Jacobs Krönung, a western coffee brand, and Honecker’s name. Citizens resorted to the last available form of protest in the DDR: writing letters of complaint. More than fourteen thousand letters complained about its flavour, taste, and how it would clog coffee machines. But why was so important? People were used to disservices, lateness and goods shortage. However, coffee, as part of the propaganda, was a proxy for the living conditions. If the DDR’s capability was put in question, so would its legitimacy.

Chto delat?

What is to be done? Reserves dwindled down because people preferred to buy the costlier mix, without weird ersatz, so the state had to get new sources of coffee. Prices were sky-high, and the state had limited reserves of foreign currency, so how could they afford it? Barter, of course. The DDR tied foreign aid in machinery and services to coffee exports. The plan was to start up the production in various, neglected, countries. They targeted places like Laos, Vietnam, and Angola where they set up farms, trained the populations, and sent pieces of machinery.

Did it work out? Technically no. This was because the coffee production was often below agreed targets, but it was a (baby) step to act in a globalized world and to push their own ambitions. Unsurprisingly, the propaganda could spin it in a better way. It was presented as an alternative approach to the “Western neocolonialism”. Plantations where locals only worked as assistants to German technicians were justified as a supervision and assistance towards their socialist brethren. At least, the propaganda was a part of the East German state that worked with Teutonic efficiency.

The post The Brew of the People: the DDR’s Coffee Crisis appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Great Britain and the Splendid Aberration

The puzzle becomes considerably less mysterious if one focuses on the security policies of the UK during its history. For Great Britain, its decision then to join the Entente actually aligns perfectly with a policy pursued since the days of Henry VII. In actuality, the irony is that Britain’s Splendid Isolation in the second half of the 19th century was the aberration – the anomaly. British intervention in Continental affairs was actually meant to be the norm.

The lack of British intervention in the Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 was possibly compelled by fears of a French invasion. Less than a decade later, Britain would successfully assert its interests against those of France and Prussia during the 1867 Luxembourg Crisis. The crisis started with France attempting to purchase the Grand Duchy from the Dutch, igniting Prussian agitation at the threat to their rights in the area.

The subsequent conference in London denied both Paris and Berlin control of the region, guaranteeing the perpetuation of the personal union between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It also led to the demolishing of the great fortifications of Luxembourg, which had long been important and famous, earning Luxembourg the nickname “Gibraltar of the North”. Further, it compelled all the major powers to guarantee Luxembourg’s neutrality, even forcing a reluctant Prussia to withdraw her garrison from the Duchy, which had been a Prussian right ever since the Congress of Vienna. And so, merely with diplomacy, and backed by the threat of force, London managed to neutralise the crisis and win enforcement of the 1839 Treaty of London.

Likewise, the absence of British soldiers from the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War does not equal to a retreat from the matter: on the contrary, Whitehall took actions to preserve the balance of power on the Continent. In 1870, the British threw their weight into the brewing conflict by demanding separate treaties from France and from Prussia, reaffirming their guarantee of Belgian neutrality as contained in the Treaty of London 1839. This further forced both sides to renounce all claims to the Belgian territory. Thus, merely by putting her foot down, Great Britain cowed Paris and Berlin into compliance. Accordingly, the German assault came via the Rhine and Moselle, rather than through Belgium.

Due to these diplomatic successes, Great Britain did not need to intervene militarily nor did it desire to. However, this did not represent disentanglement: London never left the Continental powers to do as they pleased. On the other hand, it made it abundantly clear that if either power violated Belgian neutrality, it would march to war on Belgium’s behalf. The two sides were wise enough to recognise this and to not risk British hostility. Great Britain also repeatedly sent fleets into the Turkish Straits in support of the Ottoman Empire against Russia, going so far as to prepare troops to land in Constantinople to repel the Russians in 1878. This also led to a concession by Russia to Britain’s wishes at the Congress of Berlin.

From this, the conclusion is even during the so-called Splendid Isolation, Britain did not act like an isolated country. It asserted its rights with the threat of force, and this was enough to compel conformity to its wishes. A quote that perfectly encapsulates British policy at the time can be found in a letter written in 1749, sent by the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Hardwicke: “France will outdo us at sea when they have nothing to fear by land. I have always maintained that our marine should protect our alliances upon the continent; and thus, by diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain our superiority at sea.”.

Security Guarantees

Another excellent quote comes from historian Cyril Falls: “Yet too many British historians and self-styled experts in strategy have, especially when dealing with this war [First World War], made preposterous claims for sea power, claims both contrary to common sense and founded on distortion of history. Britain, they say, should not have created a mass conscript army; she should have stood off, kept the seas, and blockaded the enemy. This, they add, was her traditional policy. It may have been the policy she had hankered after in selfish moments, but it had never been pursued for long. Time after time Britain – a country with a small population, and therefore a small army, before the 19th century – had been forced to send land forces to the continent to prevent her allies from collapsing. It was not merely that they might be routed and driven out of the war by sheer force of arms. They might walk out.”

Britain first developed the policy of providing security guarantees to her allies on the Continent in the late 15th century. Henry VII had committed himself to an anti-French alliance with Spain and Austria at the opening of the Italian Wars in the 1490s. This was the beginning of England’s policy of neutralizing the Low Countries and restraining any prospective hegemon, which initially was France and then Spain, following the disintegration of the French Kingdom in the Wars of Religion.

Queen Mary sent troops to help Philip II at St Quentin, Queen Elizabeth sent strong contingents to help the Dutch in their revolt against Spain, and from William III the British committed increasingly powerful forces to the Continent to fight Louis XIV. This was the great age of Marlborough when Britain contributed to such mighty victories as Steinkirk, Oudenarde, Malplaquet, Ramillies, and Blenheim. It saw British redcoats fighting side by side with Austrians in the heart of Germany. Eventually France, first as a reunified kingdom under Richelieu and then as a revolutionary power, emerged once more as Britain’s main antagonist – until Germany took on the mantle in 1871.

The Key to Prosperity: Access to the World’s Oceans

Britain’s access to naval bases the world over allowed an unprecedented ability to project military power. It also gave London an undisputed role steering world trade, something which her European competitors perceived as an undue influence on their ability to obtain economic prosperity. This was acutely felt in Germany, where the great economic and industrial progress of the 19th Century depended primarily on the Reich’s export trade – which in turn depended from Great Britain, as the chief controller of the world’s oceans.

In this light, Britain traded acceptance for its role as a guardian of trade and finance in exchange for military guarantees to her allies. These military guarantees were also designed to keep European powers focused on each other’s antagonism and prevent any of them from achieving a position of dominance on the Continent.

The American political scientist, Nicholas Spykman, observes in America’s Strategy in World Politics: “In times of continental threats to her naval supremacy Great Britain usually deserted her policy of isolation and joined one of the continental combinations. Such a step improved the relative power position, reduced the size of the naval strength to be met, and increased the size of the fleet with which to meet it. A continental ally was helpful in the early stages of a power struggle and absolutely indispensable when war broke out. Only through a land power of the mainland could Britain take a successful offensive against a large continental state. Only with the army of an ally could the land frontier of the opponent be attacked and the type of action developed which, together with the British blockade, might bring victory.”

He also points out that “Great Britain has played an active role in most of the coalitions that have been formed to restrain growing continental powers. In the name of preserving the equilibrium, everybody in Europe has fought everybody else. Britain has successively defeated Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and German sea power and has successfully used Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and Prussia as allies. Power politics is responsible for her reluctance to make advance commitments to any nation beyond the buffer zone. He who plays the balance of power can have no permanent friends.”

The Place in the Sun

So it is now understood that the policy of Great Britain has always remained the same. With that in mind, the initial question which was posed can now be answered. “Why did Great Britain get involved in the First World War or the Second World War?”. The answer comes from Robert J. Art:

“In 1914, Germany needed England to stand aside so that it could shore up its failing great power ally Austria-Hungary and deal with the growing power of Russia. Diplomatic isolation for Germany (the dissolution of Austria-Hungary) meant the political encirclement and eventual strangulation of Germany in the eyes of Germany’s leaders. If Britain stood aside while Germany attained continental hegemony, however, then Britain’s security would be at risk if a hegemonic Germany deployed the resources of the European continent against it. So, in classic security dilemma terms, Britain’s security would be at risk from the continental hegemony that Germany believed it needed for its security, and similarly, Germany’s leaders believed that Germany’s security would be at risk if Britain denied it continental hegemony. The same logic applies to the British-German struggle during the 1930s. A Nazi Germany that had defeated Russia and dominated the continent could aggregate its resources and turn them into an invasion force to crush England’s defences. The threat that German hegemony posed on Britain brought on the two World Wars.”

Berlin and London were concerned about the security of their nations and were justified in seeking it. To suggest that England ought to have done nothing while Germany had its way with the continent is to ignore or be ignorant of every major war England has ever fought. England could only perpetuate its supremacy at sea and by extension her very independence by the balance of power on the continent. What scared Great Britain the most about Germany was their aggressive actions against the territory and integrity of France. After the Franco-Prussian War, Berlin merely spirited away with Alsace-Lorraine, a minor province, but after the dismissal of Bismarck, it became obviously clear that the German designs on France did not end there.

The World in Flames

Britain attempted to find common ground with Germany in spite of these frictions, and London found itself completely alone diplomatically after the Boer Wars. England had intended to end that isolation when it realised that it had no allies on the continent and that it faced the two armed camps of Germany/Austria and France/Russia by herself. Determining to join one it opted first for Germany but was rebuffed due to German arrogance and misunderstanding.

Accordingly, it shifted its alignment towards France, and the Entente of 1904 delineated the spheres of interest between the two powers. France recognised and guaranteed England’s possession of Egypt, long a bone of contention between the two, while in turn, England did the same for France in Morocco. Friedrich von Holstein immediately wished to challenge this arrangement by provoking the First Moroccan Crisis which led to the Conference of Algeciras, in which everyone but Austria ruled in France’s favour. Particularly, England supported France. This would eventually lead to Germany’s mistrust and perceived lack of stakes in the system of diplomacy via conference – a major factor in the diplomatic deterioration that would precipitate the war.

Realising this, Germany now hoped to drive a wedge between England and France. The method chosen was Tirpitz’s risk theory. He explicitly stated that the purpose of his fleet was not to challenge England but to make war with Germany so costly for England that it wouldn’t fight. In simple words, it was meant to impose neutrality upon England in case of war between the continental blocs. It post-dated the Moroccan crisis and had little to do with imperial ambitions for which neither Germany or England cared in reality. England was on the verge of signing a treaty for the partition of the Portuguese colonies with Germany, and England had conspicuously not opposed German imperialism in Southwest Africa or other places.

Thus, the friction between Germany and England was due to England’s support of France and England’s refusal to let Germany dominate Europe by threatening war, as it was accustomed to doing by sending ultimatums to both Russia and France. At Algeciras, Germany threatened war with England and England threw it in its face, saying that England wasn’t afraid of Germany and that France and Russia might back down but England never would.

Great Britain understood that German ambitions would never settle for slicing off one territory or imposing their will. They wanted to be completely self-sufficient, and this by extension meant to cripple or destroy all other major powers in Europe, leaving Britain isolated. They hoped that Britain, by some miracle, would leave them alone. It is in connection to these events, however, that Britain’s security guarantees at last failed – at least temporarily.

The British Government, in its haste to disarm after Versailles, forgot the underpinning element of its security strategy in Europe. Winston Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons that condemned the minuscule contribution of the British Expeditionary Force and their efforts in the war saying that it was unacceptable that one ally [France] be expected to do all the dying while the other paid only in treasure. So in 1940, France was given little assistance by Britain. Later, they watched even that little assistance get withdrawn from Dunkirk. They then decided to walk out rather than bleed and die on England’s behalf when she herself would not do the same.

This dark page in the history of the Western Allies would eventually be overturned as Britain, the Commonwealth and the United States reaffirmed their stakes in a European continent free of hemispheric hegemonic powers.

The post A Stake in the Continent: why Great Britain Fought in the World Wars appeared first on My Country? Europe..