Thaçi resigned in early November and is now facing trial. But he isn’t the only one who has been called to The Hague recently. Former Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj was called as well in 2019, triggering the early legislative elections of October 2019. Both men were prominent members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK): a former paramilitary unit, a prominent figure of Kosovar independentism, and one of the main actors of the last war in the Balkans.

Kosovo within the Socialist Federation

Kosovo has been attached to Serbia for centuries and a prominent place of Serbian culture and history, which grew on a territory populated by Albanians that settled there in early Middle Ages. When the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) was formed, Josip Broz Tito and the newly formed Communist government separated Serbia in three parts, in an attempt to weaken Serbia’s influence on the country.

These were Serbia itself and two autonomous regions. Vojvodina in the north of the country, because of the Hungarian minority, and Kosovo in the south because of the Albanian population. Vojvodina had more devolved powers, still considering that this devolution took place under a communist, autocratic state. While Kosovo remained more directly controlled by Belgrade between 1945 and 1963, it received the exact same powers as Vojvodina in 1963.

These concessions were granted by the SFRJ to weaken Serbia’s influence within the communist Federal State. In Kosovo’s case, these were also used to appease Albanian nationalism. One of the main objectives of the Yugoslav government was, indeed, to suppress any form of nationalism in any of the Republics and by extension, autonomous provinces.

When Tito died in 1980, an economic crisis fell on the country and nationalism started to rise again. While the main focus was indeed Serbia and Croatia, nationalism and Albanian irredentism also started to be noticed. The Kosovar and Albanian diaspora that settled in Western Europe strongly supported the movements that emerged in Kosovo, and supported movements that would later merge to form the UÇK.

The Republic of Kosova

In March of 1981, the first significant protests in Kosovo erupted, marking the beginning of the Yugoslav collapse. Students demonstrated for more autonomy and more liberties, whilst the federal and Serbian authorities answered by sending in troops. It ended with several casualties on both sides, thousands of arrests, and the massive sacking of people from the Kosovar branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The protesters’ ‘nationalism’ was then considered ‘unacceptable’. Several thousands of Serbs emigrated to Serbia from Kosovo, fearing retaliation.

Fast-forwarding to 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Polje battle, the Serbian government revoked Kosovo’s autonomous powers that were granted through the history of the SFRJ. Kosovo returned to its 1945 status, basically under the tutelage of Belgrade. It was a part of a more global movement called “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” in which Milošević arrested and replaced local leaders in Vojvodina and Kosovo to ensure the support of the autonomous regions to his regime for the upcoming wars. 1989 also was the year where the LDK (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, Democratic League of Kosovo) was founded.

Across 1990, the Communist regime officially collapsed and the Serbian government kept suppressing Albanians’ rights. Kosovar officials attempted to maintain neutrality during the war with Bosnia and Croatia, while many Albanian soldiers within the Yugoslav Army deserted. In July 1990, the Republic of Kosova was formed and would self-proclaim its independence in 1991, immediately and solely recognized by Albania. With the escalation of the tensions, Serbian authorities revoked any autonomy that Kosovo had left, at least legally. The Republic of Kosova indeed went on developing its own underground institutions.

UÇK Rising and the Kosovo War

The UÇK would become more and more important in the early Nineties, with more volunteers joining due to the frustration over how Belgrade was treating the Albanian population. Most of their fighters were trained in underground training camps under the patronage of Adem Jashari, one of the leaders of the UÇK.

After the Dayton Peace Agreements of 1995, the situation in Kosovo started progressively worsening. There were often generalized clashes between Serbian forces and the UÇK, the latter targeting Serbian military forces, police, and civilians. Belgrade answered by sending more troops up until 1997, which did nothing but allow the tensions to escalate even more.

The LDK, which as at the time the biggest party in Kosovo (though officially banned by Federal authorities) was highly critical of the UÇK actions, which targeted civilians, and attempted de-escalation. Due to Belgrade’s violent answer, more and more Kosovars saw armed guerrilla as the only option to resist the Serbian forces. This would drive a wedge between the LDK and the UÇK. Indeed, during those times, several spokespersons of the Party or militants disappeared or were killed. The suspicion is that UÇK attempted to eliminate people that would have been classified as ‘traitors’.

By February of 1998, Yugoslav authorities had started engaging in a full-on war in Kosovo by sending the actual army and divisions, not only law enforcement, to crush the insurgency once and for all. The Yugoslavian troops were well equipped but lacked the full knowledge of the terrain the UÇK had. Later, in March 1998, the UN Security Council Resolution n°1160 imposed an embargo upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to force Belgrade to cease the repression. It also qualified the UÇK as a terrorist organization. The US envoy to the Balkan, Robert Gelbard, also used these same words to describe it, although it was never the official position of the US government.

During the following months, Kosovo was plagued with war and massacres coming from both sides. Federal troops’ advancement forced the mass relocation of Kosovar civilians. After the failure of Rambouillet Conference negotiations in March, NATO bombings started against various targets in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The relocation and killing of Kosovar civilians became more and more widespread after that. Shelling, destruction of mosques, houses and entire villages were to be seen all across Kosovo. The war ended with more than a million of displaced Kosovars.

The UÇK answered Yugoslav actions by abducting and killing Serbian civilians all around Kosovo, as well as forcible relocations. The UÇK opened up prison camps and used their prisoners for forced labour, often under the threat of summary executions. Answering the Yugoslav army’s destruction of mosques, the UÇK went up to destroy or damage orthodox churches and monasteries. It is also important to note that the UÇK also intensified its crackdown against Kosovars opposing their violent actions, killing and abducting some of their critics as well.

According to the latest research, the Kosovo war ended with the death of approximately 15.000 civilians. 10.000 of those were Albanians and approximatively 2.200 were Serbs. Millions of civilians ended up homeless or displaced out of their house.

Post-war Kosovo and “Commander Politics”

Immediately after the end of the war in June 1999, while the Yugoslav people were turning against the dictator and the opposition was gaining more and more traction, UÇK guerrilla fighters, despite the efforts of KFOR and UN troops, started to harass Serbian civilians in Kosovo. Beatings, assassination, burning of homes and churches became widespread, as well as pressures on Serbian and Roma communities. Everything was fair game to force them to leave Kosovo.

It is estimated that up to 200.000 Serbs were driven out of their homes by UÇK fighters, in addition to the 90.000 Serbs that had fled during the war. Along with them went several thousands of hundreds of Roma people, although their precise number is unknown.

Kosovo remained de facto under Serbian sovereignty according to international law, but Belgrade virtually lost all control on the province. After years of tensions with Belgrade and poor progress being made, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on the 17th of February 2008.

The same year, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, famous for chasing Serbian war criminals, made shocking revelations. In The Hunt, a book that came out in 2008, she exposed how several hundreds of Serbian civilians had been abducted by the UÇK and had their organs stolen to be smuggled. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe immediately started an investigation, gathering testimonies. If del Ponte was previously praised in Kosovo for her fight against Serbian criminals, her determination to chase down Kosovar criminals afterwards turned the public opinion against her.

Kosovo has been a battleground between the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo, the political wing of the UÇK), the AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, the party of Ramush Haradinaj) and the LDK since its independence. Several scandals, especially in regard to corruption, have undermined the progress that Kosovo could make. Reports by the European Union, as well as other foreign observers, are all denouncing this situation.

The shady policies led by former UÇK members that went into politics have been ironically labelled ‘Commander Politics’ by part of the country. Last year’s election constituted a break in tradition, resulting in Vetevëndojse gaining the most seats – though Albin Kurti’s government didn’t last long.

Trialling the UÇK

The pressure imposed by the international community led to the opening of Kosovo’s Specialist Chamber in 2016. This was something that Thaçi originally supported but which has sparked angry reactions within Kosovo, both by political parties and the population. There, criticizing the UÇK can be dangerous in some circles, as can be seen in the case of Shkelzen Gashin. A journalist and political analyst, she received death threats in April 2020 after stating that the UÇK committed war crimes.

The crimes committed are, in fact, not something broadly talked about in Kosovo. They’re often relativised, since they were answering the violence of the Serbian forces. The fact that the UÇK crimes are dismissed so summarily is worrying: the main goal of several former high ranking members of the UÇK was to create an ‘ethnically pure’ Kosovo, without any other communities such as the Serbs, Roma people, Kosovar Egyptians and so on.

Thaçi and Haradinaj facing trial may force Kosovo to have an internal debate about the UÇK, its actions, and the role it played in the country’s politics. Minus the LDK, which historically opposed the UÇK actions, nearly all major parties have at least one top figure indicted by the Kosovo Specialist Chamber for past crimes during the war.

The rhetoric of the UÇK shouldn’t be one used in mainstream politics, as it is inherently violent against some of the communities populating Kosovo. All criminals have to be brought relentlessly to justice, and Kosovars can’t an exception to this rule. Only with all the criminals out of important positions, whether it is in Serbia or in Kosovo, can the healing process be truly complete.

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This election came at a difficult time in Kosovo. The dialogue with Belgrade had never been so intense compared to recent years with some specialists speculating about the odds of a land-swap between Belgrade and Pristina. The latter would be giving back the northern province of Kosovo populated by Serbs to the Republic of Serbia, while Belgrade would give the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia, populated by Albanians, to Kosovo.

While it may seem appealing at first, several specialists, politicians, and historians suggested this would be a dangerous thing to do as any land-swap, especially in a region with a history like the Balkans, could create further tensions considering other countries could revive heated border debates.

Kurti Blowing the Wind of Change?

The electoral results came as a semi-surprise. Low turnouts had been a common trend, following the poor governance and management of Kosovo over the past few years. Oddly enough, after the resignation of Haradinaj, the Kosovar diaspora in Europe, as well as Kosovar citizens living in their country, significantly mobilised themselves, hence the turnout of 43%; a significant increase compared to previous elections.

The results declared the Pan-Albanian, nationalist and social democrat party, Vetëvendosje! (‘Self-Determination’, reusing the motto of the 1968 protests in Kosovo) led Albin Kurti, as victors, winning 31 seats, resulting in a loss of one seat. Yet, with the higher turnout of voters, the Kosovar diaspora sanctioned “Commanders” politics that ruled Kosovo since its self-proclaimed independence in 2008.

A Tale of Domination

Political life in Kosovo has been dominated by the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) and the PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo): two right-wing parties which have been led by former Kosovar independence advocates. The country’s president, Hashim Thaçi (PDK), was a prominent member of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Haradinaj, though not being a member of the PDK, was also a former KLA fighter who founded his own political group in 2001. The infighting between the two aforementioned parties plus the numerous cases of abuses of power explained the loss of interest in politics and especially, the rise in popularity of VV and its leader Albin Kurti prompting a serious blow for the traditional lawmakers in Kosovo.

VV since its foundation in 2005, is extremely critical of the various government policies and was historically hostile to any dialogue with Belgrade on how to end the whole independence and self-determination crisis. One of their former mottos used to be ‘Jo Negociata: Vetëvendosje!‘ or ‘No negotiations, self-determination’.

As of January 2020, no government has been formed with a stalemate beginning to worry international experts as well as lawmakers inside the country. Hashim Thaçi warned Albin Kurti that a government has to be formed in a very near future. VV has been in talks with the LDK since the results and if a government is formed with the two parties as coalition leaders, Kurti will likely be forced to enter the negotiation process simply because Kosovo cannot risk cancelling all the difficult talks that have occurred in previous years.

Albin Kurti: from Opponent to Prime Minister?

Albin Kurti isn’t exactly a new face in Kosovar politics. He was born in 1975 and growing up he became a student leader of the non-violent 1997 student protests in Pristina, the beginning of the chain of events that later led to the Kosovo war. Kurti became a political representative of the UÇK in 1998 during the war. A vocal opponent to Slobodan Milošević regime, he was arrested in 1999. In 2001, Zoran Đinđić’s Serb government announced a release of all political prisoners. Kurti returned to Kosovo and remained an active opponent to UNMIK and continued to advocate for total independence of Kosovo as well as a future merger with Albania.

He founded Vetëvendosje! in 2004 and the movement hasn’t stopped growing to this day. Kurti was arrested again alongside several high ranking party members in 2015 because VV blocked the process of normalising relations with Serbia in the Assembly and regularly protested. The most famous rebellious act of VV according to lawmakers is possibly the one that occurred in March 2018 when a tear gas canister was set off during a parliamentary session. With the electoral success that VV enjoyed a year later, the odds of Kurti becoming Prime Minister after being a central figure in Kosovar politics for two decades were very high.

Serbian Enclaves and Minorities

In the north of Kosovo, where most of the Serbs enclaves are located, the Srpska Lista won the 10 seats reserved for the Serbian community living in the country. Srpska Lista is known for being the ‘puppet’ of Aleksandar Vučić’s SNS employing similar methods of coercion. Despite the organisation of an opposition movement, Sloboda (Liberty) regrouping Serbian citizens and parties tired of Belgrade’s stronghold, the campaign in Northern Kosovo was plagued with violence and coercion. Local thugs attacked people who were campaigning or who were simply partisans of Sloboda. Such actions remind many of what occurs in Serbia during elections as these methods are used by local SNS thugs: coercing people to vote for their party.

Despite Sloboda not winning any seats, Albin Kurti expressed his intentions to work with them, and rejected Srpska Lista, calling them Belgrade’s “remote-controlled arm in Kosovo”. For most leaders and important figures of Sloboda Lista, as well as Albin Kurti, the dialogue with the Serbs has to be done locally. Nenad Rašić, one of Sloboda’s leaders, insisted that an Albano-Serbian reconciliation has to be made within Kosovar institutions and the dialogue has to be re-established between the populations; therefore fighting against sectarianism.

The View from the Other Side

Rada Trajković, Sloboda’s leader, saluted the Kurti initiative to fight and give “no rest” to organised crime and tweeted about the results, calling the future Premier the “first regional politician since Zoran Đinđić [who was assassinated in 2003] to tackle organised crime and war criminals”. Such a declaration created a fuss in Serbia and attacks from SNS-owned media outlets were launched towards Sloboda.

The constitution of Kosovo requires the government to work with the Serb minority; at least one cabinet position has to be offered to them. Since Sloboda didn’t win any seats, Srpska Lista, designated as an enemy by Albin Kurti and VV, was the only path that the government could choose with regards to working with the Serbian community. The problem is, presently, unsolved.

While the recount of the vote has concluded, it is very likely that the future government will need the support of another minority party to form the government; either Bosniak, Ashkenazi Jew, Turkish or Romanis, who may be all interested in a cabinet position as well.

Kurti vs Thaçi

The stand-off between the future Prime Minister and the actual Kosovar President, Hashim Thaçi, may be significant. Kurti and VV, as stated before, historically opposed any normalisation of the relations with Belgrade, something that Thaçi has been favourable of. Kurti was arrested in 2015 alongside several colleagues because the party continued to block resolutions aimed at opening negotiations with the Serbian government.

Close to coming to power, Kurti has somewhat softened his positions on the matter but more so than Thaçi and,  indeed, confirmed that he plans to take the role of the main negotiator; a role that Thaçi has held since the election in 2016. The tensions between the two figures, politically opposed on almost all domains, will possibly result in tensions running high within the executive at least until the presidential elections are held in 2021. The fact that Thaçi was implicated or has been accused by several actors to be involved in criminal activities also explains the distrust expressed by Kurti.

What Now?

With Kosovo’s government in its formation stage, we can only speculate on what will happen. It is very likely that Kurti will prove himself to be more “aggressive” and more vindicative during the negotiations as he announced that he expected “reciprocity coming from Belgrade”.

With VV hostile to the possible land-swap Thaçi was a partisan of, there will undoubtedly be more debates to come because of this decision. Kurti stated in an interview with Radio Free Europe that a land-swap was a: “racist idea against all democratic ideas.” Belgrade hasn’t commented on the VV victory and is still, after three months, silent despite the stalemate.

The post After the Election, Can Albin Kurti Be the Wind of Change Kosovo Needs? appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Since the birth of the Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European project has grown from a meagre 6 founders to its current 28 members through six distinct enlargement waves. Now, the European Union seems to be ready for a seventh wave – this time incorporating the Western Balkans within the bloc. But how does a country go about joining the EU, exactly? It is necessary to meet determinate criteria before even being considered as a potential candidate member. For example, countries must be ‘European‘, something which has proven of difficult interpretation in the past. When Morocco applied, the EU turned it down on the basis that it was not a European country, but only a few years later Cyprus’ application was accepted – even though the island is technically in Asia. Nowadays, it is down to a purely political decision on a holistic basis.

European countries which wish to apply for membership also have to show that they fulfill the so-called Copenhagen criteria. This requires potential candidate countries to demonstrate respect of democracy and fundamental freedoms, the existence of a functioning market economy, and the intent to accept the obligations formed by EU membership. It is only once the Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled that the accession negotiations can finally begin. These negotiations involve the complicated process of adapting the candidate country’s legislation to the EU’s acquis communautaire, the corpus of legislation of the Union.

There are currently five countries which have the official status of candidate countries: Albania, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia, and Turkey. The European Commission moreover recognises two additional potential candidate countries, which are not ready to start negotiating yet but will probably be in the near future: Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Each of these countries has a unique relationship with the EU, and their negotiating processes has been very different due to the different internal mechanisms. This series will attempt to track the specificities of each of them and what those means for the future of their enlargement negotiations. Today, we shall look at Kosovo’s progress.

Geography and Culture of Kosovo   

Kosovo is located in the centre of the Western Balkans, in between Albania, Serbia, Northern Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro. It spans across 10,908 sq. km. and has a population of just over two million citizens. Not all countries have accepted its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia back in 2008. In fact, only 116 countries recognise its existence as a sovereign nation.

Amongst European states, the ones which do not recognise the breakaway region, apart from Serbia itself, are: Spain, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Belarus, Cyprus, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia. In addition, also China, India, Mexico and many African and Latin American countries have also refused to recognise it as independent.

A vast majority of the Kosovar population is made up of Gheg Albanians. The Ghegs are one of the two major ethnic sub-groups in Albania, where they mostly inhabit the mountainous north. Their presence in Kosovo means that Albanian, and specifically its Gheg variant, is spoken by 94.5% of the population. The Serbian language also holds official status at the national level, with Bosnian, Turkish, and Roma being officially recognised in some municipalities.

The country’s capital, Pristina, is a prime example of Yugoslav-era socialist architecture, unlike other major cities, like Prizren, which are dominated by Ottoman styles. Mosques and hamams are common throughout the country, and so are Orthodox monasteries. Over the past few years, Pristina has been trying to rebrand itself, and it has become an important fashion design hub for Albanian-speaking territories.

Kosovar cuisine reflects the complicated history of the region, with Albanian and Serbian dishes intermingling with Turkish desserts, such as baklava, lokum and halva. These are a staple of religious holidays like Christmas, Easter, and Ramadan. Sheep salami, called suxhuk, is another common Kosovar delicacy of Turkish origin. Kosovo’s national dish is undoubtedly flia, a baked pancake composed of multiple crepe-style layers, filled with cheese, meat and potatoes. Turkish coffee is very popular in Kosovo, although Albanian-style mountain tea and black tea are also common.

Sports play a significant role in Kosovar society, and have served as a vehicle for celebration of the breakaway region’s independence. The Olympic Committee of Kosovo became a full member of the International Olympic Committee in 2014. The national team participated at the 2015 European Games in Azerbaijan, and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil, with judoka Mailinda Kelmendi winning the gold medal in judo. Football, basketball, and boxing are also popular, and Kosovo is home to several talented football players, like Lorik Cana, who played with Olympique de Marseille, Sunderland, and the Albanian national team, among others.

Society and Religion

Obtaining consistent and reliable figures on Kosovo’s ethnic composition is complicated, as several municipalities have boycotted official censuses. Nevertheless, it’s clear that Albanians make up a vast majority of the country’s population, reaching 92.9% in the official census of 2011. The Bosnian minority comes a very distant second at 1.7%, and is mostly concentrated in the south. Serbs, on the contrary, are concentrated in North Kosovo, as well as in some eastern municipalities. In the 2011 census, they accounted for 1.6% of Kosovo’s population, but North Kosovo did not participate in that census, so the number is de facto higher. Turks are approximately 1.1% of the population, and are concentrated above all in the district of Prizren).

Relations between Albanians and Serbs have always been difficult. The Serbian minority, currently concentrated in North Kosovo, as well as in the east, is represented by its own party, which has become a regular fixture in the Parliament of Kosovo. At time of writing, this party is also a member of the governing coalition. Relations between ethnic minorities also impact diplomatic relations between Kosovo and its neighbours: slights, diplomatic incidents and provocations occur often.

While many Gheg areas are Catholic, Islam is the most practiced religion in Kosovo, with 95% of the population self-identifying as Muslim. Relations between the Albanian Muslim and Catholic communities are good, whereas the Serbian Orthodox community is relatively isolated. Kosovars define their identity more along linguistic lines than religious ones. In fact, Kosovar society is firmly secular, ranking first in southern Europe and ninth worldwide for tolerance towards different faiths and atheism.

Kosovo is going through a democratic boom, with its population having grown by 460% between 1921 and 2003. This growth continues to this day: Albanians in Kosovo have the fastest growth rate of any other population in Europe. The Serbian population, on the other hand, has shrunk, especially after many Serbs relocated to neighbouring Serbia following the ethnic strife of 1999. As a result of these, and other factors, Kosovo is the youngest country in Europe. Almost half of its population is constituted by under 25.

Economic context          

Given the troubled history of the region, it’s no surprise that the Kosovar economy is still in transition. War, political instability, and economic upheavals have created a negative economic environment at the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, since the independence declaration of 2008, Kosovo’s economy has grown by an average of 5% every year. To maintain this growth, Kosovo is highly dependent on capital flowing in from abroad, typically in the form of foreign-direct-investment, or remittances from the Albanian Diaspora.

Kosovo also has a curious history when it comes to its currency. In the aftermath of the conflict with Serbia, the United Nations mandate administering Kosovo never withdrew the Yugoslav Dinar from circulation. The currency, however, was already ailing by then, and Kosovars preferred using US Dollars, Swiss Francs and German Marks as hard currency. All three were given official status in 1999, with the Mark quickly becoming the prominent currency in the region. In 2002, Kosovo adopted the Euro as its official currency. While not a member of the Eurozone, and thus minting no coin of its own, the breakaway region conducted the switch with the cooperation of the European Central Bank.

Kosovo has signed free trade agreements with Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Turkey, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland are prominent commercial partners, with the latter hosting many of the Kosovars who fled abroad during the war. The country is also part of CEFTA, a free trade area comprising non-EU European countries. The wine industry is very successful and a prime export candidate: millions of litres of wine (above all Pinot noir, Merlot and Chardonnay) are produced around Orahovac every year. Agriculture contributes almost 35% of the national GDP. Additionally, Kosovo has large reserves of zinc, silver, nickel, zinc, lead, and bauxite. It has the 3^rd largest lignite reserve in Europe, the 5^th largest in the world.

Tourism has grown to become one of the most prominent economic activities in Kosovo, mostly thanks to the country’s breath-taking landscapes, which have been enthusiastically described by many renowned international outlets, like The New York Times and The Guardian. In order to preserve these landscapes, however, further action is needed on sustainability, and the adoption of EU environmental standards.

The country’s young population faces considerable hardships in obtaining the skills demanded by employers, not least because of how difficult it is for Kosovar students to get visas. Due to the uncertain diplomatic status of Kosovo, these visa requests are often denied, preventing participation in internships and other programmes abroad. This negatively affects the research sector, as well as universities.

State of talks                   

In 2013, Kosovo and Serbia signed the Brussels Agreement, a treaty seeking to normalise their relations, allowing both countries to proceed on the path of European integration. The agreement commits both “not to block or encourage others to block the other side’s progress in the respective EU paths”. Days after the agreement was ratified, the European Commission authorised the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo, as well as membership negotiations with Serbia.

The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed on 27 October 2015, and it was the first such agreement to be signed after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Since the latter established legal personality for the whole Union, this meant that the EU could sign the agreement with Kosovo as a legal entity, without requiring ratification by each Member State. Independence is not required for such an agreement, allowing the EU to side-step the Serbian-Kosovar territorial dispute. Nevertheless, since five Member States do not recognise Kosovo, the Commission had to issue a directive saying that the agreement “will not signify that the EU or any of the countries recognise Kosovo as a state”. The agreement went into force on 1 April 2016.

The latest reports show that, for all its progress, Kosovo still needs to work on several, critical issues. While elections are generally competitive and well-administered, intimidation against candidates and journalists remains common. Even more seriously, the implementation of human rights strategies, legislation against corruption, and measures against organised crime is fatally weakened by a chronic shortage of funds, and limited support from the government. The ruling coalition has struggled to implement EU related reforms, and parliament remains rowdy, with the proceedings hampered by obstructionism and the use of tear gas.

Kosovo is moderately prepared in other areas, such as free movement, industrial policies, public procurement and the business environment. Its environmental policies, however, lag far behind EU standards, and the situation in North Kosovo represents a significant obstacle. The four Serbian-majority municipalities experience severe problems with crime and corruption, and their relationship with central authorities is frayed, although the EU has successfully fostered some institutional dialogue in recent years. Plans for a comprehensive census of the area are still under development.

In economic terms, Kosovo’s rapid growth, the government’s fiscal discipline, and the expanding business environment bode well for its chances of future accession. Nevertheless, the country is barely in the early stages of creating a functioning market economy, and significant obstacles remain: the informal economy is still widespread, there has been little progress in education, and the railways and energy sector are still held back by significant infrastructural gaps.

The Road Ahead     

The future of Kosovo in the EU will depend first of all on its commitment to normalising relations with Serbia, and winning recognition by all Member States. The Brussels Agreement is an exceptional document in the long process of bringing peace to the Balkans, but it needs to be upheld through the years in order to gain legitimacy.

Serbia is not the only neighbour playing a role in Kosovo’s potential EU accession. Albania is also a factor, with some political parties on both sides of the border coveting unity and the establishment of a greater Albania. In the event of an attempted unification referendum, Kosovo could well suffer a dramatic setback in its path towards EU membership.

Aside from diplomatic and domestic considerations, border controls are also an immediate concern. Visa liberalisation is a priority to bolstering Kosovo’s education and labour market, but more pressingly, Pristina needs progress in ensuring the security of its borders, now hat numerous foreign fighters who fought for the Islamic State in Syria are making their way back to the Balkans.

There is no doubt that Kosovo’s continued engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement is a good sign, and the progress made by the breakaway region is tangible. There can be no illusion, however, on the fact that Kosovo is very much in its early stages on the road to accession. Moreover, the final outcome will equally be determined by its internal development, and by its ability to find a lasting settlement with its Balkan neighbours.

The post The Next Enlargement Wave: Kosovo Still in Its Early Accession Stage appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Who was Milošević?

Slobodan Milošević initially rose to power in the late Eighties as a figurehead personality in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, one of the constituent republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Being an extremely charismatic leader, he was the one who subdued the main Yugoslavian power organs for the Serbs and “by the Serbs”. He was also one of the main nationalist figures with a front role in the conflicts which tore up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995. These wars lead to an incredible amount of crimes and atrocities committed mainly by Serbs and Croats, when both Croatia and Serbia (at that time under the name Yugoslavia) attempted to assert their dominance on the region, especially in Bosnia.

After the Dayton Peace Agreement, the now-fragmented region fell into a relative state of tranquility. Without external conflicts, the internal opposition to Milošević grew stronger each day passing. He became the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro – a theoretically democratic state born from the ashes of the former 6-republics Socialist Federation. And yet, despite the democratic façade, the Socialist Party of Serbia and Milošević held the country with an iron fist, crushing opposition voices and main opponents even though the rallies against time grew.

The Aftermath of the Kosovo War

In February 1998 began the latest war in the Balkans, being the Kosovo War. Kosovo had for decades been an autonomous province under Serbian authority and was mainly populated by ethnic Albanian throughout, with the exception of its most northern province, populated by Serbs. Desiring an independent country, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacked the Serbs from north Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Milošević answered by sending their troops attacking the KLA and the Albanian population, creating yet another conflict in which both Albanian and Serbs civilians suffered.

NATO, without directly consulting the UN, took the decision to act against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and began the Operation Allied Forces in March 1999. At that time, NATO bombers – mainly American and British ones – bombed Yugoslavian (mainly Serbian) troops and infrastructures. While the operation explicitly aimed towards military targets, it was inevitable that some civilians would get caught in the cross-fire. During bombings on Belgrade and Novi Sad, several bombs fell on living areas and schools, killing approximately 400 Serbian civilians in total. Yet, the bombings were efficient in the long-term and forced Milošević and his forces to withdraw from Kosovo, which was then placed under International Administration.

With the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under harsh sanctions as a result of the de facto lost conflict, the Kosovo War was instrumental in turning the public opinion even more against Milošević and his rule. The population had had enough of him, and opposition rallies against his autocratic regime grew stronger once again. In January 2000, the opposition parties formed a coalition against him, led by the founder of the Democratic Party, Zoran Đinđić. The so-called Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) had as its explicit goal that of ousting the Socialist Party and its tyrannical leader from the country’s political arena.

The Bulldozer Revolution

Trying to preserve his democratic legitimacy, Milošević called for early presidential elections in September 2000. The DOS saw this opportunity as a chance to finally drive him out of power and selected Vojislav Koštunica, a highly respected politician who was also the leader of one of the parties composing the DOS, as its presidential candidate. On the 24th September 2000, the first turn of the election took place. The DOS claimed that Koštunica had won over 50% of the votes, thus defeating Milošević by absolute majority without needing to resort to a second round. However, the Electoral Committee, controlled by Milošević’s government, announced that he hadn’t in fact won the required amount of votes and called for a second turn to be held.

The DOS called for a general strike in the country against this perceived electoral fraud. In early October, the miners of Kolubara mine, an important coal mine providing half of Serbia in electricity, went on strike. Half of Serbia was in the dark. The army and police were sent there to try to contain the protests and restore peace. However, the majority of them were not being paid anymore and equally exhausted by the regime, and consequently didn’t do anything against the miners – in some cases even joined their rallies.

On the 3rd and 4th of October, thousands of Serbs traveled all the way to Belgrade from all over the country, answering the calls of the DOS and other protesting associations such as the student movement “Otpor!” (“Resistance!” in Serbian). More than 300.000 people took to the streets of Belgrade on the 5th of October, all shouting “Gotov je” (“He’s finished!”) and calling for the President to resign. It was the shout of an entire generation for democracy and liberty. Even though police forces were deployed in the city, they didn’t firmly oppose the thousand of people, even though some tear gas was shot at the crowd during some points of the day.

At some point during the protests, Ljubisav Đokić, an engineering vehicle operator, fired up his wheel loader (it was neither an excavator nor an actual bulldozer, the event name is inaccurate out of convenience) and used it to charge a Belgrade building. The building was the main office of the Radio Television of Serbia, main propaganda tool of Slobodan Milošević. The classical music which was being broadcast stopped. It would be remembered as the defining moment and symbol of the revolution against Milošević.

In the afternoon, a great part of the crowd gathered around the Federal Assembly, the legislative organ of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the centre of Belgrade, which was still defended by some policemen. The crowd pushed forward and the guards finally joined them and they charged the Assembly together, taking over and waving on the balconies and roof flags of the Republic of Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, DOS, and other flags of the resistance movements.

Milošević remained locked in his house all day. At the end of it, Vojislav Koštunica and some other leaders of the DOS joined all the crowd and announced his political victory on the balcony of the Federal Assembly. Under the pressure of the people and due to his legitimacy having been completely broken, Milošević finally resigned the 7th of October 2000.

The Aftermath

After that, things went fast. The new government in place announced that general elections would be held in December 2000. Zoran Đinđić became the candidate of the DOS for the post of Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the European Union lifted the sanctions on the country, allowing new funds and humanitarian aid to come in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The DOS won the absolute majority in the general elections and Zoran Đinđić was sworn as Serbian Prime Minister in January 2001.

At that time, it looked like things would be going fine for Serbia. Milošević was arrested and sent to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in April 2001 to answer for his crimes during the Balkan wars. Đinđić was a true believer in democracy, a very energetic man passionate about education and rule of law. He also was a staunch pro-European and thought that the European Union would help Serbia to achieve its transition to peace and democracy. As he once said: “As a man who had been kept under water for 50 years, wishing to grasp some air, Serbia cannot be stopped on its path to the oxygen, and that is Europe, being a family of democratic, modern and developed countries.”

Yet, the reformist Prime Minister had enemies. The Conservatives didn’t like the reforms that the Demokratska Stranka and Zoran Đinđić were pushing forward, and by trying to tackle the issue of mafia groups in the country, he found himself on the hit-list of many criminals. He faced several attempts of assassination, but never backed down from his reforms. In early March 2003 he was quoted saying: “If they think that by eliminating me they’ll stop the progress, they’re being mistaken. I’m not the system and it will keep going even if I’m not here for seeing it.”

Only a few days later, on the 12th March, Zoran Đinđić was shot in the back by a sniper, former supporter of Slobodan Milošević. He was 51 and had two young kids. The death of Đinđić was a huge blow to the forming democracy. Corruption and nationalist rhetoric came back in full force in Serbia.

Is It Time For a Second Bulldozer Revolution?

Fast-forward 15 years from that event, and Serbia finds itself in a difficult position – being led by a President and a party which are using the same methods that Milošević once used. The lack of charismatic leaders in the opposition, as Đinđić, partly explain the global disinterest towards politics coming from the younger generation, which had instead led the 2000 overthrow.

There is still a will of revolt subconsciously present in Serbia, there are still some people willing to fight against the autocratic ways of the government and trying to bring the post Bulldozer Revolution ideas to life. There are still people who believe that Serbia could one day fully enjoy democracy and liberty. But there’s a lot of work to do before any of that turns from wishful thinking to reality. Let’s hope that the new generation will find a renewed interest in these matters, in order to ensure a peaceful and free future for the Republic of Serbia. Some say more bulldozers would be needed for that.

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1- Tony Blair and Bill Clinton are both considered heroes in Kosovo. Pristina, the capital, has both a major road named after and a 3 meter tall statue of President Bill Clinton. Moreover, a number of children are given the names Toni, Bler or Tonibler in honour of Tony Blair, the UK’s Prime Minister at the time, for his support of the 1999 NATO air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War.

 2 – The Olympic Games in Rio 2016 were the first to host athletes competing under the flag of Kosovo. The Olympic Committee sent a total of eight athletes, and returned with one gold medal, the first ever of the country, in Judo. 

3 – Although it is not an official Eurozone member, Kosovo has unilaterally adopted the euro ever since 2002, well before its declaration of independence. However, Serb -majority communities in the country are still illegally using the Serbian dinar as an unofficial currency.

4 – The national anthem, Europe, has no lyrics. The Albanian-speaking government decided not to risk offending Serbs who live in the country by having lyrics in Albanian.

5 – Ode to Joy, the anthem of the European Union, was played at the official declaration ceremonies of the Republic of Kosovo. The interim government decided to do this as a mark of respect to the European Union for its efforts in helping it gain independence.

6 – More than 70% of the country’s population is under the age of 35, which makes it the youngest country in all of Europe. The median age of the people of Kosovo is only 29.1 years.

7 – The flag is unusual among national flags,  as it uses a map of the country’s territory as a design element. Together with the Republic of Cyprus, Kosovo is one of only two countries whose flag doubles up as a geographic representation. 

8 –  The six stars on the flag represent the six major ethnic groups that live in the country: Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Gorani, Romani, and Bosniaks. Unofficially, the stars are sometimes said to represent the six regions, which according to Albanian ultra nationalist ideology, make up Greater Albania: Albania, Kosovo, western parts of Macedonia, parts of northern Greece, parts of Montenegro and the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia.

9- After Moldova, the people of Kosovo are the second poorest in Europe, with a GDP per capita of only 8,325 euro. 30% of the population falls below the poverty line, and the majority of citizens live with a monthly income of fewer than 500 euro.

10 – The name Kosovo is derived from a Serbian place-name meaning ‘field of blackbirds’. Albanians also refer to the country as Dardania, the name of a Roman province formed in 284 AD which covered the territory of modern Kosovo. The name is derived from the Albanian word dardha/dardā which means pear, for the country meaning ‘the land of pears’.

Do you want to find out more curious facts about other European countries? Try our Top 10 Curious Facts about Lithuania or Finland!

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