Unquestionably, this sentence is yet more proof that the Russian State under Vladimir Putin’s presidency is nothing but a ruthless dictatorship which stomps on virtually everyone that dares oppose it. However, it doesn’t mean that Alexei Navalny would be a much better alternative for Russia in any regard. In fact, many of Navalny’s political stances should raise red flags for Russian and Western observers alike.

Navalny’s Political Ideology

On paper, an uninformed observer may point at the amorphous Russian Communist Party as the main opposition to the Russian regime. Indeed, the party holds the dubious honour of being the second-largest political party in Russia with its 43 out of 450 seats in the State Duma. Reality, however, shows a much different picture.

By virtue of being consistently suppressed by the government and being more appealing to the Russian youth than the Russian Communist Party, the title of main opposition party undoubtedly goes to the social-liberal Yabloko. Protesters have rallied around this party like a beacon of hope and it is not unusual to see the Yabloko’s flag during protests and anti-governmental rallies. It is not surprising, then, that it was the only non-system party which managed to secure multiple seats in Moscow’s 2019 local election, despite the standard electoral fraud by the Russian regime.

Navalny himself was, in the early days, involved with Yabloko. However, he was expelled in 2007 for his far-right views. That same year, he then went on to co-found a new political movement called The People, which allied itself with two other ethnic nationalist groups called Movement Against Illegal Immigration and Great Russia. All these groups were characterised not only by their zealous nationalism but also by a generalised unsatisfaction with Putin’s leadership, which was considered “too weak”.

But Navalny’s links to the far-right go beyond mere association. Since the first edition in 2006, he has been involved in the yearly Russian March, a gathering of far-right nationalists from all political groups. He has routinely been accused of using racial slurs and basing his relations with people on their ethnicity. Most concerningly, his foreign policy doesn’t mark any significant departure from the status quo.

In the past, Navalny has stated his support for Russian presence in Ukraine, notably stating that “Russia should strive for the integration of Belarus and Ukraine” and claiming that they are a part of Russia and form only one country together. While he criticised Russia’s policy in Ukraine – because it was led by Vladimir Putin’s government – he has been remarkably silent about his criticism on the annexation of Crimea in itself. When asked about possibly returning it to Ukraine if he was ever to lead Russia, he confirmed that his government would not start such a procedure.

When it comes to the Caucasus, his track record is even more appalling. He supported Russia in its war against Georgia in 2008, going as far as calling for all Georgians to be expelled from Russia. In a recording of a pro-gun rights video around the same time, he also compared people from Russia’s mostly Muslim North Caucasus to “cockroaches” and mimicked shooting one. His efforts were crowned by the ardent endorsement of the nationalist campaign “Stop Feeding the Caucasus”, in which he called for an end to the federal subsidies for the poor, ethnic minority-populated autonomous regions in the south of the country.

A Moderate Turn?

Despite never retracting many of his controversial statements, in recent years Navalny’s inflammatory rhetoric has mellowed out. His attention has turned primarily to another one of his special interests: the fight against corruption and authoritarianism in his country. His dabbling in journalism, through which he uncovered many high-profile investigations against State-owned companies, served to launch him well beyond his far-right niche and propelled him as a Russian opposition hero in Western media. The most recent assassination attempt has cemented this distorted legacy of a “champion of democracy” fighting for the rule of law in Russia.

This image couldn’t be farther from the truth. His attempts to seem more moderate now are simply a consequence of his desire to garner more sympathy from the West. He is not interested in being a “champion of democracy” as much as he is interested in preserving Russian integrity. If he has been more discreet about his – really important – ties with nationalist groups, it is probably only to enjoy the support that the West has been giving him.

There is a reason why Navalny isn’t really liked by significant parts of the Russian opposition. Though he makes better attempts to hide them, he has the same authoritarian tendencies as Putin. It would be absolutely foolish to think the Russian Constitution and democracy would be better off with him in charge. Nor would he be any more friendly towards the West than Putin is right now.

Navalny isn’t the best hope for Russia, but merely another side to the Russian autocracy with a “reformer” label that he knows how to use. Unlike the way in which he is pictured in Western media, he doesn’t represent the entirety of the Russian opposition in and of himself, but rather he is merely one opponent amongst others. He should not be getting all the spotlight, or in fact any at all.

If Not Navalny, Who Else?

For those looking in, the real question then becomes: if we don’t shine a spotlight on Navalny, the public face of Russian opposition to the regime, who else should we shine the spotlight on? The question is not as simple as it may seem.

It would be wrong to assume that everyone who voices support for him in Russia is backing him for all his positions. This is especially the case in recent years, as Navalny has indeed presented himself as a moderate. His work on exposing corruption remains fundamental to the democratic progress of Russia as a whole. At the same time, however, the people he has worked with, in particular the Russian ultranationalists, are not personalities that are keen to uphold the rule of law or ensure basic democratic freedoms.

For this reason, it is important not to conflate the struggle of Russian opposition about the rule of law and democracy merely with Navalny. The focus has to be less on him and more on individuals from civil society, opposition mayors or people in elected positions, and so on. Through Western media, we should promote more groups like Yabloko and the ultra pro-western Republican Party of Russia, which have been doing important work in this respect, and the legacy of people like Boris Nemtsov, former Deputy Premier assassinated in 2015, who is still today an important symbol of pro-democracy protesters in Russia.

The hopes of a lot of people are pinned on a regime change that will finally bring an end to Putin’s reign. It may seem easy to support Navalny in this respect, if only because he clearly and outspokenly opposes Putin himself. However, supporting someone with his own, different brand of autocracy could prove to be a critical short-term mistake, one dangerous to the West as much as it is to the democratic aspirations of the Russian people. 

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Between the Urals and Siberia

Russia’s heartland is situated west of the Urals on the North European Plain. To the north, south, and west there are open spaces, endless steppe protected by the many forests of the north. To the east, Russia is protected by the Urals. However, these have a low elevation and many passes through them, tapering off to the south. On the north end, expansion reached the Arctic and Finland. There, Russia was protected by the vast emptiness of the tundra, with boreal forests continuing on seemingly forever. This forms the northern shield of the Russian heartland. With its sheer cold, size, and desolation it had prevented major armies from traversing the distance.

During the first half of the 19th century, Russia pressed south into the Caucasus, which forms a neck of land between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Long wars against the Turks and the Persians brought the Russians the control of this region at last. They pushed to the southeast of the mountains, establishing their boundary on the Araxes in 1828. In the southwest, the Russian border was planted at Akhaltsikhe in 1829 and pushed forward to Kars in 1878.

In the second half of that same century, Russia undertook the conquest of Turkestan. This was prompted by Turkic the recurring raids into southern Russia by the peoples of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva. They used to kidnap Russian subjects, primarily women to fill the harems of the Turkic elite. Tsars Alexander II and III had no intention of enduring this humiliation any further. Ultimately, they pushed south to capture the whole of Turkestan and released their enslaved people.

This forward advance brought Russia’s borders to the ranges of the Pamir Mountains, giving some protection toward India and the Tien Shan, which was part of the Silk Road. They nearly reached the Hindu Kush, occupied by Afghanistan. Westwards, they approached the Kopet Dag, forming the border between Turkmenistan and Persia, and the Caspian Sea.

Expansion towards Siberia

The Russian conquest of Siberia, much like the American conquest of the West, was a formative moment in the making of a nation. Just as the spirit of America was in part defined by its pioneers in the West, so that of Russia was defined by its conquest of the East. Many of the basic features of the Russian state reached their perfection (or imperfection) in Siberia. This was not so much a place as it was a state of mind.

The first moves toward Siberia began when the first Russian Czar Ivan IV (the Terrible, r. 1533-1584), captured the city of Kazan in October 1552. Four years later, Astrakhan and the territory associated with that Khanate, were added to the burgeoning Russian Empire. Later, in 1563, Kuchum, the Khan of the Noghay Horde, had defeated and killed the Khan of Sibir, a successor state to the Golden Horde, located east of the Ural Mountains. The Khan of Sibir had nominally been the vassal of Ivan IV. Kuchum promptly assumed his Siberian predecessor’s position of Russian vassal and sent envoys to present tribute. This was to make sure that the Russian Czar did not protest the takeover. Instead, Ivan IV awarded the right to establish settlements east of the Urals to a private family, the Stroganovs,  and allowed them to hire Cossacks to defend themselves.

When the Stroganovs discovered silver and iron in western Siberia, they asked for permission to expand their landholdings. They then hired Cossacks under the command of Yerman Timofeyevich, who later launched an attack on Khan Kuchum and captured his capital, Sibir, in 1583. By 1587, the Russians had consolidated the territory of the former Khanate of Sibir and constructed the city of Tobolsk.

Tobolsk would become the nerve centre of the conquest. From there on out, Russia’s expansion consisted of subduing minor tribes and building forts and outposts to control the countryside. Before the end of the century, Kuchum had been defeated, killed by his own people, and Noghay was integrated.

Eastward expansion and colonization

With their main enemies crushed and annexed, there was now nothing standing in the way for Russian expansion and colonization eastward. Commerce, and particularly fur trade, was the driving force behind this expansion. By moving East along Central Eurasia, the Russians also managed to avoid the remaining, powerful steppe peoples. The highways used were the many rivers and their tributaries, allowing even further expansion to the east. Following the Lena River into the northeast, the Russians established Yakutsk in 1632 and reached the Pacific Ocean, building the first Russian settlement there, Okhotsk, in 1647.

From Okhotsk, Russia moved toward Lake Baikal, reaching even further East to the Amur River basin. Where the upper Amur river turns south lay a town called Albazin. On this site, in 1651, the Russians invaded and began settling. The Manchus, however, did not take kindly to this. They had barely established their authority in China (the Qing Dynasty) when these upstart Russians began colonizing on their doorstep.

Though offended, the Manchus gave diplomacy a try. When this failed, they threw down the gauntlet and attacked Russia, capturing Albazin in 1685. In the Treaty of Nerchinks in 1689, Russia was forced to cede all territory south of the Stanovoy Mountains (or Range), but in return, they gained trade concessions and kept a presence in Okhotsk.

One hundred and sixty-nine years later, in 1858, part of that mass of land, the Primorskiy Kray (the “Maritime Province”), came under Russian control. It was here that, in 1860, the future port city of Vladivostok was constructed. After the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1903, Vladivostok became a large, prosperous city and Russia’s main Pacific port. The city would also play a key role in its economic expansion and defence in the East.

Conflicts along the way

Even though the Qing Dynasty and the Russian Empire seemed to have settled their relations, tensions were brewing. By the time of the Treaty of Nerchinks, modern Mongolia had been captured by the last nomadic empire in that area, the Dzungar Khanate. But over the decades, these nomads were slowly pushed westwards, toward Russia. At the time, the Qing feared that they would not be able to fully incorporate the Khanate. As the Chinese-Russian borders drew ever closer in that area, questions were raised. What if the Russians took advantage to push their expansion into Mongolia? Could the Dzungar people fleeing into Russia be given sanctuary?

Because of this, the 4th Qing Emperor began poking St Petersburg in the 1710s, pressuring Russia into signing an agreement. They did this largely by interfering with trade caravans in the area. The Russian fur traders were indeed the largest reason behind Russian expansion. Despite Peter the Great having his hands full with the ongoing Great Northern War, he decided to end the border conflict before his death. After much discussions and drawing up of maps, in 1728, the Treaty of Kyakhta was signed.

This treaty remedied most of the diplomatic and territorial issues between the two empires. It thus ensured that Russian trade could once again start in earnest. This trade was extremely valuable for the colonists and Russia’s expansion overall, helping cement Russia as a major economic power in Europe. From this moment on, until 1904, Russia kept its grip on the East and continued increasing its value, strategic and economic, and was even capable of extending their tentacles further down into Chinese territory.

This continued until the rising Japanese Empire, to the surprise and fear of the West, crushed the Russian Empire during the Russo-Japanese War. This led Russia to lose its possessions on the Liaodong Peninsula. But even today, the Russian East, from Vladivostok to the Urals, remains a growing, integrated part of Russia. It is fundamental to understand it in order to understand Russia.

The post Russia’s Expansion Towards the East: From the Urals to Siberia appeared first on My Country? Europe..

In this episode, we talk about Belarus’ trouble with Russia, Malta’s internal turmoil around the issue of a journalist’s murder, Bosnia’s newfound PM compromise, and more.

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Links to articles used:

Montenegro, Italy Turn on Undersea Power Cable

Belarus threatens to pull out of Russia integration deal over subsidy row

Belarus election: No seats for opposition as Lukashenko maintains power

Hungary’s Varhelyi Cleared for EU Enlargement Post

EU agrees 2020 budget deal

Bosnia names Serb as prime minister after compromise on NATO

Police investigating murder of Malta journalist arrest local businessman

EU’s Tusk to lead struggling European center-right umbrella group

Russian parliament backs law to label individuals foreign agents

UK misses UN deadline to return Chagos Islands

Any opinions expressed on the show are not intended to represent “My Country? Europe.” as a whole.

The post Episode 1 – Belarus and Russia in disagreement, Malta in turmoil, and Bosnia heading towards stability appeared first on My Country? Europe..

Geography and Culture of Russia

Russia is a transcontinental country located between Eastern Europe and North Asia. It the largest country in the world by area, spanning across 207,595 square kilometres and covering more than one-eighth of the Earth’s inhabited land area, with a population of 144 million citizens. However, about 77% of the population lives in the western, European part of the country. From northwest to southeast, Russia shares borders with Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania (considering the Kaliningrad Oblast), Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, Mongolia, and North Korea.

Even the symbol of the crowned double eagle and the central crown (connected with the other two crowns) is a striking example of Russian cultural nature. One crowned head looks to Europe symbolising the Western European element, while the other one points to Asia, reflecting the Asian Oriental aspects.

Russian folklore takes its roots in the pagan customs of the ancient Slavs. Some Russian poets, like Yershov and Filatov, created a high number of famous poetical interpretations of classical Russian fairy tales. Alexander Pushkin, instead, created entirely original fairy tale poems. Since the Age of Enlightenment, Russian literature had grown in importance. From the early 1830s on, Russians lived through a period of flourish in poetry, prose, and drama. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are just two examples of this astounding golden age. When Stalin came to power, the Soviet government started to censor folklore studies considering them part of the old tsarist system and capitalist economy. After that, the government removed fairy tales from bookshelves.

As well as for poetry and literature, Russian cuisine is a collection of the different cooking traditions of the Russian people. It comes from the multi-ethnic expanse of Russia, including influences from Northern and Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and East Asia. Based on the peasant food of the rural population, it uses fish, caviar, mushrooms, poultry, pork, berries, and honey in addition to rye, barley, and wheat to prepare many assorted types of bread and alcohol like beer and vodka.

Different from the Russian cuisine is the Soviet cuisine, formed by the integration of the various national cuisines of the Soviet Union. It includes a small number of ingredients and simple ways of cooking. Most dishes were simplifications of Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Western European (French and Italian, above all) cuisines. Essential elements were the canteens managed by the government called stolovaya.

Society and Religion of Russia

In Russia, almost 170 ethnic groups (considered as nationalities) are present. The populations of these groups can be enormously varied, from millions of Russians and Tatars to fewer than 10,000 like the Eskimo. According to a 2002 poll, 79.83% of the population speak Russian. Additionally, the Russian population is made up of 3.83% Tatars, 2,03% Ukrainians, 0,94% Chechens and 0.78% Armenians.

Russian was the sole official language of the Russian Empire. During the Soviet period, the policies toward the languages of the other ethnic groups depended on political choices. A superior status was reserved for Russian, but even though each republic had its idiom, Russian usually supplanted it even in unofficial contexts. Some tongues like Ukrainian, Latvian and Lithuanian underwent discriminations due to large forced displacements of people. In some regions like Eastern Latvia or Crimea, Russian people were moved and settled following Russification politics.

Now, most of the republics have at least two recognised languages — Russian and the local one. Even religion in Russia includes several different faiths. Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the most widely professed faith, but significant minorities of irreligious people, Muslims, Pagans, and Jews are also present.

Economic Context of Russia

Russia has an upper-middle income mixed economy mainly based on the enormous amount of natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas. It has the 12th largest economy in the world by nominal GDP and the 6th largest by purchasing power parity (PPP). Since 2000, non-traded services and goods for the domestic market, as opposed to oil or mineral extraction and exports, have primarily driven economic growth. Natural gas, oil, metals, and timber account for more than 80% of Russian exports. According to the 2012 statistics, the oil-and-gas sector accounted for 16% of GDP and 52% of federal budget revenues.

Thanks to excess income stored in the Stabilization Fund of Russia, the country managed to repay most of its massive debts. Therefore, it has become one of the countries with the lowest amount of foreign debt among major economies. The Stabilization Fund also helped Russia to come out of the global financial crisis in a better state than many economists had expected. The average nominal salary per month increased from $80 in 2000 to $967 in 2013. Nevertheless, the sanctions imposed by the EU and the USA after the invasion of Ukraine made the entire economic system fall into stagnation with a high inflation rate. Therefore, in May 2016, the average nominal monthly wages had dropped below $450 per month, 13 percent of which are taken away by taxes.

Due to the war in Donbas, the fall of the Russian ruble increased the capital costs for Russian companies who had been paying interests on debt issued in dollars or in other foreign currencies. In 2016, the ruble had devalued by more than 50 percent compared to July 2014. Now, approximately 19.2 million Russians, 13.2% of the population, and one in four children live below the national poverty line. Officially, about 20–25% of the Russian population belongs to the middle class; however, some economists figured out the real share of about 7% after the economic sanctions of the EU and the USA.

Another critical factor for the Russian economy is corruption. Russia is ranked the second-most corrupt country in Europe (after Ukraine), according to the Corruption Perceptions Index. The Norwegian-Russian Chamber of Commerce also states that “corruption is one of the biggest problems both Russian and international companies have to deal with.”

State of Relations between Russia and the EU

The foreign policy concerning Russia is considered the first “common” foreign policy of EU Member States. Moreover, four European Union-Russia Common Spaces have been agreed as a framework within which both can establish better relations. The legal basis for the relations is the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) signed in 1994. Since 2007, it is automatically renewed every year. It includes the promotion of economic ties, especially investments and trade.

 Common Economic Space

The aim is to build an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia removing barriers to trade and investment. Additionally, the promotion of reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency, and good governance is essential. Environmental issues are also present in this space, including nuclear safety and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.

Common Space of Freedom, Security, and Justice

This space saw a huge step forward with the agreements on the Visa Facilitation and the Readmission. Another key issue of this shared space is the cooperation between the European Border Agency (FRONTEX) and the Federal Border Security Service of Russia.

Common Space on External Security

This space deals with effective multilateralism, with joint support for the central role of the UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe. The parties should have strengthened their cooperation on crisis management and security issues like terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the Donbas war and the annexation of Crimea have been a terrible blow to the principles at the base of this common space.

Common Space on Research, Education, Culture

This space addresses the long-standing relations between Russian and EU Research and Development activities, connected under the TEMPUS programme. It aims at reinforcing the EU and Russian cultural and intellectual heritage by strengthening cooperation on education such as through convergence of university curricula and qualifications.

However, when one talks about EU-Russia relations, not everything is rosy. One needs to underline some fundamental issues and disputes.

Crimea

On June 20, 2019, the Council extended the restrictive measures introduced in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia until June 23, 2020. The standards, which apply to EU people and EU-based businesses, are limited to the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Sanctions include bans on imports of products originating in Crimea or Sevastopol in the EU, as well as investments in Crimea or Sevastopol. This means that no European citizen and no EU-based company can buy real estate or entities in Crimea, finance Crimean businesses, or provide related services. Tourist services in Crimea and Sevastopol, in particular, European cruise ships cannot call at ports on the Crimean peninsula, except in emergencies.

Moreover, it forbits exports of certain goods and technologies to Crimean companies or those destined for use in Crimea in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, as well as of activities concerning the production of oil, gas and mineral resources. It is also forbidden to provide technical assistance or intermediation, construction or engineering services relating to infrastructures in these sectors.

Kaliningrad Oblast

Since 2004, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast is surrounded by EU members, isolated from the rest of the federation. Poland and Lithuania shared an external EU border and controls became stricter, leading to small tensions. In 2004, Germany opened a general consulate in the city, allowing Kaliningrad residents to obtain Schengen visas without having to travel to Moscow. Thanks to an arrangement with Poland and especially with the Polish centres of Olsztyn, Elbląg, and Gdańsk, Kaliningrad residents can get individual cards, which permit travel crossing the Polish-Russian border.

Association Agreements and the Invasion of Ukraine

After the Vilnius summit between the EU and its eastern neighbours in 2013, the Russian government succeeded in convincing Armenia and Ukraine to halt the negotiation of association agreements with the EU and instead begin negotiations with Russia. Nevertheless, despite the Russian government’s opposition, the EU summit negotiations were successful for Moldova and Georgia.

As a result of Russian pressure, widespread protests occurred in Ukraine. As a result, President Viktor Yanukovych (a member of the pro-Russian Party of the Regions) left Ukraine for Russia in February 2014. Subsequently, Russia started a military intervention in the border regions of Ukraine, especially in Crimea. It also gave support to the pro-Russian militia in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The EU considered this action an invasion and it imposed visa bans and froze Russian officials’ assets.

In 2017, the EU and Ukraine signed the official Association Agreement, which provides for regular summits and meetings among ministers, other officials and establishes a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area”. From 2017 on, a visa-free travel regime has been active for Ukrainian citizens.

Russian Political Influence and Pro-Russian Parties in the EU

Russia expanded its political power using a wide range of techniques, including subsidising of political parties, movements and NGOs, spending on online propaganda and working on media broadcasting in EU languages. Many observers associate the Kremlin with an attempt to debilitate the EU and its reaction to the Ukrainian crisis. Russia has formed close ties with Eurosceptic and populist parties at both ends of the political spectrum.

By the end of 2014, various European far-right and far-left parties were getting financial or organisational support from Russia with the goal of assembling a common anti-EU and pro-Russian front in the European Union. Among the far-right parties included were the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alternative for Germany (AfD), National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), France’s National Front, Italy’s Lega Nord (now just Lega), Hungary’s Jobbik, Bulgaria’s Attack (Ataka), and Latvian Russian Union. Among far-left parties, there were members of Die Linke, Communist Party of Greece and Syriza.

In the European Parliament, the European United Left–Nordic Green Left have been depicted as a “reliable partner” for Russia, voting against resolutions denouncing and condemning Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and the Russian intervention in Syria.

The Destabilisation of EU Member States

In 2019, Central and Eastern European leaders signed an open letter affirming that:

“Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. […] It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices, and uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.”

Moreover, national security agencies in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia have directly connected Moscow to local pro-Russian groups.

Some evidence of those contacts are the controversial contracts of cooperation established between the Estonian Centre Party, the Latvian Social-democratic Party “Harmony” (cancelled in 2017), and Putin’s party United Russia. Despite the impact of both parties on the national politics (the current Prime Minister of Estonia belongs to the Estonian Centre Party, and the mayor of Latvia to Harmony), these agreements had no impact on both countries joining NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, they are used as an essential tool of propaganda for Russian-speaking minorities in the two Baltic republics.

In November 2015, the president of Bulgaria, Plevneliev, affirmed that Russia had launched a massive hybrid warfare campaign “aimed at destabilising the whole of Europe”, acting with reiterated violations of Bulgarian airspace and cyber-attacks. British analysis of the Russian government’s English-language channel, Sputnik, found “systematic propaganda in favour of the “LEAVE” campaign which was too consistent with being the result of accident or error”.

In 2016, according to the chief prosecutor, Milivoje Katnić, a group of 20 people “planned to break into the Montenegro Parliament on Election Day, kill Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and bring a pro-Russian coalition to power”. The facts are even clearer since the head of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Leonid Reshetnikov was dismissed by Putin a couple of days after the failed coup.

In 2017, three parliamentary representatives of the far-right German party Alternative for Germany (AfD) confirmed that they received $29.000 during a private jet visit to Moscow; in 2019 an Italian magazine published a transcript describing a private event in Russia at which “tens of millions” in financial support was offered to the League party of Matteo Salvini.

Cyber-attacks and Fake News

In 2007, following the Estonian government’s decision to remove the statue of a Soviet soldier, the Baltic country’s major commercial banks, government agencies, media outlets, and ATMs were targeted by a coordinated cyber-attack, which was later traced to Russia. Later, in April 2015, the French television channel TV5 Monde was targeted by a cyber-attack claimed by ISIL, but French sources said their investigation lead to Russia.

In May 2015, the Bundestag’s computer system was shut down for days due to a cyber-attack carried out by a hacker group that was likely “being steered by the Russian state”, according to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany. The agency’s head, Hans-Georg Maaßen, said that, in addition to spying, “lately Russian intelligence agencies have also shown a willingness to conduct sabotage.” British Prime Minister Theresa May accused Russia of “threatening the international order”, “seeking to weaponise information” and “deploying its state-run media organisations to plant fake stories”. She mentioned Russia’s meddling in German federal election in 2017 after German government officials and security experts said there was no Russian interference.

Pro-Russian media have also produced fake stories to influence public opinion in European countries. In 2017, for example, a Russian TV team paid Swedish teenagers to fake anti-government protests in Rinkeby. Even in the Czech Republic, Russia set up tens of websites where conspiracy theories and fake news are published. According to the State Secretary for European Affairs, “The key goal of Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic is to sow doubts into the minds of the people that democracy is the best system to organise a country, to build negative images of the European Union and Nato, and to discourage people from participation in the democratic processes.”

A Lithuanian military analysis stated, “We have a pretty huge and long-lasting disinformation campaign against our society”. In 2018, the European Commission introduced a new Action Plan to contrast “disinformation that fuels hatred, division, and mistrust in democracy” as well as interference with elections, “with evidence pointing to Russia as a primary source of these campaigns”.

Military Threats

In 2015, Russia’s ambassador to Denmark stated that if Denmark joined NATO’s missile defence system, Danish warship “will be targets for Russian missiles”. The Danish foreign minister Martin Lidegaard said the Russian threats were “unacceptable” and “crossed the line”. In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Aleksandr Lukashevich said that Russia could “neutralise” the defence system of Denmark. The following year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia would “have to take the necessary military-technical action” if Sweden joined NATO.

In 2016, these declarations lead Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland to agree to increase their military cooperation. In 2017, Sweden reintroduced military conscription. Even Lithuania reinstated military conscription and called on NATO to bring more troops into the Baltic countries. Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė said: “I think that Russia is terrorising its neighbours and using terrorist methods”. In Lithuania, three guides about how to act in the case of a Russian invasion have been published in the last three years.

The Road Ahead

Trying to make sense of what lies ahead in EU-Russia relations is a tough task. In February 2014, a poll promoted by Russia’s largest independent polling centre, the Levada Center, found that almost 80% of Russian citizens shared a “good” feeling about the EU. These data changed drastically after the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. 70% of respondents then declared to have a hostile view of the EU.

Another Levada poll of August 2018, however, states that 68% of Russian respondents believe that “Russia needs to improve relations with Western countries”. Furthermore, 42% of Russians polled said they had a positive view of the EU, up from 28%

Nevertheless, one needs to consider that enormous differences are at play between the European and the Asian part of Russia. Moreover, the repressive attitude toward any internal opposition and journalists is surely worrying and may stop every type of evolution towards positive cooperation. Political attitudes in Moscow and St. Petersburg will determine whether or not a new cycle of relations between Russia and the European Union is possible.

The post The Other Side of Europe: Russia appeared first on My Country? Europe..

The Kremlin propaganda machine has been active in spreading misinformation about these sanctions, however, and has met some limited success in this endeavour. Public opinion has a very vague idea of what these sanctions are in practice, and myths are very common. In the list below, we look at five key facts to understand Western sanctions against the Russian Federation.

1 – The sanctions do not target Russia’s civilian population.

This is an important point, since pro-Kremlin outlets and commentators usually paint a gloomy picture of evil Western governments starving Russian civilians in the name of great power competition. This is not the case. The sanctions currently placed on Russia are sanctions against individuals – specifically, bankers and businessmen with close connections to the regime.

These wealthy figures have played a key role in Russia’s drive to assert control over privatised industries: while these industries are still privately owned, the oligarchs now heading them in effect act like an extension of Russian state organs. Aside from these oligarchs, a handful of companies have also been sanctioned for profiteering from the illegal occupation of Crimea. A typical example would be hotel chains currently busy building tourist resorts in Yalta.

This is pretty far from being a comprehensive economic sanctions regime that would damage or affect the civilian population. Putin’s dictatorship, however, has introduced a number of so-called counter-sanctions against Western countries, and these measures do affect the civilian economy, since they restrict imports of fruit or greens from the West, to make an example. This gives Kremlin media a handy excuse to blame Western powers for empty supermarket shelves.

2 – Western sanctions are lawful. 

With its unprovoked invasion of Crimea, Russia has committed an act of aggression against Ukraine. It’s important to understand that aggression – that is, using military means to annex territory – is on the list of the very worst crimes that can be committed under international law, together with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. That list is limited to these four entries, and after Nazi Germany’s aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1938, forceful annexation has rightfully been a line in the sand of international politics.

The Russian government has presented a number of arguments to justify its act of aggression, each emptier and more dishonest than the last. Danger to the Black Sea Fleet and Russia’s naval concessions in Crimea were cited as grounds for intervention, but that begs the question of why exactly Russia did not wait until the situation deteriorated to a point where legal grounds for intervention were available. Both the Black Sea Fleet and Russian bases on foreign soil could have been readily evacuated at any point in March 2014, and there is no evidence that either came under direct threat from Ukrainian forces.

Russia’s attempt to spin this as an intervention in support of self-determination, or as the fulfillment of a historical claim on Crimea, is equally laughable. How long Crimea was a part of Russia and the USSR is irrelevant to the argument: Ukraine is a sovereign nation and Russia committed to recognising its borders in the Budapest Memorandum. It must be noted that Ukraine surrendered the considerable nuclear arsenal it presided over in the wake of the Soviet collapse, in exchange for Russian recognition of its territorial integrity.

Both the Crimean parliamentary vote to join the Russian Federation and the confirmatory referendum were held under military occupation, threat of violence, and complete lack of neutral, international observers. In the case of the parliamentary vote, several members of the Crimean parliament were forcibly prevented from entering the building to join the proceedings. This ruthless behaviour makes both votes illegal under international law, much like Russia’s military presence in Crimea in the first place.

3 – Western sanctions restrict Russia’s ability to weaponise international finance.

As we have established, Western sanctions target oligarchs who help carry out Putin’s policies – but how can these wealthy figures materially advance Russian goals? The answer is that oligarchs use offshore or European bank accounts to store their petrol-derived revenues, instead of sending the money directly back to Russia. This effectively removes their revenues from the money supply, and allows Russia to conduct a more expansionary monetary policy without worrying about crippling inflation.

This is the same reason why Russia, like China and Japan, is an intensive buyer of American bonds and accumulates large monetary reserves. Hitting the oligarchs makes this merry-go-round much more difficult because they can’t use American or European banks to conduct their transactions. This is a completely different system from that of large scale economic sanctioning, but it’s effective, because it restricts Russia’s room of economic maneuver.

4 – The sanctions are working.

The magnitude of these revenues is considerable, which is why sanctions have such a big impact on Putin’s regime. The share of government-owned firms in oil production in Russia rose from 19% in 2004 to 50% in 2008. It was the oil boom, following the fluctuation of world prices for petrol and gas, that bankrolled the surge in Russian consumer spending.

Without these, Russia is in dire straits: while the country has a few important strengths, such as an abundance of raw materials which makes its army incredibly cheap to build and maintain, its economy is not diversified. Russia has the raw material reserves to conduct an extensive war, but there is no question that its civilian economy is extremely vulnerable to international upheavals. To make a comparison, 180 billion dollars made their way into Russia in the year 2007. Of these, only 28 billion were in foreign direct investment. The rest was revenues from the sale of oil and gas.

Available evidence clearly shows just to what extent sanctions are hitting Russia where it hurts. The Russian economy is 10% down today on trends of growth calculated prior to 2013. The downward deviation was driven by the collapse in global oil prices at first. Given Russia’s reliance on these revenues, it’s no surprise that lower oil prices resulted in negative economic outcomes. Low oil prices, however, stopped being the largest source of the Russian economic crunch in early 2017. It’s sanctions that are hitting the hardest now.

5 – Western sanctions are preventing further Russian rearmament.

Largely thanks to sanctions, 2018 was the first year since 2007 in which Russia was forced to reduce military spending. Unlike in the years from 2014 to 2016. With Russian soldiers continuing to die in Ukraine, and at a time when both the West and China are ramping up their military production, this is extremely bad news for Russia. Precisely at the time when the ship-building programme, the production of the new Armada tanks and its new interceptor programme were slated to take off, Russia has been forced to scale back.

This does not detract from the considerable tools available to the Russian armed forces for national defence, but it does mean that the confrontation in Ukraine is turning a lot more complicated than Putin expected. It is uncertain how many Russian soldiers are currently tied up in Syria and in eastern Ukraine, but whatever the exact number, this means that a not insignificant part of Russia’s core expeditionary strength is already committed and/or dented.

And make no mistake – the war in Ukraine is not going well for Russia. Even assuming Russian de facto control of Crimea for the time being, their forces’ attempts at breaking out of the secessionist areas have been repeatedly beaten back by Ukrainian soldiers. Before Euromaidan, Russia had access and control over the entirety of the country, if only indirectly. Now, Russia can at best boast of its illegal ownership of Crimea and its support of the tiny secessionist enclaves on the border. For these meagre prices, Russia has paid a considerable price in prestige, money, and blood. With time not on Putin’s side, the continuation of sanctions into the future is the best strategy to ensure that Russia can never commit acts of aggression again.

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1 – The Soviet navy trained dolphins and whales to attack enemies with harpoons and undertake kamikaze strikes against enemy shipping. They could even allegedly distinguish foreign and Soviet submarines by the sound of their propeller. In 2000, Russia then sold them to Iran after becoming unable to continue feeding them.

2 – In Russia’s Altai region there is a “spacecraft graveyard”. There, over 2.500 tons of space debris – some tens of metres long – have rained down since the start of the Space Age. That’s because the Altai region sits right beneath the Baikonur Cosmodrome – the main flight path of the oldest, largest and busiest spaceport in the world.  As new space junk falls, locals rush to raid the wreckage for precious metals they can sell.

3 –  In the dacha settlement of Staroye Arakchino, inside the Kazan municipality in Russia, there is an architectural complex known as the Temple of All Religions. The large complex consists of several cupolas, minarets and spires representing the religious architecture of 12 major religions of the world. It was started in 1992 and is still under construction. Eventually, the goal is to have 16 cupolas, corresponding to the 16 major world religions including past religions that are no longer practiced.  

4 – In September 1994, then Russian President Boris Yeltsin met for the first time with his US counterpart, Bill Clinton, in Washington. During his stay there, Yeltsin got drunk and wandered into the street in his underwear, trying to get a pizza. After being escorted back to the Blair House and getting his pizza, Yeltsin tried to do it again the next night.

5 – In the 1908 London Olympics, the Russian team arrived 12 days late and missed their most favoured event. The reason? They were still following the Julian calendar rather than the Gregorian calendar.

6 – As Yuri Gagarin, the first human to journey into outer space, was directed to the launch pad in April 1961, he asked the bus to stop so he could relieve himself. He got out and urinated against the back right-hand tyre of the bus. To this day, all male astronauts departing from the Russian Soyuz traditionally urinate against that same wheel before reaching the launch pad. Female astronauts have been known to bring vials of their urine to splash on the wheel.

And this is not the only astronautical tradition inspired by Gagarin on that day. While he was strapped into his capsule on the launch pad, he requested that mission control play some music over the intercom. They started playing some Russian love songs. Exactly the same thing happens today, although it intersperses with some other international tracks as well.

7 – In  Novosibirsk, Siberia, there is a monument to honour laboratory mice that have lost their lives furthering scientific research. The Monument to the laboratory mouse, completed in 2013, is located in front of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics. 

8 – It is home to a widespread anti-semitic conspiracy theory which says that Jews have a secret ‘hairy vegetable’ they eat so they don’t become alcoholics. Anti-semitism is justified because they refuse to share their magic vegetable. This myth dates back centuries, and was by eternalised in writing by the novelist Nikolai Semyonovich Leskov, in his short story “Immortal Golovan” dating back to 1880.

9 – Almost 23% of the world’s fresh surface water is contained in a single lake in Russia, Lake Baikal.

10 – In the vault beneath the Monument to the Heroic Defenders of Leningrad, the only sound is the steady ticking of a metronome. During the 900-day siege of the city during World War II, this was the only noise that could be heard on the local radio, interrupted only for emergency communications. With this sound still going, that residents knew the city was still alive. Today, it commemorates the heroic efforts of the residents of Leningrad and the soldiers on the Leningrad Front to the repel the Nazis.

Did you enjoy learning more about Russia? Try out some more curious facts about Romania or Portugal!

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While remaining firm in its refusal to recognise the territory as rightfully Azerbaijan’s, it has called for a resumption of proactive peace talks together with authorities in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the international community which has styled itself as a mediator in the negotiations. However, this opening is unlikely to bring any changes to the status quo in the region. Russia, in particular, has every interest to keep the conflict alive. The reasons for this need to keep tensions in the South Caucasus high are varied and all equally important for the Kremlin, especially as support for Putin and his government is waning.

The origins of the conflict

Ever since the dormant conflict in the mountainous enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh exploded into a four-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016, tension in the South Caucasus has been simmering quietly, ready to boil over at any moment. With the two-decade old peace process in the deepest deadlock since the first ceasefire, the escalation of war rhetoric and cross-border skirmishes along the line of contact between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops has been commonplace.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has proved a real Gordian knot to resolve. It has left more than 30,000 dead and one million displaced, with the prospect of many more to come if a solution is not found. No diplomatic attempt, international intervention or supranational organisation has so far managed to obtain more than uneasy, short-lived truces.

The roots of the conflict can be traced back to 1921, when the Soviet Union placed the ethnically Armenian territory of Nagorno-Karabakh under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic, in an effort to divide and rule the South Caucasus. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh sought to reunite with Soviet Armenia, but its attempts were repressed through blood and violence. The fall of the USSR did not stop the escalating violence, and the resulting war ended with the Armenian troops’ occupation of about 20% of Azerbaijani territory – namely Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. Although nowadays the unrecognised Republic’s aim is to achieve independence, Armenia remains its most important ally, especially militarily.

In 1994, Russia successfully mediated the first cease-fire between the two parties, and was part of the creation of the Minsk Group under the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This group – which sees Russia, the United States and France as co-chairs – has since been tasked with mediating and leading the peace talks between the two parts of the conflict.

However, not even the ceasefire has been effective in maintaining peace, and it has been systematically broken to allow for fighting along the line of contact. More than twenty years of peace negotiations have not brought the parties much closer to a permanent solution of this frozen conflict. And while both Yerevan and Baku do not seem keen to strike a peace deal, the absence of any progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks is often attributed to external actors – and naturally the Minsk Group co-chair countries are the first suspects. Of the countries with geostrategic interests in the region, Russia bears the lion’s share of the blame.

Russia as a mediator

As of late, against the prevailing perceptions of its European and U.S. partners, Russia has increasingly less influence over the South Caucasus territory and in particular over the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Unlike in the cases of other frozen conflicts such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, Moscow does not offer financial and moral support to Nagorno-Karabakh, it does not have direct contacts with its de facto leadership in Stepanakert, and it does not have military forces situated in its territory.

And while sometimes the Russian levers over Armenia are attributed also to Nagorno-Karabakh due to the close relationship between the two, it would be wrong to consider the two as one and the same. In the current situation, Yerevan and Stepanakert have principally divergent views concerning the resolution of the conflict. As such the Russian influence over Armenia would hardly have an impact on the unrecognised Republic when it comes to peace talks.

On much of the same line, its official approach to Nagorno-Karabakh diverges significantly with its treatment of other conflicts. So far, it has carefully omitted to take a side in favour of either part, instead selling itself as an honest broker in the peace talks. It would against Moscow’s strategic interests to be forced to take sides should there be a military escalation of the conflict. This would undermine its credibility as a security guarantor, with repercussions in its wider foreign policy. In particular, it would have negative effects on its influence in the South Caucasus. Ever since Georgia left Russia’s orbit of influence in favour of the EU, Moscow has been very careful not to lose any further friends in the area. Taking a side in the conflict would have the sure result of antagonising one of the two parties and its allies.

These differences are of a significant importance: while in the case of the other frozen conflicts Russia has evident interests which manifest themselves in military and political meddling, these elements seem to be absent in this conflict, which points towards Russia actually wanting to style itself as a mediator instead of furthering its own interests by keeping the conflict alive.

Because of these reasons, it would be untenable to place the whole blame for the lack of a long-term solution to the issue onto Russia. In fact, as long as military escalation remains the only alternative to the current frozen tensions, the present-day situation is seen as the only feasible solution by all mediators. Despite the standstill of talks, the Minsk Group has been rightfully hesitant in advocating the unacceptability of the current status quo, as it could be interpreted wrongly by either side and inadvertently prompt a military escalation which would lead to a further degradation of the conflict.

Russia as an instigator

However, Moscow’s hesitance to take a stance in the conflict and to proactively push for a solution in the conflict is not actually born out of a genuine concern for the aftermaths of a war or for the worsening relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In fact, the Kremlin’s influence over both countries means it could push along peace talks if it really wanted to find a resolution to the conflict.

The fact that it gains both economic and political advantages from the status quo means that Moscow has no interest in taking steps to broker a peace deal. In particular, Russia has two primary interests through its involvement: it hopes to monopolise the peace settlement process in order to increase its political clout in the region, and it wants to maintain the economic gains made through trade deals both with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Ever since the first war sparked out, Moscow has been openly playing both sides. On one hand, it is Armenia’s self-proclaimed ally. Yerevan joined the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2014, integrating it within the Russian single market. Moreover, the two have bilateral cooperation agreements in place, not only individually but also within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a grouping of post-Soviet states similar to NATO. On the basis of these agreements and of a mutual defence pact, Russia has managed to permanently station its troops on their territory in the name of “protection”, which guarantee it a strong control over its neighbour. This has allowed them to sell large amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Armenia, including nuclear-capable Iskandar ballistic missile systems, which have a range of up to 500 kilometres and the ability to reach targets deep into the Azerbaijani territory.  

On the other side, Russia is also the single largest providers of arms to Azerbaijan. From 2010 to 2014, a period when its annual imports more than tripled, Azerbaijan received 85% of its arms imports from Russia. Considering that Baku’s military expenditure is twice as large as Armenia’s entire government budget, Russia has no interest in losing this important economic revenue. Moscow’s likely aim is also to push Azerbaijan towards closer engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO, thus curtailing its engagement with the West.

The Kremlin has defended this double-dealing by stating that it considers this as a policy of deterrence in Nagorno-Karabakh. By controlling the flow of arms to both countries, it has said, a full-scale war is made less likely. However, it has also meant that if any fighting should break out, it would be made deadlier due to the increasing amount of people staring down gun barrels.  If the logic of deterrence holds up and the conflict stays frozen, Russia will benefit from arms sales to both sides and from a growing political and economic dependence from both countries.

The wider picture

The Kremlin isn’t keeping the conflict in the South Caucasus only for its direct economic advantages through arm sales. It also derives indirect benefits from it thanks to it thwarting Europe’s long-term plans to reduce reliance on Russian oil and gas supplies. The only other route to bring Caspian energy to Europe is through the Caucasus, in particular though Azerbaijani pipelines which closely coast the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. In case of a conflagration of the conflict, it is likely that these pipes would be shut down for safety reasons, in order to avoid oil spills or gas leaks should they be damaged during the conflict.

Europe deeply values the existing pipelines, and hopes to see many more in the future. But those hopes are limited so long as the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh remains unsettled, thus maintaining its reliance on Russia high. Were the conflict to be resolved, it would open the floodgates to invest in Baku for energy, which would reduce Moscow’s geopolitical importance and lever over Europe.

The region is also strategically placed for Russia’s larger interests in its foreign policy, especially in relation to Turkey. The interactions between the two countries have been shifting rapidly in recent years. After a decline in good relations between Putin and Erdogan following the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet in Syria in November 2015, Moscow and Ankara have now returned to a comfortable friendship. But this could change again at any time as the two countries’ interests adapt to the geopolitical situation in the region. In the meantime, as possible defence, Russia has started to boost the two Russian bases in Armenia — one an army post and another an air base.

Incidentally, these are near the Turkish border, and the timely Armenian purchase of the Iskandar ballistic missile systems would allow Putin to strike at Turkish targets at any moment. The Russian military bases in Armenia, which exist thanks to the continued conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, are there primarily not to defend Armenia from Azerbaijan’s threats, but to curb military attacks from Turkey. Considering the 2010 Agreement of Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Baku and Ankara, in which both agree to support each other “using all possibilities” in the case of military aggression, the threat is not completely idle.

That rivalry is played out not only in the Caucasus area, but increasingly also in the Black Sea region and in Syria. Russia has been selling advanced fighter jets and air-defence missiles to one of Turkey’s biggest rivals, Iran. Together with the Armenian bases, it is effectively surrounding Turkey in preparation for a change in the tide.

Concerning Syria, the matter is geostrategically very delicate, especially as the conflict seems directed towards its epilogue. Foreign demilitarisation is a normal consequence of the Syrian civil war coming to an end, but it does mean that the Kremlin’s direct influence in the area is about to be downgraded at the most crucial moment. It is fundamental for Russia to have a strong voice during peace negotiations to allow it to maintain its role and power over the Levantine territory. Having troops and a strong presence in Armenia will allow Putin to keep as close as possible to Syria and if necessary intervene promptly with its military forces. What appears evident from all of this is that Russia is extending its sphere of influence outside of its traditional territories, and it is using the pretext of the decade-old Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to do so.

Future prospects

The risk of a full-scale war between Azerbaijan and Armenia has increased exponentially after the four-day war in 2016. More pressingly for the international community, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has the potential to become another arena in which Turkey and Russia, through proxy, compete for power and influence. If something of the sort happened, it would most likely trigger a reaction from Georgia – which happens to lie between Moscow and Ankara and is the main point of transit to reach both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both countries would likely demand the right to transit troops over its territory, and if Georgia were to grant preferential access to any one of the two, it would most likely drag Georgia in the middle of the armed conflict.

As if that weren’t enough, Iran – which like Georgia holds large Azeri and Armenian minorities in its territories – would probably end up being actively involved as well. The revived conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh may thus evolve into a larger confrontation between multiple regional great powers. However, excluding any diplomatic incident, it is unlikely that a war is actually going to spark – both Europe and Russia have too much to lose to allow an escalation to that point.

As for Russia, stepping up the conflict would also eventually lead to the involvement of the international community – as has happened in Syria – and closer attention to the Kremlin’s moves in the South Caucasus. Moreover, any settlement of this conflict would effectively mend the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan divide and bring Moscow’s regional clout to an end.

Because of this reason, as well as Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s reticence, it is unlikely that we will see a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in the next few decades, but it is equally unlikely that the situation is going to worsen. Much will depend on whether Yerevan or Baku decide to set free of the vestiges of Russia’s control and align definitely with Europe. If they were to push for integration within the European Union, solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be a prerogative. However, as of now, it appears that only Azerbaijan is interested in joining the Union. Armenia, on the other hand, remains firmly aligned with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union, which has created a single market and stronger economic ties between the two.

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Since its debut in 1994, Russia has participated twenty times, with three absences in 1998, 1999 and 2017 when the country withdrawn from the contest.

The country has won one time, in 2008 with Dima Bilan and the song Believe that achieved the first place with 272.

This year Russia will be represented by Julia Samoylova and the song I Won’t Break.

Julia is a Russian singer and songwriter. She rose to fame when she reached the final of the Russian version of X-Factor.

Julia was originally chosen to represent Russia in the 2017 Eurovision Song Contest with the song Flame Is Burning. The country is honouring the commitment made to Julia last year and she is set to appear in the 2018 competition in Lisbon.

Did you enjoy this article? You may also like Montenegro: Road to Eurovision and Norway: Road to Eurovision

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This cooperative Union between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia developed from previous, smaller-scale international agreements, but it has since become much more. The EAEU now provides for complete free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, and pursues an upgrade in competitiveness and cooperation amongst its national economies, in order to raise living standards.

Because it has isolated its members from the global markets by raising external tariffs, the EAEU’s importance in the region is paramount, and its clout is giving no sign of deflating any time soon. And while it remains an economic union for now, Putin’s explicit aim has always been that of converging even in political and social fields, and enlarging the Union to include all post-Soviet states (with the exclusion of the three Baltic countries which are already part of the EU).

But how exactly has this Moscow-led project managed to gain so much power since its very recent creation in 2015? In the following paragraphs, we will try to analyse what makes the EAEU such an important actor in the northern Eurasian region, and why the West underestimating it could prove to be a fatal mistake.

A brief history of the EAEU

The EAEU as it is today was only formed in 2015, but it is the product of many previous, gradual economic mergers. The first inklings of the future existence of the EAEU came in 1994 from Kazakhstan – a meagre three years after the dissolution of the USSR. The original proposal consisted of a “common defence” space and regional trading bloc to bolster the uncertain economies of the post-Soviet satellite states. The idea quickly gained widespread approval, especially considering the West’s own unification was strengthening its economic and soft power. One year later, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia created a Customs Union which would – ideally – eventually lead to an area with open borders and no passport checks.

Following the blueprints left behind by the integration process of the European Union – and most importantly learning from its mistakes – in 2000 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan eventually established an Eurasian Economic Community operating very similarly to the European Economic Community. Further integration led to the creation in 2015 of a single market and of unified industrial, transport, energy and agricultural policies – the Eurasian Economic Union. The organisation of EAEU institutions today closely reflects the structure of its western counterpart. The goal, at least for Moscow, has always been that of eventually creating a supranational and intergovernmental institution operating just like the European Union, and with similar competences.

A ticking time bomb

The reason why the EAEU lays largely underestimated is that its growth has not been the exponential one which has characterised the EU in recent decades. However, even though its growth may have been slow, it has also been inexorable; its clout in the region has been increasing day after day. It has proved quite beneficial for Putin that his project has so far remained in the shadows. It means that not many are aware of just how many countries have interest in the project, and just how economically strong it could become. Experts predict a 25% growth in the Member States’ GDP by 2030, which equates to around 488 billion euro. And of course, the prospect of access to a common market of over 183 million people is an appetising one.

Currently, the Union only counts five full members, a factor which has contributed to its anonymity. However, many more are in the process of negotiating accession. Moldova has recently become the first observer state in the Union. Tajikistan has been formally invited to join and has expressed interest in acceding. Uzbekistan, while hesitant to join, enjoys free trade with EAEU countries and is likely to become a full member as commercial ties with its neighbours strengthen.

Moreover, many unrecognised republics in the region – such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia – have strongly backed EAEU membership. And Putin hasn’t stopped there, extending official invitations to join to Turkey, Ukraine, Syria, Mongolia, and Azerbaijan. While some, like Turkey, have rejected the invitation in favour of pursuing EU membership, many more have been eyeing it positively as a way to enhance their trade and boost their economies.

But what Russia wants to achieve from this project can’t be simply ascribed to nostalgic empire-building. While it is undoubted that the Kremlin is slowly reassembling the vestiges of the USSR under its thumb, it is also expanding its influence outside of the traditional territories, betraying that there is much more at play. For one, Russia benefits from being the bridge between Europe and Asia, in particular the New Silk Road economic belt. Facing off against powers such as the EU, India, the US, and China, a union of countries serves to maintain the Kremlin’s relevance as a fundamental international actor.

Secondly, administering a federation which has an appalling lack of job diversification and is facing a sharp economic decline, Putin has specific challenges to face. Having a free market to feed its few exports into, and having the opportunity to get a variety of imports from its partners without tariffs is a way to keep the economy afloat while the process of diversification takes place.

The EU’s crux: energy reliance

The existence of the EAEU has allowed Moscow to keep one important advantage against other countries: the dominion over energy supplies. The EU has long since been trying to reduce its dependence from Russia in oil and gas and has developed many short and long-term strategies to wean itself off the Kremlin. Russia, on the other hand, since its economy is mostly propped up by these exports and has been using energy as its main leverage against sanctions from the West, has been trying to maintain its monopoly on oil and gas exports.

To do this, maintaining the Eurasian Economic Union is fundamental, as it is considered an energy superpower. It produces about 20.7% of the world’s natural gas and 14.6% of the world’s oil and gas condensate – the world’s top producer. It also produces 9% of the world’s electrical energy and around 6% of the world’s coal, making it the third and fourth producer respectively on a global scale.

To ensure that Russia and its partners maintain this important primacy which keeps their economies alive and gives them immunity against sanctions from the West, the EAEU plans on collaborating more in its energy production and distribution. By 2019, it intends to create a common electricity market and, by 2025, a single hydrocarbons market. This will ensure that the EAEU and its single member states maintain their relevance and become even more competitive in the energy supply market, and it will make it much harder for the EU to become completely free of Russia when it comes to this matter.

Contested spaces: the Eastern Partnership

As both the EU and the EAEU seek to deepen their ties with several former Soviet Republics, another possible consequence of the EAEU’s silent rise to power is that tensions with the European Union are bound to increase. This holds especially true if both continue enforcing their “one-or-the-other” policy when it comes to bloc accession. Because the EU has an external trade policy, no individual member country may independently negotiate to be within other economic unions, and the EAEU’s single market is an example of that. This has meant closing the door to deeper cooperation with some potential future Member States, such as Armenia, which is now a full member of the EAEU.

Equally, homogenisation with EU economic and governance requirements closes the door to EAEU membership, as Georgia’s example has proved. The struggle to bring these countries on their side, especially those which comprise the EU’s core Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine) may be the side effect of radicalising political discourse and international influence in these territories.

In the long term, Azerbaijan is going to be an especially important player in this dispute between the EU and the EAEU, as it has so far failed to expressly align with either. While government officials have repeatedly backed EU membership, they have also opened the country to the possibility of deeper ties with the EAEU, especially in light of its very active defence and military trade with Russia. Its importance becomes paramount if its gas and oil supplies are taken into account: for the EU, having Azerbaijan amongst its members would constitute a great way to bypass reliance on Russia. The only route to bring Caspian energy to Europe other than via Russia is through the South Caucasus – in particular, though Azerbaijani pipelines.

However, if it were to align with the EAEU, it would effectively perpetuate Russian dominion over oil and gas supplies to the West. In the short term, though, it will be Serbia which will be the testing ground for a more mature and effective policy by the European Union. The country has at the same time applied for a free trade agreement with the EAEU, while it is in advanced negotiations with the European Union regarding membership.

Iran, Syria, and the nuclear deal

One game changer for the whole geopolitical scenario in the area is the upcoming free trade agreement between the EAEU and Iran, which has been in the works since the birth of the EAEU and will be finalised this May. The importance of Iran as a key trading partner and strategic ally must not be underestimated. For Russia, Iran is in a fundamental position when it comes to its geopolitical interests in Syria. Having the freedom to move armaments and raw materials so close to the conflict with more freedom could prove invaluable. Iran is also Syria’s closest ally and has had positive cultural, religious, and political ties to the country for decades before the civil war. The positive implications which being on friendly relations with Iran could have for Russia after the end of the civil war are easily deductible.

This is also a perfect occasion for Russia to capitalise on the Iran nuclear deal. Russia has some of the world’s foremost expertise in atomic energy and has helped build reactors in Iran for many years. It comes then as no surprise that the Kremlin has been making the most of the lucrative contracts to expand Iran’s civil nuclear energy program, and it could especially benefit from them within the context of a free trade agreement.

Trump’s trade war: pushing Asia towards Putin

The souring of the relationship between China and the US, which comes as the expected consequence of the increased custom duties on exports of steel and aluminium imposed by Trump, may also be beneficial to the ties between ASEAN countries and the EAEU. The Moscow-led union has actively been trying to increase its ties with Asia, in particular Eastern Asian countries. With many important Russian companies cut off from business deals with the West due to economic sanctions, this is an important avenue for new economic opportunities.

The EAEU has been careful to foster good ties with many emerging powers in Asia. For example, it concluded a free trade agreement with Vietnam in late 2016. The country has boomed in the past thirty years and has a prospected GDP per capita growth of over 6%, making it one of the most dynamic emerging countries in East Asia. Moreover, the EAEU has strengthened cooperation with China in light of its concerns over the Siberian-Chinese border, taken part in the Eurasian Initiative launched by South Korea, and set up expert groups to develop preferential trade regimes with India and Israel. While progress has not yet been very evident on this front, the EAEU seems content for now to build its larger market slowly and quietly.

Future prospects

Currently, the EAEU is nothing but a single common market and economic space. If it were to continue without any modernisation or real economic development, it is unlikely that the EAEU would succeed in its aims. However, expansions and developments are taking place, albeit slowly, and they will probably lead to a concentration of wealth in the territory, which will also largely boost its attraction factor towards even further expansion. Concerns about keeping national sovereignty intact from Russia will end up on the backseat in the face of an economic boom. This has the possibility of finally leading to further monetary, political, and military convergence, as desired by Putin.

This has been particularly evident in his insistence in creating what Belarusian President Lukashenko has dubbed “the new euro” – a common currency for EAEU members. He has been so successful in his coaxing that the Eurasian Commission (an institution with a very similar role to its European Union counterpart) has already drafted documents to establish a Eurasian Central Bank and a common currency called altyn, both of which will be introduced by 2025 at the latest. Moreover, steps will probably be taken in the direction of establishing a parliament and slowly centralising competences to the EAEU’s institutions in Moscow.

What we are witnessing are the first stages of a slow but continuous convergence even within fields other than the economic one, which will eventually lead to it emulating the European Union even more. However, unlike the EU, the boast of consensual decisions within the bloc is but a façade. The Russian domination over the other member states is quite evident, even if formally all Member States are equal. Overall, it is evident that the ascent of the Eurasian Economic Union has just started, and that it will become a much more important player in the upcoming years.

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The results are give Vladimir Putin an unsurprisingly easy victory, with opinion polls giving him around 70% of thepreferences – ten times more than his nearest challenger. However, this resounding victory for a fourth term as President could be dampened by low turnout due to voter fatigue: with the result so obvious from the start, they is little incentive for Russians to turn up to the polling stations. To try and inflate the turnout, Putin’s officials have allegedly been selling discounted goods at polling stations, and instructing state to photograph themselves at the polling booth and report back to their bosses.

Electoral System

Russian Presidential elections take place every six years in a two-round electoral system. During the first round, an absolute majority is required to win. If no candidate gets 50%+1 of the votes, a second round is held exactly three weeks later between the two candidates with the most votes. To this day, in the six elections which have taken place since 1991, a second round was required only once, and it is unlikely that 2018 will be any different.

According to the Constitution, any Russian citizen who is more than 35, has permanently resided in Russia for the 10 years leading up to the election, and has committed no serious crime can run for Presidency. However, individuals running as independents or with the backing of a political party which is not represented in the State Duma, the lower house of the Parliament, face an additional obstacle. Those with the backing of a political party have to collect 100.000 signatures in support of their candidacy, while for independents that number goes up to 300.000. Moreover, there is a ban on more than two consecutive terms in office, although Presidents are free to run again for a further third and fourth time after sitting out once full electoral term.

Main Candidates and Positions

There are 7 contenders trying to take the title from Putin, although none of them have the support needed to even be a threat to the incumbent President. Here is an overview of who these eight candidates are and what they stand for:

• Vladimir Putin, already thrice President of the Russian Federation, is the clear frontrunner in the race, with the backing of a number of parties throughout the political spectrum. Although he has not presented an electoral programme, and has refused to partake in TV debates with the other candidates, he is easily going to win on a well-known platform and political approach.
• Pavel Grudinin, an engineer and farmer backed by the Russian Communist Party. Since 1995, he runs Lenin State Farm, the country’s biggest strawberry producer, which grows about 60 tonnes daily and boasted 41 million euro in revenues for 2014-2015. His programme is focused on restoring the national economic sovereignty by withdrawing from the WTO, revitalising the external provinces of Russia, introducing progressive taxation, and improving the quality of public administration by making the President’s nominations for official state positions more accountable. Moreover, he supports free healthcare and education, a minimum salary of 25.000 rubles (350 euro), and the provision of affordable healthcare for everyone.

  

• Ksenia Sobchak, a TV anchor and journalist who is backed by Civil Initiative. She is a supporter of free-market capitalism and privatisation. Her manifesto has the rights of women and female representation as one of the key issues, with the salary gap, the absence of women in the higher positions, and the official ban from certain heavy professions as the main points of focus. She has also focused a lot on Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and believes that while the return of that territory without conditions would be impossible, Crimea is rightfully Ukrainian land. To solve this issues, she has suggested a new referendum under more impartial conditions.
• Maxim Suraykin, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communists of Russia, has presented two different programs: one for his first hundred days of presidency, and one for the subsequent transition period from a capitalist into a communist regime. His aim is the restoration of the USSR, and the mobilisation of the working class in order to overturn the capitalist system.
• Boris Titov, backed by the Party of Growth, is running as President mostly to showcase his party’s economic program, known as Growth Strategy. This would involve diversifying Russian economy and creating high-quality jobs.

  

• Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist running as the candidate for the liberal party Yabloko, is attempting to become President for the third time. is policies mainly focus on improving the economic situation through governance reforms and stopping involvement in conflicts. He has also promised to give out several acres of free land to 15 million families so they can build home there and develop it, and to turn the Russian Armed Forces into a fully professional military by abolishing conscription.
• Vladimir Zhirinovsky, candidate for the Liberal Democratic Party, has promised to amend the Russian Constitution and to radically change the policies of the country. In particular, he would abolish the federal structure of Russia and to return to the Governorates, rename the post of “President of Russia” to the “Supreme Ruler of Russia” and to restore Russia’s borders to the borders of the USSR in 1985.

Polls

According to the polls, the validity of which may be contested as partial, Putin enjoys almost 70% of the vote preferences. Grudinin and Zhirinovsky are coming in next, with only 6% each. However, many voters are undecided, and many more will not go vote, dampening Putin’s resounding victory with vote fatigue.

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